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Scientists, Engineers, and Track-Two Diplomacy: A Half-Century of U.S.-Russian Interacademy Cooperation 6 Lessons Learned and the Future of the Interacademy Program There is no national science just as there is no national multiplication table; what is national is no longer science. Anton Chekhov The leadership of the Russian Academy of Sciences is proud that the RAS thrived in Soviet times and then survived the recent political and economic transitions to remain intact. In fact, it was one of the few Soviet institutions that was not dismembered and completely restructured.1 This stability has been important to the U.S. National Academies, because they continue to have a responsible and responsive partner in Russia. Despite the adoption in Russia of new approaches to governance and the economic crisis throughout the country, the RAS rests on three pillars that in many ways closely resemble academy pillars of the Soviet era: A prestigious, influential, and relatively well-paid membership consisting of academicians and corresponding members. As in the past, most members are selected on the basis of scientific achievements. Efforts by the leadership to achieve election of a significant number of young members have met with only limited success. 1 Comments by the president of the Russian Academy of Sciences at a meeting at the NAS in November 2002.
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Scientists, Engineers, and Track-Two Diplomacy: A Half-Century of U.S.-Russian Interacademy Cooperation A large Presidium with an administrative apparatus that controls budgets and senior personnel appointments. In contrast to earlier days, there is only limited central planning of research programs, except when earmarked funds become available for specified topics. These funds are often directed by the leadership to specific laboratories. Hundreds of research institutes and laboratories. Some are in reasonably good shape; others are in poor condition. Despite greatly reduced budgets, there has been little effort to downsize laboratories beyond not filling positions that become vacant from employee movement to the private sector, emigration, and retirement. The decline in the number of junior and midlevel researchers is of special concern, but a few institutes have found resources to continue to recruit outstanding young researchers (Rossiskaya Akademiya Nauk 1991–2001, 2002). In the years ahead, the extensive property holdings of the RAS will continue to provide considerable rental income for the Presidium and for the institutes. Moreover, the many current and aspiring academicians in influential positions throughout the governmental and nongovernmental sectors will help to ensure the financial viability of the institution. Some members also have strong international scientific reputations and excellent contacts abroad, and they will continue to have seats at the international tables of science. Thus, the RAS will probably continue to weather the depressed economy and play an important role in all aspects of science and technology. Many institutes are nevertheless still in dire economic straits, and they will continue to lose ground as important international science partners. A clear trend within the RAS institutes during the past decade has been a greater role for applied research and a decline in basic research despite the commitments of the leaderships of both the nation and the RAS to retaining strong fundamental research capabilities. Driven by the need to find commercial sources of financing and by funders’ waning interest in basic research that has no economic, environmental, or social payoff in the foreseeable future, most senior officials of the RAS and its institutes agree that even the most brilliant Russian scientists must learn to break bread with paying customers. They realize that technology-oriented entrepreneurs are an important key to a knowledge-based economy that complements the country’s historic reliance on exports of natural resources. They also are aware that if the most promising young entrepreneurs are to be sufficiently motivated to take the risks that could lead to business success, these young
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Scientists, Engineers, and Track-Two Diplomacy: A Half-Century of U.S.-Russian Interacademy Cooperation entrepreneurs must feel secure in meeting their needs for housing and receiving adequate financial rewards for their achievements. On paper, basic research is vital, but in practice applied research is the priority.2 Although they are not ignoring the economic downturn, most Russian academy leaders are optimistic about the future of Russian science and technology. They argue that (1) they have survived the worst times; (2) the government understands the problems inhibiting innovation efforts; (3) investors are open to new ideas; and (4) the existing, still considerable science and technology potential can undergird development of new products for both the domestic and foreign marketplaces.3 The RAS will continue to be interested in international collaboration in many areas, and especially collaboration that brings financial benefits to the Russian participants. Of special significance, a decade ago many RAS institutes were hesitant to become involved in the security-oriented activities being promoted by foreign colleagues, but such programs are no longer strange to them. Now a surprisingly large number of academy researchers who had little involvement in Soviet defense activities are being recruited to participate in counterterrorism, nonproliferation, and other security-related programs with extensive international dimensions. Also, in both security and nonsecurity areas some institutes have established core programs that are largely supported by foreign organizations in exchange for continuing foreign access to the strong intellectual capabilities of Russian staffs. Other institutes have successfully obtained renewable research and development grants and contracts from abroad. Nevertheless, most institutes are not in a healthy condition. The changing state of U.S.-Russian government relations during the past decade has had only a minor impact on cooperative programs carried out by the RAS. International security-oriented programs implemented by other Russian organizations such as the Ministry of Atomic Energy are far more sensitive to the political dimensions of bilateral relations. Apparently, Russian president Vladimir Putin places less importance on ensuring parity in the U.S.-Russia nuclear balance, on slowing the march of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) toward Russia’s borders, and on coun- 2 Some of these views were presented at meetings of leaders of the RAS and National Academies in June 1999, February 2002, and September 2003. However, RAS leaders are reluctant to accept a decline in the emphasis on basic research. 3 For a snapshot of current research trends and attitudes toward science, see Schweitzer (2001).
