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Workforce, Planning, and Advocacy and Visibility INTRODUCTION The issues discussed in this chapter are organized in three broad sections that collectively address three items in the synthesis of concerns and recom- mendations presented in Chapter 1 (see Table 1-1~. The first section is "Scientific and Engineering Workforce." The second section, entitled "Plan- ning," includes "Compliance with Section 252 Fof the FY 2001 National Defense Authorization Act]," "S&T Planning Options," and "Development (Ca- pability) Planning." The third section, "Advocacy and Visibility," includes "S&T Summits," "Applied Technology Councils," and "Air Force Organiza- tional Structure and S&T Advocate." SCIENTIFIC AND ENGINEERING WORKFORCE In addition to addressing issues relating to the S&E workforce, this section also provides part of the com- mittee response to the general statement of task ques- tion Are changes made by the Air Force sufficient to ensure that concerns about the management of the S&T program have been adequately addressed? The July 1999 Air Force chief scientist report Science and Technology Workforce for the 21st Cen- tury eloquently presents the case for the importance of the scientific and engineering (S&E) Workforce to the efficiency and success of S&T with the statement "Any S&T organization rises and falls on the quality of its people. While excellent facilities are important, it is people, either in teams or as individuals, who accom- plish the mission" (U.S. Air Force, 1999, p. 16~. 28 In short, S&T means people. The caliber of the people involved is at the foundation of any successful endeavor, but personnel of high quality are critical in the S&T arena. If the Air Force S&T program attracts and retains good people, what follows has a high like- lihood of also being good a deep understanding of warfighter needs, a robust and logical investment strat- egy that addresses those needs, strong research on the right topics, sound program management (including both in-house research and extramural research per- formed by universities, industry, and other external en- tities and the important relationship between these two modes), and expeditious transition of technology to the customer. The quality, enthusiasm, dedication, and mission-success orientation of people involved in S&T programs will make or break these programs. The workforce's connections to the national and interna- tional technical community will bring efficiency and synergism and will result in an effective military S&T program. The converse is also true: An overworked, demoralized, poorly managed Workforce will narrow its scope of interests and interactions to the detriment of the S&T program. It is important to note at the outset that the military component of the S&E Workforce is, in the view of the committee, extremely important to the overall viability of the S&T enterprise and must be given adequate at- tention in any review of "workforce considerations." While government civilians (i.e., civil servants) ac- count for the vast majority of government manpower in the Air Force laboratory system, a mix of govern- ment civilian S&Es and uniformed technical officers brings distinct advantages to the total S&E Workforce
WORKFORCE, PLANNING, AND ADVOCACY AND VISIBILITY picture. Simply stated, the advantages of a military S&E workforce component are at least threefold: 1. Young officers entering the service bring with them fresh degrees, new perspectives, and un- bridled enthusiasm that infuse "new blood" into the enterprise. Even if these officers decide to leave the Air Force after a 3- to 4-year tour, they have served an important purpose because of the innovative element that only "outsiders" can bring. The key is to replace these officers as they leave the service or go to new assignments with other newly commissioned technical officers so that the latest knowledge and the freshest think- ing is a hallmark of the laboratory workforce. 2. Mid-level officers who have served elsewhere in the Air Force bring a broader perspective in areas such as acquisition, logistics, and operations to the Air Force enterprise. This broader perspec- tive complements the specialized and often nar- rower technical perspective of the government civilian workforce. 3. Historically, a subset of technical officers that have had laboratory experience rise to the ranks of Air Force senior leadership (e.g., general offic- ers) and thus provide an "S&T" perspective to the corporate decision-making process in various se- nior forums. Perhaps the epitome was General Lew Allen, who served in an Air Force laboratory and ultimately was selected to be the Air Force Chief of Staff. Others, such as Lieutenant Gen- eral Tom Ferguson and Major Generals Jasper Welch, Don Lamberson, and Fred Dopplet served in the laboratory system as junior officers and went on to play major roles in policy, acquisition, and R&D decision making. These officers were consciously nurtured, mentored, and promoted in an Air Force culture that recognized the value and contributions of talented young military scientists and engineers. In short, an appropriate mix of military and govern- ment civilian S&Es, properly led and motivated, has proven its merit throughout the history of the Air Force. Concerns have been expressed over the years regard- ing the deterioration of the nation's S&E workforce (civilian and military). This is a national problem. En- rollment in science and engineering programs at uni- versities is down for students who are U.S. citizens (and are thus employable in AFRL), and promising foreign 29 students are returning home as well. At present, service laboratories cannot make on-the-spot job offers to, for instance, college students who are in a position of choosing from among multiple job offers in a competi- tive market. The pay is usually highly uncompetitive, and compared with those of many industrial organiza- tions, the facilities and equipment are inferior. Compe- tition is especially keen in the areas of most need for the modern military information, computers, and electronics. Service laboratories cannot compete for top-notch talent people who, in many cases, are highly interested in jobs with government laboratories but are understandably unwilling to wait many weeks for approval when the private sector can provide an immediate offer of employment. Unless personnel con- straints such as these are addressed immediately, the service laboratories face a downward spiral from which it will be very difficult, if not impossible, to recover. Whatever institutional difficulties affect the Air Force's S&E workforce, these difficulties must con- tend with a basic supply problem. Most recently these concerns have been articulated in several