6
Committee Observations

The U.S. Army is facing a challenge. Just as it launches a transformation toward the Objective Force, the centuries-old responsibilities for support to civil authorities have again been brought to the fore by the terrorist attacks of September 11. The committee found that these apparently diverse requirements are actually resulting in important convergences of technical and operational solutions. The requirements of homeland security (HLS) can for the most part be met through S&T work already set in motion for the Objective Force. The events of September 11 have stressed the Army’s S&T planning and budgeting and are necessitating a reconsideration of the process by which the S&T Master Plan is being developed and a review of its contents. While many, if not most, of the Objective Force technologies are of direct application to the Army’s recently reconfirmed homeland responsibilities, it will be necessary to modify or adapt specific technologies to serve a dual purpose. In addition, some new capabilities requiring modified acquisition strategies will be needed. The committee believes that if this process is accomplished thoughtfully and flexibly, there will be great opportunities for cost-effective procurements, economies of scale, and an ability to accomplish both missions successfully.

Throughout this report the committee has reached findings and conclusions and offered a series of recommendations on specific aspects of the HLS challenge for the Army. (All the chapter findings, conclusions, and recommendations are listed in numerical order in Chapter 7.) In this chapter, the committee summarizes its high-level integrated observations.

Defense of the homeland is the military’s top priority; terrorism will increase the Army’s efforts in support of civilian authorities (see Chapter 1). The



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Science and Technology for Army Homeland Security: Report 1 6 Committee Observations The U.S. Army is facing a challenge. Just as it launches a transformation toward the Objective Force, the centuries-old responsibilities for support to civil authorities have again been brought to the fore by the terrorist attacks of September 11. The committee found that these apparently diverse requirements are actually resulting in important convergences of technical and operational solutions. The requirements of homeland security (HLS) can for the most part be met through S&T work already set in motion for the Objective Force. The events of September 11 have stressed the Army’s S&T planning and budgeting and are necessitating a reconsideration of the process by which the S&T Master Plan is being developed and a review of its contents. While many, if not most, of the Objective Force technologies are of direct application to the Army’s recently reconfirmed homeland responsibilities, it will be necessary to modify or adapt specific technologies to serve a dual purpose. In addition, some new capabilities requiring modified acquisition strategies will be needed. The committee believes that if this process is accomplished thoughtfully and flexibly, there will be great opportunities for cost-effective procurements, economies of scale, and an ability to accomplish both missions successfully. Throughout this report the committee has reached findings and conclusions and offered a series of recommendations on specific aspects of the HLS challenge for the Army. (All the chapter findings, conclusions, and recommendations are listed in numerical order in Chapter 7.) In this chapter, the committee summarizes its high-level integrated observations. Defense of the homeland is the military’s top priority; terrorism will increase the Army’s efforts in support of civilian authorities (see Chapter 1). The

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Science and Technology for Army Homeland Security: Report 1 committee reviewed the roles of the three Army components—the active Army, the Army National Guard, and the Army Reserve—in homeland emergencies. Various units of the Army are regularly used in natural disasters such as floods, fires, and hurricanes and tornadoes. The committee believes that terrorism will greatly enlarge the need for Army resources in the homeland. The Army National Guard component will have a prominent role in homeland security; this growing role is not recognized in the annual development of the Army Science and Technology Master Plan (Chapter 1). The committee reviewed the restrictions on the federal portions of the Army under the Posse Comitatus Act and found that the National Guard, under state control, is the natural Army component to address terrorist attacks, at least initially. The committee also observed that the National Guard’s technical needs for performing this role have not received uniformly high priority. It notes that certain specialized elements of the active and reserve Army are regularly employed in disasters in an other than law enforcement role, such as the engineering, medical, and logistics units. The magnitude of this effort will increase in the face of terrorism. Many of the technologies recommended by the committee for use by the Army for HLS are also of high priority in the R&D plans for the Objective Force (Chapter 1). The committee believes that this overlap of technical needs should make it easier to develop R&D investment strategies in both areas. The committee also believes increased R&D in sensors; in communications, command, and control; and in the medical arena, all three of which are common to HLS and the Objective Force, will be helpful. While the details will likely differ, necessitating R&D to adapt from one area to the other, the substance will be the same. There are striking similarities between the active Army working with allies and coalitions of allies and the HLS requirement for the Army to work with state and local civilian emergency responder organizations (Chapters 1, 4, and 5). Many of these challenges are technical; many are cultural. The committee focused on the technical but is concerned about the nontechnical issues that may operate to the detriment of close working relationships. This is especially true in communications, command, and control, where there are difficult organizational and operational challenges. The committee observed that the technologies included under command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) are of prime importance for HLS and for the Objective Force (Chapters 1, 4, and 5). Difficulties with interoperability have been encountered in both areas, sometimes with devastating results. The Army may have to replace interrupted civilian communications services on an emergency basis. This will require downward-compatible, plug-in capabilities. The committee observed that rapid event assessment is essential in HLS in order to mitigate losses (Chapter 4). The responders first on the scene need a means of rapidly knowing what kinds of hazards are present. Technologies are needed to assess rapidly and accurately the nature of the threat, its extent and

