Alerting America: Effective Risk Communication: Summary of a Forum (2003)

The sixth Natural Disasters Roundtable (NDR) forum, “Alerting America: Effective Risk Communication,” was held on October 31, 2002 at the National Academies in Washington, D.C. Approximately 140 participants from government, academia, business, industry and civil society attended the one-day forum. The objective of the forum was to provide the opportunity for researchers, decision-makers, practitioners and other stakeholders to exchange views and perspectives on communicating risk information to the public about various kinds of hazards and disasters.¹ As William Hooke, American Meteorological Society and NDR chair, noted in his opening remarks, the intent was to provide a broad view of risk communication, facilitate understanding across relevant disciplines and professions, and offer a basis for future risk communication research and action. The first four sessions of the forum involved individual and panel presentations on various aspects of risk communication followed by open discussion and audience participation. In the final session, all forum participants were encouraged to identify research needs and challenges in risk communication.

Effective and consistent risk communication is vital to disaster reduction and response. Formal and informal groups and the media are important channels for risk communication. And technology is playing an increasingly crucial role, making it possible to track potential disaster agents, alert authorities, and educate and warn the public in a more timely manner. However, underlying the public response to risk communication are other factors such as social structure, norms, resources and risk perception, which is embedded in past experience and group interaction.

Many issues related to risk communication were discussed at the forum by speakers and participants from the scientific community, local and federal agencies, and media organizations. One theme that emerged from the discussions, including during the open discussion session at the end of the forum, was the need for more research and actions to further the nation’s risk communication capacity and make communities less vulnerable to natural, technological, and human-induced disasters. This report is a brief summary of those forum discussions.

Disasters are most likely when there is a lack of public awareness about conditions and human actions that can make individuals, groups and communities vulnerable. Thus risk communication plays a vital role in disaster reduction. However, effective risk communication alone, even if it is based on sound science, does not guarantee the most appropriate behavioral response. As noted in the forum discussion, risk communication is the effort to convince people that a risk is real and describe what its characteristics are as well as providing information on what can be done about it. Risk perception is a major factor in this process.

David Ropeik, Harvard University Center for Risk Analysis, discussed the risk perception aspects of risk communication. He noted that humans don’t relate to risks solely on the basis of facts. For various reasons some risks are more feared, or dreaded, than others are. Natural disasters make us less afraid than we perhaps should be. “Getting people to fear natural disasters is an uphill battle,” said Ropeik. Several factors account for why people are less afraid of some risks than others. Familiarity is one factor. If similar types of disasters occur repeatedly over time such that they become familiar, a person may become less concerned about such events if they have not suffered losses from them. Trust is another factor. If information about a risk comes from a trusted source, such as a recognized expert or government official, it is more likely to be believed and acted upon. A third factor is choice. If risks are imposed on a person, the individual may fear them more than if they were assumed voluntarily, such as a decision to mountain climb or perhaps to live in a flood plain. Control is another consideration. When people think they have control of a situation, such as driving a car as opposed to flying as a passenger in a plane, they tend to be less fearful in spite of car accident statistics. The acuteness of a situation is also important. A disaster that kills many people right away tends to generate more attention and fear among people than chronic situations that kill many persons over long periods of time. The extent to which individuals begin to personalize a risk also becomes an important factor in risk perception. When individuals think that they could be disaster victims, they may take protective actions even if the risk is statistically low, as was the case following the fall 2002 sniper incidents in the suburban Washington, D.C. area. Another factor is risk vs. benefit. For example, the risk of contracting a disease may well justify someone’s decision to be vaccinated, despite possible side effects of the vaccine. However, risks tends to outweigh benefits when someone concludes that the possibility of contracting the disease is less than the possibility of suffering the side effects of the vaccine. Ropeik indicated that these and many other factors help determine risk perception and therefore it is imperative for risk communicators, whether they are scientists, government decision makers or emergency managers, to help the public keep risks in perspective.

Risk perception and risk communication seldom take on such immediate importance as they did during the September 11, 2001 attack on the World Trade Center. During this catastrophic event, the very survival of building occupants and emergency personnel depended on their ability to make the right decisions with limited information. In a four part series for her newspaper (see reference section for the most related article), Martha Moore, USA Today, helped chronicle this

dramatic example of how fundamentals of risk perception and communication played out at the World Trade Center, and shared her insights at the forum.