DSB, SAB, NRAC, and NRC reports. The committee learned that more than 100 studies on this topic have been con- ducted over the past 30 years with remarkably consis- tent recommendations, few of which have been imple- mented. Here the committee focuses specifically on the concerns addressing the Air Force civilian and military S&E workforce. Whatever long-standing problems existed within the DoD S&E workforce in the distant past have been ag- gravated in the past 15 years by a series of consolida- tions, downsizing, and hiring freezes that have pre- vented a renewal of the workforce. As a result, the Air Force S&E workforce, military and civilian, is well below authorizations and, in particular, is facing a near- term crisis as impending retirements further erode the civilian workforce. While the gap between authoriza- tions and accessions may not be a very accurate mea- sure, the size of that gap and its persistence over many years is very troubling (e.g., during 2002, the Air Force believed that it needed about 500 new entrants into the military S&E population, but it was able to add only about 320~. The supply of scientists and engineers in the nation has also shrunk over the same 15-year pe- riod, and competition for the best of the supply is keen. The analyses and tone taken in previous reports re- flect a serious situation. Words such as "crisis" and "death spiral" are used to describe the current status and, more important, the future prospects of the Air
30 EFFECTIVENESS OF AIR FORCE SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM CHANGES Force S&E workforce. A host of quantitative indica- tors support this gloom. The various reports have re- sulted in a plethora of recommendations, more than 30 addressing S&E workforce issues alone and directed at the Secretary of Defense, the Director Defense Re- search and Engineering (DDR&E), or the Secretary of the Air Force. The scope of the recommendations cov- ers a broad range, from adjustments to the current pro- cesses governing acquisition and retention of the S&E workforce to recommendations (at the other extreme) of substantial changes in civil service or of phasing in, over time, half of the DoD R&D management and labo- ratory technical staff from the private sector, academia, and nonprofit organizations as attrition reduces the civil service S&E workforce. The Air Force began, most recently, to address the The Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for S&E workforce issues during calendar year 2000, con- Science, Technology, and Engineering (SAF/AQR) is vening a special summit specifically for this purpose. embarking on this journey; however, the committee The 2000 S&E Summit ("Summit I") highlighted the urges that the process and progress be carefully re- issues, quantified the scale of S&E shortages, and be- viewed to ensure that the right steps are being taken gan developing a consensus on steps needed to reverse based on a sufficiently comprehensive analysis and that the seemingly alarming trends. Summit II, held in De- future actions are implemented consistently over the comber 2001, resulted in plans of action addressing, in years and are measured on the basis of carefully derived spirit, many of the prior recommendations. The per- metrics. As the recent Air Force "re-recruiting effort" sonal commitment of the Air Force Secretary and Chief for its S&E workforce pointed out, pay was not high on of Staff, as expressedin their joins memorandum(dated the list of what S&Es crave; thus, bonuses may not be February 4, 2002) addressed to the S&E workforce, is the first thing that the Air Force should implement to encouraging (U.S. Air Force, 2001~. Specific funding help solve S&E retention and recruitment problems. to initiate actions in FY 2003 has been identified, al- Finally, whatever the Air Force does in this regard, it though not all of the actions have been funded. Some must be remembered that it is a "total force" problem. FY 2004 initiatives have been accelerated to FY 2003 The people that the Air Force needs can be accessed by direction from the Air Force Secretary. Planned Air and retained as active, reserve, or guard officers and as Force actions have the characteristics of incremental civilians. steps,implicitly recognizing that the overallproblemis There is one piece of existing legislation that, if "too hard" to admit to more global solutions. Summit implemented by DoD, would provide the Air Force and III, planned for December 2002 to follow up on initia- all other services with critically needed flexibility for fives developed earlier, was unfortunately canceled. managing the S&E workforce. Section 1114 of the FY 2001 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 106- 398) eliminated the requirement for the Secretary of Defense to obtain approval from the director of the Office of Personnel Management to carry out person- nel demonstration projects at Department of Defense laboratories. By eliminating this requirement, Section 1114 granted the Secretary of Defense the same au- thority granted to the director of the Office of Person- nel Management by the United States Code, Title 5, Section 4703, "Demonstration Projects." The authority granted by 5 U.S.C. ~ 4703 is far- reaching. It allows the conduct of personnel demon- stration projects that are not limited by any civil ser- Without a sufficient assessment of the S&E require- ments and of the skill mix needed for the future versus the supply that exists, the Air Force's decisions will not likely provide a lasting approach to addressing this important issue. The Air Force needs to conduct a cred- ible, comprehensive review of requirements for S&E- trained people across the Air Force, including labora- tories and system program offices (SPOs). This analysis needs to view the problem more broadly than just recognizing the shortfalls of today; it also must address the middle and far term (e.g., the impending retirement of large numbers of the S&E workforce might be an opportunity). If an adequate analysis of requirements can be accomplished soon, the Air Force could "hire" to the needs of the future, as opposed to simply filling the needs that are on the books. Future S&E manpower requirements are not necessarily lin- ear extrapolations of today. Important considerations include supply, changes in weapons systems, competi- tion from outside the Air Force for the same people, jobs requiring S&E talent that are "inherently military" and that must be filled by officers, review and revision of the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act of 1990 (DAWIA [see DoD manual DOD 5000.53- M]) to enable movement between the acquisition ca- reer fields and operational assignments, and, more gen- erally, opportunities for promotion and assumption of additional responsibilities.
