|
Items in cart [0] |
Questions? Call 888-624-8373 |
| Copyright © 2009. National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved. Terms of Use and Privacy Statement |
Below are the first 10 and last 10 pages of uncorrected machine-read text (when available) of this chapter, followed by the top 30 algorithmically extracted key phrases from the chapter as a whole.
Intended to provide our own search engines and external engines with highly rich, chapter-representative searchable text on the opening pages of each chapter.
Because it is UNCORRECTED material, please consider the following text as a useful but insufficient proxy for the authoritative book pages.
Do not use for reproduction, copying, pasting, or reading; exclusively for search engines.
OCR for page 79
3
Information Restriction and
Control Regimes
INTRODUCTION
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 and the subsequent an-
thrax mailings in which five people died have produced a new
sense of vulnerability in the United States. The governmental re-
sponse has been wide ranging, affecting almost every sector of society. With
respect to the life sciences, the most important initiatives to date are those
embodied in the PATRIOT Act and the Bioterrorism Response Act. As dis-
cussed in Chapter 2, the latter legislation provides for the regulation of ac-
cess to select agents and toxins through registration and screening of all
institutions and individuals that possess, use, or transfer select agents.
Some have proposed that government control should go beyond the reg-
istration of laboratories and researchers who work with specified agents to
include broad controls on the dissemination of research results, as well as the
vetting of research proposals. Should these proposals be adopted they
would require a regulatory framework that would involve procedures for
reviewing research proposals and restrictions on dissemination of research
results; inevitably these regulations would profoundly affect research prac-
tices in biology laboratories. In effect, areas of life sciences research that were
deemed "sensitive" because they could theoretically aid terrorists or be used
in the production of biological weapons would be treated as secret.
Such a step should not be taken lightly; openness in science is highly
valued. As the 1982 "Corson" report stated:
Free communication among scientists is viewed as an essential factor in
scientific advance. Such communication enables critical new findings or
79
OCR for page 80
80
BIOTECHNOLOGY RESEARCH IN AN AGE OF TERRORISM
new theories to be readily and systematically subjected to the scrutiny of
others and thereby verified or debunked. Moreover, because science is a
cumulative activity each scientist builds on the work of others the free
availability of information both provides the foundations for further sci-
entific advance and prevents needlessly redundant work. Such commu-
nications also serve to stimulate creativity, both because scientists com-
pete keenly for the respect of their peers by attempting to be first in
publishing the answers to difficult problems and because communica-
tion can inspire new lines of investigation. Finally, free communication
helps to build the necessary willingness to confront any idea, no matter
how eccentric, and to assess it on its merits.2
This chapter reviews the existing and emerging regulatory and over-
sight structure that governs the control of information related to biologi-
cal research. Because issues of secrecy and sensitive information are new
for much of the biological sciences, the chapter first discusses the experi-
ence of other scientific disciplines with these concerns. How other disci-
plines have addressed concerns about security suggests lessons that the
Committee believes are relevant to the biological sciences as they respond
to these issues.
PAST AS PROLOGUE?
The life sciences differ from the physical sciences in that they have not
been deeply involved in developing new weapons in the United States
since the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention banned biological
weapons in the early 1970s.3 While many countries pursued BW work
prior to the BWC entering into force, only a few had large-scale programs,
and even in those countries military support for biological research was
dwarfed by the resources going into nuclear and conventional weapons
programs.4
The main patrons of research in the life sciences in the United States
have been the National Institutes of Health (NIH), the Department of
Agriculture (USDA), the National Science Foundation (NSF), the Depart-
ment of Defense (DOD, the Department of Energy (DOE), and the phar-
maceutical and agricultural industries. Secrecy issues involving national
security concerns, as distinct from questions of intellectual property,
have largely been absent in the life sciences. When the military did fi-
nance research in fields that had a biological content, such as oceanogra-
phy, the result was to shift the balance in the field away from biology
and toward the physical sciences that were familiar to the military pro-
gram officers and advisory boards.5 It should also be recognized, how-
ever, that the Defense Department has had a long-standing interest in
fundamental basic and applied medical research for the development of
OCR for page 81
INFORMATION RESTRICTION AND CONTROL REGIMES
81
diagnostic and medical countermeasures to "exotic" diseases that could
adversely affect personnel readiness.
The Nuclear Weapons Complex
It is instructive to compare the situation in the life sciences to other
areas of science in which the military has taken a stronger interest. The
U.S. nuclear weapons program offers an example in which the Depart-
ments of Defense and Energy have played dominant roles in funding and
shaping developments in nuclear physics and related fields. Nuclear
weapons design is carried out in the Energy Department's national labo-
ratories (primarily the Los Alamos National Laboratory, Sandia National
Laboratories, and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory). This work
requires a special security clearance that restricts access to a small number
of scientists who, in effect, constitute a closed society.6 Although the prin-
ciples that underlie the design of nuclear warheads are well understood
by scientists around the world, the details of nuclear weapons design re-
main highly classified. Under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, all informa-
tion concerning nuclear weapons is "born classified," so that even research
done outside the national laboratories under private sponsorship may be
automatically classified if it is deemed relevant to nuclear weapons.7 The
category of "unclassified controlled nuclear information" (UCNI) is ex-
empt from release under the Freedom of Information Act.8 Exports of
nuclear materials and related technologies are controlled under provisions
of the Atomic Energy Act, the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978, and
the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, with nuclear dual use items covered
by the Export Administration Act. As discussed below, "technology" can
include information and various kinds of technical data and knowledge.
