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multiethnic States and Conflicts
After the USSR*
Valery A. TishEov
Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology, Russian Academy of Sciences
primary purpose of this analysis is to provide an overview of
major issues and to determine the most promising areas for a Na-
tional Academies-Russian Academy of Sciences research project on
conflicts in multiethnic societies.
TERRITORY, BORDERS, AND RESOURCES
Territorial issues over and claims to natural resources are directly
related to the status of ethnic relations and potential conflicts. Moreover,
most armed conflicts are caused by these issues. In this context, territory
serves not only as a utilitarian life-supporting resource, but also as a
symbol of history or culture or both of a given nation, or a "historic land."
In the post-Soviet environment, in spite of a long-time and extensive min-
gling of people with different cultures, ethnicity used to be and still is
highly territorialized, predominantly through doctrines and emotions.
This link was reinforced by the newly emerging polities and now it car-
ries substantial political weight: Ukraine is a land of Ukrainians and Esto-
nia is a land of Estonians; the others non-titulars live on ethnic territories
not their own. Therefore, to what extent is peaceful cultural mix possible
within the post-Soviet states or are these states doomed to move toward
ethnic homogenization through out-migration, assimilation, and even
cleansing? Answering this question will have significant scientific value
*Translated from the Russian by Rita Kit.
99
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CONFLICT AND RECONSTRUCTION IN MULTIETHNIC SOCIETIES
and will influence policy making to ensure the democratic and peaceful
management of complex societies. It is likely that no single solution will
be found for all countries, but some of the problems are similar, and there
is sufficient international experience that can be applicable.
The breakup of the Soviet Union, where administrative borders be-
tween republics were not defined, resulted in serious tensions in many
regions, especially in Central Asia and the South Caucasus. First, there are
disputed territories both in the mountainous areas and in the river valleys
and oases. Attempts to impose strict control, up to the mining of border
zones, as Uzbekistan did on the border with Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan in
a unilateral order, results in deprivation, extortion, and sacrifice among
the common population. Second, the population of the post-Soviet states,
especially culturally-related populations of the border regions, do not
wish to recognize rigid lines. These strict borders interfere with human
relations and everyday business.
Immediately after the breakup of the Former Soviet Union (FSU),
serious mistakes were made not only in the area of citizenship rules and
regulations, but also in formulating the new border regime. In our view,
the situation required at least a decade of free movement and free choice
of citizenship. Although we cannot go back in time to correct these errors,
one very important conclusion can be made based on this experience:
People will respect national borders only when they are transparent and
democratically established.
One can argue that transparency of the post-Soviet borders may be
contrary to the new states' desire to build up their national security and
defend themselves from outside extremists and paramilitary groups. But,
it is much better to build effective cooperation among authorities, armed
forces, and special services of the post-Soviet states, rather than installing
roadblocks and mine fields. Post-Soviet states possess various territories
and natural resources, and no considerable changes took place after the
breakup, except for some newly created states losing control over part of
their territories because of armed separatist struggles. These events repre-
sent serious challenges for several countries (Azerbaijan, Georgia,
Moldova, Russia), the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and
to some extent, the larger world community. All of the secessionist con-
flicts took place in the first half of the 1990s, and most of them ended with
some form of military victory, but none of the self-proclaimed separatist
regions has achieved its political objective of creating a viable and recog-
nized state. At the same time, none of these territories has been returned
to the control of the central government. Some of these regions have
transformed into isolated military-political formations with various de-
grees of political governance and some form of a blockade economy. This
situation has existed for more than a decade and can last for an even
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MULTIETHNIC STATES AND CONFLICTS AFTER THE USSR
101
longer time. However, this does not mean the conflict has been resolved.
Rather, it has halted, with the danger of a new cycle of violence as with
Chechnya three years after the first war. The experience of restoring con-
stitutional order in this part of Russia in 1999-2001 clearly illustrates the
difficulty of restaging lost battles, where sovereignty over the territory
and governance systems has been lost. An alternative scenario namely,
accepting the separation of the region does not solve the problem either.
