4
Recovery and Consequence Management Technologies

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this chapter is to identify science and technology (S&T) initiatives that will enhance the ability of the Army to accomplish its emerging mission requirements for homeland security (HLS). This chapter is focused on the recovery and consequence management (R and CM) functions.

Generally, recovery is viewed as a local and private sector responsibility. However, in the case of terrorist acts using weapons of mass destruction (WMD), or significant cyberattacks on the nation’s critical infrastructure, the damage may exceed the capacity of local agencies and the private sector that owns and operates the critical infrastructure. In this situation, the nation’s military, most likely the Army, would be called upon. Compounding the seriousness of the situation is the fact that R and CM mission activities may need to be conducted simultaneously with missions to protect the critical infrastructure or to conduct contingency operations overseas.

Consequence management (CM) is concerned with minimizing the damage resulting from a disruptive event (White House, 1998). CM is often conducted in conjunction with crisis management activities. Crisis management is a law enforcement mission aimed at early detection, prevention, and elimination of the cause of a disruption as quickly as possible (White House, 1998). There is an overlap in the crisis management and the CM missions. Mitigating the effects of a terrorist event and restoring public order and essential services is the principal objective of CM.



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Science and Technology for Army Homeland Security: Report 1 4 Recovery and Consequence Management Technologies INTRODUCTION The purpose of this chapter is to identify science and technology (S&T) initiatives that will enhance the ability of the Army to accomplish its emerging mission requirements for homeland security (HLS). This chapter is focused on the recovery and consequence management (R and CM) functions. Generally, recovery is viewed as a local and private sector responsibility. However, in the case of terrorist acts using weapons of mass destruction (WMD), or significant cyberattacks on the nation’s critical infrastructure, the damage may exceed the capacity of local agencies and the private sector that owns and operates the critical infrastructure. In this situation, the nation’s military, most likely the Army, would be called upon. Compounding the seriousness of the situation is the fact that R and CM mission activities may need to be conducted simultaneously with missions to protect the critical infrastructure or to conduct contingency operations overseas. Consequence management (CM) is concerned with minimizing the damage resulting from a disruptive event (White House, 1998). CM is often conducted in conjunction with crisis management activities. Crisis management is a law enforcement mission aimed at early detection, prevention, and elimination of the cause of a disruption as quickly as possible (White House, 1998). There is an overlap in the crisis management and the CM missions. Mitigating the effects of a terrorist event and restoring public order and essential services is the principal objective of CM.

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Science and Technology for Army Homeland Security: Report 1 NEW MISSION CHALLENGES The new HLS mission requirements are still under development, but a review of the likely challenges and threats can provide insights into the new missions and capabilities that will be necessary. The need to assist authorities in restoring order, overcoming the effects of physical damage, and beginning the road to recovery will remain. The Army has demonstrated its ability to meet these challenges. It has been fortunate that the training, equipment, and organizational constructs developed for wartime mission and contingency operations have met these challenges, by and large. However, the security environment of the 21st century poses new demands that call for new capabilities. The work that the Army has accomplished as part of the Objective Force in developing adaptive force packaging will be important in providing the right types and numbers of forces to meet the new challenges associated with HLS missions. The effects of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high explosive (CBRNE) weapons can far exceed the effects (in time and scale) of even the largest natural disasters. These weapons can cause large numbers of casualties that are beyond the capacity of the civilian medical care system to address. Compounding the effects of physical destruction, chaos, and casualties, such weapons leave behind chemical, biological, and radiological contamination that can continue to cause death and disease and must be contained and cleaned up before public order is restored and recovery is initiated. In addition to large-scale R and CM operations for WMD, Army forces may be called upon to provide R and CM activities for a cyberattack on the nation’s critical infrastructure. Such an attack could deny power and communications to wide areas, cause massive disruption in the nation’s transportation and financial systems, and deny essential government services. Multiple events where WMD are employed against the nation, combined with cyberattacks against the critical infrastructure, could be even more challenging. Without a clearly defined mission for the Army, the committee postulates that it would participate in many of the following tasks as part of the R and CM phase. Postulated Tasks Initial Response Deploy forces. Protect responding forces. Identify the on-scene commander. Establish an interoperable command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) system with existing civilian and military assets.

