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Representative terms from entire chapter:
air transportation
1
Top-Leve' Assessment
, . . .
. i\ .~
The committee developed 12 recommendations
that pertain to all three Aeronautics Technology Pro-
grams. These recommendations are presented in this
chapter as the top-level assessment. Specific findings
that led to these recommendations are presented as part
of the detailed descriptions of the three programs in
Chapters 2, 3, and 4 of this report.
Top-Level Recommendation 1. The government
should continue to support air transportation,
which is vital to the U.S. economy and the well-be-
· ~ ~ ~ ~
sing of its citizens.
A strong national program of aeronautics research
and technology directly contributes to the vitality of
the U.S. aeronautics industry, the efficiency of the
U.S. air transportation system, and the economic well-
being and quality of life of people in the United States.
The government has an important role in assuring the
best possible air transportation system and the devel-
opment of related technologies that enable products
and services to compete effectively in the global mar-
ketplace. This is consistent with the legislative char-
ter for NASA, the National Aeronautics and Space
Act of 1958, as amended. The Act specifies that
NASA's aeronautics research and technology devel-
opment should "contribute to a national technology
base that will enhance United States preeminence in
s
civil and aeronautical aviation and improve the safety
and efficiency of the United States air transportation
system."
Top-Level Recommendation 2. NASA should pro-
vide world leadership in aeronautics research and
development.
To provide leadership, NASA should develop con-
sistent strategic and long-range plans that focus the
aeronautics program in areas of national importance.
NASA should have well-formulated, measurable, at-
tainable goals at all program levels. To be meaningful,
the goals should be based on a sound evaluation of fu-
ture needs, of technological feasibility, and of relevant
economic and other nontechnical factors.
[Another recent NRC report, Securing the Future of U.S. Air
Transportation: A System in Peril, addresses in more detail the
need for strong interagency leadership in overcoming future tech-
nical and nontechnical challenges to the success of the U.S. air
transportation system. That report also identifies specific long-term
research needs related to modeling and simulation and the perfor-
mance of aircraft and the air transportation system. (National Re-
search Council. 2003. Securing the Future of U.S. Air Transporta-
tion: A System in Peril. Washington, D.C.: The National Acad-
emies Press. Available online at
6
Top-Level Recommendation 3. NASA has many
excellent technical personnel and facilities to
achieve its aeronautics technology objectives, but
NASA should improve its processes for program
management.
~ ..... .
., ;.
AN ASSESSMENT OF NASA 'S AERONA UTICS TECHNOLOGY PROGRAMS
Many NASA facilities are world-class national as-
sets. In addition, the committee was impressed with the
technical expertise of many program personnel. To
maximize these assets, NASA needs to improve its pro-
gram management and systems integration processes,
including integration across programs. NASA should
also assure clear lines of responsibility and account-
ability. The use of matrix and line management report-
ing structures sometimes obscures lines of accountabil-
ity, and subproject and task-level plans, funding, goals,
metrics, staffing, and responsibility are often difficult
to define or cannot be clearly traced back to a plan or
vision for the program as a whole. Further, NASA
should use independent quality assurance processes for
program evaluation, and all projects should be evalu-
ated regularly to determine whether continued invest-
ment is warranted.
Top-Level Recommendation 4. NASA should elimi-
nate arbitrary time constraints on program comple-
tion and schedule key milestones based on task com-
plexity and technology maturity.
Research priorities, funding, and organizational
structure change during the course of any research and
development effort. However, NASA should resist con-
stant changes and realignments designed to meet artifi-
cial 5-year sunset requirements. Several long-term re-
search efforts have been disguised as a series of 5-year
projects with different names so that it is not easy to
trace the real progress of the research. In addition, the
continuous reorganization and restructuring that occur
in response to the 5-year sunset rule create an unstable
atmosphere that does not permit NASA researchers to
pursue the best path to technology maturation. NASA
programs need clear exit criteria at the task level that
specify when research is complete or ready for transi-
tion to industry or other agencies.
Top-Level Recommendation 5. NASA should re-
duce the number of tasks in its aeronautics technol-
ogy portfolio.