Post-Soviet states will not accept a second round of disintegration.
In this context, the past decade brought growing understanding that
separation of states per se does not encourage economic and cultural
prosperity, much less bolster the nations' self-determination. The price of
separation (including human casualties and economic losses) is much
higher than the strategy of improving governance systems, including im-
proving ethnic relations based on the principles of internal self-determi-
nation and democratic governance. The Yugoslavian crisis and the situa-
tion in the former Soviet republics marks rethinking of the minority
problem, which dominated the second half of the twentieth century and
remains vital for the European community and the post-Soviet countries.
The new approach is that the only solution to the territorial disputes in
the multiethnic societies is not creating new borders, but searching for
mutually acceptable ways of social governance on a common territory.
However, this declaration does very little for specific ongoing open
conflicts in the territory of the former Soviet Union. From a strategic
standpoint, these conflicts can be ended one of two ways: either by forc-
ing the will of central governments on separatist regions or through nego-
tiated compromise. In recent years, both ways were tried, but it is too
early to claim any success. It is possible that joint efforts (and not only a
joint declaration of the CIS members about their commitment to the prin-
ciples of territorial integrity) will change the situation. Nevertheless, pres-
ervation of the status quo, namely, keeping these conflicts simmering is
the worse possible scenario.
Territorial issues remain potential sources of conflicts within the Rus-
sian Federation; however, during recent years their significance has di-
minished. At this point, there are no explicit territorial disputes among
the subjects of the Russian Federation, except for some unresolved conse-
quences of the Ingush-Ossetian conflict. Separate radical appeals to draw
new, fair borders lack support from the public and government authori-
ties. Even so, these problems exist and they could escalate. I can mention
several cases, the Chechnya-Dagestan and Chechnya-Ingushetia borders,
the claim of Kalmykia to regain a part of the Astrakhan Oblast in Volga
Delta, the unification of three different Buryat autonomies, and a unique
situation with Russia's territorial enclave the Kaliningrad Oblast se-
verely isolated by the Shengen visa regime. Constant monitoring and
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CONFLICT AND RECONSTRUCTION IN MULTIETHNIC SOCIETIES
preparation of adequate responses remains a necessity in Russia and other
nations.
As far as natural resources are concerned, the last decade illustrated
that among CIS and Baltic states, the best results in economic well-being
and fairness of natural resources utilization were achieved by nations
without the largest reserves. In large nations, many natural resources of
the former Soviet Union are still being used jointly some nations receive
direct benefits from these resources; some nations gain from transporta-
tion routes; others do not have any of the above, and therefore, they
cannot take any advantage from these resources. With the exception of
the Caspian Sea resources and fresh water in Central Asia, there are no
disputed natural resources within FSU territory. However, it is possible
for tension to appear in the tie between agrarian overpopulation of the
countries of Central Asia and the growing need of water resources. These
problems affect not only the region itself but also Russia as a potential
donor of the vital resource.
Within the Russian Federation itself, the issue of natural resource
distribution and utilization has been primarily resolved through constitu-
tional means, policies of budget federalism, and targeted development
and economic assistance programs. However, there appears to be a very
important issue that remains underestimated. It is probable that natural
resources have been distributed unequally northern regions and Siberia
possess larger deposits than southern and some central parts of Russia.
Some subjects of the Federation, for example, the North Caucasus, pos-
sess few natural resources. Nevertheless, standards of living in these re-
gions often do not correspond to the resource base of that particular terri-
tory. People residing in the donor regions, like Bashkortostan, Yakutia,
Komi, the Udmurtia and Tatarstan Republics, northern autonomous
okrugs should live better than the population of the regions receiving
federal budget aid. Otherwise, tensions are inevitable, and some of these
tensions might be based on ethnic issues.