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Science and Technology for Army Homeland Security: Report 1 severity, and the changes of these variables with time. In the case of fire, the responders need to know instantly the rate of growth and the effect on safety within a structure. The technologies for situational awareness for the Objective Force can be adapted for use by civilian site commanders at scenes of terrorism (Chapter 4). The committee believes the need to know where the first civilian emergency responders are, what they are doing, and where they are moving is the same as the military’s need to know where their forces are on the battlefield. Civilian incident commanders need to know the location and movements of individual responders, such as firefighters inside buildings. The committee finds that methods of sensing specific threats in chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and conventional explosive and incendiary weapons are not adequate to combat terrorism (Chapter 2). Packaged nuclear devices, explosives, and biologicals are particularly difficult to detect even when the detector is close to the package. Chemicals, because of their higher vapor pressure, are somewhat easier to detect. The committee believes that new technical approaches are needed and emphasizes smart networks of multifunctional detectors. Given the all-encompassing role of such detectors, the committee believes they are legitimate research topics for the Army even though some of the functions are in areas assigned elsewhere. The committee has identified high-priority areas for R&D that could significantly reduce losses at Army facilities due to blast and impact (Chapter 3). R&D advances can minimize the chances for progressive collapse, improve structural connections, reduce dangerous debris from window and wall materials, and improve design practices for multihazard situations. The committee believes that a serious effort must be made to transfer new technologies in this area to civilian designers and contractors. The Army should continue to give the highest priority to cybersecurity and to the use of best practices (Chapter 3). One disaster scenario envisioned by the committee involved terrorists operating over computer networks to shut down or alter targeted computer systems. The likely effects in the committee’s scenario were interruption of DoD command-and-control systems; loss of power across the national electricity grid; denial of service over the public switched network; and interruption of air traffic control. Although the private sector will make many of the technical advances in this field, there is much technical work for the Army to do on its own specialized systems. Conclusion 6-1. Science and technology can and will assist the Army in its homeland security role. Recommendation 6-1. The Army should focus its funding and research efforts on the high-payoff technologies shown in summary Table 6-1.

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Science and Technology for Army Homeland Security: Report 1 TABLE 6-1 High-Payoff Technologies Function Technology Availabilitya (R, N, F) Multiuseb (H, O, C) Chapter 2 Indications and Warning Technologies   Perimeter defense and warning HgCdTe imaging LWIR arrays to fabricate high-performance detector arrays.c R H, O, C Uncooled bolometer arrays utilizing temperature-dependent dielectric constants and operating at room temperature.c R, N H, O, C GaAs quantum well arrays; a type of extrinsic photoconductor in which the bound electrons reside inside the quantum wells instead of on dopant ions.c R, N H, O, C GaN UV detectors for solar blind applications.d F H, O, C Biological agent detection DNA microarrays that can monitor thousands of genes simultaneously. F H, O, C Combinatorial peptides using massive libraries for screening. F H, O, C Raman scattering; matches observed Raman spectra against library of predetermined signatures.e N, F H, O, C Vapor-phase explosive detectors Chemical resistors that detect at parts per billion level. Must be close to explosive or chemical, needs improved SNR.f,g N H, O, C Fluorescent polymers that detect at parts per trillion level (in principle). Must be close to explosive or chemical, needs improved SNR. Demonstrated at parts per billion in reliable system.h R, N H, O, C Surface-enhanced Raman spectroscopy that detects at parts per billion. Portable, must be close to explosive.h N, F H, O, C Immunoassay (biosensors) that detects parts per billion. Must be close to explosive. Potential for increased sensitivity.h N, F H, O, C