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Science and Technology for Army Homeland Security: Report 1 Assess in real time the extent of the physical damage, casualties, and the enduring level of contamination and risk of disease transmission. Establish quarantine zones, safe areas, and perimeter control of movement. Triage and treat the injured. Preserve forensic information. Establish an information clearinghouse. Containment Expand the area of control and model/predict moving boundaries. Isolate secondary threats (gas mains, electrical service, stability of damaged infrastructures and buildings). Restore or replace (substitute) infrastructure critical to containment. Near-Term Recovery Keep the population informed. Eliminate/control ongoing immediate threat (contain the effects of WMD). Expand the treatment of casualties (begin stress management, including for military responders). Rescue, protect, evacuate, and track civilians. Assure food and water safety. Provide shelter, food, and support for personnel in the affected areas. Establish and validate the census of people and resources. Determine, marshal, and deploy forces required for long-term operations. Restoration of Normalcy Decontaminate the effects of WMD. Consolidate deployment of forces. Establish or become part of an interoperable C4ISR system. Assess in real time the extent of the physical damage, casualties, and the enduring level of contamination and risk of disease transmission. Restore public order and essential services. Protect consequence management personnel. Move essential provisions. Establish quarantine zones and safe areas. Treat mass casualties. Secure the area and communicate the area of control. Reestablish lost essential facilities and infrastructure. Restore the physical infrastructure.

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Science and Technology for Army Homeland Security: Report 1 The Army will not be called upon to conduct all of these missions by itself but will support civil authorities. Numerous other agencies, including many in the private sector, will also have a significant role. However, in an event of national significance, the military may be called upon to take over where other institutions lack the capacity. Part of the Army’s challenge will be to work in conjunction with the Northern Command (NORTHCOM) and the new Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to define the extent of potential missions prior to the occurrence of events that require large-scale consequence management. REQUIRED TECHNOLOGIES AND CAPABILITIES The infusion of new capabilities and technology will enhance the ability of the Army to conduct large-scale R and CM activities in conjunction with other agencies. The Army currently possesses significant capability to meet many of the challenges described in the preceding section. Through planning, organization, and training, the Army can satisfy other mission challenges as well. Many of the needed capabilities can be achieved as part of the Objective Force. Nevertheless, the Army will need to monitor developments to leverage promising technologies and to assure interoperability with the local, state, and federal agencies participating in the HLS mission. In the mission capabilities described above, several areas are ripe for exploitation by the Army and lend themselves to the application of Army S&T and apply to both HLS and the Objective Force mission. The areas of concentration include the following: Establishment of, or integration into, an interoperable C4ISR system; Real-time assessment of physical damage, casualties, and the enduring level of contamination; Force protection; Treatment of mass casualties; and Containment of and, later, decontamination of the effects of WMD. The Army already has the capacity in other mission areas, provided that the appropriate doctrine is developed and that plans are established across the government and in NORTHCOM. Interoperable Command, Control, Communications, Computer, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance System Over the next few years, it is expected that the HLS organization will establish a national emergency response command and control (C2) system. Many different systems exist today across the numerous departments and agencies that are being blended into the DHS. Each system was created for (and is currently

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Science and Technology for Army Homeland Security: Report 1 used for) a variety of purposes and missions. Very few are interoperable. Indeed, in crisis and consequence management incidents over the last decade, responders consistently report that an unwieldy number of different radios and wireless devices were needed to talk to the other participants. It is possible that lives were lost because the first responders were unable to communicate and share their situational awareness. There is a strong need for an integrated system that allows the new HLS structure to conduct operations effectively; share a common operational picture built on a common database; provide multilevel security information to accommodate local, state, and federal needs; and facilitate real-time communications between these local, state, and federal entities. The Army has already designed a mobile battlefield network system that might meet many of the DHS needs. As discussed briefly in Chapter 3, the Multifunctional On-the-Move Secure Adaptive Integrated Communications system, commonly called MOSAIC, is currently in the advanced technology demonstration stage of development. MOSAIC is intended to provide on-the-move net communications for the mobile, geographically dispersed battlefield. “Its wireless communications architecture will support multimedia applications; quality of service for mobile/multi-hop networks; adaptive and ad hoc mobility protocols; bandwidth management; and horizontal/vertical handoff in a mobile wireless environment” (U.S. Army, 2002a). These networks differ from civilian and most other networks in being ad hoc, since there can be no fixed hubs on a moving battlefield. Such systems would be very useful after an incident if there is a loss of civilian communications. However, Objective Force C4ISR systems will need to be adapted for the different mission and different challenges of HLS. One difference between the Objective Force requirement and the future HLS C4ISR system is that unlike the former, which is designed to operate where no communications are available, the HLS C4ISR system may have the option of using an existing communications network—the nation’s public switched network. The public switched network may, however, be degraded following a major physical or cyber terrorist attack, so the future system should consider the expeditionary characteristics inherent in Objective Force concepts. Local connectivity might be gained in such a system through applications like the Joint Tactical Radio System and, perhaps, local, mobile laser communications networks, or transportable microwave networks, which would provide the bandwidth to share data and gain a common operational picture. The Army’s WIN-T program, in development, can provide a seamless C2 grid where the local C2 infrastructure has been disabled. The Army, working in conjunction with NORTHCOM, can provide the model for the national emergency response network. This model can set the standards for local and state C2 architectures, so that the DHS can seamlessly