Moore discussed how survival was related to risk perception and communication at the South Tower, which was hit after the North Tower was attacked. People in the South Tower had little information on which to react. Factors that influenced what people in the South Tower decided to do for their own safety included:

1. What they could see (e.g., the plane hitting the North Tower; people jumping out of the North Tower; or nothing if they were on the side of the South Tower that had no view of the North Tower) ;

2. What others did (e.g., people around them, especially their boss);

3. Safety announcements made in the building;

4. Experience during the February 1993 car bombing at the World Trade Center.

Moore reported that many people in the World Trade Center did not know what had actually happened for some time. Some occupants on the north-facing side of the South Tower were able to see the fire in the North Tower and many of them witnessed North Tower occupants jumping to their deaths. Observing this encouraged some South Tower occupants to evacuate. Many people made their decision about when or whether to evacuate on the basis of “ What the boss did.” In some instances, if the boss stayed, their subordinates stayed, and if the boss left, the workers did likewise. Before the second plane that hit the World Trade Center had struck the South Tower, authorities had announced that there was no need for occupants to evacuate because the building was safe, advising them to stay inside to avoid falling debris. This influenced the evacuation decision of some occupants, some of whom unfortunately returned to the building after hearing such information. Some building occupants were also influenced by the 1993 World Trade Center disaster. Some evacuated quickly following the September 11 attack because they remembered how long it took to get out before, but others did not hurry because, even though the evacuation took four hours before, everybody had made it out of the building.

During the discussion period following her remarks, Moore agreed with an audience member that actions of building occupants during the emergency should not be labeled as panic behavior, which in social science terms is characterized as self-centered flight behavior that does not take into account the safety needs of others. In contrast with panic behavior, actions of building occupants during the emergency, as in many natural disasters, were group oriented with individuals providing information to and, in many cases, outright helping others in need. Moore’s observations on the World Trade Center experience support certain findings from research on risk communication. This includes, for example, that those at risk are influenced by significant others around them, they seek additional information in determining how to respond, and what they can directly observe in the threatening situation may override other information.

Social scientists have conducted research on disasters and risk communication for decades, providing a sound knowledge base for action (see references). Nevertheless, much improvement is needed in risk communication efforts, perhaps because, as noted by Dennis Mileti, University of Colorado, many risk communicators remain unfamiliar with the risk communication literature. Some

of the fundamentals of risk communication growing out of this body of research involve matters related to message content, communication channels, target audiences, interaction between communicators and recipients, and interactions within groups of information recipients.

Dennis Mileti indicated that the purpose of risk communication, which is fundamentally a social process, is to get people to understand that they are vulnerable to a particular risk as well as to inform them of the most effective protective actions they can take. Risk messages often need repeating several times through multiple channels. People will tend to believe such messages when they can confirm them through interactions with significant others, such as family members, friends, and coworkers, as was the case during the World Trade Center disaster. Risk is the consequence of risk communication, not the other way around. Risk communication messages need to be consistent, accurate, timely, simple, clear, convey confidence in their validity, and say what people should do. Mileti underscored the role of the media in influencing the importance with which people regard the information. He noted that the media drives risks, that is, media presentation of any form of risk actually influences the importance people associate with that risk. Risk communication is about the risks we perceive as real and the collection of information on those risk functions.

Kathleen Tierney, University of Delaware, advised, “Don’t convey danger without explaining what to do and where to go.” Tierney outlined four components of a framework on risk communication: information sources, messages, channels, and audience. With respect to sources of information, people judge risk communicators on the basis of such traits as their perceived competence, objectivity, consistency, honesty, and trustworthiness. It is easy to lose credibility as a risk communicator, but difficult to regain it. Tierney observed that the public considers the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) as having credibility regarding hurricane warnings and earthquake advisories respectively, and that a credible source for communicating homeland security information is yet to emerge. She noted that institutionalized sources tend to have more credibility than other sources. Messages should show confidence in what is being said about a risk. Also, information conveyed to the audience at risk needs to be consistent across channels

The media - including television, radio, newspapers and other print sources - play a crucial role in risk communication and are most effective when they closely collaborate with other risk communicators such as local emergency managers. Tierney noted that the various types of media have different strengths. For example, television provides dramatic visuals and is attention grabbing, but television broadcasts are ephemeral. Radio is similarly attention getting, but people also quickly forgot messages unless they are repeated frequently. While the print media lacks drama, print messages can be more detailed and storable and readers have more time to absorb the information.