In short, there is a pervasive system of governmental secrecy and con-
trol for all research and development information related to nuclear weap-
ons design and testing. Moreover, there is substantial consensus among
scientists and the public that secrecy in the case of nuclear weapons is
justified and should be maintained. Nuclear weapons scientists exchange
their freedom to publish for relatively secure jobs and the satisfaction of
feeling that they are contributing to national security.9
Other structural elements further distinguish nuclear weapons from
biological and chemical weapons. Although some of the knowledge and
facilities related to nuclear energy are relevant to the production of nuclear
weapons, many steps intervene between the underlying science and suc-
cessful production of a reliable nuclear weapon. Production of weapons-
grade material, for example, requires industrial-scale processes. The pro-
liferation of nuclear weapons capabilities has in every case so far required
the resources of a state-sponsored program.~° This means that in the case
OCR for page 82
82
BIOTECHNOLOGY RESEARCH IN AN AGE OF TERRORISM
of nuclear weapons there are relatively few interests that might argue for
greater openness for research results. By contrast, in the case of biological
weapons, the basic science relevant for civilian uses is essentially the same
as that relevant to military and especially terrorist applications. No
"bright line" exists between purely defensive and purely offensive uses of
infrastructure and knowledge. Box 3-1 offers additional comparisons of
the distinct differences between fissile materials and biological pathogens
that fundamentally affect the security concerns related to research rel-
evant to nuclear and biological weapons.
Some scientists have argued that a small group of terrorists, using
knowledge that has long been publicly available, could assemble a crude
bomb based on highly enriched uranium (HEU). Such a device would not
be a weapon of the sort designed in state weapons programs; it could,
nevertheless, potentially equal the explosive power of the bomb used at
OCR for page 83
INFORMATION RESTRICTION AND CONTROL REGIMES
83
Hiroshima. This possibility makes the safeguarding of stockpiles of fissile
materials paramount, since controlling access to HEU remains the pri-
mary technical barrier to this type of weapons proliferation.
Cryptography
Cryptography offers a second comparative case with potential les-
sons for the regulation of biotechnology. For hundreds of years cryptog-
raphy was the province of governments that wanted to conceal state se-
crets diplomatic and military from others. To that end, they also kept
information secret about the codes they used in order to make decryption
by others less likely. The situation changed when private corporations
developed a serious interest in cryptography as they began to do business
electronically and needed to be able to conduct their affairs in private.
Over the last three decades researchers in academic and industrial labora-
tories have entered the field in increasing numbers. Cryptography has
thus become a dual use technology.
The new users of cryptography do not always see eye to eye with the
government, which has an interest in retaining the ability to crack codes
used by criminals and by foreigners doing business in the United States.
In the 1990s controversy flared over the government's attempt as part of a
new encryption standard to impose a key escrow feature, which would
have enabled it to read any message it desired. The cryptography com-
munity and commercial interests argued that such a system would com-
promise privacy and undermine consumer confidence in business con-
ducted over the Internet. It might also provide an opportunity for abuse
of power by government agents holding the key. The encryption escrow
feature was retained in the new standard, but use of the standard is vol-
untary.~2
More significant for the debate over secrecy was the government's
attempt in the late 1980s to put some academic research papers dealing
with cryptography under export control laws and to require that research
publications be vetted by the National Security Agency (NSA). The secu-
rity concern was (and is) that open publication of some research could
reveal vulnerabilities in encryption algorithms that an enemy could ex-
ploit. The cryptography community, by contrast, has argued consistently
that in a well-designed cryptographic system only the key should be se-
cret. In addition, algorithms should be public and open to challenge, so
that problems can be quickly identified and fixed; that is, cryptography,
like other sciences, progresses best under conditions of openness.
The outcome of this controversy provides an alternative model for
addressing security concerns. In this case, the government dropped its
efforts to impose secrecy in exchange for an informal system in which
OCR for page 84
84
BIOTECHNOLOGY RESEARCH IN AN AGE OF TERRORISM
cryptographers often (but not always) submit their proposals and papers
to the NSA for prepublication review, even when NSA is not the funding
agency.~3 Thus, although there is no "born secret" category for cryptogra-
phy research, the government has been able to keep track of ongoing re-
search and to exercise some control over publication of results. Compli-
ance is not universal, but there appears to be an informal norm in large
segments of the cryptography community that cooperating with the gov-
ernment on this issue is a sign of good citizenship.