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Scientists, Engineers, and Track-Two Diplomacy: A Half-Century of U.S.-Russian Interacademy Cooperation tering the projection around the globe of U.S. military power than he does on the information and communications revolutions and the globalization of markets—developments that will directly affect Russia’s economic future. In short, Russia has been described as “a center of geo-economics, not geo-strategy, and a pathway for arbitrage and export, not power plays and arms races” (Legvold, 2002–2003). The attendant reorientation of national strategy should call for a greater role in international affairs for science institutions such as the RAS than in the past. THE VIEW FROM WASHINGTON All indications are that U.S. policy will continue to emphasize cooperative programs that support U.S. security objectives, promote the oil-related and other commercial interests of American companies, and encourage the evolution of a system of political governance that looks like it was designed, or at least fine-tuned, in the United States. Cooperative science and technology projects financed by the U.S. government will usually be shaped to fit into this three-part agenda. Projects will occasionally address health, environmental protection, small innovative business development, and fundamental science, but clearly efforts to strengthen Russia’s institutional capacity to develop and use science and technology effectively in addressing development problems, even if they are of global concern, have not been a U.S. priority. In the months since the February 2003 loss of the Columbia space shuttle, continued cooperation in development and operation of the international space station has become a huge question mark.4 A major challenge facing the National Academies and other U.S. science-based organizations with international programs is to convince an array of U.S. government departments and agencies that building science and technology capacity in Russia in nonsensitive areas of global concern is an important objective, and that cooperative programs can have tangible benefits for the United States. The Russians have considerable underutilized talent that has contributed significantly to efforts to address, for example, infectious diseases, ocean pollution, global warming, and the search for more efficient energy sources. 4 In 1993 the U.S. and Russian governments signed a 10-year agreement for cooperation in science and technology. It had been scheduled for renewal in 2003. However, U.S. concerns about the possibility that funds flowing to Russia might be subject to Russian taxes and that the United States might be held responsible for accidents or other claims of liability resulting from cooperation delayed such renewal.
