Below is the uncorrected machine-read text of this chapter, intended to provide our own search engines and external engines with highly rich, chapter-representative searchable text of each book. Because it is UNCORRECTED material, please consider the following text as a useful but insufficient proxy for the authoritative book pages.
1 Introduction BACKGROUND This study was mandated by Congress in the Na- tional Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002 (P.L. 107-107), Section 253: Study and Report on Ef- fectiveness of Air Force Science and Technology Pro- gram Changes (see Appendix A). Section 253 re- quested that the National Research Council (NRC) conduct a study to determine how changes that the Air Force had implemented to its science and technology (S&T) program during the previous 2 years responded to concerns about the program that had been raised by Congress, the Defense Science Board (DSB), the Air Force Scientific Advisory Board (SAB), and the Air Force Association (AFA). Section 253 also requested that the NRC determine how those changes affected the future capabilities of the Air Force (U.S. Congress, 2001~. In recent years, there have been numerous concerns expressed, studies conducted, and recommendations made pertinent to the Air Force S&T program. Con- gress has expressed its concerns in a series of national defense authorization acts. The DSB, SAB, AFA, NRC, and Naval Research Advisory Committee (NRAC) have conducted studies and issued reports. (These are summarized in Appendix E.) A synthesis of the con- cerns and recommendations from these studies and re- ports yields a list of five overarching issues with re- spect to the Air Force S&T program. (See Table 1-1.) The five areas in Table 1-1 correspond to the main concerns or issues identified in Section 253 of P.L. 107- 107 and in the statement of task for this study (see the section "Statement of Task," below). The areas are these: TABLE 1-1 Synthesis of Concerns and Recommendations Issue Concern Raised by: ~ cat ~ cd ~ m cat ~ v: ~ .= cd v: ~ ;^ cd ;^ ~ . 0 ¢ :- E~ v: cd · · .~ o o En Congress DSB AFSAB AFA NRC NRAC X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X · S&T investment levels and balance (Statement of Task Part 1.C); · The S&E workforce (within Statement of Task Part 1.A); · S&T and development planning (Statement of Task Parts 2.D, 2.E, and within Part 1.A); · S&T advocacy and visibility (Statement of Task Parts 1.D through 2.C); and · Technology availability, or content of the Air Force S&T program (Statement of Task Part 1.A). 7
8 AIR FORCE RESPONSE TO CONCERNS During the initial meeting for this study, the Air Force presented its view of the background for the study and described actions that the Air Force had taken to respond to the concerns raised by Congress and oth- ers (Schneider, 2002a,b). The Air Force identified 16 reports that had been published from January 1999 through January 2002 that expressed concerns and pro- vided recommendations about the Air Force S&T pro- gram. In these reports, the Air Force found numerous comments and 202 recommendations, ranging from "quick and easy" to implement, to "difficult and time consuming." Within the group of 202 recommenda- tions, the Air Force found some to be seemingly con- tradictory. Of the 202 recommendations, the Air Force found 28 that it felt did not apply to this study. Of the remain- ing 174, the Air Force believed that the Secretary of Defense was the primary action party for 52 of them and that the Secretary of the Air Force was the primary action party for 122. The Air Force concluded its back- ground presentation to the study committee by stating that "the Air Force has heard the concerns and is ad- dressing those concerns" (Schneider, 2002a). In describing the actions that it had taken to address concerns, the Air Force used five overarching areas (not exactly the same as, but similar to the list described above): the S&E workforce, visibility and advocacy of S&T, technology availability, S&T planning, and bal- anced investment. For each of these five areas, the Air Force then described specific actions that it had taken and changes that it had made to address these concerns. These actions and changes included holding "S&T Summits," creating applied technology councils (ATCs), designating the Air Force Materiel Command commander (AFMC/CC) to be the Air Force's S&T advocate, reinstituting development planning, and con- ducting the S&T planning review required by Section 252 of the FY 2001 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 106-398) (see Appendix B). STATEMENT OF TASK The Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Science, Technology, and Engineering sponsored this study. The statement of task for the study is as follows (see Appendix A): The NRC is requested to conduct a study to determine how changes to the Air Force science and technology program implemented EFFECTIVENESS OF AIR FORCE SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM CHANGES during the past two years affect the future capabilities of the Air Force. The NRC will: 1. Independently review and assess whether such changes as a whole are sufficient to ensure the following: A. That concerns about the management of the science and tech- nology program that have been raised by the Congress, the De- fense Science Board, the Air Force Scientific Advisory Board, and the Air Force Association have been adequately addressed. B. That appropriate and sufficient technology is available to en- sure the military superiority of the United States and counter fu- ture high-risk threats. C. That the science and technology investments are balanced to meet near-, mid-, and long-term needs of the Air Force. D. That the Air Force organizational structure provides for a suf- ficiently senior level advocate of science and technology to en- sure an ongoing, effective presence of the science and technology community during the budget and planning process. 