WORKFORCE, PLANNING, AND ADVOCACY AND VISIBILITY vice law or regulation relating to the hours of work per day or per week or to the methods of . . Establishing the qualification requirements for, recruitment for, and appointment to positions; Classifying positions and compensating employees; Assigning, reassigning, or promoting employees; Disciplining employees; Providing incentives to employees, including the provision of group or individual incentive bo- nuses or pay; Involving employees, labor organizations, and employee organizations in personnel decisions; and Reducing overall agency staff and grade levels. With these restrictions lifted, the Secretary of De- fense has the authority and great flexibility to address DoD S&E workforce problems by changing the way in which DoD manages its S&E personnel. Although not formally briefed by the Air Force on this legislation, this committee believes that Section 1114 of the FY 2001 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 106- 398), if implemented by the Secretary of Defense, has the potential to ease the long-standing concerns of AFRL scientists, engineers, and managers. PLANNING This section covers two aspects of planning the Air Force S&T program: Section 252 and follow-on op- tions for S&T planning. It also covers development (ca- pability) planning. Compliance with Section 252 This subsection addresses the statement of task ques- tion Is the implementation of Section 252 of the FY 2001 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 106- 398) effective to identify the basis for the appropriate science and technology program top line and invest- ment portfolio? iSection 1114 of the FY 2001 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 106-398) amends Section 342 of Public Law 103-337, the FY 1995 National Defense Authorization Act, by giving the Secretary of Defense the authority, without approval by the Office of Personnel Management, to conduct personnel demonstration projects in DoD laboratories. 31 Section 252 states that "the Secretary of the Air Force shall conduct a review of the long-term chal- lenges and short-term objectives of the Air Force sci- ence and technology programs. The Secretary shall complete the review not later than one year after the date of enactment of this Act" (see Appendix B in this report). The remainder of Section 252 goes on to specify the requested budgetary assessments and the details requested of the long-term challenges and short- term objectives, as well as the completion of the pro- cess through review by the Comptroller General and subsequent submission to Congress. According to the presentations to the committee at its May 2002 meeting by Col. Schneider (2002b) and Lt. Col. Brandt (2002), the requested procedures were completed in the fall of 2001. Some 300 people were involved in the review (100 military and 200 civil- ians) 90 from Air Force headquarters, 50 from the Air Force user community ("warfighters"), and 160 from the general S&T community. Six long-term challenges were identified: 1. Finding and Tracking, 2. Command and Control, 3. Controlled Effects, 4. Sanctuary, 5. Rapid Air and Space Response, and 6. Effective Air and Space Persistence. Each of the challenges was addressed by an inte- grated product team (IPT) that identified the desired capabilities within that challenge. A long-term roadmap and a listing of required research elements are given for each capability. These in turn are subdivided into their basic research (6.1), applied research (6.2), and advanced technology development (6.3) compo- nents. Altogether, the six long-term challenges identi- fied 23 desired capabilities. Eight short-term objectives were also identified: 1. Target Location, ID, and Track; 2. Command, Control, Communications, Comput- ers, and Intelligence; 3. Precision Attack; 4. Space Control; 5. Access to Space; 6. Aircraft Survivability and Countermeasures; 7. Sustaining Aging Systems; and 8. Air Expeditionary Force Support.
32 EFFECTIVENESS OF AIR FORCE SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM CHANGES Each of the short-term objectives was addressed by an IPT that identified warfighter prioritized enabling capabilities, identified deficiencies for each enabling capability, and developed an S&T roadmap to elimi- nate each deficiency. Altogether, the eight short-term objectives listed 41 enabling capabilities and 100 defi- ciencies, leading to 300 roadmapped projects. The required funding for these endeavors shows a nearly linear ramp-up, from the present S&T budget level of about $1.5 billion to a level of about $3.2 bil- lion by FY 2006 and remaining at that FY 2006 level for the foreseeable period beyond FY 2006. These latter funds significantly exceed the funds pro- grammed for Air Force S&T in the FY 2003 President's budget, according to the briefing presented to the com- mittee on June 28, 2002, by William gorger, director of plans and programs for the AFRL. In other words, the review was not fiscally constrained by the resources planned for either S&T or the acquisition programs that must absorb the S&T. In summary, definition of the long-term challenges and short-term objectives was completed on October 25, 2001. The Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) was notified of completion on October 26, 2001. The SECDEF notified the Comptroller General of the completion of the review on November 19, 2001, and the Comptroller General in turn reported to Congress that "the Air Force complied with the requirements of section 252 of the Fiscal Year 2001 National Defense Authorization Act" (GAO, 2002~. The ConOps Task Forces framework recently de- fined by the Air Force Chief of Staff will be used by the Air Staff for future planning and programming ac- tivities in upcoming POM formulations/submittals. If the short-term objectives framework continues to be used, it will have to be mapped by means of a cross- correlation matrix to the ConOps Task Forces frame- work if the Air Staff is to understand the relevance of the S&T program. Using the approved Air Force frame- work from the start would preclude the need for this cross-correlation step and eliminate the risk of "losing fidelity" during the cross-correlation process, while also being a much more efficient and straightforward process. The committee judges that the Section 252 review, though fully satisfying the congressional directive, does not yet completely satisfy the overarching con- cern for a long-term and executable S&T plan because of several artifacts of the congressional directive and the "first-time-through" nature of the review. These include the lack of a mid-term category (that was not specified by Congress; i.e., the committee understands that the Air Force was advised to follow the congres- sional directive precisely); the assumption of a far-term schedule for ATDs and transition to an acquisition pro- gram (50 years hence in many cases); and the lack of fiscal constraints. In addition, the review did not con- sider the complete S&T portfolio, and it preceded the Air Force's ConOps Task Forces, which are now a key part of the Air Force' s strategic planning methodology. S&T Planning Options The discussion in this subsection responds, in part, to the general statement of task question Are changes made by the Air Force sufficient to ensure that con- cerns about the management of the S&T program have been adequately addressed? The Air Force reported to the committee that it has taken action on an overarching planning concern (which it views as follows: "The Air Force should have a long-term plan that provides for the future needs of the Air Force."), as well as about half of the specific concerns that were raised previously. The most com- prehensive specific action taken by the Air Force in S&T planning was the response to Section 252, de- scribed above. The Air Force told the committee (Brandt, 2002) that its response established a frame- work for strategic investment guidance; that the results have been integrated into key Air Force planning and guidance documents, including the S&T Plan, Annual Planning and Programming Guidance, and Transfor- mation Flight Plan; and that lessons learned have been identified for future reviews. A candidate planning framework involves Warfighter Technology Areas (WTAs). AFRL reported that it is defining WTAs aimed at relating technology push to requirements pull (Borger, 2002; Rubertus, 2002~. Part of the motivation for developing this frame- work was supposedly to insulate the S&T program from many Air Force planning and acquisition initia- tives. The committee certainly understands that the Air Force S&T community cannot and should not either replan or reorient the S&T program quickly or fre- quently as the focus churns from program elements to core competencies, to critical future capabilities, to critical future goals, to short-term objectives and long- term challenges, to task forces, to concepts of opera- tion, to transformation, and to pathfinders. But the com- mittee noted a propensity for the use of "meatball"