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Scientists, Engineers, and Track-Two Diplomacy: A Half-Century of U.S.-Russian Interacademy Cooperation The role of the National Academies in mobilizing high-level talent to address difficult issues while promoting U.S. objectives in Russia, and earlier in the Soviet Union, has been widely recognized over several decades. The ongoing financial support of such activities by several U.S. government departments and agencies and private foundations serves as impressive testimony of this recognition. In Russia, the National Academies are well respected because of their high scientific standards at a time when the popularity of foreign organizations is often measured by the size of their financial contributions to Russian organizations and individuals. This latter measurement criterion does not favor the National Academies. They must rely on the quality and results of their activities to keep the welcome mat out in Russia. INSIGHTS FROM THE INTERACADEMY PROGRAM Future interacademy programs should take into account experiences of the past decade. Many recent activities have in effect been experiments undertaken in a rapidly changing political and economic environment. A few particularly important lessons learned from recent efforts are described in this section. Most if not all of these lessons are also relevant to other cooperative programs, and the National Academies should certainly share successes and difficulties broadly with interested parties. Learning from Reviews of Past Cooperative Activities A review of government-financed U.S.-Russian cooperative efforts is carried out each year by the U.S. coordinator for programs in the former Soviet Union, who has a staff in the Department of State. This review is held in conjunction with the preparation of budget requests by U.S. departments and agencies, so that they can continue or modify intergovernmental programs, which encompass many activities. The review’s assessments of impacts are based largely on department and agency self-evaluations. Nevertheless, the annual review provides a framework for considering program initiatives and preserves a historical record of past activities. It also helps the U.S. Congress to assess individual program activities within a larger context (U.S. Department of State, 2003). A more focused assessment of science and technology cooperation was carried out by the author of this report in 1996–1997 under the sponsorship of the Twentieth Century Fund. The assessment was directed primarily
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Scientists, Engineers, and Track-Two Diplomacy: A Half-Century of U.S.-Russian Interacademy Cooperation toward programs supported entirely or partially by the U.S. government, including several interacademy projects, although it recognized a few industrial and academic initiatives as well. The report of the assessment sets forth a list of lessons learned from cooperative programs (Schweitzer, 1997). Those that seem particularly relevant to future interacademy activities appear in Box 6-1. BOX 6-1 A Review of Cooperative Programs: Lessons Learned of Special Relevance to Interacademy Programs In 1996–1997 the author of this report developed some general principles to guide U.S.-Russian cooperation in science and technology. Among those that will continue to be relevant to interacademy activities are the following: Recognize that Russia is different and that many elements of the U.S. model may not be appropriate. Replace the concept of technical assistance with the concept of technical cooperation. Give priority to the details of implementation of projects. Recognize that technical data are considered of great value in Russia and are not given away free of charge, even in cooperative programs. Train the real Russian managers—not simply Russians who are seeking training. Train in Russia the Americans who manage projects in Russia. Do not ignore the support of the Russian research infrastructure in cooperative activities. Question the realism of Russian research proposals that may suggest exaggerated benefits. Recognize the ability of Russians to develop proposals without prompting from Westerners. Find interested audiences before launching demonstration projects. Accept the reality and appreciate the impact of the internal brain drain. Support both large and small projects. Anticipate the ubiquitous tax inspector. Source: Schweitzer (1997:98–104).
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Scientists, Engineers, and Track-Two Diplomacy: A Half-Century of U.S.-Russian Interacademy Cooperation In addition, as described in Chapter 5, in 1997 the National Academies sponsored a brief review of intergovernmental science and technology programs at the request of the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy. This review suggested steps that could be taken to improve cooperative activities (NRC, 1998a). Most of the projects supported by the U.S. and Russian academies have been considered successful by financial sponsors and participants. Some have had discernible impacts on the countries’ government policies or programs. Yet other projects have encountered difficulties. What are the characteristics of successful projects? Clarity of project goals, timeliness of topic, quality of project leadership, and novelty of approach have often been the precursors of success. Projects can be thwarted, however, by lack of follow-up after interesting contacts have been established, differences of opinion with government officials in both countries on the appropriate roles of the academies, and skepticism of potential funders about the ability of the academies to bring about significant changes in government policies. Clearly, an important lesson learned in preparing this report is that there should be more frequent across-the-board reviews of past interacademy programs to help guide future plans. Cooperating on Important Topics Not Adequately Addressed in Moscow and Washington Over the years, a characteristic of many of the most notable interacademy projects has been that they were “ahead of the curve.” They explored topics that were of great interest to both governments but that had not benefited from scrutiny by highly qualified, independent experts; they were held in locations not accustomed to receiving foreign visitors; or they involved organizations and individuals who were not regular participants in cooperative programs and who brought fresh perspectives to efforts to address seemingly intractable problems. In the wake of some projects, the governments became interested in sponsoring their own programs in these areas. In the security area, for example, the academies blazed new trails in organizing meetings that attracted biological weapons specialists from closed military research institutes such as the center in Kirov, and in revealing conversion activities in Perm and other cities at defense factories that took “conversion” credit for simply producing samovars and fishing rods. In the civilian arena, the academies concentrated on programs to link Russian researchers and Russian industry, while other international programs in the field of commercialization of technology concentrated on linking Russian researchers