2. In addition, the study shall independently assess the specific changes to the Air Force science and technology program as fol- lows: A. Whether the biannual science and technology summits provide sufficient visibility into, and understanding and appreciation of, the value of the science and technology program to the senior level of Air Force budget and policy decisionmakers. B. Whether the applied technology councils are effective in con- tributing the input of all levels beneath the senior leadership into coordination, focus, and content of the science and technology program. C. Whether the designation of the commander of the Air Force Materiel Command as the science and technology budget advo- cate is effective to assure that an adequate budget top line is set. D. Whether the revised development planning process is effective to aid in the coordination of the needs of the Air Force warfighters with decisions on science and technology investments and the establishment of priorities among different science and technol- ogy programs. E. Whether the implementation of section 252 of the Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2001 (as enacted into law by Public Law 106-398; 114 Stat. 1654A-46) is effective to identify the basis for the appropriate science and technology program top line and investment portfolio. The NRC Committee on Review of the Effective- ness of Air Force Science and Technology Program Changes recognized that the tasks listed above encour- age unequivocal "yes" or "no" answers; however, the committee judged that unequivocal answers would lack consideration of a number of factors. First, they would imply unequivocal forecasts about what is required for military superiority, the nature of future high-risk threats, how to counter those high-risk threats, and how technology could, given certain changes by the Air Force, unfold to ensure all of those outcomes. Second, military superiority does not depend on S&T alone, as
INTRODUCTION unequivocal answers to the statement of task questions might imply, but instead on successfully balancing, within the reality of constrained resources, the risks among (1) today's readiness and ongoing operations, (2) modernizing to meet tomorrow, and (3) investment in S&T as the basis for modernizing the "day after to- morrow." Such forecasts and balances are at least im- plicit in the funding requests contained in the President's budget request (PBR) each year, but they can never be unequivocal. The committee found Statement of Task Question 1.B to be particularly troublesome in this regard. En- suring that the Air Force has appropriate and sufficient technology to counter future threats in the post- September 11, 2001, era is perhaps more difficult than at any time in the past. The reasons are multifaceted. First, terrorism, the possible development and use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) by rogue nations, and more widespread availability of means to deliver WMD all increase the diversity of the threats our country faces and make the nature of such threats more uncertain. Second, as stated above, the funds available to support the development of countering technologies are constrained by limited total Air Force funding in the context of a high operational tempo, the necessity of renewing stockpiles of expended weapons (readi- ness), replacing or upgrading aging weapons systems and infrastructure (modernization), and adapting to the changing nature of 21st-century warfare (transforma- tion). Third, both threats and countering technologies are more numerous and more complex as are all as- pects of modern living as the result of the inexorable advances of scientific discovery and engineering appli- cations. Even without the totality of these complexities, at- tempts to evaluate the effectiveness and adequacy of programs of long-term research have always met with substantial difficulty. The results of long-term research will not be available in time to be useful for currently approved projects, and those projects for which the re- sults of long-term research could be helpful have not yet been approved or fully defined. Moreover, since S&T funding amounts to less than 2 percent of the over- all Air Force program but is made up of perhaps a thou- sand or more individual tasks and programs, it is not conducive to regular, comprehensive, in-depth reviews by senior Air Force leadership. 9 . The committee believed that it could not definitively answer the question posed by Statement of l ask Ques- tion 1.B ("That appropriate and sufficient technology is available to ensure the military superiority of the United States and counter future high-risk threats". However, the availability of appropriate, sufficient, and flexible technology is significantly affected by several factors that the committee could address. Those factors include the following: ~ . The level and stability of overall S&T funding; 2. The S&T investment balance to meet near-, mid-, and long-term needs; 3. The flexibility of the S&T program to aggres- sively pursue new and evolving challenges and opportunities without disrupting ongoing, pro- ductive programs; 4. The organization for advocacy of S&T; 5. The quality and quantity of the S&E workforce; 6. The effectiveness of the link between the S&T programs and the programmed and anticipated ac- quisition programs provided by development planning and other means; and 7. The methodology for S&T planning and the vis- ibility into the planning both by those who advo- cate the other major elements of the Air Force program (the Major Commands) and by those who integrate the overall Air Force program (the Air Force Corporate Structure). These factors are addressed in the chapters that follow. In summary, the committee did not attempt to pro- vide unequivocal answers. Instead, it attempted to as- sess the changes that the Air Force had made to its S&T program and to judge whether those changes ad- dressed past concerns about the Air Force S&T pro- gram and whether those changes were for the better or the worse. In other words, had the Air Force moved its S&T program in the right direction? STUDY APPROACH To conduct this study, the NRC formed an indepen- dent committee of persons with knowledge and exper- Within the resources available to it, the committee tise relevant to the study issues. Concise biographical faced the same challenge in conducting a comprehen- sketches of the committee members are provided in sive, in-depth review of the Air Force S&T program. Appendix C. Over a 7-month period, the committee
10 EFFECTIVENESS OF AIR FORCE SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM CHANGES gathered data and information through meetings with persons involved in Air Force and Department of De- fense (DoD) S&T planning, budgeting, and execution and through review of relevant reports and other docu- ments. Appendix D contains a list of the presentations made to the committee by guest speakers. ORGANIZATION OF THE REPORT Chapter 2 addresses the level of the Air Force' s total S&T investment (top line) and the balance of that investment. It responds to statement of task Parts 1.A and 1.C and addresses factors 1 through 3 listed above. Chapter 3 addresses the areas of the S&E workforce, S&T planning, development planning, and S&T pro- gram advocacy and visibility. Included in its discus- sion, Chapter 3 addresses specific changes that the Air Force has made in these areas. It responds to statement of task Parts 1.A and 1.D, and 2.A through 2.E and addresses factors 4 through 7, listed above. The appendixes provide supplementary information, as described in the report.