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Science and Technology for Army Homeland Security: Report 1 Function Technology Availabilitya (R, N, F) Multiuseb (H, O, C) Bulk explosive detection Nuclear quadrupole magnetic resonance (NQR). Low SNR, must be close to explosive, does not require magnets. Produces RF signals characteristic of particular explosives.g,i R, N H, O, C Millimeter-wave radiometry. Potential to provide radiometric images of objects (e.g., explosives) under clothing.g,j N H, O, C Cross-cutting detection and tracking Sensor networking—gathers data from a wide variety of spatially distributed sensors. N, F H, O, C Sensor fusion—intelligently combines, correlates, and interprets data from distributed sensors. N, F H, O, C Anomaly detection—examines data from networked sensors to discover patterns, unusual behavior, etc. N, F H, O, C Surveillance platforms (UAVs, UGVs, UUVs)— small autonomous vehicles for carrying sensor payloads as part of distributed sensor network. R, F H, O, C Cross-cutting perimeter surveillance IR, RF, acoustic, seismic, etc. techniques that monitor for intrusion into predetermined spaces (encampments, facilities, borders, etc.). R, N H, O, C Cross-cutting capability in miniaturized systems MEMS—methods for integration of many technologies into microsensors using electronic fabrication technologies. R, F H, O, C Active-passive sensor suites—suites of lasers and detectors that can query and image as well as perform spectroscopic measurements. N, F H, O, C Nanofabrication techniques—fabrication of sensing systems at the atomic level. F H, O, C

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Science and Technology for Army Homeland Security: Report 1 Function Technology Availabilitya (R, N, F) Multiuseb (H, O, C) Chapter 3 Denial and Survivability Technologies   Perimeter control X-ray assessment, swimming sensors for rapid detection of LVBs. N, F H, O Unattended sensor networks, advanced power sources, C2 and secure communication, low-power sensing elements for deployable perimeter control system. N, F H, O C2 and secure communications, situational awareness tools, area sensors for mobile perimeter system. F H, O Building and facility access control Smart ID with bioinformation, ID tracking with area authorization, iris ID, liveness tests, auto DNA ID for automatic, high-confidence access control. F H, O, C Structural blast resistance Prediction of blast and impact loads on and in buildings, bridges, dams, etc. N, F H, O, C Connection details for steel and concrete structures (new and retrofit construction) to upgrade current approaches for dynamic environments and material behavior. N H, O, C Methodology to prevent/evaluate potential for progressive collapse. N (+ university, industry)k H, O, C Blast-resistant window concepts, including new glazing-to-frame connections. N H, O, C Blast-resistant tempered and laminated glass (stiffness, strength enhancement, ductility). F H, C First-principles analysis techniques to supplement experimental databases for design of windows and structural component retrofits. N H, O, C

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Science and Technology for Army Homeland Security: Report 1 Function Technology Availabilitya (R, N, F) Multiuseb (H, O, C)   Software to include new test and analysis data and techniques for design and retrofit of structures in blast environments. R, N H, O, C Integration of performance standards with building codes from a multihazard perspective. N, F H, O, C Cybersecurity IP version 6 to provide ad hoc mobile C&C networks to rapidly reconfigure systems. N H, O, C Technologies to avoid enemy intrusions, guarantee functionality. F H, O Technologies to provide alternative C&C after a disaster. N H, O IP version 6 for networks, universal radio, etc. to allow the Army systems to interoperate with other emergency services. N H, O Chapter 4 Recovery and Consequence Management Technologies   Command and control Adaptive integrated multiplexer systems to integrate communications between multiple agencies. N H, O, C Mobile local broadband networks to pass imagery and communications. N, F H, C Blue Force Tracking to determine the location of operational personnel and assets from multiple agencies. N, F H, O, C Planning Decision support aids such as those in the Agile Commander ATD to enhance real-time planning among multiple agencies. N H, O Event assessment Family of interoperable operational pictures displays that can be shared by operational planners and implementers. N, F H, O, C

