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5
Summary and Recommendations
HIGHLIGHTS
This chapter
· Articulates justification for and recommends improving ac-
cess to, and the utilization of, the nation's deep submergence assets
· Articulates justification for and recommends construction of
a new ROV
· Articulates justification for and recommends delivery of an
upgraded HOV
As Chapter 2 points out, beyond its importance to ocean science, re-
search in the deep ocean touches on some of the most basic scientific ques-
tions facing humanity. In recognition of both the importance of this work
and the unique challenges that must be faced to pursue it, the nation has
made a significant commitment to provide operational support. To maxi-
mize the scientific return on investment in this area it will be necessary to
overcome both technological and institutional obstacles. This chapter dis-
cusses the main obstacles and potential solutions.
As shown in Chapter 4, the scientific demand for deep submergence
assets is, at present, not being adequately met. Part of this problem can be
traced to the inadequacy of the number and capabilities of existing assets
to perform the type of scientific effort associated with deep submergence
105
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FUTURE NEEDS IN DEEP SUBMERGENCE SCIENCE
science funded through the National Science Foundation (NSF) and the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). This report
makes specific suggestions for additions to and modifications of this asset
pool. Part of the problem, however, can be attributed to the way in which
existing assets are managed and utilized. In this context, management re-
fers to the acquisition, maintenance, and accessibility of vehicles used to
carry out basic ocean research and exploration. In particular, the current
management system does not always ensure a match between the require-
ments of federally funded projects and the appropriate deep submergence
assets. Modification of existing assets and construction of new assets to alle-
viate this problem would represent a significant capital investment and
would likely engender additional demand for operating funds. Decisions
to commit these resources should be accompanied by a commitment to en-
sure the best use of the nation's deep submergence assets. The management
of the nation's deep submergence assets should, therefore, be clarified and
revised to ensure the optimal use of both existing and potential assets in
future scientific research. The following discussion points out key steps that
should be taken to ensure that basic research conducted at depth in the
ocean is not limited by access to appropriate research platforms.
PROBLEMS WITH ACCESSIBILITY
Many previous studies have called for a reexamination of the use of
U.S. and foreign platforms to support deep submergence science. Beyond
general calls for increased access, however, specific suggestions have not
been put forward. Thus, some additional discussion is warranted here.
As discussed in Chapter 1, the National Deep Submergence Facility
(NDSF) currently operates two vehicles: the human-occupied vehicle
(HOV) Alvin and the remotely operated vehicle (ROY) Jason II. Support
for the operation of these vehicles is guaranteed by the three NDSF spon-
soring agencies (NSF, NOAA, and the U.S. Navy). These agencies are also
major supporters of research that utilizes NDSF assets. For example, in
2002, NSF and NOAA accounted for nearly 100 percent of the operational
days of all NDSF platforms, with NSF generally accounting for more than
70 to 80 percent annually. This arrangement ensures consistent support
for NDSF, while allowing some flexibility in the burden borne by each of
the three sponsoring agencies. This, in turn, allows each agency to predict
its annual contribution to NDSF funding and to develop budget mecha-
nisms to accommodate that contribution.
The use of NDSF assets by scientists funded through NSF is covered
by funds from the Marine Operations Section of NSF's Ocean Sciences
Division (OCE). Proposals to the NSF requesting use of these vehicles are
submitted to a number of science programs within OCE. No costs for the
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SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
107
use of NDSF platforms are included in the budgets of individual propos-
als. The cost of NDSF platform use is borne by the Marine Operations
Section, rather than by individual science programs. This policy reflects
the commitment made by NSF to provide the additional fiscal support
needed to undertake deep ocean research and ensures that proposals are
evaluated on intrinsic scientific merit. For the most part, vehicle use is
essentially guaranteed to any project that is funded by the science pro-
gram to which it was submitted. Scheduling vehicle use is facilitated in at
least two ways. First, projects may be postponed to accommodate vehicle
schedules. Second, one vehicle may be substituted for the other in projects
where such substitution is possible. In some cases, it is simply not pos-
sible to accommodate vehicle requirements, and proposals are deferred
or even rejected on these grounds.