WORKFORCE, PLANNING, AND ADVOCACY AND VISIBILITY charts that indicate a relationship between frameworks by means of a matrix with dots or "x' s" indicating some relationship. Such charts usually mask the enormous amount of work required to link programs substantively and quantitatively to strategic goals. To be useful, the WTAs must provide a much more substantive link than meatball charts. Further, alignment of all S&T with the WTAs would be dangerous if it does not allow for new or revolutionary concepts to arise either as a result of basic research or in response to the evolving vision and strategic plan. In view of the discussion above, it would make sense for the Air Force to take advantage of the framework provided by Section 252, but to refine it. Here the com- mittee expands on possible refinements. For example, prior to preparation of the FY 2005 POM, steps could be taken to ensure that the result is the "long-term plan that provides for the future needs of the Air Force," as captured in the Air Force' s statement of the overarching concern for planning. The number, scope, and technical content of the tasks may make it impractical for the major commands and corporate leadership to review in detail the com- plete Air Force S&T program. The committee judges, however, that the AFRL allocations of 6.2 and 6.3 can and should be at least reviewed at the margin. A sug- gested process is described in Appendix F. In developing the long-term plan, the committee urges consideration of the following approaches: 1. Implementation of the lessons learned from the Section 252 review, including full consideration of mid-term technologies; . Selection of objectives and challenges that are measurable and related as explicitly as practical to the current Air Force strategic planning (con- sistent with the earlier SAB recommendation ESAB, 20011~; 3. Inclusion of S&T that is evolutionary, necessary to provide needed capabilities independent of risk or difficulty, and a continuation of ongoing ac- tivities excluded from the Section 252 review but necessary for a complete plan; 4. Establishment of milestones and transitions for an efficient program rather than the end date of the planning phase or any other artificial date and, where applicable, creation of a display of the milestones and transitions on roadmaps that link to Air Force strategic planning; 5. For programs, projects, and tasks that are funded, 33 maintenance of roadmaps and the quantified con- tribution to the relevant objective or challenge; 6. Again, for funded activities, consideration of the bow-wave effect in subsequent updates of the long-range plan with feedback of the results to shape future POMs; and 7. To the extent practical, use of funding estimates concurred in by the Air Force Cost Analysis Agency consistent with USD/AT&L full funding guidance. Above the committee used the term "evolution- ary S&T." For a complete long-term plan, the im- portance of including evolutionary S&T is exempli- fied by the case of the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). The invention of the atomic bomb was revolutionary. However, evolutionary develop- ments of rocket propulsion, inertial guidance, and warhead design resulted in a truly revolutionary ca- pability when combined into a system that could deliver a nuclear weapon across the world, with suf- ficient accuracy, in just minutes. The ICBM was a revolutionary capability made possible by a series of evolutionary technology developments. The committee notes that the Section 252 review for long-term challenges had to meet four criteria: The challenges should involve compelling requirements of the Air Force, high-risk/high-payoff areas, and diffi- cult but probably achievable results but should not be a direct extension of an ongoing program. For future reports to Congress, it may prove useful to continue tracking activities that satisfy these criteria. In addi- tion, the following thoughts are offered. In closing the gap between short-term objectives and long-term chal- lenges, either (1) add a category of mid-term challenges covering transition in 5 to 15 years or (2) extend the time frame of long-term challenges to cover 15 years and beyond to fill the gap or (3) define categories based on budget activities (e.g., the short-term category would apply to potential 6.3 activities, mid-term would apply to 6.2, and long-term to 6.1~. As long as all potential S&T challenges and opportunities are fully addressed, the committee judges that the choice should be made on the basis of an assessment of cost and an attempt to stave off any unintended consequences that would have a negative effect. Further suggestions in completing the long-term plan include the following: Apply reinstituted development (capability) plan-
34 EFFECTIVENESS OF AIR FORCE SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM CHANGES ning (see the subsection below) to develop sys- tem or system-of-systems concepts. 2. Request that industry and professional associa- tions provide recommended technologies, con- cepts, or thrusts to be considered. 3. Apply WTAs only to the extent that they increase efficiency without compromising the rigor of the resulting plan. 4. Conduct an SAB quality review of the results. 5. In preparation for the subsequent, FY 2005 POM, make explicit, documented funding decisions on each task or project that falls within the POM window. 6. In the resulting program, assess the relative fund- ing for 6.1 versus 6.2 versus 6.3, evolutionary ver- sus revolutionary, technology push versus opera- tional pull, air versus space and, among technical areas, compare the assessments with previous such measures like "sanity checks." 7. Review the resulting long-term plan and POM submission at an S&T Summit in the time frame of the AFMC submittal of the FY 2005 POM, and if the recommendation for a biennial, iterative review at the margin is implemented, take the re- sults to the summit. 8. Maintain roadmaps and assessments to reflect funding changes, milestones accomplished or de- layed, technical breakthroughs or problems, and so on. 9. Capture the new lessons learned and institution- alize the process to take place every fourth year (more frequently if changes to the plan or the na- tional security environment dictates) through steps such as updates to the applicable Air Force policy documents and associated implementing instructions. Development (Capability} Planning This subsection addresses the statement of task ques- tion Is the revised development planning process ef- fective to aid in the coordination of the needs of the Air Force warfighters with decisions on S&T investments and the establishment of priorities among different S&T programs? Throughout the Cold War, the Air Force signifi- cantly benefited from consistent S&T investment. A key reason was that it had a balanced development team. To have this balance there must not only be ad- vanced technology scientists and engineers but also conceptual designers as well as planners who can rec- ognize the risks and formulate plans to reduce them to a practical level. During the Cold War, many programs (e.g., B-1, F-117, B-2, F-22, C-17) came out of devel- opment planning activities of the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. Early in the 1990s, Congress eliminated fund- ing for development planning, and this decision was not challenged by the Air Force. To keep some devel- opment planning activities going, the funding had to come from current programs or product center operat- ing funds, and both sources became scarcer as the mili- tary drawdown continued through the decade. Today, a key ingredient in achieving a truly trans- formational future warfighting capability is widespread adoption of new system-of-systems methods and ar- chitectures, which cut across conventional stovepiped product and platform boundaries. Despite the critical need for such thinking today, given the explosion of information technology and the need for new network- centric system-of-systems constructs, a significant gap exists in the overall Air Force S&T process because there is no current organizational entity equipped or charged to perform the vital system-of-systems func- tion. This function is in contrast to a previous develop- ment planning function, which was organized around each individual product center. Although very useful, that process tended to limit the breadth of the systems considered to those bounded by individual product cen- ter spheres of responsibility. The Air Force has been without a development plan- ning function for almost 10 years, and it has lost the organization and, most importantly, the people to do it. Congress and Air Force leadership have recognized the problem and endeavored to re-establish the function. AFMC commander General Lester Lyles made some initial funding available in 2002 and established an AFMC office focused on "capability" planning to lay a foundation for restoring the broad development plan- ning function (Schulz, 2002~. However, until the right people are recruited, assigned, and funded, the func- tion whether it is called development or capability planning cannot even begin to achieve proper results. S&T work is normally performed by individuals who are specialists in their fields and usually work at limits of the state of the art. To better channel their work and enhance the transition of technology to use- ful products, there is a need for a small group of con- cept-development personnel who have broad experi- ence in many different technical areas and who can synthesize new system constructs.