Lessons from the Comparisons
What lessons do these examples offer for possible governmental con-
trols on research in the life sciences? We can compare structural condi-
tions in the three cases in at least four dimensions. In all three cases, the
government has an interest in controlling access to information for secu-
rity reasons: there is a prima facie argument for keeping some research
secret from potential enemies. The ease with which research results can
be transformed into weapons or a technological advantage to be used
against the United States varies sharply, however. In the case of nuclear
weapons, understanding the principles behind the bomb is only part of
what is needed to produce a weapon. lust as important and far more
difficult to obtain is access to plutonium or weapons-grade uranium and
the know-how to construct the device. Cryptography lies at the opposite
extreme: a cryptographer can pursue his or her research with no more
than pencil and paper, or at least with computing capabilities that are
widely available.~4
Research in biology lies between these two extremes. Traditionally,
biology has been considered a small-scale science. Although work in
genomics, proteomics, and bionanotechnology is overturning this para-
digm, the research and development associated with biological weapons
programs do not necessarily require large-scale investment or specialized,
dedicated facilities. Creating pathogen weapons poses certain technical
challenges, but the ability to produce enough material to cause morbidity,
mortality, public panic, and economic costs is within the capability of
many laboratories.
The degree to which the three technologies are dual use also varies.
The civilian uses of nuclear energy have been cordoned off from weapons
developments through a large investment in security classification, inter-
national diplomacy, and a discourse that insists that nuclear weapons are
special.~5 Cryptography, as we have seen, has recently become a dual use
technology, but its applications in the civilian world are growing rapidly
in tandem with the Internet. The life sciences lie beyond cryptography in
the dual use dimension; civilian uses dominate in the field, and the
OCR for page 85
INFORMATION RESTRICTION AND CONTROL REGIMES
85
military's interest in the life sciences, although not negligible, has been
dwarfed by their interest in the physical sciences. This is seen most clearly,
perhaps, in the dominance until fairly recently of the NIH, NSF, and
USDA, rather than DOD and DOE, in federal support of research in the
life sciences.
The size of the field is also important when contemplating govern-
ment controls. One reason the cryptography solution has worked rela-
tively well may be that the number of publications is so small. The lead-
ing journal, The Journal of Cryptology, publishes only about 20 papers a
year, and researchers present about 125 papers annually at conferences.
By contrast, the American Society for Microbiology's 11 journals publish
6,000 papers a year, and by some estimates there are between 10,000 and
20,000 journals published in the life sciences internationally.~7 Even if only
a very small fraction of the research in these journals potentially arouses
concern, the sheer volume of publication in the life sciences would make
any effort to devise a screening mechanism for information deemed "sen-
sitive" or to ensure compliance a daunting challenge.
In addition, there are many more life scientists than there are nuclear
physicists or cryptographers. Only a few scientists are likely to be work-
ing with the list of select agents that have been the target of control so far,
but many more would be included in a control regime that encompassed
sensitive techniques as well as an expanded list of select agents. Further-
more, unlike the nuclear physicists, the life scientists are in many widely
dispersed locations. The more people and facilities subject to control, the
higher the costs.
Finally, there is no established culture of working with the national
security community among life scientists as currently exists in the fields
of nuclear physics and cryptography. As a group, biologists lack the ex-
perience of either nuclear physicists or cryptographers in interacting with
the security agencies of the federal government, and conversely those
agencies lack close ties and working relationships with the life sciences
community. The tradition of classified government research is well estab-
lished in the latter two fields; the counterpart in the life sciences was the
DOD program for research on biological weapons centered at Fort Detrick,
MD, which ended in 1970. As noted above, however, that bioweapons
program was only a small part of the government's funding of basic re-
search in the life sciences and its very secrecy tended to isolate it from the
larger community of life scientists. Since 1970, when President Nixon
ended offensive biological weapons research, Fort Detrick has been a rela-
tively open facility, housing a number of military and civilian tenants,
including a large array of National Cancer Institute laboratories, as well
as the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute for Infectious Diseases
(USAMRIID). The number of life scientists involved in intramural research
OCR for page 86
86
BIOTECHNOLOGY RESEARCH IN AN AGE OF TERRORISM
sponsored by the Department of the Army remains, however, relatively
smaller It should be noted that other DOD agencies, such as the Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and the Defense Threat
Reduction Agency, have become significant sponsors of biodefense re-
search, as have other federal agencies such as the Department of Home-
land Security and the intelligence community. DARPA-sponsored re-
search, while sometimes controversial, is unclassified.
The differences among the three areas are instructive. They suggest
that controls on information flows in the life sciences will face obstacles
rather different from those encountered in nuclear science and cryptogra-
phy. The situation would be further complicated by the expansion of cat-
egories of information that the government wishes to control.