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Science and Technology for Army Homeland Security: Report 1 distribute critical information across the nation and to the agencies that need specific essential information to respond to threats and events. In the interim, the Army should investigate deployable communications packages equipped with universal multiplexer capability to facilitate C2 across the vast, and disparate, array of agencies that will respond to incidents and events. Another promising development that the Army S&T community should address for the emerging HLS C2 system is Joint Blue Force Tracking (CJCS, 1999). The Blue Force Tracking architecture is designed to provide tracking, tagging, and locating of friendly troops and assets; logistics and asset management; and situational awareness. The Global Positioning System (GPS)-based concept can allow operational commanders to view the position of friendly forces in real time. Blue Force Tracking is being developed for U.S. forces engaged in expeditionary operations, but it could also be advantageous to know the location of local, state, and federal “forces” and key assets, including the Army, in real time, particularly when contending with the complex environment following a catastrophic event involving WMD. The Army has explored many of the technologies necessary for an effective, end-to-end national emergency response C2 system. Applications of the S&T program essential to the Objective Force may provide a framework for such a system. If the system eventually adopted for the nation exploits and is compatible with Objective Force technologies, it can be beneficial to the Army. However, just as the Objective Force may have to operate with allies with various levels of modernization, the Army in discharging its HLS mission must address C2 compatibility with civilian responders. Table 4-1 highlights key S&T requirements for HLS C2. Conclusion 4-1. A new national emergency response command, control, and communications system for homeland security must be developed and fielded to meet the demands of the emerging threats, particularly to integrate the response to chemical, biological, high explosive, radiological, and nuclear weapons. This system must be compatible with developments in the new Department of Homeland Security, the U.S. Northern Command, and state and local entities. Current Army science and technology thrusts and programs that are integral to the Objective Force can be adapted for the new national system. Recommendation 4-1. To facilitate the development and fielding of an integrated command-and-control system for homeland security, the Army should initiate or continue research that permits the earliest possible fielding of deployable communications packages equipped with universal multiplexer capability to facilitate command and control across the vast, and disparate, array of agencies that will respond to incidents and events.

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Science and Technology for Army Homeland Security: Report 1 TABLE 4-1 Technologies for Command and Control Functionality Technology Characteristics Availabilitya (R, N, F) Priority for Army S&Tb Multiusec (H, O, C) Command and control Adaptive integrated communications Multiplexer systems to integrate communications between multiple agencies N High H, O, C Mobile local broadband networks Mobile laser and/or microwave communications to pass imagery and communications N, F High H, C Blue Force Tracking System to determine the location of operational personnel and assets from multiple agencies N, F High H, O, C Planning Decision support aids Family of decision support aids such as those in the Agile Commander ATD to enhance real-time planning among multiple agencies for CM N High H, O NOTE: ATD, Advanced Technology Demonstration; CM, consequence management; TLR, technology readiness level. aAvailability: R, ready (TRL 8-9); N, near-term (TRL 4-7); F, far-term (TRL 1-3). bPriority for Army S&T (investment): low, someone else has mission or technology is ready and available; medium, useful but of limited impact and some investment needed; high, very important, no one else working on it, considerable investment needed. cMultiuse: H, Army homeland security; O, Objective Force; C, civilian (first responders and others).

