Below are the first 10 and last 10 pages of uncorrected machine-read text (when available) of this chapter, followed by the top 30 algorithmically extracted key phrases from the chapter as a whole.
Intended to provide our own search engines and external engines with highly rich, chapter-representative searchable text on the opening pages of each chapter.
Because it is UNCORRECTED material, please consider the following text as a useful but insufficient proxy for the authoritative book pages.
Do not use for reproduction, copying, pasting, or reading; exclusively for search engines.
OCR for page 8
1
Introduction
Today, in our post-Cold War world, terrorism represents the single most prominent
threat to global security, economy, and social order. As expanding societal
globalization has brought different cultures and ideas into closer contact and
occasional conflict, technological globalization also has increased societal access to
weapons of mass destruction. Terrorism, including the threatened use of weapons of
mass destruction against innocent civilian populations, has been adopted as a key
instrument of asymmetric conflict between groups or nations of disparate political and
military standing in the world. Given the complex and often ambiguous purposes moti-
vating these acts, the anticipation, preparedness, prevention, and response to terrorism is
exceedingly difficult, requiring a dedicated refocusing of our national security efforts.
Terrorism today spans the use of traditional methods of warfare such as conventional
explosives to the emerging possibility of the use of weapons of mass destruction,
including chemical, biological, and nuclear (C/B/N) agents. Particularly for these
weapons of mass destruction, anticipation and assessment of the dispersal of harmful
agents is a critical element of our counterterrorism preparedness and response.
Airborne releases of hazardous agents have been a principal concern of communi-
ties and emergency managers (Appendix D). Communities have prepared themselves to
deal with accidental releases from industrial sites, energy facilities, and vehicles
transporting hazardous materials. The military has been concerned with chemical and
biological warfare as well as the potential for tactical nuclear weapons in the battlefield.
Dispersion models are important tools for dealing with all of these issues, and
observations ranging from direct visual sightings to sophisticated sensor measurements,
provide essential input for these modeling systems. The workshop that is the focus of
this report examined the application of such observations and dispersion models in a wide
~ The requirements of a truly comprehensive operational system go well beyond the technical
modeling and observational tools discussed here. For instance, such a system requires appropriate
expertise and capabilities for effective communications, data acquisition, and "user-friendly"
product display. Although these factors are all vitally important, they are beyond the scope of this
study.
8
OCR for page 9
INTRODUCTION
9
variety of contexts, such as prediction of the global transport of radioactive material from
the Chernobyl accident (Appendix G); dispersion of a possible hazardous agent release
(Appendix E); preparatory planning for the 2002 Winter Olympics in Salt Lake City
(Appendix H); analysis of the dispersion of smoke plumes from the World Trade Center
disaster (Appendix F); and air quality research and prediction.
The basic components of a dispersion modeling system are illustrated in Figure 1.1.
As is evident from the figure, a comprehensive model takes into account the nature of the
material released, local topography, and meteorological and atmospheric data; and from
this information is derived some form of risk parameters. Current available modeling
systems range from the relatively simple to the highly complex (for example, a sophis-
ticated model may contain its own meteorological prediction component and interactive
atmospheric chemistry).
In order to determine how dispersion models can be applied most effectively, it is
important to identify the end users and assess their needs. In doing so, it is useful to
classify emergency response activities into the phases of preparedness, response, and
recovery and analysis. As discussed in the subsequent chapters of this report, for each of
these phases, emergency responders have different information needs and there are
different opportunities for utilizing atmospheric observations and models.
.~.
:::::::::: :
ace )
\..)
I }
3....N
....
= ._
He=~e ~ ~ Su~e ~ ~ w6~ .!
chara~ ~ ~ Geom elm ~ ~ -~a
POW ! F~ We .q4~ ~ ~ ~ ,< i~ : l ~ PIP ~ / of Anon ~-
.~ ~ , . ~
~ do
.,.,.,.! i ~
....... , ~ ~ ~ l~ .
~ .\ it .
a i'
it. ................................................................................................................
'\. \
\.,.,\
~ . . .
.~........
mm
. ...................................................................................................................
. . ,~ .~ _
. .... ,l~ ..~ a.........
i@@
:~2
,l..,.,.,.}
Health.
Eny'i.~np~pen~] Enec~
~ ~ ... ~
/ ~
: /:.:2:2:2:,:,:,:,:,' '~:v222222222222~22222222222222222222222222222222. 'to
i222222222. ~,l~.......................................................
,p - :,:,:,:,:,:,:,:,:,:, ,:,:,:,:,.,"!},.,. :,.,.,. : :,.,. a: +.,:~,:,+.,:,:,:,:,:,:,:,:,:,:,:,:,:,:,:,:,:,:,:,2
: /:,:,:,:,:,:,:,:,:,:,:,:,:,:,:,:::: :,:,:,:,:,:,:,:,:,:,:,:,:,:,:,:,:,:,:,:,:':: :,:,:,:,:,:,:,:,:,:,:,:,:,:,:,:,:,:,:,:':':':':':':':
. I" 2 2 2 2 2 2 """""22222222~2=~^P—~~ ~"""""""""2
. ~ ::::::::::::::::~::~—f::~:x:.~:::::::::::::::::.
: a , , ,, . . . . : :.:: :.::::::::::::::::::::::
~ ~ ~ 2 ~ 2 ~~ 2 .t /
i,,,,,,,~ ~,,,~W,
~ - .............................
., ~ ~
. ,;,,;
FIGURE 1.1 Chemical, biological, and nuclear event modeling system.
OCR for page 10
10
ATMOSPHERIC DISPERSION OF HAZARDOUS MATERIAL RELEASES
Anticipating and responding to terrorist attacks is extremely challenging because
the possible scenarios of timing, location, and method of attack essentially are infinite. In
many cases, the exact source location may not be known initially (e.g., it could be an
instantaneous release or be distributed temporally and geographically; the source could
be ground-based or airborne), and the nature of the substance released may also be
unknown initially. Thus, dispersion tracking and forecasting systems must be capable of
providing useful information even in the absence of some basic input information.
il
Much can be done with existing resources to strengthen observational and model-
ng capabilities for tracking hazardous releases, such as better use of existing local
observational networks and better exploitation of existing models. However, additional
resources likely will be required by many communities for the development and imple-
mentation of improved observing systems and higher-resolution models. Because the
terrorist threat probability is small, many communities might find it difficult to justify the
investments needed. However, as discussed in this report, robust observing systems and
high-resolution atmospheric modeling systems can support many other important func-
tions such as local weather warnings, air quality forecasting, and transportation system
management. The combined benefits thus are likely to justify the investments.
These issues are discussed in greater depth in the following chapters. Chapter 2
examines the information needs of emergency responders in the preparedness, response,
and recovery and analysis phases of a hazardous release. Chapter 3 examines the role of
atmospheric observations in tracking and predicting the dispersion of hazardous agents,
including an assessment of our current observational capabilities and needs for improve-
ment. Chapter 4 contains an overview of the capabilities and limitations of the various
types of dispersion models in use today. In each chapter the committee identifies a
number of priority findings and recommendations that emerged from discussions among
the workshop participants.
Representative terms from entire chapter:
atmospheric observations
