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  • Young American scientists are reluctant to take time off from early career development activities to travel to Russia, and thus they need special incentives to encourage them to participate in cooperative programs.

  • Reports distributed in the United States about the state of Russian science are overwhelmingly negative, and more publicly available reports on the positive aspects of many research and related activities in Russia are needed.

  • Training Russian research and development managers in modern approaches to the effective use of personnel and facilities and to interactions with potential customers should be a priority in cooperative programs.

  • The Russian educational system should be strengthened both in training the next generation of science and technology leaders and in supporting Russian government-sponsored industrial technology activities.

  • U.S. visa policy requires continuing attention to ensure that it does not inadvertently facilitate an international brain drain by being too lenient in decisions to issue nonimmigrant visas to applicants considering immigration while not being too stringent in the name of national security in issuing visas for international scientific collaboration.

  • Concerns about misuse of dual-use technologies for weapons systems are usually exaggerated and should not be allowed to block legitimate commercial deals (NRC, 1998a: 17–18).

Although security-oriented interacademy programs will probably continue to have strong support from both U.S. government departments and private foundations, the likelihood of support for civilian-oriented interacademy programs is less certain. Indeed, the acquisition of funds to support such programs is always a major accomplishment. Meanwhile, the RAS seems more comfortable with civilian-oriented projects, which are in line with its strengths. Yet it is more difficult to promise results of obvious importance to U.S. interests from nonsecurity projects, even though they are less likely to duplicate the efforts of U.S. government agencies than security projects.

Overall, the recovery time for Russian civilian technology prowess will be long and the survivability of many Russian schools of science is uncertain, but the influence of American involvement on both scientific and technology policies and programs can be important.



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