NASA is trying to do too much within the avail-
able budget and resists eliminating programs in the face
of budget reductions. Often there are too many tasks to
achieve research objectives in key areas. This overload
may be partly the result of including various basic re-
search tasks within more focused efforts. The commit-
tee is concerned that breadth of activities is coming at
the expense of depth.
Top-Level Recommendation 6. NASA should pur-
sue more high-risk, high-payoff technologies.
Many innovative concepts that are critical to meet-
ing aviation needs in the next decades will not be pur-
sued by industry or the Federal Aviation Administra-
tion (FAA). NASA should fill this void. The committee
applauds the inclusion of high-risk, revolutionary sub-
projects in many areas and believes the program port-
folio could benefit from additional far-reaching efforts
with the potential for high payoff. This type of research
is critical to investigating the feasibility of innovative
concepts and reducing risk to the point where the con-
cepts are suitable for advanced development and trans-
fer to industry or the FAA.
Top-Level Recommendation 7. NASA should re-
constitute a long-term base research program sepa-
rate from the other aeronautics technology pro-
grams and projects.
The current research is mostly product-driven, with
not enough fundamental work. Fundamental research
is crucial for the development of future products.
NASA needs to provide researchers the opportunity to
conduct forward-Iooking, basic research that is unen-
cumbered by short-term, highly specified goals and
milestones. Historically, NASA has been a world
leader in its core research areas; however, that base has
eroded in recent years as the amount of in-house basic
research diminishes. NASA needs to reassess its core
competencies and assure their support through a base
research program.
Top-Level Recommendation X. NASA's aeronau-
tics technology infrastructure exceeds its current
needs, and the agency should continue to dispose of
underutilized assets and facilities.
NASA test facilities incur large fixed costs. Some
of these facilities are not unique, and long-term fixed
costs could be reduced through consolidation and de-
TOP-LEVEL ASSESSMENT
1
activation. This should be an ongoing effort as the
needs of the industry change and as validated computa-
tional tools reduce or eliminate the need for some ex-
. . . .
per~mental facilities.
Top-Level Recommendation 9. NASA should
implement full-cost accounting in a way that avoids
unintended consequences harmful to the long-term
health of the aeronautics program.
NASA is in the process of transitioning from a net
accounting system to a system that uses- full-cost ac-
counting. Under the former scheme, researchers man-
aged only costs directly related to research and devel-
opment. In full-cost accounting, all project costs are
included in the project budget, including institutional
infrastructure costs such as research operations support;
direct procurement; direct civil service workforce, ben-
efits, and travel; service pools; center general and ad-
ministrative; and corporate general and administrative.
The committee is concerned that, if not carefully man-
aged, fulI-cost accounting could result in (1) the clo-
sure of critical infrastructure and special-purpose fa-
cilities that will be needed for future program execution
and (2) a disincentive to use large-scale facilities and
flight tests to fully demonstrate technology readiness.
This can easily occur if the responsibility for preserving
institutional capabilities is delegated to lower level
project managers. These project managers will also
tend to avoid full-scale flight tests or wind tunnel tests
in order to conserve their project budgets, since under
full-cost accounting much of the cost of the testing in-
frastructure will be billed directly to their projects if
they perform such tests. The testing infrastructure will
be underutilized and will not generate the resources
needecl to sustain it. The committee recommends that
basic research costs should be carried as a line item and
not hidden in larger projects and that large infrastruc-
ture costs, such as wind tunnels and full-scale flight
testing, should be attributed to the total program and
accounted for accordingly.
Top-Level Recommendation 10. NASA should de-
velop a common understanding with the FAA of
their respective roles and relationship.
NASA's airspace research ultimately benefits
many government, industry, and private organizations
with an interest in aviation, including the Department
of Defense (DoD), airlines, manufacturers, system op-
erators (air traffic controllers, managers, flight dis-
patchers, and pilots), and the flying public. Practically
speaking, however, the most important customers are
the senior managers at the FAA who decide whether
they will take applied research products from NASA
and continue their development to the point of incorpo-
rating them in operational systems. Although much of
NASA's airspace research is applicable to systems ac-
quired and operated by DoD, other government agen-
cies, and industry, most of it is intended for application
to civil aviation systems acquired, operated, andlor cer-
tified by the FAA. In this sense, customers also include
the many other organizations and officials who influ-
ence decisions by the government and industry regard-
ing the advanced development of new systems for civil
. .
app Location.