Proposals to the NSF that request the use of non-NDSF platforms must
include platform operating costs in the proposed budget. Should the pro-
posal be funded, funding for platform use must be provided by the sci-
ence program to which the proposal was submitted. Since the additional
cost for the use of these platforms (not including cost of support ships)
can be substantial ($10,000 to $30,000 per day of use), this compared cost
is widely perceived as placing such proposals at an unfair disadvantage
to those requesting NDSF platforms. This lack of access to suitable assets
outside the NDSF is limiting the scope of deep submergence science
(UNOLS, 1999~. It is apparent that realizing the vision of deep ocean re-
search described in Chapter 2 will require access to a broader mix of more
capable vehicles than are currently available through the NDSF.~
Because the NDSF is funded irrespective of vehicle use, the marginal
cost (i.e., cost of an additional day of operation) is zero. In contrast, the
marginal cost of using non-NDSF assets can be substantial. From a fiscal
perspective, it is therefore sensible to require, when possible, that NDSF
assets be used in favor of non-NDSF assets. In the absence of additional
funds, excess demand for NDSF assets can be managed by a combination
of asset substitution (ROV for HOV or vice versa), scheduling, and if nec-
essary, proposal rejection. If additional funds were to be made available,
excess demand could also be addressed by leasing non-NDSF assets.
There appear to be situations, however, in which deep submergence
scientific goals cannot be met by NDSF assets but can be met by non-
iThe submersibles used to support deep ocean research are similar to those discussed in
two recent reports Enabling Ocean Research in the 21st Century: Implementation of a Network of
Ocean Observatories (NRC, 2003a) and Exploration of the Seas: Voyage into the Unknown (NRC,
2003b). The recommendations in this report are above and beyond any capabilities called
for in those two reports.
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FUTURE NEEDS IN DEEP SUBMERGENCE SCIENCE
NDSF assets. Moreover, these limitations preferentially restrict the utility
of NDSF assets in certain areas of deep submergence science funded by
NSF. For example, limitations on the viewing capability of Alvin and its
capability to achieve neutral buoyancy multiple times during a single dive
make it less suited for certain types of midwater biological research than
certain non-NDSF assets. For this reason, arguments favoring the full uti-
lization of NDSF assets have the unintended consequence of restricting
the scope of deep submergence science.
A reasonable solution to this problem is to upgrade the capabilities of
NDSF assets so that they can be used in all fields of deep submergence
science. This would expand the scope of deep submergence science and
maintain costs at a reasonable level. Although this is clearly an important
part of the solution, by itself, it may be inadequate. First, these upgrades, if
they occur, will not be completed for two to three years, and some short-
term measures are needed. Perhaps more importantly, there is a danger
that the existing pattern of use of NDSF assets will simply persist. One way
to address both of these problems is for NSF/OCE to provide modest, but
immediate, funding to support the use of non-NDSF assets (NOAA cur-
rently funds the use of non-NDSF facilities on a modest basis). This funding
should not be drawn from the NSF/OCE science program budgets but
should be allocated by the NSF/OCE Integrative Facilities Program. An
additional benefit of establishing such a fund is that it would provide a
gauge of demand for capabilities not provided by current NDSF assets.
Recommendation: NSF/OCE should establish a small pool of additional
funds (on the order of 10 percent of the annual budget for NDSF) that
could be targeted specifically to support the use of non-NDSF vehicles
for high-quality, funded research, when legitimate barriers to the use of
NDSF assets (as opposed to personal preference) can be demonstrated.
If, as additional assets become available (through either purchase or
construction), the demand for non-NDSF vehicles declines (or never ma-
terializes), these funds could be used to address other (non-deep submer-
gence) marine operational needs as determined by NSF/OCE.