The diversity of the U.S. population presents a significant challenge to risk communicators. It is crucial that risk communicators take into account social and cultural differences in the population at risk and design group-based risk communication strategies. Brenda Phillips, Jacksonville State University, noted that, among other things, differences in age, income, race, and ethnicity have an impact on exposure to risks and the receipt and interpretation of risk information. Simply put, risk communicators may have to work harder and make special efforts to reach certain population groups in a community, such as those who are socially or geographically isolated, and to be seen as a credible source of information by such groups. The elderly is a diverse group that needs special attention from risk communicators. They may be less likely to receive warnings. However, when the elderly are warned, if they are able to do so, they are likely to comply with the warnings. Phillips observed that public agencies and community groups could offer significant assistance to

risk communicators seeking to bridge formidable social and cultural barriers in order to provide credible information to vulnerable groups.

The goal of risk communication is to provide timely and credible information to the public so that appropriate protective actions can be taken by those at the local level. Such groups as local emergency management organizations and media organizations play a key role in getting the word out to vulnerable population groups.

In discussing hurricane threats, Walter Maestri, Jefferson Parrish, Louisiana Emergency Management, noted that in doing their jobs local emergency managers have to overcome the hurdle that while they may rely on official information, citizens may not. Thus emergency managers have to work extra hard in some cases to get citizens, who tend to rely on what is familiar and whom they know, to protect themselves from impending danger. Maestri observed that emergency managers and the media are in a symbiotic relationship when it comes to providing risk information to the public, with both entities playing vital roles. He also noted that local media organizations need to resist the temptation of looking to increase their audience by challenging valid information provided by credible outside sources such as the National Hurricane Center.

Even though local media organizations, including television stations, are an important source of information during times of actual crisis, they normally give little attention to long-term threats of disaster to their communities. Deborah Potter, NewsLab, suggested that it is important to change this situation. She noted that most journalists are unfamiliar with research findings on risk communication and that most local stations are unprepared for disasters, either lacking disaster plans or, when they do exist, not giving them much attention. Potter suggested that the media need a plan of action. They should be aware of community-based emergency preparedness strategies and plans, for example, in order to track problems before they occur. Community preparation has to occur before, during and after an event, and risk communication is involved at every step. Also, in order to carry out their risk communication roles, the media need to be prepared to use the most advanced available technology, including Doppler radar and aircraft. Potter advises that television stations in particular should develop and practice disaster plans in order to improve their capacity to respond to disaster-generated demands.

With their many resources, including experts and technology, national organizations such as NOAA, USGS and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) play a prominent role in risk communication, providing vital information directly to the public and furthering the capacity of local groups to meet the needs of the community. There is no single national warning system in the U.S. today that collects and disseminates risk information. Instead, the situation is compartmentalized, with at least a dozen federal agencies having responsibility for issuing warning information for various types of hazards.

Peter Ward, Partnership for Public Warning, noted that warning primarily involves local issues, but that providing the public critical risk information is also a federal responsibility. Echoing others at the forum, he observed that what to include in warning messages is a major challenge. The choice of words is significant. Should an all-hazards terminology be used, as some have advocated?

This would involve the challenge of developing a common terminology for natural, technological, and human-induced threats. Should risk statements be issued as warnings, outlooks, watches, or hot tips? Ward advised that more national leadership is needed to deal with such issues as well as to define goals and standards for public warning for all emergencies and to improve and integrate existing systems. He suggested that lack of technology is not the problem, because many of the available technologies have not been adopted. What is needed, he noted, is a common vision of what should be done to improve public warning.

Remarks made by Jack Kelly, National Weather Service (NWS), NOAA, also reflected concerns about the capacity of national organizations to meet the growing challenge of risk communication. NOAA provides a family of services and a set of weather service providers. It operates a satellite broadcast system, an Emergency Weather Information Network, and administers national and local weather websites. There are 121 local Weather Forecast Offices in the U.S. that partner with the media to deliver consistent messages and educate the public on how to respond to extreme weather conditions. NOAA also works on behalf of homeland security, issuing civil emergency messages and broadcasting AMBER alerts to further efforts to locate missing children. Kelly noted that the NWS needs to improve its risk communication efforts. For example, some areas of the country lack weather forecasting coverage, which is usually the result of old transmitters and the absence of backup power. Like Ward, he also suggested that broader national changes should be considered, such as the need for a national lexicon of warning terms and national threat indicators that would take us beyond the color-coded system now in place.

The USGS has risk communication responsibility for geohazards, including earthquakes. This involves issuing long-term forecasts and information on expected aftershocks following sizable earthquakes when such aftershocks are likely to endanger the public. The fundamental unpredictability of earthquakes in the short term increases the public’s perception of risk. Lucy Jones, USGS, suggested that people often ask for information in order to make them feel better and make disasters more manageable. After earthquakes, USGS often receive a huge volume of hits per hour on their website from people who are looking for information. Providing public warnings about earthquake risks presents major challenges to risk communicators. In order to meet such challenges in earthquake-prone California, USGS scientists and government officials jointly issue statements about earthquakes and work with the media.