SECRET AND SENSITIVE INFORMATION
An excellent summary of the different types of information control
regimes in the United States is published by the Association of American
Universities and is reproduced in Box 3-2. 20
Secret Information
The U.S. government handles issues of secrecy through a complex
mix of statutes, regulations, and procedures that govern the control of
classified information, public access to government information, and the
OCR for page 87
INFORMATION RESTRICTION AND CONTROL REGIMES
87
OCR for page 88
88
BIOTECHNOLOGY RESEARCH IN AN AGE OF TERRORISM
OCR for page 89
INFORMATION RESTRICTION AND CONTROL REGIMES
89
OCR for page 96
96
BIOTECHNOLOGY RESEARCH IN AN AGE OF TERRORISM
Dual Use Information
Scientists may also face restrictions on their communications with
foreign colleagues under various export control restrictions on sharing
information regarding dual use technology. These restrictions can apply
to communication both within the United States and with scientists
abroad. Limits on foreign scientists through the visa system were de-
scribed in Chapter 2. As with the Technology Alert List designed to
prompt scrutiny of visa applications, the export controls governed by
the Export Administration Act and its implementing regulations also
extend to the transfer of dual use technology. Technology is considered
"specific information necessary for the 'development,' 'production,' or
'use' of a product," and providing such information to a foreign national
within the United States may be considered a "deemed export" whose
transfer requires an export license.4~ Technology "which arises during
or as a result of fundamental research" is not subject to export restric-
tions which relieves many scientists but not those engaged in propri-
etary research sponsored by commercial interests at public and private
universities.42
PUBLICATION OF SENSITIVE INFORMATION
IN THE LIFE SCIENCES
Until recently, there were very few cases of problems related to the
publication of research results in the life sciences that attracted signifi-
cant public attention. Some specialists in bioterrorism, however, had
warned that, given continuing advances in biotechnology, open publi-
cation could provide information of use to terrorists.43 The publication
of the "mousepox" study, as well as other studies discussed in Chapter
1, made the issue a major concern for journal editors.44 The public per-
ception of potential risks associated with publication of such informa-
tion led to calls for scientific journals to refrain from publishing "dan-
gerous" research or to delete some data from published research results
in order to preclude others from replicating the results.45 Journals in the
life sciences have responded in a number of ways to the concerns that
published articles might provide useful knowledge or a road map for
terrorists or rogue states.
In addition to the results of fundamental research, the compilation,
synthesis, and assessment of already published results in review articles
may provide an understanding of a field that could guide or assist terror-
ists. Even more difficult are the concerns raised by reports that result when
scientists are assembled to render their judgment as experts about par-
ticular problems, even when they rely completely on open sources of in-
OCR for page 97
INFORMATION RESTRICTION AND CONTROL REGIMES
97
formation.46 Against these risks, one must weigh the genuine service to
the research community provided by review articles and the contribu-
tions of expert panels to informed public debate and decision-making on
issues where scientific knowledge and perspective play a role. The Com-
mittee wanted to acknowledge these problems, which it expects will re-
main and perhaps grow as a concern, but they are beyond the scope of
this report.
In response to the concerns about publication of research results, the
American Society for Microbiology (ASM) determined that the 11 jour-
nals it publishes would not restrict the information in the materials and
methods section of articles. But ASM has also instituted formal proce-
dures as part of the peer-review process for submitted articles so that
reviewers address the potential risks of the research results to national
security. At present, these policies apply primarily although not exclu-
sively to research conducted on select agents.47 In 2002, of the 13,929
manuscripts submitted to ASM journals, 313 select agent manuscripts
received special screening, and of these two manuscripts received addi-
tional screening by the full ASM publication board. The statistics
through July 2003 are 8,557 manuscripts submitted, 262 select agent
manuscripts screened, and none referred to the publication board for
further review.48 Other journals, such as Science, the Proceedings of the
National Academy of Sciences, and Nature, have also become alert to po-
tential articles that could cause concern and have moved to develop re-
view procedures of their own.
These new procedures have been the subject of intense discussion
within the life sciences community and between life scientists and the
national security community. In January 2003, for example, the National
Academy of Sciences and the Center for Strategic and International Stud-
ies convened a one-day workshop to review the general question of sensi-
tive information and specific issues of publication. Gatherings such as this
attest to the seriousness with which the scientific and national security
communities regard these issues but also to the difficulty of establishing
productive communication and even more of devising satisfactory,
workable solutions.49
In mid-February 2003, the editors of the major journals in the life
sciences, including Nature, Cell, Science, and the Proceedings of the Na-
tional Academy of Sciences (PNAS), published a joint statement on "Scien-
tific Publication and Security."50 The statement, which appears in Box
3-3, was the outcome of discussions begun at the January workshop. It
has generated substantial comment and controversy, but is also an ex-
ample of the efforts of the scientific community to respond to issues
related to potential risks through the development of self-governance
mechanisms.5~
OCR for page 98
98
BIOTECHNOLOGY RESEARCH IN AN AGE OF TERRORISM
OCR for page 99
INFORMATION RESTRICTION AND CONTROL REGIMES
99
CONCLUSIONS
Any argument about imposing information controls whether
through formal classification or restrictions on "sensitive" information-
must be made in the context of the specific institutional history and re-
search culture of the life sciences research community. Like all sciences,
the life sciences rely upon a culture of openness in research, where the
free exchange of ideas allows researchers to build on the results of others,
while simultaneously opening scientific results to critical scrutiny so that
mistakes can be recognized and corrected sooner rather than later. Most
OCR for page 100
100
BIOTECHNOLOGY RESEARCH IN AN AGE OF TERRORISM
scientists would argue that the openness that characterizes much of the
scientific research enterprise is the source of the extraordinary gains in
scientific knowledge that have enriched us materially and intellectually.