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Science and Technology for Army Homeland Security: Report 1 Function Technology Availabilitya (R, N, F) Multiuseb (H, O, C)   Land mobile robotics that can breach obstacles to implant sensors. R, N H, O, C Sensor networking and fusion to integrate multiple sensors into a common picture. N, F H, O, C Real-time damage and contamination modeling to provide attack assessments based on the reports of fused sensor data. N, F H, O, C Force protection Development of improved protective mask filters and service-life indicators. R, N H, O, C Development of semipermeable membranes and self-detoxifying material for protective suits. N H, O, C Vaccine development for protection against biological agents. N, F H, O, C Medical response Chemical, biological, and radiological triage assessment cards providing C4ISR integration of data, decontamination of the patients and material, tracking of the patients, physical evidence, clothing; chain of custody. R, N H, O, C C4ISR; on-demand access to expert’s network, scenario modeling/procedures to provide remote expert support for the on-site medical personnel; on-demand linkage to medical and scientific information systems, experts, and laboratories. R, N H, O, C Field-deployable diagnostic, life-support, and emergency surgical systems that can be easily and rapidly deployed; that are resistant to vibration, low environmental quality and electromagnetic interference; and that can be operated efficiently in the presence of chemical, biological, or radiological residuals. R, N, F H, O, C

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Science and Technology for Army Homeland Security: Report 1 Function Technology Availabilitya (R, N, F) Multiuseb (H, O, C)   Field-deployable rapid-assay devices; dynamic meteorologic models of CBRN threats to provide the first responder an assessment of agents and risks for staff and patients; assessment of ongoing environmental risks. R, N H, O, C Scenario development software based on physiologic and biochemical response to agents. R, N H, O Hemorrhage, neurological, and respiration stabilizing devices and technologies with a long shelf-life, rapid-acting agents. R, N H, O, C Vaccines and immunologic factors (including therapeutic applications), counteragents for chemical, biological, and radiological exposure with a long shelf-life, rapid-acting agents. R, N, F H, O Distributed learning platforms with AI and decision-assisting tools for CBRNE. R, N, F H, O Remediation and decontamination Development of a process to plan and implement remediation and decontamination for chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear events. N H, C Further development and assessment of solutions to clean up chemical and biological contamination. R, N, F H, C Chapter 5 Attribution and Retaliation Technologies   Detect traffic/activity abnormality in urban and rural locations Multisensor fusion. N H, O Data mining techniques. N H, O Inference algorithms. N H, O Redeployable UGS. F H, O

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Science and Technology for Army Homeland Security: Report 1 Function Technology Availabilitya (R, N, F) Multiuseb (H, O, C) Locate terror cells in areas of heavy foliage 3-D ultrasensitive lidar. N O Defeat covered and concealed targets in rural environment 3-D ultrasensitive lidar. N O Multisensor fusion techniques. N O Locate gunshots in urban environment Ultrasensitive acoustics triangulation . system. F H, O, C Enhanced red force (enemy) location in urban environment Track deconfliction algorithms. F O Situational awareness Enhanced blue force (friendly) personnel location in urban environment provided by fused GPS, RF, and dead-reckoning hardware and algorithms. N H, O, C Mobility in remote urban environment Exoskeleton for soldier platform. F O, C Light, highly survivable, signaturesuppressed troop-carrying helicopter. F O, C Mobile, small-scale robotic breachers for clearing alleys, etc. in urban environment. N, F O, C Remote operations Reduced usage of signature-producing technologies. N H, O Advanced composites for lightweight armor protection. F H, O, C Advanced composites for enhanced vehicle mine protection. F H, O, C Advanced health and wound monitoring system that integrates blood pressure, heart rate, body temperature, skin penetration sensors. N, F H, O, C

