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Appendix A Statement of Work SUMMARY The DoD is responsible for ensuring that standoff CWA detectors will meet user operational requirements in the real world. The DoD has previously tested and fielded only one such detector (the Remote Sensing Chemical Agent Alarm—M21 RSCAAL) and the DoD is currently testing a second (the Joint Service Lightweight Standoff Chemical Agent Detector—JSLSCAD). Concerns have been raised over plans to rely on very short range indoor “chamber testing” using real agents combined with long range field testing using chemicals chosen to simulate the real agents (“simulant testing”). If feasible, conducting open-air, live-agent testing would undoubtedly provide the highest level of confidence that standoff detectors will meet user requirements in the real world. However, doing so would require obtaining the appropriate political, safety, and environmental permissions at the congressional, executive, DoD, state, and local levels in accordance with 50 USC Sec 1512 and other statutory requirements. There are also significant costs and time requirements associated with live agent open air testing. On the other hand, relying only on chamber testing combined with field testing with simulants may cause the DoD to field a detector that will not be operationally effective. The criticality of this issue is not limited to war fighting. The DoD is planning to use these detectors for homeland defense of military installations, and there is potential that the nation will use these detectors for homeland defense of U.S. cities. The Chemical and Biological Defense Program (CBDP) commissioned an examination of this issue by the Battelle Memorial Institute, which produced the report (to be provided), “The Use of Chemical Agent Simulants in Standoff Detection Testing,” The Battelle report summarizes, “using simulants instead of chemical agent provides an effective means for conducting outdoor operational testing of standoff detection instruments such as the JSLSCAD system. When combined with live agent laboratory and chamber testing, it provides an integrated means of validating the JSLSCAD instrument, precluding the need for open air chemical agent testing.” However, the deputy under secretary of the army for operations research (DUSA-OR), in the course of personally reviewing the Battelle report, concluded: “I believe the report’s caveats about using simulants add up to great uncertainty regarding
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our ability to determine the operational effectiveness of standoff chemical detectors.” The DUSA-OR recommended a review of the issue by the NAS, a body of experts recommended by the NAS, or a panel of experts convened by the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Other comments on the study will also be provided. STATEMENT OF TASK The NAS will answer the following: What test protocols should be adopted to ensure that standoff chemical agent detectors will meet operational requirements and why. Consideration should be given to a variety of options to include chamber testing, chamber and simulant testing, and live-agent, open-air testing. Identify the challenges associated with executing the recommended protocols. Identify the risks associated with not doing open-air testing using live agents. Using Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Risk Management as described in FM 3-100.12, Air Land Sea Risk Management, dated February 2001 (ref Annex D Risk Assessment Matrix), assess the risk associated with operationally employing standoff chemical agent detectors that have been tested at three possible levels: (1) baseline—live-agent chamber challenges combined with simulant open-air challenges; (2) baseline plus challenges in a test facility capable of enclosed long-range ,live-agent challenges; and (3) baseline plus live-agent, open-air challenges. If NAS does not feel qualified to assess the severity component of such a risk assessment, NAS may provide the probability component and defer risk assessment to the DoD. SCOPE This effort will use the JSLSCAD Derivation of Requirements document (Enclosure 3) to provide the operational context and baseline for standoff chemical agent detection requirements. This effort will consider both the uncertainties in meeting the requirement as a given and the uncertainties inherent in the way the requirement was derived. Testing could well depend on the technology used for detection. This effort will consider the hardware and software technologies associated with current developmental detectors (M21 RSCAAL, JSLSCAD, Artemis, and MCAD). This effort will indicate which findings, if any, are specific to these technologies and which, if any, are inherently applicable to the problem of standoff chemical agent detection.
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