It is not that individual researchers, research groups, university ad-
ministrators, or editors do not know how to keep secrets. Anyone who
has spent much time in a university recognizes that there are categories of
information that are not widely shared, from faculty salaries at private
universities to the location of animal testing facilities. Academic journals
and funding agencies keep secret the names of their reviewers. Research
performed under contract to proprietary interests routinely requires a
period of secrecy and prepublication review of manuscripts intended for
presentation and publication in the peer-reviewed literature as a contrac-
tual condition of funding. These areas of secrecy, however, are the result
of widely accepted understandings and local negotiations, and the num-
ber of people affected is limited to those directly concerned.
As already discussed, compared with other disciplines such as phys-
ics, the life sciences have relatively little experience with classified re-
search. Beyond this, the life sciences cover a broad set of disciplines, from
evolution and ecology to genomics and proteomics. Unlike nuclear weap-
ons research, much of life sciences research is not of interest either to
"rogue" offensive weapons programs or to potential terrorists. The range
of scientists and institutions affected would thus be hard to enumerate, let
alone monitor.
The costs of complying with information controls on life sciences re-
search would range from their impact on the culture of the research labo-
ratories, which is generally acknowledged to be extraordinarily open, to
financial costs borne by institutions in complying with government regu-
lations, to the creation of obstacles to monitoring compliance with inter-
national arms control measures directed at biological weapons. The re-
strictions already in effect on select agents have caused some laboratories
to destroy archived samples and to limit exchanges of materials between
scientists. To extend government controls to the information contained in
laboratory reports, conference papers, and journal articles would further
constrict avenues of communication, both formal and informal, which
have been an essential source of the dynamism of biological research in
the modern era.
Perhaps most important, major universities have proscribed classi-
fied research on campus. Those who do accept classified research have
usually created separate facilities where access can be limited and con-
trolled.52 Secrecy would thus deprive the government of the graduate
students and postdoctoral fellows who drive much of biological re-
search in many cases the best minds engaged in rapidly developing
fields. Even without formal classification, the specter of information con-
OCR for page 101
INFORMATION RESTRICTION AND CONTROL REGIMES
101
trots on "sensitive" information, given the current vagueness of the cat-
egories and the great difficulty of being any more exact about most of the
dual use research, could be a significant deterrent to scientists to under-
take research in some areas, such as infectious diseases. Yet these are pre-
cisely the areas where the best researchers are needed to help develop the
nation's defenses against biological weapons, bioterrorism, and emerg-
ing-disease threats.
Thus there is a danger that the life sciences as a field of study would
come to be regarded as less inviting, affecting the quality of researchers
entering the field or making it more attractive to work outside the United
States. Unlike the situation with nuclear weapons design/development/
production and testing, biotechnology-related research in the life sci-
ences is an international activity and proliferation-relevant knowledge
is widely held. Limiting the development of biotechnology in the United
States would reduce our worldwide competitiveness in this rapidly
changing field. We conclude that imposing mandatory information con-
trols on research in the life sciences, if attempted, will be difficult and
expensive with little likely gain in genuine security. The next chapter
describes the system that the Committee has concluded can best meet
the needs of reducing the risks of misuse of biological research while
still enabling vitally needed research to meet civilian and biodefense
needs to go forward.
NOTES
~ The Department of Defense, for example, proposed in early 2002 that researchers
be required "to obtain DoD approval to discuss or publish findings of all military-
sponsored unclassified research." The draft was withdrawn in the face of consid-
erable criticism from the research community. Knezo, G.~. 2003. "Sensitive But
Unclassified' and Other Federal Security Controls on Scientific and Technical In-
formation: History and Current Controversy." (Washington, D.C.: Congressional
Research Service), April 2. A critique of the proposed regulations by Don
DeYoung, executive assistant to the director of research at the U.S. Naval Research
Laboratory, can be found at: www.fas.org/sgp/othergov/deyoung.html.
2 National Academy of Sciences. 1982. Scientific Communication and National Secu-
rity. Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press. Available atwww. nap.edu/
books/0309033322/html/, p. 24. This is often called the "Corson report," after its
chair, Dale Corson, president emeritus of Cornell University.
3 The 1925 Geneva Protocol had already banned the "use in war" of chemical and
biological weapons. The 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, which
entered into force in 1975, bans the development, production, stockpiling, and
transfer of biological weapons.