Overall, the Russian Federation possesses sufficient natural resources
to provide a reasonable level of social well-being. In order to prevent
internal tensions and conflicts, the state should avoid significant inequali-
ties in the living standards of different regions. At the same time, at-
tempts to impose a rigid egalitarian system or transfer additional funds to
certain regions in return for political loyalty will not yield positive results.
THE DEMOGRAPHIC SITUATION AND MIGRATION
During the past decade, two major factors shaped the demographic
situation in the FSU. First, the population declined because of a drop in
the birth rate and an increase in mortality. The second factor was the
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MULTIETHNIC STATES AND CONFLICTS AFTER THE USSR
103
unprecedented growth of migration. The overall population of the FSU
was reduced by approximately 5-6 million people (some of that from
emigration to other parts of the world). The most noticeable population
declines were in Armenia, Georgia, the Baltic states, Belarus, Moldova,
Kazakhstan, and Ukraine. Population growth rates in Azerbaijan and
Central Asian republics remain relatively high (yet lower than in Turkey);
however, Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan are donating a serious
proportion of the male working population as labor migrants to Russia.
Russia, like the Baltic states, has suffered serious negative natural growth,
but the loss of population has been compensated by immigration. Since
1990, the country has experienced a very high migration flow. Through
an exchange of population with other former Soviet republics, Russia has
increased its population by 5 million; it has lost one million in migration
exchange with the rest of the world. The country's total population is
about 145 million people (147.8 in 1989), but this estimate does not in-
clude the large number of non-registered (illegal) migrants, most of whom
will stay in Russia (for example, Meskhetian Turks).
Population decline is not related to shock therapy, or rapid impover-
ishment of the population, since in Russia, for example, the highest birth
rates are registered in the North Caucasus, especially in the rural areas of
Dagestan, the Republic of Ingushetia, Chechnya, and Karachaevo-
Cherkessia. Natural population growth (or decline) has no direct link to
ethnic relations and ethnic conflicts, although overall political instability
and conflicts may have an adverse impact on birth rates and, obviously,
on the number of deaths. In Chechnya alone, direct (combat casualties)
and indirect losses (from diseases and collapse of the healthcare system)
could reach one hundred thousand people.
At the same time, differences in birth rates can be identified along
ethnic borders, sometimes even within the same region, community, city,
and city quarters. Large families in one ethnic group may cause a negative
attitude from representatives of other nationalities, which in turn can lead
to ethnic tensions. Some specialists and politicians have issued alarming
forecasts, and authorities have responded inadequately. Some regions
and cities deliberately imposed limitations on registration and housing,
introduced declared and undeclared restrictions on labor markets, and so
forth. In some instances, attempts were made to exile members of non-
indigenous ethnic groups with higher birth rates.
Excessive attention and politicizing the issue of different birth rates
among various ethnic groups in the Russian Federation cannot yield any
positive outcome. Demographic processes will always have their own
dynamics, which should be accepted as a natural phenomenon. We should
learn to adjust to new realities and attempt to benefit from them rather
than turning them into the source of potential conflict.
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CONFLICT AND RECONSTRUCTION IN MULTIETHNIC SOCIETIES
Demographic situations are shaped not only by natural growth (or
decline) of the population, but also by migration processes. The ethnic
makeup of the population and its proportions are determined through
marriages (resulting in a change in identities and the passage of represen-
tatives from one group to another) and assimilation. In this regard, Rus-
sians have almost always emerged as the culturally and quantitatively
dominant ethnonation in the Russian Federation. Despite the growth of
ethnic identity among non-Russian residents of the Federation, this trend
holds. Russianness remains the preferred group identification in the coun-
try, and most offspring of mixed marriages usually choose it as their
ethnic identity.
Sharp changes in the migration processes in the FSU became the sec-
ond major component shaping the status of ethnic relations and conflicts.
