discretion. Although idiosyncratic behavior of examiners can be controlled to some extent by formal processes such as supervision, selection of examiners, training, and incentives, the institution’s cultural norms necessarily play an important role in their exercise of discretion in awarding patent rights. Policy changes that impact the organizational structure and internal culture of the USPTO should be careful to take patent examiner behavior into account.

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