4 For a description of national chemical and biological weapons programs prior to
1970, see SIPRI. 1973. "The Problem of Chemical and Biological Warfare," CB
OCR for page 102
102
BIOTECHNOLOGY RESEARCH IN AN AGE OF TERRORISM
Weapons Today, Vol. II (New York: Humanities Press), Chap. 3. As noted in Chap-
ter 1, the Soviet Union maintained a secret BW program into the l990s.
5 Doel, R. 2001. "Constituting the postwar earth sciences: The military's influence
on the environmental sciences in America after 1945." Social Studies of Science 33:5
[Special Issue: The Earth Sciences in the Cold War, l. Cloud and l. Reppy, guest
editors].
6 Gusterson, H. 1996. Nuclear Rites: A Weapons Laboratory at the End of the Cold War
(Berkeley: University of California Press), Chapter 4.
7 Hewlett, R.G. 1981. "Born classified in the AEC: A historian's view." Bulletin of
the Atomic Scientist, 37, December:20-27.
~ In 1981 Congress gave the Department of Energy authority under the AEA to
prevent unauthorized dissemination of information regarding "unclassified con-
trolled nuclear information" (UCNI), which includes: (1) the design of production
or utilization facilities; (2) security measures for such facilities or for nuclear mate-
rial in such facilities or in transit; and (3) the "design, manufacture, or utilization
of any atomic weapon or component if that information has previously been de-
classified or removed from the restricted data category." A discussion of the evo-
lution of UCNI may be found in National Research Council. 1995. A Review of the
Department of Energy Classification Policy and Practice (Washington, D.C.: National
Academy Press).
9 With the end of nuclear testing by the United States and the creation of the
Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP) to maintain the safety and reliability of the
U.S. nuclear arsenal, knowledge from a number of other unclassified areas of sci-
entific research, such as advanced computing, became essential for the large-scale
simulations and other measures that were part of the SSP. For scientists in those
areas, work in the national laboratories has caused significant tensions between
security measures and maintaining contact with the unclassified research com-
munity from which advances relevant to their work will come. These issues are
discussed in Center for Strategic and International Studies. 2002. Science and Secu-
rity in the 21st Century: A Report to the Secretary of Energy on the Department of En-
ergy Laboratories (Washington, D.C.: The CSIS Press).
in For a discussion of the barriers to nuclear weapons proliferation, see MacKenzie,
D. and G. Spinardi. 1995. "Tacit knowledge, weapons design, and the uninvention
of nuclear weapons." American Journal of Sociology 101 July):44-99.
ii The topic is discussed briefly in National Research Council, Committee on Sci-
ence and Technology for Countering Terrorism. 2002. Making the Nation Safer: The
Role of Science and Technology in Countering Terrorism (Washington, D.C.: The Na-
tional Academies Press), Chapter 2. It is worth noting that public discussion of
these possibilities is problematic in the same way that the publication of the
mousepox and polio virus research has been.
i2 Dam, K., and H. Lin, eds. 1996. Cryptography's Role in Securing the Information
Society [CRISIS] (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press), especially Ch. 5.
Following the September 11 attacks, the idea of requiring the "clipper chip" was
briefly resurrected in Congress, but then dropped.
is CRISIS, p. 417. See also Scientific Communication and National Security, Appendix
E (fn. 8~.
OCR for page 103
INFORMATION RESTRICTION AND CONTROL REGIMES
103
id There is, however, a considerable distance between the mathematics of devising
an encryption algorithm and constructing a secure working system; in most sys-
tems there are multiple vulnerabilities outside the encryption process. For ex-
ample, users may share their passwords or keep them on a note posted on their
computers.
i5 U.S. nuclear nonproliferation policy has tried to discourage the development of
civilian nuclear power in states it considers would-be proliferators, however, in
part to deny such states "cover" for their programs and in part because the techni-
cal skills and knowledge obtained through working on civilian nuclear power are
considered useful in a general sense for those trying to develop nuclear weapons.
i6 Monatersky, R. 2002. "Publish and Perish? As the Nation Fights Terrorism, Sci-
entists Weigh the Risks of Releasing Sensitive Information," The Chronicle of Higher
Education, October 11.
i7 "Openness in an insecure world." 2003. The Lancet Infectious Diseases 3 (Febru-
ary). See also discussion in Chapter 1 of this report, p. 25.
i~ The financial costs could be considerable. An estimate of the costs of the U.S.
nuclear weapons program between 1940 and 1995 suggests a rough figure of 575
billion for secrecy. Representative items on the list that would apply to the control
of biological select agents include costs for screening personnel; for secure filing
cabinets; for guards; and for routine inventories of controlled material. Schwartz,
S.I. 1995. "Four trillion dollars and counting," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 51
(Nov/Dec):32-52, especially p. 50-51.
i9 For example, USAMRIID has only 650 employees, a third of which are Army
officers. Enserink, M. 2002. "On Biowarfare's Frontline," Science 296 (5575~: 1954-
1956. For a sense of the activities supported at Fort Detrick, see Covert, N. 1993.
Cutting Edge: A History of Fort Detrick, Maryland, 1943-1993, Public Affairs Office,
Headquarters U.S. Army Garrison, Fort Detrick, MD. In addition to the work per-
formed in defense laboratories, the Army and other services and agencies fund
research on biodefense in industry and universities.