NASA and the FAA often collaborate at the tech-
nical level, but there is a real need for more effective
management coordination. The need for continued im-
provement in NASA's interactions with its customers
is indicated, in part, by the committee's observation
that NASA managers seem to perceive interactions
with the FAA as more effective than do FAA manag-
ers. NASA officials need to recognize that implemen-
tation decisions rest with FAA management (for sys-
tems to be implemented by the FAA), and advocacy by
NASA, when it runs counter to FAA implementation
plans, is not helpful. Problems in this area are exacer-
bated by (1) the view of many at NASA that the suc-
cess of applied research is measured only in terms of
the extent to which customers incorporate NASA tech-
nology in their operational systems and (2) competi-
tion that may arise between NASA and other organiza-
tions that conduct research on behalf of the FAA or
other key customers. As a particular NASA research
effort approaches the point where the value of contin-
ued development is contingent on operational imple-
mentation, the prospective user may decide that imple-
mentation is not feasible. NASA should then be willing
to close out the project that has no future and use the
resources to support other research.
Top-Level Recommendation 11. NASA should seek
better feedback from senior management in indus-
try and other government organizations.
NASA's customers include aircraft manufacturers,
operators, airlines, and the FAA. NASA already in-
volves customers in almost all of its research for ex-
ample, in the form of joint efforts with the FAA to take
8
aN ASSESSMENT OF NASA 'S AERONAUTICS TECHNOLOGY PROGRAMS
research products into the field for testing. Some
projects, such as Small Aircraft Transportation Systems
(SATS), also sponsor wide-ranging outreach efforts.
Usually, however, customer involvement earlier in the
process would be beneficial. Early involvement would
(1) ensure that researchers understand and are able to
respond to user requirements and concerns as early as
possible and (23 probably increase customer buy-in.
Customers need not and should not be given veto au-
thority over NASA research, but researchers should be
aware of—and research plans should account for ob-
jections or concerns that customers raise. This is espe-
cially important for research intended to provide op-
erationally useful products capable of meeting specific
functional requirements, but early consultations with
users would also be beneficial in a base research pro-
gram. NASA should improve its relationships with the
FAA and other customers by involving them from the
early stages of the research and development process
through field implementation. One method for improv-
ing interaction would be for NASA to convene a yearly
meeting, co-chaired by the FAA and NASA Adminis-
trators, with participation by industry executives at the
chief operating officer level and senior managers from
other federal agencies (e.g., Department of Transporta-
tion, Department of Homeland Security, and DoD).
Topics should be limited to near-term issues and imple-
mentation plans, and such a meeting should not be held
unless the NASA and FAA Administrators and indus-
try chief operating officers will commit to personally
attending the meeting.
Top-Level Recommendation 12. NASA should con-
duct research in selective areas relevant to rotorcraft.
Rotorcraft are an important constituency of air
transportation. Many of the research projects currently
under way in the Aeronautics Technology Programs,
such as synthetic vision and human factors, would be
directly relevant to rotorcraft with only minimal addi-
tional investment. NASA could make a significant im-
pact in underresearched areas of rotorcraft such as de-
cision aids, synthetic vision, pilot workload, and
situational awareness. Further, the existing U.S. Army
programs in rotorcraft technologies and industry re-
search and development in rotorcraft could be lever-
aged by NASA to meet civilian needs in this area. The
committee believes that research in civil applications
of rotorcraft will not be conducted elsewhere in gov-
ernment or industry and that NASA's decision to dis-
continue rotorcraft research has left critical civilian
needs unaddressed. Therefore, NASA should consider
potential applications to rotorcraft in its research pro-
grams in general aviation and transport aircraft.
·
.
The first two top-level recommendations reiterate
the importance of air transportation and of NASA's role
in the research and development process. Top-Level
Recommendations 3-7 suggest ways the content and/or
structure of the programs could be improved. Top-
Level Recommendations 8 and 9 identify near-term,
important concerns. The final three top-level recom-
mendations address the relationships between NASA
and its customers. The committee believes that NASA
can improve and strengthen its Aeronautics Technol-
ogy Programs by following this advice.