DEVELOPING NEW ASSETS
Reforming the asset management system to allow for wider (though
still limited) access to deep submergence assets will, by itself, not be suffi-
cient to meet the needs of science. Existing assets are simply too limited in
their capabilities and capacity, especially at depths greater than 3,000m,
to support the growing demand to conduct research over the necessary
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SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
109
geographic and depth range. High demand for existing deep-diving as-
sets within the NDSF pool has forced asset managers to place a heavy
premium on maximizing operational days while minimizing days in tran-
sit. The pressure that this geographic restriction has led to can only be
expected to increase as ongoing efforts to address a more scientifically
diverse set of problems increase the demand for deep-diving vehicles to
work in diverse settings.
Recommendation: NSF/OCE should construct an additional scientific
ROV system dedicated to expeditionary research,2 to broaden the use
of deep submergence tools in terms of the number of users, the diver-
sity of research areas, and the geographical range of research activities.
Furthermore, while such an ROV system can be constructed using
well-established subsystems several factors should be considered dur-
ing its design. Probably most important overall is the incorporation of
several features that will greatly enhance its utility as well as its ability
to complement existing assets. Some of the most significant features in-
clude a robust variable ballast system, standardized tooling suites, open
software and hardware architectures, electronic thruster systems, tether
management systems, improved handling systems, and camera and
lighting system. The total cost of this system would be approximately $5
million, and it could be built and ready for service within one year of
authorization. Using the current University-National Oceanographic
Laboratory System (UNOLS) model for marine operations, this ROV
system could be mobilized onto the current fleet without any significant
addition of hardware. The operational requirements would be similar to
those for the current Jason II crew. The operational costs of this new
ROV should be similar to those of Jason II and, thus, would represent a
20 percent increase in the overall operating costs of NDSF. This increase
should have a modest impact if it is anticipated and the overall budget
is increased incrementally in preparation for the construction and op-
eration of a new ROV. One justification for adding a new ROV system to
the NDSF asset pool is to provide even greater geographic range to the
growing number of ocean scientists seeking access to deep submergence
assets.
2As opposed to those needed to support the Ocean Observatories Initiative.
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FUTURE NEEDS IN DEEP SUBMERGENCE SCIENCE
Recommendation: NSF/OCE should, after a proper analysis of the cost-
benefits of distributed facilities, strongly consider basing this new ROV
system at a second location that would minimize the transit time for
periodic overhaul and refit of both ROV systems.
The best approach to deep submergence science is the use of a combi-
nation of tools. Detailed reconnaissance surveys are best achieved using
tethered vehicles and AUVs. Experiments and observatory work that re-
quire longer time at already well characterized sites on the seafloor are
best conducted with ROVs. Moreover, work at depths greater than 6,500m
will definitely require unoccupied vehicles, as long as the expense and
risk of constructing and operating HOVs capable of work at these depths
discourage their use.
As discussed in Chapter 3, human presence at depth remains a sig-
nificant lynchpin in the nation's oceanographic research effort. Detailed
descriptions of specific sites or work in the water column benefit from the
direct human observation allowed by HOVs. Despite rapid and impres-
sive growth in the capabilities of unoccupied vehicles (both remotely op-
erated and autonomous), the scientific demand for HOV access can be
expected to remain high. However, the capabilities of the existing Alvin
limit its scientific usefulness for some types of deep ocean research. Im-
proving these capabilities, even without extending its depth range, is
clearly necessary if many of the high-priority scientific goals discussed in
Chapter 2 are to be achieved.
Recommendation: NSF/OCE should construct a new, more capable
HOV (with improved visibility, neutral buoyancy capability, increased
payload, extended time at working depth, and other design features
discussed in Chapter 4~.