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Scientists, Engineers, and Track-Two Diplomacy: A Half-Century of U.S.-Russian Interacademy Cooperation with Western investors. A recent pioneering effort has been the establishment of a program of pilot grants for Chechen educators working in Chechnya (see Chapter 5). Documenting Conclusions from Interacademy Projects An important characteristic of many interacademy activities has been the participation of specialists from both countries who have had close ties with officials of their governments, thus easing the flow of observations and suggestions from interacademy deliberations to government policy circles, at least during and immediately after the projects. In the mid-1980s, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev established a brain trust of academicians, who were also the principal interlocutors for interacademy programs. More recently, President Putin has turned frequently to RAS specialists who are working with the National Academies for advice on problems ranging from the war in Chechnya to the future of the science cities of Russia. As for the American participants, many have served in senior government positions, some are consultants to government agencies, and others are often invited to participate in policy deliberations in Washington. This participation in interacademy projects by well-connected specialists is important in ensuring that projects are realistic, that they do not inadvertently duplicate the work of the governments, and that they frame conclusions in a manner that is easily understandable to government officials. However, there is also a down side to excessive reliance on former government officials. Although they are accustomed to participating in important deliberations, they assume that a large phalanx of staff members is available to carry forward their ideas and provide appropriate documentation. This is seldom the case in interacademy deliberations. The academies are not well equipped to become long-term advocates of policies espoused at meetings, even consensus recommendations, in the absence of special efforts to prepare supporting documentation. Thus, an important lesson is that documents detailing the conclusions and lessons from interacademy workshops, studies, and operational programs can have a considerable impact for many years, while undocumented U.S.-Russian consultations may be quickly forgotten. This is particularly true in Russia, where “hearsay” information is not widely respected and where the turnover rate of government officials who might participate directly in interacademy meetings is high. In the United States, usually a large number of officials in the executive and legislative branches are interested in
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Scientists, Engineers, and Track-Two Diplomacy: A Half-Century of U.S.-Russian Interacademy Cooperation the topics considered by the academies, and written documentation is the only way to reach many of them. Thus, published reports in both English and Russian are important aspects of interacademy projects and often remain in high demand until the supply is exhausted. Posting reports on the World Wide Web also should enhance the value of the projects. Engaging the Leaderships of the Academies in Cooperative Activities The RAS leadership is now playing a bigger role in interagency deliberations in Moscow on many issues. The RAS president is a member of the Russian Presidium and of the Security Council. He also serves as vice chair of the Council on Science and Technology, which is chaired by President Putin. In Washington, the leaders of the National Academies participate in many interagency discussions, and the staff is regularly invited to discussions on science and technology cooperation with Russia. An example of the close contact between senior government officials and leaders of the National Academies followed the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, on New York City’s World Trade Center and the Pentagon in Washington. Senior academy officials and experts assembled from around the country were given access without delay to senior government officials addressing vulnerabilities in the nation’s physical infrastructure. Moreover, Secretary of State Colin Powell has met with academy leaders, and he delivered a particularly memorable talk on the nation’s international agenda vis-à-vis science and technology at the NAS annual meeting in April 2002. Given these close linkages with governments, the presidents of the NAS, NAE, IOM, and RAS recognize the importance of playing active roles in interacademy programs, and especially programs involving the United States and Russia. They are often in a good position to magnify the impact of interacademy activities in their discussions with government officials and funders. Even if busy with other priority responsibilities, the willingness of the presidents to spend even a few minutes focusing on the details of individual projects can often have a significant payoff in promoting an interacademy effort. Encouraging Russian “Buy-in” for Concepts Developed Abroad Since the reemergence of Russia as a state, most interacademy programs have arisen from suggestions from the U.S. side. This bias stems in large part from the fact that the National Academies have taken on the responsi-
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Scientists, Engineers, and Track-Two Diplomacy: A Half-Century of U.S.