We now live in an age when the public faces major risks posed by nuclear, chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction. Such risks are exacerbated by certain on-going demographic and societal trends, including increased population density, an aging population, settlement in high-risk areas, and technological dependencies. In addition to science application issues, this heightened risk also presents major risk communication challenges to the public health sector, such as the Public Health Service’s Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, which has major responsibility for protecting the nation’s health. Eric Noji, U.S. Public Health Service, feels that significant improvement is needed in the way public health professionals carry out their risk communication role. He said, for example, that most people in the public health community have little expertise in working with the news media, even though it is their responsibility to keep the public informed. Also they are uninformed about risk communication principles that have been learned from social science research. In recognition of this, CDC officials are now receiving training from social and behavioral scientists. Noji suggested that medical personnel in risk communication agencies also receive training on how to work with the media.

Many countries share at least one thing in common, that they are at risk to such disasters as hurricanes, drought, earthquakes, floods, and terrorism. This global dimension of risk has led to international collaboration, including in the area of risk communication. U.S. agencies have partnered with organizations in other regions of the world, in particular those in developing countries most subject to disaster, to further disaster reduction through risk communication programs. This is important because, through such programs and activities, the U.S. has been able to use its vast resources, including its scientists and other technical personnel and technology, to help increase the capacity of vulnerable countries to cope with various types of disaster risks.

As discussed by Patrick Gonzalez, USGS, one example of international risk communication collaboration by the U.S. is the Famine Early Warning System Network (FEWS NET). FEWS NET receives financial support from the U.S. Agency for International Development. NASA, NOAA, and USGS help to carry out the program, which uses remote sensing and field observations to track food security risks related to drought and flood conditions. Environmental monitoring focuses on such indicators as rain fall, stream flow and the status of crops and vegetation. The collaborative risk communication and capacity building effort is directed at 17 African countries. Information on food security is transmitted to governmental and non-governmental decision- makers in Africa and to decision-makers in both the U.S. and Europe. FEWS NET provides weekly weather assessments and develops monthly reports. Information on food security threat levels is placed on websites.

The National Weather Service offers another example of U.S. involvement in important international risk communication activity, which was discussed by Michel Davison, NOAA/NWS. The NWS provides valuable information and expert guidance to regional forecasters as severe weather patterns develop in areas such as the Caribbean Basin. Additionally, because capacity building in at-risk countries in the developing world is also critically important, NWS collaborates in a program with the World Meteorological Organization that provides training for forecasters from the Caribbean and Latin America. The training involves numerical weather prediction, objective forecasting techniques, short and long-range forecasting and drought analysis. Davison indicated that the aim is to improve risk communication and warning criteria so that emergency managers and the public can be better served in at-risk locations overseas.

In the concluding session of the forum, all attendees were asked to help identify research opportunities and needs as well as actions to meet existing risk communication challenges. Thus, researchers, practitioners, and decision-makers attending the forum had the opportunity to address such issues from their perspective one final time. Because of time constraints, only a list of research and action ideas was developed to serve as the basis for future discussion and consideration by stakeholders. Also, no attempt could be made to prioritize the suggested topics.

• Warning and response

• Need and requirements for an all-hazards warning system

• Public response to warnings for combined threat events

• Societal response to rapid onset events

• Public response to cumulative disaster impacts

• Stakeholder interaction

• Cooperation between public agencies and private corporations

• Communication between emergency managers

• Collaborative research between physical and social scientists

• Measuring aspects of risk and outcomes

• Real vs. perceived risk

• Differences between life and livelihood threatening risks

• Disaster loss metrics

• Knowledge application

• Apply extensive existing knowledge on risk communication

• Borrow successful techniques from sales and marketing to further risk communication

• Synthesize existing knowledge

• Disseminate research results to local and other stakeholders

• Craft effective training programs

• Warning systems

• Improve local warning systems

• Have national television news function as an effective warning system

• Integrate military warning systems with civilian warning systems

• Increase the involvement of local emergency managers in crafting warnings

• Create user-centered warning systems

• Produce warnings that provide the requisite degree of specificity

• Develop secure warning systems

• Focusing risk communication for best results

• Design risk communication efforts that are responsive to the social context

• Use risk communication to maintain social stability

• Develop better vertical and horizontal exchange of risk information

• Include risk communication as a component of mitigation

The forum adjourned after the list of research and action items was developed.

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