WORKFORCE, PLANNING, AND ADVOCACY AND VISIBILITY The classic view of development planning in the Air Force can be described as the definition of broad re- quirements supporting eventual procurement of a com- ponent system. However, there is now a need to envi- sion any component of the arsenal from aircraft to small munitions, from space vehicles to ground sup- port equipment as part of an overall "system of sys- tems" in which that component must be planned from its inception as part of the evolving overall system. Each component must be designed to enhance Air Force warfighting capability not only as a component, but also through its role in exploiting potential syner- gistic interactions of all components of the overall Air Force system. The overarching capabilities of new technologies (e.g., widely and deeply embedded information tech- nologies) should be not only innovatively exploited within Air Force "component systems" such as aircraft, but also used to enable novel new warfighting capabili- ties through integration of "systems of Air Force sys- tems." Innovations at that level are increasingly likely to be the basis for major transformation of Air Force warfighting methods. Therefore, innovation at that level should be actively supported by appropriate new forms of development planning. An aircraft designer must have knowledge of aerodynamics, materials, structures, thermodynamics, electronics, and so forth. In the future, an even broader range of capabilities will routinely have to be considered when designing any new system and system of systems. That broader sys- tems outlook is needed in order to innovate entirely new combinations of air, space, communications, sens- ing, control, and weapons systems or technology hav- ing new warfighting capabilities. To do this effectively, there must be constant interplay between the overall S&T community, the concept development people, and the mission analysts. A development (capability) planning group would be a catalyst for bringing together the S&T and design com- munities, establishing long-range plans to sort out the most promising new systems concepts, and setting realis- tic schedules and funding needs. The resulting capability plan would communicate to users what the potential new developments might be and what the various choices among them are, and it would help dialogues with using commands to be truly two-way exchanges. The AFMC commander strongly voiced his concern to the committee regarding the atrophied development planning activities, stated that he was committed to rec- tifying the situation, and articulated the critical value 35 of this process in the evolution of future systems. Each of the product center commanders has recognized the need to reinvigorate development planning, and each has submitted budget inputs for it over the past few years. Despite a focus on bringing back robust devel- opment planning, funding for this activity has not sur- vived the budget process. The committee judges that today there is inadequate funding to conduct even a minimal development (capability) planning activity. Establishing a development (capability) planning or- ganization with development teams and planning per- sonnel is mandatory for improving the planning of fu- ture systems. The shortage of S&T personnel is a major worry today, but the shortage of qualified systems-of- systems analysts and concept designers with a strong systems engineering background to serve as develop- ment (capability) planners is actually more acute. Such individuals must have served an apprenticeship in more than one discipline or product area as well as having actual design experience. These skills are hard to ob- tain, whether working in industry or government. Since the Air Force's development planning function was eliminated many years ago, there is no ready pool of people from which to recruit to fill this void. Attracting these skilled people requires a funded budget line item, special job positions, and high-level leadership (e.g., a leader with experience reaching back to earlier devel- opment planning). The organization should be led by a general officer or senior executive service (SES) civil- ian and staffed with a cadre that includes personnel with operational and S&T experience. Such a group is necessary if there is to be an effective capability plan leading to innovative future warfighting systems that rapidly and fully exploit our expanding technology base. The Air Force should consider consultation with its traditional systems houses (such as The RAND Cor- poration and The MITRE Corporation) and experi- enced personnel in the other services in the reconstitu- tion of this capability. ADVOCACY AND VISIBILITY This section covers S&T Summits, Applied Tech- nology Councils, and the Air Force organizational structure and S&T advocate. S&T Summits This subsection addresses the statement of task ques- tion Do the biannual S&T Summits provide sufficient
36 EFFECTIVENESS OF AIR FORCE SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM CHANGES visibility into, and understanding and appreciation of, the value of the S&T program to the senior level of Air Force budget and policy decision makers? A significant change initiated by the Air Force early in 2000 was the creation of S&T Summits, which in- volve the entire top Air Force leadership. The purposes of the summits are to better inform the operational and support leaders of the Air Force about future capabili- ties that can be expected from S&T programs and to help educate the S&T community on the specific needs and desires of the operators. The following are specific summit objectives: (1) review the S&T program; (2) review findings and recommendations from Congress, the SAB quality reviews, and the S&T portion of De- fense Planning Guidance; (3) present technology plan- ning initiatives and strategy for the Program Objectives Memorandum; and (4) identify candidates for the Un- funded Priority List. The first summit was planned to last most of a day in April 2000; it was sponsored by General Lyles in his new capacity as AFMC commander and was organized by the S&T community. The audience included the Air Force Secretary, Air Force Chief of Staff, many four- star generals, and many staff generals and key civil- ians. The agenda covered the entire S&T portfolio to expose selected opportunities, people, and ideas within the S&T program to top Air Force leaders and policy makers. Attendees discussed S&T investment strategy and identified specific candidates for increased fund- ing associated with zero percent real growth (i.e., Tanks Under Trees, Agile Laser Protection, Joint Battlespace Infosphere, and Directed Energy). There was also an action item to develop a corporate process for (1) stop- ping or slowing the pace of advanced technology dem- onstrations if no transition funds appear in two succes- sive cycles of user POMs, and (2) obtaining senior leadership approval prior to S&T disinvestment. All together, nine action items resulted, and more summits were recommended. The second S&T Summit was held in November 2000. It, too, was sponsored by General Lyles and had top-level attendees (e.g., the Air Force Secretary and Air Force Chief of Staff). The meeting included an overview of Defense Planning Guidance and congres- sional direction, a review of ATDs and the SAB qual- ity review findings, and a look at the S&T investment strategy and additional investment opportunities. The meeting concluded with 13 action items. Originally it was planned to have the summits twice a year, but the Air Force found it too difficult to sched- ule the top leadership twice a year. Consequently, the third S&T Summit, again sponsored by General Lyles, was held in October 2001. The audience included the new Air Force Secretary, the new Air Force Chief of Staff, the Vice Chief of Staff, the USAFE Commander, and 16 other general officers and key civilians. The Deputy Assistant Secretary for Science, Technology and Engineering opened the meeting, and the AFRL Commander made the wrap-up. As a result of the attacks of September 11, the 2001 agenda was changed to include Active Denial Technol- ogy (nonlethal antipersonnel directed energy