-Russian Interacademy Cooperation bility of raising most of the funds to support the activities. Because most Western funding organizations are interested in activities directed toward transition challenges in Russia, the bulk of the projects are designed either to develop recommendations for implementation in Russia or to support activities that are carried out in Russia. Therefore, there is a special challenge in ensuring that key RAS and Russian government officials are committed to successful implementation of the projects conceived abroad, including the basic concept of the projects, the details of implementation, and the areas to be addressed by recommendations or by field activities. Such a commitment is often referred to as the “Russian buy-in,” a concept widely espoused but often forgotten by U.S. organizations and specialists with their own agendas. Even though informal interacademy discussions usually precede organization of projects, and over the course of projects many dialogues are held about the policy issues or program activities at the heart of the efforts, the true buy-in means that after completion of a project the participants will become active proponents of the project’s conclusions. No better example can be cited than the enthusiasm of the leadership of the Russian Patent Agency in carrying forward the ideas on modification of Russian patent laws that were initially tabled at several interacademy meetings in the mid-1990s. Although the significant legislative changes were enacted five years later, the roots of the changes can be clearly traced to the interacademy program.5 Sometimes special measures are needed to focus attention on the important issues of the knowledgeable Russians invited to participate in interacademy activities. To this end, the National Academies have frequently commissioned papers, providing small but nevertheless significant honoraria to the Russians who prepare these papers. Also, key Russians are invited to visit the United States as part of project implementation. Both techniques help to ensure that Russian colleagues understand the goals of the projects and have an opportunity to influence the projects’ directions and outcomes. The hope, then, is that they will feel a degree of commitment, not only to their own views reflected in the project’s report, but also more broadly to the activity in general. In the United States, the review procedures of the National Academies help to ensure the buy-in of the American participants. Most of the princi- 5 Discussions with the director of the Russian Patent Agency, April 2003. Also see Korchagin and Orlov (2001).
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Scientists, Engineers, and Track-Two Diplomacy: A Half-Century of U.S.-Russian Interacademy Cooperation pal participants in projects are the members of NRC committees who are required to approve reports. By attaching their names to reports, they usually embrace at least some of the recommendations as their own. Emphasizing the Sustainability of Short-Term Projects Another area of concern is the long-term sustainability of activities undertaken by the academies. Hundreds of U.S.-Russian cooperative projects involving science and technology last for one to three years and then end—often because of limitations on funding—without leaving footprints in the sand. This issue is of crucial importance if the activities are advertised as pilot projects, because no matter how successful the pilot efforts, without follow-up they are considered failures. Fortunately, sustainability is becoming a high-priority issue for many intergovernmental programs, particularly those designed to enhance security interests. These interests are long term, and even in the security arena, where the academies are currently active, there will come a day when U.S. funding is no longer available. As for the sustainability of other interacademy projects, the record is spotty, as described in earlier chapters. Given the limited resources available for the continuation of projects and for new starts, the project activities that have been sustained have often had to rely on other organizations in the wake of the academies’ efforts. A good example is in the field of high-impact terrorism, where the initial interacademy workshop that attracted many key Russian organizations and several U.S. organizations preceded the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, by three months. After September 11, these same Russian organizations were eager to respond to the overtures of other U.S. organizations to engage in cooperative projects in fields that were considered at the workshop. At the same time, they retained their interest in cooperating through interacademy channels. Adopting Modest Goals for Interacademy Projects Frequently, false expectations are associated with interacademy projects—particularly when some of the participants are unfamiliar with the traditional role of interacademy cooperation, which, with several exceptions, has emphasized convening specialists rather than initiating operational programs. These false expectations are usually linked to a belief that the academies have easy access to financial resources, and therefore translation of recommendations
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Scientists, Engineers, and Track-Two Diplomacy: A Half-Century of U.S.-Russian Interacademy Cooperation for additional program activities into action should be relatively simple. Indeed, an important role of the academies is to explore new areas and come up with new concepts for cooperation. But, paradoxically, it is difficult to jump-start new approaches when funding for these approaches is uncertain. A particularly difficult situation sometimes surrounds interacademy workshops that are addressing complicated issues. All participants know that a single workshop will not resolve the particular problem; rather, it can only start movement toward resolution. Even though the academy organizers will probably emphasize that the goal of the workshop is to stimulate discussions of important topics, to foster new contacts between specialists in the two countries, and to produce a proceedings of the discussions, participants will not be satisfied with such a limited vision and will call for follow-on activities sponsored by the academies. INTERACADEMY COOPERATION IN THE YEARS AHEAD In 2002 the academies of the two countries laid out an ambitious agenda for cooperation for the next three years (see Appendix C). Two areas were singled out for special attention in joint statements: nuclear nonproliferation and development of knowledge-based economies (see Appendixes E and G). The latter topic, a new formulation for the academies, called for activities directed toward integrating higher education with scientific research and industrial development, establishing technology transfer centers, supporting small innovative firms, and all the while protecting the environment. Of special relevance to evolution of a knowledge-based economy are increased understanding of the innovation process (see Appendix I) and trends in scientific manpower (see Appendix J).6 Also important in developing interacademy programs are the following technical areas selected by the Russian government (“Basic Principles of the Russian Federation Policy in the Field of Development of Science and Technology for the Period until 2010,” approved by President Vladimir Putin, March 30, 2002) for priority in revitalizing the science and technology base: information-telecommunication technologies and electronics aerospace technologies 6 A good overview of the science and technology potential, organization, legislation, policy, funding, and education in Russia is presented in Gokhberg (1997).