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Science and Technology for Army Homeland Security: Report 1 Function Technology Availabilitya (R, N, F) Multiuseb (H, O, C) Munitions and delivery systems designed for remote urban combat Nonlethal munitions to include acoustic systems. N, F H, O, C PSYOP products. N O UAVs and UGVs designed for urban fire support. N H, O, C Precision insertion and targeting for warheads Advanced propellants. N, F O Improved warhead design. N, F O NOTE: AI, artificial intelligence; ATD, Advanced Technology Demonstration; CBRN, chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear; CBRNE, chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high explosive; C&C, computers and communication; C2, command and control; DARPA, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency; EO, electro-optical; FOLPEN, foliage penetration; GPS, Global Positioning System; ID, identification; IP, Internet protocol; IR, infrared; lidar, light detection and ranging; LVB, large vehicle bomb; LWIR, long-wave infrared; MEMS, microelectromechanical systems; NSA, National Security Agency; PSYOP, psychological operations; RF, radio frequency; SNR, signal-to-noise ratio; UAV, unmanned air vehicle; UGS, unattended ground sensor; UGV, unmanned ground vehicle; UUV, unmanned underwater vehicle; UV, ultraviolet; 3-D, three-dimensional. aAvailability: R, ready (TRL 8-9); N, near-term (TRL 4-7); F, far-term (TRL 1-3). bMultiuse: H, Army homeland security; O, Objective Force; C, civilian (first responders and others). cWestervelt et al. (1991). dDARPA (2002a,b). eNATIBO (2001). fLewis et al. (1997). gBruschini and Gros (1997). hWard et al. (2001). iU.S. Navy (2002). jNRC (1996). kParticipation by universities and industry should be sought, because their technology, understanding, experience, and capabilities in this area are advanced, their databases are useful, and they would provide new insight and information to the program and shorten the time frame for development. REFERENCES Bruschini, C., and B. Gros. 1997. A Survey of Current Sensor Technology Research for the Detection of Landmines. Available online at <http://diwww.epfl.ch/lami/detec/susdemsurvey.html>. Accessed on September 24, 2002.

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Science and Technology for Army Homeland Security: Report 1 DARPA (Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency). 2002a. Semiconductor Ultraviolet Optical Sources (SUVOS) Available online at http://www.darpa.mil/mto/suvos/index.html. Accessed on October 2, 2002. DARPA. 2002b. Solar Blind Detectors. Available online at http://www.darpa.mil/MTO/SBD/index.html. Accessed on October 2, 2002. Lewis, N.S., M.C. Lonergan, E.J. Severin, B.J. Doleman, and R.H. Grubbs. 1997. Array-based vapor sensing using chemically sensitive carbon black-polymer resistors. Pp. 660-670 in Detection and Remediation Technologies for Mines and Minelike Targets II, Proceedings of SPIE, vol. 3079, A.C. Dubey and R.L Barnard, eds. Bellingham, Wash.: The International Society for Optical Engineering. NATIBO (North American Technology and Industrial Base Organization). 2001. Biological Detection System Technologies Technology and Industrial Base Study, February, Available online at <http://www.dtic.mil/natibo/>. Accessed on September 23, 2002. NRC (National Research Council). 1996. Airline Passenger Security Screening: New Technologies and Implementation Issues. Washington, D.C.: National Academies Press. U.S. Navy. 2002. Department of the Navy Explosive Detection Equipment-Explosives. Available online at <http://explosivedetection.nfsec.navy.mil/explosives./htm>. Accessed on September 24, 2002. Ward, K.B., A. Ervin, J.R. Deaschamps, and A.W. Kusterbeck. 2001. Force protection: Explosives detection experts workshop, NRL/MR-MM/6900—01-8564, CDROM. Arlington, Va.: Office of Naval Research. Westervelt, R., J. Sullivan, and N. Lewis. 1991. Imaging Infra-red Detectors. JASON report number JSR-91-600. McLean, Va.: Mitre Corporation.