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Science and Technology for Army Homeland Security: Report 1 Rapid Assessment of Physical Damage, Casualties, and Contamination A necessary condition to conduct R and CM activities is an assessment of the situation. The Army and the DoD have introduced a program for the Family of Integrated Operational Pictures (FIOP). This program is designed to meet the needs of the warfighter. However, the concept could be extended to the HLS mission area, and the Army’s experience with the Objective Force can help in doing so. Key elements for the development and fielding of an HLS common operational picture are the development and fielding of a family of both wide-area and focused sensors; the networking of these sensors for situational assessment; the fusion of sensor data; and adapting models that predict physical damage, contamination, and casualties based on real-time reports and sensor information. The situational awareness needed for HLS is closely related to the network-centric concepts inherent in the Objective Force; however, building such awareness is a complex problem because the operational picture must be shared by multiple agencies operating with mixed levels of systems and technologies. A number of sensors exist that can assist with the real-time situational assessment. Overhead imagery from satellites and high-endurance unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) can build an optical and infrared picture of the physical damage. They can also use measurement and signal intelligence to determine WMD contamination. These assets provide a wide-area view of the “battle area.” However, focused views of the affected area are needed. The family of tactical UAVs being fielded for the Objective Force can provide focused views of the HLS situation and be maneuvered to meet real-time needs of the on-scene commander. Chemical, biological, and radiological (CBR) surface sensors can be implanted throughout the affected area to fill in the picture. Robotic land vehicles can be used to implant and locate a family of surface sensors to characterize the damage. Finally, as the needs become more focused, sensors that can look into structures and detect casualties in rubble will need to be developed and fielded to complete the picture. Like the concepts and technology that underwrite the Objective Force, a common operational picture tailored to the demands of a specific contingency, integrated from wide-area sensors, filled in with tactically deployed air and land sensors, and augmented by specially designed and placed local sensors can help support the HLS mission. The current state of sensors to characterize the effects and extent of CBR weapons varies. In Chapter 2, the committee describes the difficulties of detecting CBRNE weapons before they are employed. The post-attack assessment problem is easier technologically. However, it will be necessary to build the operational picture by networking multiple sensors and fusing the inputs into a common picture. For chemical weapons, local sensors are being fielded today, but there is still a need to improve the ability to characterize the attacks over a wide area. As we saw from the anthrax attacks in late 2001, a meticulous process of testing is necessary to identify the biological agent and to determine the extent

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Science and Technology for Army Homeland Security: Report 1 of contamination. Nuclear and radiological detectors are the most highly developed sensors and can now be used to determine the extent of radiation. Multiple sensor reports and images do not, by themselves, build the situational awareness and operational picture needed to conduct effective operations. The sensor pictures and reports need to be analyzed and depicted on a common grid and shared with the R and CM forces digitally. Fusion techniques are under development for the Objective Force, but here again the fusion technology for the HLS mission will need to be adapted to a related, but different, set of requirements. If such an information fusion capability is developed, it can also be used for warfighting in scenarios where WMD is threatened or actually used. Finally, a family of models that can predict physical damage, contamination, and casualties can play an important role in the HLS mission. CBR contamination models today show the effects of known weapons. For example, the Army Risk Assessment Model system provides specific capability to examine the fate and transport of toxic materials in the environment and the implications for ecosystems and human health. The Anti-Terrorist (AT) Planner Software, developed by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) Research and Development Center (in conjunction with the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) and the Technical Support Working Group), provides a flexible tool for examining the vulnerability of facilities to a variety of blast threats and the expected value of alternative approaches to enhance protection. The AT Planner is a good example of a technology whose use is currently restricted to the defense community (or contractors that serve the defense community) that could be of considerable use to the engineering community serving industry. However, the capabilities of these models need to be extended to predict contamination based on a limited set of reports and sensors readings. DTRA has a number of contamination models, and DARPA is also integrating models that can address this problem. These models are based on computational fluid dynamics approaches and their incorporation into simplified models that can be used to predict the movement of contaminants through the atmosphere, a city, inside buildings, and in tunnels and subway systems. Examples of such codes include the Hazard Prediction and Assessment Capability code (a dispersion code developed by DTRA that has been incorporated into its Integrated Munitions Effectiveness Assessment program), the Vapor, Liquid, and Solid Tracking (VLSTRACK) program, and the Dispersion and Diffusion Puff Calculator (D2PC). As reported in Making the Nation Safer: The Role of Science and Technology in Countering Terrorism, work on this type of tool is proceeding, but results of the several models are often in disagreement. The report says, “Further R&D is needed to resolve these anomalies or develop more dependable alternatives” (NRC, 2002). The new technical challenge will be to link contamination models to real-time sensor reports and images to provide for timely attack assessment. The civil engineering community possesses detailed structural drawings and models for civilian buildings and for facilities important to the nation’s infrastruc-