technol- ogy); Information Extraction (for asymmetric threat detection and warning); a Surface Target Ordnance package; Infrared Countermeasures for Aircraft (ad- vanced ideas); and a new Vehicle Stopper. There were also briefings on classified S&T programs. There were several unclassified action items (e.g., identify spiral opportunities to accelerate the fielding of active denial technologies) and five classified action items. The next summit had originally been planned for December 2002 but was canceled and may not be re- scheduled. The committee strongly believes that an annual S&T Summit is critical. Although, summits are demanding in terms of preparation and attendance time for the senior leaders, they are worth the effort. The summits appear to be having the desired effect of edu- cating top Air Force leaders on opportunities for en- hancing future combat capabilities through the S&T program. The commanders of both AFMC and AFRL indicated that the summits have improved communica- tion and understanding between the S&T community and warfighters. The meetings have also helped ensure that the right S&T projects are being worked to best support warfighters. The result from the first summit- getting the major commands to commit transition fund- ing for ATDs was a significant step. Action items from the summits also evidence their effectiveness. The scope of this summit activity could be expanded by instituting similar exchanges between the S&T advo- cate and other constituencies, including OSD, other services, and key congressional members and staff. Applied Technology Councils This subsection addresses the statement of task ques- tion Are the applied technology councils effective in contributing the input of all levels beneath the senior leadership into coordination, focus, and content of the S&T program?
WORKFORCE, PLANNING, AND ADVOCACY AND VISIBILITY The Air Force has instituted ATCs to improve the transition of technology from AFRL into applicable weapon systems. ATCs are semiannual meetings of the AFRL commander, the appropriate product center commanders, and the vice commander of the using command. There are five different ATCs (with Air Combat Command LACC], Air Mobility Command LAMC], Air Force Special Operations Command [AFSOC], Air Force Space Command [AFSPC], and AFMC). All of the ATCs have met at least four times and will continue to meet. The ATCs originally started by reviewing the progress and funding on ATD programs being con- ducted by AFRL. Consistent with the overall aim of the rapid, successful transition of technology into the hands of warfighters, three goals have been established for each ATC: (1) that AFRL have 50 percent of 6.3 funding in ATDs, with the remainder in critical experi- ments; (2) that an ATC not commission a new ATD or continue funding an existing ATD without commit- ment by the using command to budget for the funding required to transition the matured technology into a weapon system; and (3) that the applicable SPO direc- tor be prepared, together with his or her contractor, to incorporate the matured technology into the weapon system when funding is available. ATCs have matured and broadened in scope. A Weapon System Capability Plan (WSCP) has been de- veloped for each weapon system. WSCPs track the technology availability dates for each of the emerging technologies and graphically depict the time when the technology will be available for incorporation into the weapon system and the status of required funding. ATCs appear to be very successful in establishing effective and meaningful communication between the using commands, SPOs at product centers, and AFRL. When the process was initiated, less than 15 percent of the ATDs were fully funded for transition. After four rounds of ATCs, required transition funding has been budgeted for over 50 percent of the ATDs. Some ATDs have been terminated or restructured, and some new ATDs have been commissioned. Using commands, at the top-leadership level, have a greater appreciation for S&T potential and a stronger voice with respect to which ATDs are pursued. Weapon system SPOs have an increased appreciation for the technology thrusts being pursued in AFRL and for which ones using com- mands would like incorporated into weapon systems. AFRL has developed an increased appreciation for helping to ensure that technology is not only developed 37 but also successfully transitioned to using commands. However, the ATC process has not yet been codified in an Air Force regulation, although one has been drafted. The ATCs have been a success in two directions- they enhanced AFRL awareness of warfighter needs and the transition of technology, and they improved the MAJCOMs' appreciation of the value of S&T and the processes required. The latter, improving the leadership's appreciation for S&T, is a key to improv- ing the long-term prospects of S&T in the Air Force. This appreciation could be enhanced by extending this process down to the 6.2 level. Air Force Organizational Structure and S&T Advocate This subsection addresses two statement of task questions: Does the Air Force organizational structure provide for a sufficiently senior-level advocate of S&T to ensure an ongoing, effective presence of the S&T community during the budget and planning process? Is the designation of the AFMC commander as the S&T budget advocate effective to assure that an adequate budget top line is set? The Air Force views the principal concern regard- ing organization and advocacy as "senior leadership's understanding of the need to maintain S&T for the fu- ture warfighter needs and advocating a long-range di- rection for the S&T program" (Schneider, 2002b, chart 13~. The Air Force reported action on this concern to the committee and on most of the specific concerns and recommendations relative to it that have been raised by Congress and in previous studies. Changes described in the present report apply to the organizational structure or to processes employed by the structure. For the changes to provide an "ongoing, effective presence of the S&T community during the budget and planning process," as called out in the ques- tion beginning this subsection, those changes must positively influence the Air Force's process for inte- grating its program and budget submissions. There exists a widespread perception that S&T ad- vocacy has suffered in comparison with that for other parts of the Air Force program. The committee be- lieves, however, that since the Air Force designated AFMC to program for and advocate S&T (see below), advocacy for S&T has become comparable to that for other major parts of the Air Force program (i.e., it is initially programmed by an Air Force major command
38 EFFECTIVENESS OF AIR FORCE SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM CHANGES with a four-star commander as the principal advocate). During integration of the total Air Force program by Air Force headquarters, the AFMC commander and his staff advocate S&T in the same way that the other ma- jor commands advocate their programs. Also, during the integration, S&T is represented in the Air Force corporate structure at the same level in the Office of the Secretary or the Air Staff as are other major parts of the Air Force program. The way in which S&T resulting from Air Force funding finds its way into Air Force systems may ob- scure an understanding of its role in the Air Force for maintaining the technological edge. S&T applied in a system is usually the choice of the winning prime con- tractor, so the S&T "source" is not usually known to personnel beyond those directly involved in the acqui- sition program. The committee notes that the shorter acquisition cycle promised by the Air Force's collaborative, spiral development initiative may offer more opportunities for technology insertion, assuming that programs are so structured, as the Air Force states. Such program design requires clever, resourceful people with knowl- edge of potential technological opportunities and inge- nuity. Success requires integrated program and tech- nology planning that effectively bridges the organizational boundary between AFRL and the Air Force product and logistics centers; perhaps the rein- vigorated development (capability) planning discussed in this chapter can facilitate such planning, with em- phasis on a modular, open systems approach. While to many, the value of S&T to the Air Force is self-evident, to many others now, the lessons of history could profitably be told. A serious, thorough, and com- petent effort to educate the officer corps on the history, value, and necessity for S&T may be the most fruitful investment in the long term. One approach to this en- deavor would be to task the Air Force history com- munity to document, for reading throughout the Air Force, the technological history of the enablers of current major Air Force capabilities (such as stealth and precision munitions). The objective would be to provide future Air Force planners and leaders with an appreciation of the link between S&T and opera- tional military capabilities. Another approach would be the development of case studies that could be used at the Air War College to enhance the curricu- lum for all Air Force mid-level officers. Such case studies could also be developed by a few of these students as a "thesis" and/or a research project and then be available as classroom material for the larger group of students. As a result of pressures on the Air Force budget and resulting impacts on the S&T component of that bud- get over the past several years, recent studies have called for a senior-level uniformed advocate for the Air Force S&T program. As an indirect result of the rec- ommendations of these studies and a direct result of a recommendation in an Air Force SAB summer study of 2000 (SAB, 2001), the Air Force has recently desig- nated the AFMC commander as its "S&T advocate." The mechanism for this advocacy was the reassignment of S&T POM formulation and submission from SAF/ AQ to the AFMC commander. Previously, the AFRL commander, serving also in the position of Air Force technology executive officer, submitted the S&T POM through SAF/AQ, who served as advocate throughout the Air Force's POM and bud- get deliberations. Under that arrangement, the AFMC commander still had responsibility for AFRL man- power (submitted as part of the AFMC POM) and in- frastructure (where AFRL military construction EMILCON] projects were prioritized and submitted as part of the AFMC submission). Under the new arrange- ment, about 2 years ago S&T POM responsibility was shifted from SAF/AQ to AFMC. Thus, the S&T POM is now submitted as part of the overall AFMC POM, and the AFMC commander has become the advocate for the S&T budget. Since this change has been operative for only one full Air Force POM cycle, it is too early to judge its effectiveness fully. However, the rationale for the change seems well grounded, and preliminary indica- tions are that it is already having positive effects. There are at least four reasons why designating the AFMC commander as the S&T advocate is sound. First, the AFMC commander is a four-star military ex- ecutive who has peer relationships with his four-star counterparts in the Air Force's warfighting commands. Second, with this change, the AFMC commander now has responsibility for the full set of S&T resource-re- lated decisions S&T budget, laboratory manpower, and laboratory infrastructure. As a result, he can for- mulate an integrated set of investment strategies that were otherwise divided between different organiza- tional chains of command and different POM and bud- get submissions. Third, the AFMC commander partici- pates in senior forums with his four-star counterparts during which investment deliberations and decisions are often shaped (e.g., the Corona series of Air Force
WORKFORCE, PLANNING, AND ADVOCACY AND VISIBILITY senior leadership meetings). Fourth, as a senior officer, the AFMC commander has the opportunity to be espe- cially effective in advocating Air Force S&T outside the Air Force to key decision-making and policy orga- nizations, such as OSD and the Congress. This combi- nation of factors positions the AFMC commander to be a most logical and effective advocate of S&T within and outside the Air Force. A potential downside to assigning S&T POM re- sponsibility to the AFMC commander is that a fu- ture commander with marginal appreciation for the S&T mission could, when faced with budget short- falls in other AFMC organizations (e.g., near-term needs of product, test, or logistics centers) be less protective of the S&T budget and use part of it to fix such shortfalls during preparation of the overall AFMC POM submission. External checks and bal- ances (e.g., corporate Air Force, OSD, and congres- sional review of POM submissions) should help mitigate this possibility. It has been suggested that the Air Force Vice Chief of Staff should be considered as an alternative to the AFMC commander as the S&T advocate. However, current roles and missions of the Vice Chief explicitly preclude this position from serving as an advocate for any program during the POM process (S&T is a budget line item and therefore considered a program). More specifically, the Vice Chief chairs the Air Force Coun- cil, which adjudicates the Air Force POM and budget process, and therefore cannot serve as an advocate for any program that the council would consider during the adjudication process. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS Scientific and Engineering Workforce Finding 3-1. Problems within the Department of Defense's scientific and engineering (S&E) workforce have been aggravated in the past 15 years by policies that have adversely affected the workforce and resulted in a crisis in the Air Force S&E military and civilian workforce. Air Force plans, to be implemented in FY 2003, may help alleviate these problems; however, ab- sent action by the Secretary of Defense, present plans are unlikely to halt the trends in the S&E workforce, described in dire terms in numerous studies and reports as well as in presentations made to this committee (Schneider, 2002b). Steps and processes being adopted by the Air Force are but small, incremental steps. 39 Finding 3-2. Although Congress has provided by law for the capability to help with the S&E workforce prob- lem, administrative difficulties within the Office of the Secretary of Defense have prevented the implementa- tion of the needed measures. Based on experience to date, it appears that only direction by the Secretary of Defense will override the interests of various agencies which, from their perspectives, have a legitimate role in "protecting the current personnel system." Critical constraints, until gone or reduced, will not allow the service laboratories to compete effectively for S&E personnel. Said another way, the committee believes that it is not an overstatement to conclude that the need to address the S&E workforce problem is a situation in which national security concerns merit the direct in- volvement of the Secretary of Defense. Finding 3-3. The committee found no evidence of a comprehensive plan or methodology in place for the management of long-term military and civilian S&E workforce requirements. Recommendation 3-1. The Secretary of Defense should immediately direct the implementation of the provisions of Section 1114 of the FY 2001 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 106-398) so that De- partment of Defense laboratory directors have the abil- ity to shape their workforces. The Air Force Secretary and Chief of Staff should ensure rapid execution of these provisions. Recommendation 3-2. The Air Force should conduct a comprehensive review of requirements for military and civilian S&E-trained people across the Air Force, including laboratories and system program offices, and establish a system for long-term management of the S&E workforce. Planning Finding 3-4. The Air Force complied with the require- ments of Section 252 of the FY 2001 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 106-398). The committee found agreement among the participants that the Sec- tion 252 review was an effective aid in helping to de- fine the candidate investment portfolio. Additional re- finements beyond Section 252 in the planning methodology are needed to influence the S&T portfo- lio. Many possibilities for refinement exist, such as those discussed in the text.