20 Association of American Universities. March 2003. Definitions and Regulations
Involved in the Classified-Sensitive Information-Unclassified Debate.
2i Meridian Corporation. 1992. "Classification Policy Study," Report prepared for
the U.S. Department of Energy Office of Classification, Washington, D.C.; July 4:
p. 87.
22 The Invention Secrecy Act of 1951, 35 U.S.C. 181-188. Available at http://
www. fast org. / sap / othergov / invention / 35usc 1 7.html.
23 The Project on Government Secrecy of the Federation of American Scientists.
Available at http: / /www.fas.org/sgp/othergov/invention.
24 See Aftergood, S. "Government Secrecy and Knowledge Production: A Survey
of Some General Issues," in l. Reppy, ea., Secrecy and Knowledge Production, Peace
Studies Occasional Paper # 23, Cornell University Peace Studies Program, Octo-
ber 1999.
25 See footnote 2.
26 "Fundamental" research is defined as "basic and applied research in science
and engineering, the results of which ordinarily are published and shared broadly
within the scientific community, as distinguished from proprietary research and
from industrial development, design, production and product utilization, the re-
OCR for page 104
104
BIOTECHNOLOGY RESEARCH IN AN AGE OF TERRORISM
suits of which ordinarily are restricted for proprietary or national security rea-
sons." See National Security Decision Directive 189, September 21,1985. Available
at http: / /www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd-189.htm.
27 Rice, C. Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Letter to Dr.
Harold Brown, November 1, 2001. Available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/bush/
crllO101.html. John Marburger, Director of the Office of Science and Technology
Policy, Executive Office of the President, reaffirmed NSDD-189 in a speech to a
workshop on "Scientific Openness and National Security" at The National Acad-
emies on January 9, 2003. Available at http://www.ostp.gov/html/new.html.
28 The CSIS Commission on Science and Security in the 21St Century identified at
least 20 types of information that could be considered "sensitive" within the De-
partment of Energy, most without consistent, department-wide definitions or ap-
plication. See Center for Strategic and International Studies, op. cit., p. 55.
29 Knezo, op. cit., p.l0.
30 U.S. Congress. 1996. The Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552, as
Amended by P.L. 104-231, 110 Stat.2422, October 2, which states that "Geological
and geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning wells" may be
withheld under FOIA.
3i See report of the Ad Hoc Faculty Committee on Access to and Disclosure of
Scientific Information. 2002. In the Public Interest. Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, June 12. Available at http: / /web.mit.edu/faculty/reports/
publicinterest.pdf. See also Statement on "Science and Security in an Age of
Terrorism" by the presidents of The National Academies regarding "sensitive but
unclassified" information, October 18, 2002. Excerpt cited in Chapter 4. Available
at http: / /www4. nationalacademies.org/news.nsf/isbnslO182002b?0pen
Document.
32 The Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of
2002 calls for a national registry of facilities holding select agents, and requires
that information about the sites be kept secret. Ronald M. Atlas, immediate past
president of the American Society for Microbiology, points out that this runs
counter to the requirement that Institutional Biosafety Committees operate with
community participation and maximum transparency. Atlas, R.M. "Applicability
of the National Institutes of Health Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee para-
digm for reducing the threat of bioterrorism," Draft paper prepared for the Con-
trolling Dangerous Pathogens Project, CISSM, School of Public Affairs, University
of Maryland, p. 26.
33 Card, A.H. Jr. 2002. "Action to safeguard information regarding weapons of
mass destruction and other sensitive documents related to Homeland Security,"
March 19. Memorandum for the heads of executive departments and agencies.
Available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/bush/whO31902.html. See also Matthews,
W. 2002."0MB weighs info classification," Federal Computer Week September 16.
Guidance accompanying the memo states that: "The need to protect such sensi-
tive information from inappropriate disclosure should be carefully considered on
a case-by-case basis, together with the benefits that result from the open and effi-
cient exchange of scientific, technical, and like information."
34 U.S. Congress. Homeland Security Act of 2002. P.L. 107-296 (November 25~.
Available at http: / /www.cio.gov/documents/pl_107_296_nov_25_2002.pdf.
OCR for page 105
INFORMATION RESTRICTION AND CONTROL REGIMES
105
35 An excellent review of the legislation, policies, and issues surrounding sensitive
information may be found in the Congressional Research Service study by G.
Knezo, op. cit.
36 Washington Post. February 13, 2000.The potential penalties included civil fines of
up to 5100,000. "Sloppy Secrecy,"p. B6.
37 U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Security Affairs. 1995. "Safeguards and
Security Glossary of Terms," December 18 (cited in CSIS, op. cit., p. 56~. Available
at http: / /www.directives.doe.gov/pdfs/nnglossary/termss_z.pdf.