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Science and Technology for Army Homeland Security: Report 1 ture. However, these are not readily obtainable in all localities and regions, nor can they be accessed in centralized databases. The application of these structural models along with progressive collapse technology can be used to forecast building failures and damage from terrorist attacks. The challenge will be to link these existing models to existing and emerging sensors that monitor structural health and to adapt them to the specific needs of the Army and the HLS community. The Army should participate in and encourage the establishment of centralized databases that include structural drawings and models for high profile and critical infrastructure buildings and facilities. The databases would be used for assessing damage and casualty states in the event of terrorist attacks. The application of these structural models could forecast building failures such as occurred at the World Trade Center. Table 4-2 describes technologies for event assessment. Conclusion 4-2. Rapid assessment of the effects of natural disasters and attacks using chemical, biological, high explosive, radiological, and nuclear weapons is essential to mitigate the damage, save lives, and restore order. To some degree, the process for event assessment is similar to that used by the Objective Force in building a common operational picture; however, different sensors and analytical processes will be used. Recommendation 4-2. The Army should conduct research on processes and systems to facilitate the event assessment process. It should support the high-priority research such as sensor networking and fusion to merge reports from disparate sensors into a common picture. Force Protection The forces employed for large-scale R and CM activities need to be protected for sustained operations. Individual protection suits and inoculations are necessary to sustain operations in these conditions. The Army, through its Soldier and Biological Chemical Command (SBCCOM), continues to lead in the development of individual and collective protection technologies. The fielding of the Joint Service Lightweight Integrated Suit and the Joint Service Protective Mask over the next few years will provide some needed improvements in individual protection at a lower maintenance cost while relieving the physiological burdens of heat stress and breathing resistance. Current SBCCOM research on materials for facepieces and lenses, advanced filters, and service-life indicators to improve masks will aid the Army and the civilian community and should be aggressively continued.1 Similarly, the research into protective clothing enhancements in- 1   Anna Johnson-Winegar, Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Chemical and Biological Defense), briefing to the American Association for Engineering Education Forum, Alexandria, Va., on February 25, 2002.

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Science and Technology for Army Homeland Security: Report 1 TABLE 4-2 Technologies for Event Assessment Technology Characteristics Availabilitya (R, N, F) Priority for Army S&Tb Multiusec (H, O, C) Family of interoperable operational pictures Integrated situational awareness displays that can be shared by operational planners and implementers N, F High H, O, C Sensor development Continued development of point and wide-area sensors to characterize chemical, biological, and radiological contamination following an attack R, N, F Low H, O, C Development and fielding of sensors to determine the state of damage to buildings and to locate casualties in structures R, N Low H, C Robotics Land mobile robotics that can breach obstacles to implant sensors that will characterize damage in a contaminated area R, N High H, O, C Sensor networking and fusion Integration of multiple sensors into a common picture N, F High H, O, C Real-time modeling Enhancement of damage and contamination models to provide attack assessments based on the reports of fused sensor data N, F High H, O, C NOTE: TRL, technology readiness level. aAvailability: R, ready (TRL 8-9); N, near-term (TRL 4-7); F, far-term (TRL 1-3). bPriority for Army S&T (investment): low, someone else has mission or technology is ready and available; medium, useful but of limited impact and some investment needed; high, very important, no one else working on it, considerable investment needed. cMultiuse: H, Army homeland security; O, Objective Force; C, civilian (first responders and others).

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Science and Technology for Army Homeland Security: Report 1 tended to reduce physiological stress, increase protection, and improve the logistics burden should maintain the priority given it by the Army. The direction of this research is to develop a family of selectively permeable membranes, reactive self-detoxifying materials, and electro-spun materials and to employ nanotechnology in this development effort.2 Another promising concept for individual protection is the breast-pocket hood, which will provide survivors and first responders with crucial temporary protection from chemical and biological contamination.3 Improvements in individual protection will assist the Army, the first responders, and other personnel who risk exposure following a terrorist event. Mobile collective-protection facilities are necessary for long-term R and CM activities. The Army is currently developing a family of deployable collective-protection shelters that can be used by forces performing CM tasks, local and state authorities and their supporting workforce, and victims of the event (U.S. Army, 2002b, 2002c). Some of the collective-protection shelters are independent facilities that can be rapidly assembled; others are liners for existing buildings. The research that is under way in individual and collective protection is important both to the Objective Force and to the HLS mission. The primary responsibility for the development of vaccines and medical countermeasures to protect against biological agents rests outside the Army, in the Department of Health and Human Services and the Centers for Disease Control. However, the expertise available in Army laboratories is essential to progress in this area, with the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases in particular being a unique source of expertise and continued research. Table 4-3 describes technologies appropriate for force protection. Conclusion 4-3. An aggressive, continuing science and technology program across the spectrum of technologies needed for individual and collective protection is necessary for the Army and civilian emergency responders. Recommendation 4-3. The Army’s research and development across the spectrum of technologies needed for individual and collective protection from the effects of weapons of mass destruction for the Army and civilian emergency responders should be continued. Treatment of Mass Casualties It is likely that mass casualties will result from the use of WMD and high explosive incidents. A mass casualty incident is one in which there are not enough 2   Ibid. 3   Corey M. Grove, Edgewood Chemical Biological Center, briefing to the committee on May 16, 2002.