Migration from rural to urban areas is not included in the scope of this
analysis, although it would have been required for proper ethnographic
monitoring. Often, ethnic conflicts start as conflicts between rural and
urban populations, as in Chechnya, where the urban population was pre-
dominately Russian, while the majority of the rural population was
Chechen. Here, we are primarily interested in the migration between dif-
ferent states and the ethnic characteristics of this process.
Recent decades produced a number of new trends and features. First,
there was a sharp increase in international migration and a slowdown in
the internal movement of people (other than forced migrants from the
areas of armed conflicts in, for example, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Tajikistan,
and Russia). As a result of the Chechen war, half of its former population
(approximately five hundred thousand people) moved to other parts of
Russia. A similar number of people were forcefully moved because of the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in Azerbaijan. In Georgia at least two hun-
dred thousand people were forced to leave Abkhazia and forty thousand
left South Ossetia.
Sizable movements of people primarily took place between Russia
and other former Soviet republics; earlier, it happened between Armenia
and Azerbaijan. The Russian Federation experienced a sharp increase of
inflow with simultaneous reduction of outflow of its population. Accord-
ing to official data, more than five million people moved to Russia during
the past 10 years. However, this number does not include undocumented
immigrants and the so-called shuttle migrants (people who spend most of
their time in Russia, have jobs and residences there, but keep the citizen-
ship of another country). Russian society (including politicians and aca-
demicians) understood poorly that the arrival of culturally related and
economically valuable migrants from the former Soviet republics was in
fact a benefit, most likely the only factor working against depopulation
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MULTIETHNIC STATES AND CONFLICTS AFTER THE USSR
105
and acting as a source of development. However, these migrants were not
embraced (net migration declined from eight hundred thousand in 1994
to two hundred thousand in 2000~. The economic uncertainties and the
Chechen war were not the only reasons for curbing immigration to the
Russian Federation. Potential immigrants were concerned about how they
would be received by the authorities and the rest of the population, and
what would happen with registration, housing, and schools for their chil-
dren. Xenophobia and incompetence of Russian experts and policy mak-
ers channeled energy and fears into the false direction of "consolidating
the Russian nation" and "repatriation of the compatriots." Instead of sup-
porting valuable workers from Armenia, Moldova, and Ukraine, a federal
law was passed, granting preferential treatment to ethnic Russians in the
former Soviet republics (most likely, no longer interested in moving to
Russia) and the descendants of former Russian emigrants residing prima-
rily in such countries as Israel and the United States. In reality, strict anti-
immigration policy is still pursued. Starting in 2000, simplified proce-
dures for obtaining Federation citizenship are no longer in place; passport
and visa agencies are prohibited from accepting new citizenship applica-
tions. Restrictions on migration and receipt of Russian citizenship for all
residents of the Soviet Union regardless of nationality are clear examples
of nearsighted and self-destructive Russian policies.
A few million new residents slowed the natural decline of the coun-
try's population and seemingly should have removed grounds for claims
about the so-called demographic disaster. Russia is not losing seven hun-
dred thousand or even one million people a year, and any statements and
forecasts to that effect are unscientific and politically self-destructive. Be-
sides, these statements become a breeding ground for Russian chauvin-
ism, since it is the Russian people who are supposedly dying out. Never-
theless, sharp changes in the usual makeup of the population in various
Russian regions have caused some social and cultural-psychological prob-
lems. Even ethnic Russians settling into their new communities were faced
with problems of adaptation and integration in the new surroundings.
Recent monitoring indicated that anti-immigrant tendencies are ris-
ing in Russia and several other countries. None of the countries has a
policy of stimulating immigration, although all of them, with the excep-
tion of Azerbaijan and the Central Asian countries need such policies to
ensure their further development. Our conclusion is that exchanges of
population in the form of temporary or permanent migration will con-
tinue in the former Soviet Union and these countries should compete for
human resources. It should not become reason to create additional barri-
ers between countries. Xenophobia toward immigrants of other ethnicities
should be overcome through public awareness and education, and even
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CONFLICT AND RECONSTRUCTION IN MULTIETHNIC SOCIETIES
administrative actions against politicians, government officials, and em-
ployers, if necessary.