The bulk of existing Alvin use is at depths considerably shallower than
its 4,500-m limit. Even at these shallower depths, scientific demand re-
mains unmet. At the same time, certain scientific goals would be furthered
by the acquisition of an HOV with a 6,500-m-depth range. Under current
safety guidelines imposed by the operating institutions, Alvin and other
HOVs are prohibited from operating in waters deeper than the rated
working depth, even if this operation is in the water column. For this
reason alone, providing access to an HOV with a greater depth capability
would allow its use over a broader geographical range, thereby improv-
ing its utility for a portion of the potential user community. As discussed
at length in Chapter 4 however, it is not clear at present that a suitable
sphere can be obtained to allow the fabrication of a deeper-diving HOV,
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SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
111
especially given the limited funds available to NSF/OCE in the next two
fiscal years.
The most promising approaches for moving ahead during the time
frame articulated by NSF/OCE would make use of one of two existing
spheres. The first is the third, unused sphere from the Russian Mir HOV
series (referred to as the Lokomo sphere), which has been rated to 6,500m.
The other available sphere is the titanium sphere used in the existing
Alvin, which is rated to 4,500m. While the possibility of fabricating an
entirely new sphere warrants investigation, there is insufficient informa-
tion at this time to determine the ultimate availability and cost of a spe-
cifically fabricated sphere. Given the technical and cost uncertainties, and
that the scientific justification for conducting HOV operations at depths
greater than 4,500m appears to be incremental (i.e., it represents promis-
ing but logical extensions of work supported at shallower depths), it is
not clear that significant additional resources (i.e., in excess of those
needed to fully upgrade the current NDSF HOV capability;, as discussed
in Chapter 4) should be expended on a new HOV with greatly extended
depth capability if that expenditure were to preclude construction of the
ROV system recommended in Chapter 4 of this report.
Recommendation: Thus, constructing an HOV capable of operating at sig-
nificantly greater depths (6,000m plus) should be undertaken only if addi-
tional design studies demonstrate that this capability can be delivered for
a relatively small increase in cost and risk as discussed in Chapter 4.
To implement these recommendations, NSF and other NDSF spon-
sors would have to increase funding at a rate of 10 to 15 percent over the
next three years to (1) cover the cover the cost of non-NDSF vehicle use
and (2) cover the cost of the new ROV. In order to provide the capabili-
ties and capacity to meet existing and anticipated demands, NSF and
other NDSF sponsors should take a three-step approach: (1) set aside
additional funds called for to support non-NDSF vehicle use as quickly
as possible; (2) initiate acquisition of the new ROV in 2004 or 2005; and
(3) undertake a detailed engineering study to evaluate various HOV en-
hancement options called for in Chapter 4 with an aim of delivering
these new platforms by 2006. It is entirely possible, perhaps even prob-
able, that given more time and significantly greater funds, the federal
agencies that fund deep submergence research could build a number of
platforms with greater capabilities than those described here. The state-
ment of task, however, was specifically crafted to ensure that advice
provided in this report was appropriate given the current fiscal and pro-
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FUTURE NEEDS IN DEEP SUBMERGENCE SCIENCE
grammatic realities facing federal science agencies. If, in the future, these
requirements were to change significantly, then the appropriate mix of
assets needed to support the deep submergence effort should be revis-
ited.3
3The purpose of this study is to provide NSF with recommendations for consideration
regarding activities to provide infrastructure support for basic research at depth in the oceans
through NDSF or other means. As such, the discussions in this report are designed to in-
form this question and are not intended to provide an exhaustive account of all research-
related activities carried out at depth or a complete account of all the potential assets that
exist. The discussion of assets in this report is limited therefore to those that establish
whether adequate deep submergence vehicles exist within or outside the National Deep
Submergence Facility. Furthermore, any recommendations made in this report are above
and beyond the needs for other large programs such as NSF's Ocean Observatories Initiative
or activities falling within the realm of ocean exploration.
Representative terms from entire chapter:
ndsf assets