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Science and Technology for Army Homeland Security: Report 1 TABLE 4-3 Technologies for Force Protection Functionality Technology Characteristics Availabilitya (R, N, F) Priority for Army S&Tb Multiusec (H, O, C) Individual protection Protective masks Development of filters and service-life indicators for masks R, N High H, O, C Suits Development of semipermeable membranes and self-detoxifying material for protective suits N High H, O, C Vaccines Vaccine development for protection against biological agents N, F High H, O, C Collective protection Mobile collective shelters Enhancements to the family of collective shelters under development for the Objective Force R, N Low H, O, C NOTE: TRL, technology readiness level. aAvailability: R, ready (TRL 8-9); N, near-term (TRL 4-7); F, far-term (TRL 1-3). bPriority for Army S&T (investment): low, someone else has mission or technology is ready and available; medium, useful but of limited impact and some investment needed; high, very important, no one else working on it, considerable investment needed. cMultiuse: H, Army homeland security; O, Objective Force; C, civilian (first responders and others).

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Science and Technology for Army Homeland Security: Report 1 resources for casualty management. In the most likely scenarios, civilian emergency medical teams (EMT) and their field and individual equipment will be the first responders on the scene. Their first task will be to perform triage.4 Under normal circumstances, medics carrying out on-site triage have four responsibilities: (1) initiate the triage system and tag patients according to the severity of their injuries or illness, (2) report progress, intervention, and needs to the medical commander, (3) treat only immediate threats to life, i.e., blocked airways and severe arterial bleeding, and (4) move patients by priority to the casualty collection point. In a mass casualty event, the triage5 effort takes on an entirely different meaning, closely resembling rules of engagement in wartime or low-intensity conflicts. The approach will shift from the peacetime emphasis of optimized care for the individual to optimized care for the masses. The tasks of the EMT units will be to perform (1) initial high-level identification of life-threatening injuries and causes, stabilizing them whenever possible and appropriate, (2) assessment of on-going hazard and risk and or protection of responder personnel, (3) assessment of requirements for support infrastructure (facilities, communications, transportation, security), (4) medical triage, and (5) immediate medical response to the WMD event. Immediate medical response at the treatment center (civilian) relies on effective triage tagging. Continuing improvements in the techniques for triage and initial access (e.g., to patients trapped within confined structures), treatment, and distributed, secure communication will be necessary. Where the cause of injury is suspected to involve chemical agents, toxins, or toxic industrial chemicals, the responders must be able to identify and evaluate whether the chemical is corrosive, ignitable, toxic, or reactive; subsequent actions and treatment by the medical responders will key from these observations. Methods for the field assessment of a biological hazard are also employed at this phase of the operation. Identification and containment of the agent after early presumptive diagnosis and identification of the threat will be very important because chemical and biological agents are indiscriminate and may be disseminated over large areas. The patient population will be diverse in age, gender, race, cultural preferences, and basal health. Further, the effects of biological agents can be particularly insidious in that they can be delayed, with the onset occurring and potentially contributing to distribution, even after the person has been transported to a safe area. Communication of the identity and assessment of chemical and biological 4   Triage is the sorting of patients by the severity of injury or illness so that resources can be more efficiently utilized to do the most good for the most people. Triage is conducted repeatedly: during the initial encounter with the civilian emergency medical teams, when the patient is stabilized, decontaminated, and moved to the casualty collection point. 5   The Army’s well-developed and validated approaches for triage could be adapted for civilian mass casualty emergencies.

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Science and Technology for Army Homeland Security: Report 1 agents and an estimate of ongoing risk to other components of the overall response teams will be critical for protection of the responders and for development of a perimeter of quarantine and its maintenance and eventual expansion. Timely and accurate information is essential to communicate instructions and guidelines to the public and to obtain its cooperation. A secure, independent communications system, vertical and horizontal integration of data, and decontamination of the patients and their tracking, along with tracking of physical evidence and clothing, over the event time line will be critically important. Additionally, decision aids to determine dynamic disaster response and evacuation and quarantine policies tailored to the tactical situation will be needed. Medical personnel treating victims of WMD will probably require support from remote experts to identify the chemical or biological agent used in WMD events, including on-demand linkage to medical and scientific information systems, experts, and laboratories. Further, the sharing of acquired insight (agents, medical implications and treatments, exposure/decontamination data, patient and patient property tracking, etc.) will require a chain of custody and will probably be important for building an overall picture of the event theater. While it is essential that the military capability be able to interface with civilian HLS capabilities as needed, some aspects of the military capability may not perfectly match HLS applications. For example, material designed to meet warfighter requirements may not be suitable for civilian use because of material or training constraints. OSHA must certify personnel protection equipment for civilian use, and medical products for distribution to civilians must be fully licensed by the Food and Drug Administration or used with individual informed consent. Military medical defense products for CBRNE assault assume a healthy adult population, but civilian populations exposed to terrorist assault will vary in health and age. Some defense vaccines, pretreatments, and post-event treatments may confound other medical treatments and cultural/religious preferences. Moreover, pre-exposure immunization of large populations against biological agents may not be warranted. Finally, full voluntary compliance cannot be guaranteed for a large civilian population. Application of Army S&T to HLS medical needs will have to address these issues.6Table 4-4 describes technologies for medical response. Conclusion 4-4. The new challenges for recovery and consequence management include triage, tracking, and treatment of mass casualties following an event involving weapons of mass destruction. The scale of such an event 6   Anna Johnson-Winegar, Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Chemical and Biological Defense), briefing to the American Association for Engineering Education Forum, Alexandria, Va., on February 25, 2002.