POWER, THE STATE, AND ETHNICITY
What is the recent history and current context of legislative and regu-
latory actions regarding managing ethnic diversity and ethnic relations in
complex multiethnic societies, such as the Russian Federation and other
former Soviet states? There are numerous, and unfortunately, fruitless
debates among Russian academicians and policy makers. At the same
time, law making and its practical implementation has yielded some posi-
tive results, although numerous mistakes were made, and several oppor-
tunities lost.
Positive results include several federal laws and regulations, that is,
the Concept of State Nationality Policy in the Russian Federation (1996),
the Federal Law on National and Cultural Autonomy (1996), and Federal
Law on Support and Development of Small Nations of the Russian Fed-
eration (1999~. The Russian Federation also joined a number of interna-
tional conventions, including a framework convention of the European
Council, on the Rights of National Minorities.
At present, the Russian Federation is revisiting the fundamental prin-
ciples of the federal state. Currently, the Federation comprises ethnoterri-
torial autonomies (republics, autonomous oblasts, and districts) and regu-
lar administrative units of the Federation, namely oblasts and krais. The
weakness of the state during a period of tremendous social transforma-
tion, a lack of competence, and a sense of responsibility and political will
on behalf of politicians can explain the wide diversity of actions and
declarations, some of which are simply unacceptable in mature societies.
Obviously, the scope of these conflicts, especially results of the first war in
Chechnya the semirecognition of an armed separate region totally out-
side of the central government's control shocked Russian society and
became a serious burden for the present generation of Russian politicians,
most of whom are truly concerned about the well-being of their country
and their constituencies.
Some may argue that there are simple solutions to these problems: let
Chechnya (or the entire North Caucasus) go; turn present-day republics
into states; let the Russian people exercise their right of self-determina-
tion; let everybody have their state and government structures, and so
forth. Some take the opposite stance, urging the use of force to restore law
and order in the country and to eliminate ethnoterritorial autonomies.
The number of forecasts and proposals at the level of official discussions
and in sociopolitical literature is so high that there seems to be no chance
of introducing any sort of order into the mental chaos and resulting policy.
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We do not support this fatalistic position and believe that the overall
development and even evolution of the state is the result of targeted,
daily efforts. The better thought-through and targeted these efforts are,
the better the final outcome. Nothing is programmed in history. History is
best used as a political and ideological resource. Obviously, there are
several limitations in place, including the predominant state of mind. It is
difficult to change views and perceptions, which were imposed and rein-
forced throughout long periods of time. The proper level of expertise and
competency cannot be achieved overnight, either. Experience illustrates
that it is easier to learn how to set up a bank or a successful enterprise
than to draft a law or a presidential decree, not resembling the structure
of communist party resolutions, and capable of working in a modern
environment.
All of the above implies that there is a great need to educate (or re-
educate) average citizens as well as the political elite about what state
they live in, the fundamental principles of that state, and the territory it
occupies. In order to educate Russia (or learn what Russia means), there is
no need to make fast and ill-conceived conclusions, especially involving
restructuring and disintegration of the state. States are the most stable
and long lasting form of social coalitions of people. Although they are not
created by God and not expected to last forever, every generation has
limited rights to change and transform this legacy.
EXPERIENCE OF THE POST-SOVIET STATE BUILDING
All modern states were first formed on a political level. Creation of
the new social and cultural communities came later. The same thing hap-
pened in 1991, where the words "Russia," "Ukraine," "Kazakhstan," etc.
were used to describe new formations. What it really meant (other than
new borders between former republics and various degrees of local na-
tionalism/patriotism) remained unclear for politicians and the rest of the
FSU population. Actual creation of the new states by institution building
began after the collapse of the former Soviet Union.