40 EFFECTIVENESS OF AIR FORCE SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM CHANGES Finding 3-5. The applied technology councils (ATCs) provide a powerful mechanism for reviewing the 6.3 S&T activity that involves the customers. The 6.2 ac- tivities would also benefit from a similar annual review that engaged outside stakeholders such as the warfighters and major commands. Such a review should include activities marginally above and below the nominal budget limit. Finding 3-6. The development (capability) planning process is critical to successful S&T investment for meaningful warfighting capability and therefore is criti- cal to our national defense. The committee believes that the Air Force Materiel Command recognizes the need. However, the Air Force is a long way from having vi- able development (capability) planning. This deficit is especially clear in the area of broad-gauged concept planning at the level of "systems of systems." Recommendation 3-3. The Air Force should take ad- vantage of the framework provided by Section 252 of the FY 2001 National Defense Authorization Act as an important step in its overall S&T planning process. Further legislation is not required. Recommendation 3-4. For future use, the Air Force should refine the FY 2001 National Defense Authoriza- tion Act Section 252 framework to develop the long-term plan that the Air Force sees as the overarching concern. In doing this, the Air Force should seriously consider the many suggestions offered by this committee, but giving special attention to the following: (1 ) implementing the "lessons learned" that were briefed to the committee by personnel from the office of the Deputy Assistant Secre- tary of the Air Force for Science, Technology, and Engi- neering; (2) fully incorporating the planning process into the planning, programming, and budgeting system, spe- cifically with regard to timing and the application of fis- cal constraints, especially for long-term challenges; (3) revising the planning categories to cover mid-term chal- lenges (5 to 15 years) and long-term challenges (15 years and beyond); and (4) aligning the framework to the cur- rent Air Force strategic planning process by using the ConOps Task Forces framework in lieu of the short-term objectives framework. Recommendation 3-5. The Air Force Research Labo- ratory should institute a review process for 6.2 and 6.3 critical experiments that engages the warfighters and major commands. Recommendation 3-6. The Air Force should reconsti tute a strong, crosscutting development/capability plan- ning organization staffed by experienced individuals with broad backgrounds and in-depth expertise (com- bined operational and S&T experience would be highly desirable). Advocacy and Visibility Finding 3-7. S&T Summits have been effective in im- proving dialogue among S&T people, commanders of major commands, and key staff personnel. While it is still too early to determine the longevity of these sum- mits, there are grounds for concern, since the Decem- ber 2002 summit was canceled and may not be resched- uled. Although summits are demanding in terms of preparation and attendance time for the senior leaders, they are worth the effort. Indeed, the scope of this ef- fort could be expanded by instituting similar exchanges between the S&T advocate and other constituencies, including the Office of the Secretary of Defense, other services, and key congressional members and staff. Finding 3-X. The applied technology council (ATC) process has been very beneficial. Weapon System Ca- pability Plans (WSCPs) provide a readily understand- able guide to indicate the points at which technologies will be able to be introduced into a weapon system if funding remains available. However, the ATC process has not yet been codified in an Air Force regulation, although one has been drafted. Completing codifica- tion soon, including WSCPs, would help institutional- ize the process. Finding 3-9. Designation of the Air Force Materiel Command commander as the S&T advocate appears to be a positive change in terms of both higher visibility and stronger advocacy of the S&T program to both in- ternal stakeholders (the Air Force) and external stake- holders (other services, Office of the Secretary of De- fense, and Congress). Actual effectiveness can be measured over time by metrics such as the level and trend of the S&T budget relative to prior years and the Air Force budget and amount of technology transitioned from the laboratory to Air Force acquisi- tion programs. Recommendation 3-7. The important S&T Summit process should be continued on an annual basis, ar- ranged over time to cover the full range of S&T cat-
WORKFORCE, PLANNING, AND ADVOCACY AND VISIBILITY egories. The summits should be aligned to best influ- ence the budget process. Recommendation 3-X. The applied technology council process, along with Weapon System Capability Plans, should be continued and codified by regulation. Recommendation 3-9. The commander of the Air Force Materiel Command should continue as the Air 41 Force S&T advocate. A mechanism should be insti- tuted for the S&T advocate to brief the S&T plan to and receive feedback from the combatant command- ers, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, other ser- vice personnel, key congressional staff, and members of Congress, if practical; this mechanism should in- clude the possibility of briefing the results of S&T Summits as well.