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Science and Technology for Army Homeland Security: Report 1 and the need to conduct an orderly treatment process in the presence of chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear contamination is daunting. In all likelihood, the nation’s military, including the Army, will be called on to play a significant role in this activity. Recommendation 4-4a. The Army should expand its research in the area of triage, tracking, and treatment of mass casualties. Recommendation 4-4b. The Army should ensure development of individual triage assessment for mass casualties from events involving weapons of mass destruction. Recommendation 4-4c. The Army should ensure the development of a process to leverage information technology to effectively conduct mass casualty triage, tracking, and treatment following such an event. The process development should incorporate remote decision support systems that can be integrated with civilian systems, and a tracking system. Containment and Decontamination of the Effects of Weapons of Mass Destruction There is not much experience in wide-area decontamination of the effects of CBRN weapons. Even if the levels of contamination can be assessed, there are few tools or techniques available for such broad decontamination. One has only to look at the difficulty of sanitizing the facilities contaminated with the anthrax virus in late 2001 to be reminded of this. Chemical and radiological contamination present equally daunting challenges. Decontamination will probably be accomplished in stages, and it is likely that the Army will be involved in early remediation of the effects in WMD events. Decontamination will be a time-critical and stressful task. First, the extent and toxicity of contamination must be determined. It is also likely that the cleanup tasks will be accompanied by substantial physical damage and the need to provide care for mass casualties. Complicating the difficulty of the decontamination process is the fact that standards for cleanup and decontamination have not been developed, although models do exist from civilian cleanup following toxic waste accidents. A structured process based on a real-time attack assessment will be needed to conduct decontamination and cleanup operations.7 For chemical and biological events, a suite of technologies is available: 7   John F. Weimaster, Director, Research and Technology Directorate, Edgewood Chemical Biological Center, U.S. Army Soldier and Biological Chemical Command, briefing to the committee on July 18, 2002.

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Science and Technology for Army Homeland Security: Report 1 TABLE 4-4 Technologies for Medical Response Functionality Technology Characteristics Availabilitya (R, N, F) Priority for Army S&Tb Multiusec (H, O, C) Individual triage assessment and tracking Chemical, biological, and radiological triage assessment cards C4ISR integration of data, decontamination of the patients and material, tracking of the patients, physical evidence, clothing; chain of custody R, N High H, O, C Triage decision support integrated with civilian systems C4ISR; on-demand access to expert network, scenario modeling/procedures Remote expert support for the on-site medical personnel; on-demand linkage to medical and scientific information systems, experts, and laboratories. Vertical/horizontal sharing of insight (agents, medical implications and treatments, exposure/decontamination) R, N High H, O, C Medical support systems Field-deployable diagnostic, life-support, and emergency surgical systems Systems that can be easily and rapidly deployed; that are resistant to vibration, low environmental quality and electromagnetic interference; and that can be operated efficiently in the presence of the assaulting weapon (chemical, biological, radiological residuals) R, N, F High H, O, C Environmental monitoring and threat assessment tools Field-deployable rapid assay devices; dynamic meteorologic models of CBRN threats First responder assessment of agents and risks for staff and patients; assessment of ongoing environmental risks R, N High H, O, C