38 Department of Energy. 1999. "Sensitive Countries and Sensitive Subjects List,"
Memorandum for heads of departmental elements and contractor organizations,
July 27, p. 7-9.
39Laplante, P.R. 2003. The DOE OUO Program, Briefing to the Roundtable on Sci-
entific Communication and National Security, The National Academies and the
Center for Strategic and International Studies. Washington, D.C., June 19.
40 Abraham, S. 2003. "Memorandum for heads of all departmental elements," May
12. Available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/othergov/doe/secO51203.pdf. In his
memo Secretary Abraham cited the recommendations of the CSIS commission
cited in footnote 9.
4i "Generally, technologies subject to the Export Administration Regulations
(EAR) are those which are in the United States or of U.S. origin, in whole or in
part. Most are proprietary. Technologies which tend to require licensing for trans-
fer to foreign nationals are also dual use (i.e., have both civil and military applica-
tions) and are subject to one or more control regimes, such as national security,
nuclear proliferation, missile technology, or chemical and biological warfare. See
"Deemed Exports Questions and Answers," Bureau of Industry and Security, De-
partment of Commerce. Available at http://www.bxa.doc.gov/DeemedExports/
DeemedExportsFAQs.html#TopofPage.
The International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), administered by the
Department of State, controls the export of technology, including technical infor-
mation, related to items on the U.S. Munitions List. Unlike the EAR, however,
"publicly available scientific and technical information and academic exchanges
and information presented at scientific meetings are not treated as controlled tech-
nical data." See Knezo, op. cit., p. 4.
42 Ibid.
43 Zilinskas, R. and l.B. Tucker. 2002. "Limiting the contribution of the open scien-
tific literature to the biological weapons threat." Online journal of Homeland Secu-
rity, December. Available at http://www.homelandsecurity.org/journal/Ar-
ticles/tucker.html.
44 Jackson, R.~ ., Ad . Ramsay, C .D. Christensen, S. Beaton, D. F. Hall, and I.A.
Ramshaw. 2001. "Expression of Mouse Interleukin-4 by a recombinant Ectromelia
virus suppresses cytolytic lymphocyte responses and overcomes genetic resistance
to Mousepox." journal of Virology 75:1205-1210.
45 Schemo, D.S. 2002. "Sept. 11 Strikes at Labs' Door," New York Times, August 13,
p. F1, 2. See also Shea, D.A. 2003. "Balancing Scientific Publication and National
Security Concerns: Issues for Congress." Congressional Research Service, Report
RL31695, January 10. In a hearing before the House Committee on Science on
October 10, 2002, the President's Science Adviser, Dr. John Marburger, stated: "I'm
OCR for page 106
106
BIOTECHNOLOGY RESEARCH IN AN AGE OF TERRORISM
aware that there is an impression that the administration is considering a policy of
pre-publication review of sensitive federally funded research. This is incorrect-
this is not the thrust of the considerations, and it's important to note that this
process is in the formative stage." See "President's science advisor clarifies plan
for sensitive research." Available at http://www.house.gov/science/press/107/
107-299.htm.
46 An example of this dilemma is illustrated by the controversy over a report on
the risks of agricultural bioterrorism completed by the National Academies in late
2002. The report is National Research Council. 2002. Countering Agricultural
Bioterrorism. (Washington, D.C.: The National Academies Press). For an account of
the controversy, see Monastersky article cited in footnote 16.
47 The ASM policy is not restricted to select agents exclusively. At the present
time, all manuscripts addressing research conducted on select agents are flagged
but others may be as well. At the NAS-CSIS international workshop on "Scientific
Openness and National Security" January 9, 2003 in Washington, D.C.), Donald
Kennedy, editor of Science, indicated that his journal had a system of review that
used outside consultants.
48 Atlas, R.M. Email communication. August 15, 2003.
49 The National Academies and Center for Strategic and International Studies.
2003. "Scientific Openness and National Security," January 9. Further information
about the workshop, including transcripts of presentations, is available at http://
www7.nationalacademies.org/pga/Scientific_Openness_Homepage.html.
50 Journal Editors and Authors Group. 2003. "Statement on Scientific Publica-
tion and Security," Science Online 299 (5610~:1149. Available at http://www.
sciencemag.org/cgi/reprint/299/5610/1149.pdf. This statement also appeared in
the February 18, 2003 issue of the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
and the February 20, 2003 issue of Nature.
5i See, for example, Hesman, T. 2003. "Critics question journals' bow to security,"
St. Louis Post-Dispatch, February 23; Kennedy, D.2003. "To Publish or Perish?" The
Times Higher Education Supplement, February 21.
52 Ad Hoc Faculty Committee on Access to and Disclosure of Scientific Informa-
tion. 2002. In the Public Interest. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, June 12.
Report is available at http://web.mit.edu/faculty/reports/publicinterest.pdf.
Representative terms from entire chapter:
sensitive information