Russia's route was the most difficult not because it has fewer re-
sources or less reason to become an independent state, but because Russia
was the country most closely associated with the FSU, and there was a
lack of clarity in the overall direction and objectives of the nation-building
process. This lack of clarity in the process of Russian state building was
caused by the fact that most of the ideologists of socialist federalism and
proponents of the resolution of the nationality issue have lived and stayed
in Moscow. The breakup of the FSU limited the activities of these so-
called specialists to the boundaries of Russia, which made life easier for
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CONFLICT AND RECONSTRUCTION IN MULTIETHNIC SOCIETIES
other countries. However Russia was not so lucky: Some Soviet passport
holders with the right nationality, that is, similar in pronunciation to the
name of the republic, found themselves to be the owners of the nation-
state, while others had their home base in other parts of the country, or
even outside of it. This unfortunate friend-foe formula was long lasting
and caused discrimination, ethnic tensions, and conflicts.
Even though the post-Soviet states were created on behalf of all their
respective residents participating in the voting (regardless of the actual
vote of a specific individual), during the further legislative process, exclu-
sive or preferred status was grabbed by the representatives of the one
ethnic group (indigenous or titular ethnicity). This process was executed
through various legal loopholes. The most widely used one was wording
in the constitution, stating that the state is created on behalf of all its
residents, then adding that the state is the tool of self-determination of a
specific ethnicity and therefore is a nation-state of ethnic Moldovans,
Ukrainians, Kazakhs, Uzbeks, and so forth. Overall, except for some dec-
larations, nobody seriously considered cocitizenship or civic approaches
to nation building.
As a result, newly created states abandoned the old Soviet concept of
multinationalism and embraced the traditional concepts of ethnonational-
ism, which could be described as follows: Ukraine is defined as a national
state of ethnic Ukrainians; all other people are defined as national minori-
ties. They can become members of that nation only through the process of
Ukrainization, that is, cultural assimilation, sometimes more softly referred
to as integration. This approach was used throughout the rest of the newly
created states, except for the Baltic states. However, in Latvia and Estonia,
where in principle citizenship is linked to the idea of the nation, this is
made up for by excluding the overwhelming majority of nonindigenous
ethnic groups from citizenship, which is viewed as a cultural-linguistic
consideration Lalvia-ization or Estonia-ization.
THE INEVITABILITY OF FUTURE CORRECTIONS
The choice of ethnonationalism as a fundamental principle of state
building was not a random one. This choice was made in order for the
new states to distance themselves from Russia and its culture, which is
dominated by the Russian language, and to protect the new state cultures
and official languages. This approach also enabled some states to limit the
number of people that claim access to power and resources, especially
during privatization and other market reforms. Most importantly, this
approach maintains the old ideology that nationality is not citizenship,
but a membership in a specific ethnic and cultural group. This mentality
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MULTIETHNIC STATES AND CONFLICTS AFTER THE USSR
109
prevented the noncitizens and minorities from playing a more active part
in the larger political process. No one explained to these groups that the
newly created states are their common property and that the government
must speak the language of its taxpayers, which implies having at least
two official languages in the countries where over half the population
(including members of the political elite) speak Russian, and not Ukrai-
nian, Kazakh, or Moldovan languages.
Even with the shortcomings of this process in the newly created
multiethnic states of the FSU (except Russia), many of them have a chance
to correct the situation and to move away from the principles of ethno-
nationalism toward truly democratic and all-inclusive principles of state
building. With the presence of a huge Russian-language culture in neigh-
boring Russia and the status of the Russian language as one of the leading
world languages, newly created states will have serious difficulties trying
to eliminate the Russian language from their countries, for example,
switching the Gagause population in Moldova from the Russian to the
Moldovan language, as part of the derussipcation of the non-Russian eth-
nic groups. Cultural and language issues have nothing to do with the
colonial past, which has to be dismantled. Therefore, ethnonationalism
becomes counterproductive, and it will be replaced by civic nationalism
in order to keep new polities from disintegration.