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Science and Technology for Army Homeland Security: Report 1 Toxicological models for exposure to CBRNE agents Scenario development software based on physiologic and biochemical response to agents Field support for identification of assault agents and probably course of development R, N High H, O Conventional therapeutics Hemorrhage, neurological, and respiration stabilizing devices and technologies Long shelf-life, rapid acting agents R, N High H, O, C Individual countermeasures Vaccines and immunologic factors (including therapeutic application), counteragents for chemical, biological, and radiological exposure Long shelf-life, rapid acting agents R, N, F High H, O MCI training platforms Distributed learning platforms with AI and decision-assisting tools for CBRNE   R, N, F High H, O NOTE: AI, artificial intelligence; C4ISR, command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnai ssance; CBRN, chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear; CBRNE, chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high explosive; MCI, mass casual ty incident; TRL, technology readiness level. aAvailability: R, ready (TRL 8-9); N, near-term (TRL 4-7); F, far-term (TRL 1-3). bPriority for Army S&T (investment): low, someone else has mission or technology is ready and available; medium, useful but of limited impact and some investment needed; high, very important, no one else working on it, considerable investment needed. cMultiuse: H, Army homeland security; O, Objective Force; C, civilian (first responders and others).

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Science and Technology for Army Homeland Security: Report 1 Gas-phase decontaminants such as chlorine dioxide and vapor-phase hydrogen peroxide, Solution chemistry—chlorine and hypochlorite formulations, oxidative systems like hydrogen peroxide, and Catalytic systems such as enzymes.8 There are examples of responses after radiological/nuclear events, but they are limited. The cleanup following the B-52 accident at Palomares, Spain, stands out as the primary practical example of radiation cleanup by the United States. The nuclear decontamination process at Chernobyl may also provide some useful lessons learned. The common denominator in radiological decontamination is that the particles must be contained, encapsulated, and physically removed from the area at some point. Considerable research, process development, training, and planning will be necessary to successfully conduct decontamination following a CBRNE event. The Army, and perhaps the Department of Energy, will be at the forefront of the research necessary to build this capability. Table 4-5 describes technologies for remediation and decontamination. Conclusion 4-5. The processes for decontamination following chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or even large explosive events need to be expanded. Rapid remediation of the areas involved in such an event will be necessary to limit casualties and to restore critical services. Expanded Army science and technology can contribute significantly to process development and to finding decontamination materials to assist the activity. Recommendation 4-5a. Army science and technology should concentrate on the further development of a process to plan and implement remediation and decontamination for chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear events. This process must be capable of being conducted in real time based on limited information. Recommendation 4-5b. Army science and technology should concentrate on the further development of decontamination solutions for chemical, biological, nuclear, or even large explosive events. SUMMARY The challenges of R and CM posed by a massive domestic terrorist event present the Army with new requirements for S&T. There is a high degree of 8   Ibid.

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Science and Technology for Army Homeland Security: Report 1 TABLE 4-5 Technologies for Remediation and Decontamination Technology Characteristics Availabilitya (R, N, F) Priority for Army S&Tb Multiusec (H, O, C) Decontamination process development Development of a process to plan and implement remediation and decontamination for chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear events N High H, C Decontamination solutions Further development and assessment of solutions to clean up chemical and biological contamination R, N, F High H, C NOTE: TRL, technology readiness level. aAvailability: R, ready (TRL 8-9); N, near-term (TRL 4-7); F, far-term (TRL 1-3). bPriority for Army S&T (investment): low, someone else has mission or technology is ready and available; medium, useful but of limited impact and some investment needed; high, very important, no one else working on it, considerable investment needed. cMultiuse: H, Army homeland security; O, Objective Force; C, civilian (first responders and others). overlap with the research and development already under way for the Objective Force; however, R and CM for HLS will require adaptations of the current thrusts and, in some cases, new S&T. In some areas, other government agencies and the private sector can be expected to conduct the S&T, but the Army will have to monitor developments and then adapt the results to its specific needs. REFERENCES CJCS (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff). 1999. CJCSI 8910.01, Blue Force Tracking Collection and Dissemination Policy, December 15. Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Public Affairs. NRC (National Research Council). 2002. Making the Nation Safer: The Role of Science and Technology in Countering Terrorism. Washington, D.C.: National Academies Press. U.S. Army. 2002a. United States Army Weapon Systems 2002. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office. U.S. Army. 2002b. M20A1 Simplified Collective Protection Equipment (SCPE). Available online at <http://www.sbccom.apgea.army.mil/products/m20a1.htm>. Accessed on October 15, 2002. U.S. Army. 2002c. M28 Simplified Collective Protection Equipment (CPE). Available online at <http://www.sbccom.apgea.army.mil/products/m28.htm>. Accessed on October 15, 2002. White House. 1998. The Clinton Administration’s Policy on Critical Infrastructure Protection: Presidential Decision Directive 63, May 22. Available online at <http://www.cybercrime.gov/white_pr.htm>. Accessed on October 3, 2002.