Eventually all the groups initially excluded from the process of nation
building will claim a more prominent role for themselves, with other
countries setting the example for nonimmigrant national minorities being
included in the definition of the nation. There exist all the reasons to treat
Russians in Ukraine or in Kazakhstan as partner communities, rather
than national minorities. Another important issue relating to the constitu-
tional arrangements in the post-Soviet states is that they all (except Rus-
sia) chose a unitary form of organization and did not risk federalism. In
general, a unitary state can exist in the multiethnic societies, but a federa-
tion seems to be preferable, since it allows for internal self-determination.
Such autonomous units exist in Uzbekistan, Georgia, Moldova, and even
Ukraine (the Crimean Republic). Federations are possible and necessary
in such countries as Georgia and Ukraine, not only because of the ethnic
factors but also because of a wide cultural and regional diversity, which
exists in many post-Soviet states.
FROM MULTINATIONALISM TO A DIVERSE NATION
What is the situation in Russia today the only country that kept the
references to multinationalism in its constitution, while imparting more
innovative concepts, such as the multiethnic nation?
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CONFLICT AND RECONSTRUCTION IN MULTIETHNIC SOCIETIES
The recent term national minorities seems hardly acceptable for Russia.
This statement does not mean that there are no national minorities in the
Russian Federation or that the state refuses to recognize the specific rights
of a part of its population. In fact, Russia went further in protecting the
rights of the national minorities, beyond guaranteeing them cultural au-
tonomy. Since the Soviet era these small non-Russian nations had a cer-
tain degree of self-determination in their territories, and the current
Russian constitution preserves these republic-states. These ethnic com-
munities have long being nationalized on political and emotional levels,
and will obviously not be willing to accept the minority status. The same
reasons prevent them from accepting the possible and even desirable idea
of the Russian civic nation.
Ethnic rights are collective rights, and they are supposed to enhance
individual rights, rather than substitute or dominate them. Collective eth-
nic rights are a double-edged sword, and should be used carefully and
expertly. Recent years proved that in an underdeveloped civil rights cul-
ture, ethnic rights can be used to support ungrounded claims and de-
mands, impose minority rule, and even bring down the central state
through an armed separatist movement. These practices exacerbate eth-
nic tensions and distrust in the rest of the population. The situation may
become extremely tense if the state is undergoing an identity crisis or if
there is competition for limited resources.
This is what is happening in the Russian Federation. The worst vari-
ant would be to attempt to realize the radical dismantling of collective
rights, including an important democratic acquisition by a federative or-
ganization with elements of ethnic federalism. Existing laws provide
many more options, some of which have not been tried. Federalism in the
multiethnic states does not necessarily provide stability, since not all the
relevant issues have to be resolved by the present generation of policy
makers. It is the overall approach and fundamental principles, such as
recognition of cultural diversity and desire for integration that are impor-
tant. There are many forms of federalism, and federalism can have a very
strong integration component, provided that we can ensure support of
local political elites, always keeping local interests in mind. These local
interests present a major obstacle to integration. Federalism by itself is not
enough. The entire population must accept and develop dual loyalties
and identity, form broad coalitions crossing ethnic and regional bound-
aries, and create motivation for integration.
The application of federalism should not be restricted to the way that
the government authorities are set up. The federal legal system allows
coexistence of mutually enhancing or even parallel legal systems, com-
bining central (national) law and legal norms of different cultures. To
accomplish that, one does not need to revitalize nonexistent historic tradi-
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MULTIETHNIC STATES AND CONFLICTS AFTER THE USSR
111
lions such as mountainous democracy and tribal communities. It is the
recognition of legal pluralism arising from ethnic diversity that is impor-
tant as long as these different legal traditions do not undermine the
fundamental principles of state and do not provoke a mass exodus from
the legal framework.
Representative terms from entire chapter:
former soviet