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Scientists, Engineers, and Track-Two Diplomacy: A Half-Century of U.S.-Russian Interacademy Cooperation new materials and chemical technologies new transport technologies armament, military, and special engineering technologies production technologies technologies of living systems ecology and rational management of nature energy-saving technologies. The interacademy activities agreed to in 2002 stretched the capabilities of the RAS to engage the security-oriented ministries and committees of the country in interacademy projects. Such engagement has involved many exchanges of formal letters and other documents between the RAS and the other organizations. In some cases, the ministries have been reluctant to participate in interacademy activities that they consider to be their responsibilities, although in general the cooperation with the RAS has been excellent. In the nonsecurity areas, the RAS has had less difficulty arranging appropriate contacts, and efforts are being made to consider President Putin’s technology priorities in launching new projects. The number of events in the security-related arena is clearly too high. In 2003, 10 separate events were scheduled in Russia. The RAS simply does not have the staff resources to sustain such an effort in a meaningful fashion. On the U.S. side, there is competition with the activities of government departments, and this large security-related agenda needs to be reduced, at least in terms of the number of events. The most reasonable approach, given the importance of counterterrorism and nonproliferation issues, is to limit the number of events while transforming those that are held into more in-depth activities. Specifically, serious studies of contentious issues should replace single workshops on a topic. Also, a larger proportion of events should take place in the United States to reduce the administrative burden on the RAS. The focus on security-related issues, while important to the academy leaders in both countries, does not play to the primary strengths of the RAS, which does not have lead responsibilities in Russia in the security area. Therefore, in the years ahead higher priority should be given to nonsecurity interacademy programs. Four themes are suggested: Innovating for profit. This theme should build on past experience in developing linkages between RAS researchers and Russian industry, establishing viable high-tech firms in science cities and improving the legal
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Scientists, Engineers, and Track-Two Diplomacy: A Half-Century of U.S.-Russian Interacademy Cooperation and financial framework for commercializing technologies in small and medium-size industries. As noted, the academies have agreed to cooperate on the general topic of building knowledge-based economies, which is intimately tied to innovation.7 And Russia’s commitment to high tech innovation was demonstrated in a series of large grants for Russia’s most promising technologies in 2003 (Appendix K). Increasing the interest of the youth in careers in science and engineering. This theme should extract lessons learned from the success of selected Russian universities in Moscow, St. Petersburg, and the regions that graduate cadres of excellent young scientists who devote their careers to science and technology. Of special importance are opportunities for students to have research experiences and to become convinced that scientific entrepreneurship can have financial payoff. This topic is critical to preventing the loss of yet another generation of technical talent through both internal and external brain drains. Reducing the threat of infectious diseases. This theme should extend the interacademy work aimed at redirecting former biological defense scientists to civilian pursuits to include scientists with no previous connections to defense activities. Although the RAS is increasingly engaged in the field of biomedical research, it is important for the U.S. Institute of Medicine and the Russian Academy of Medical Sciences to rebuild their bridges of cooperation through projects that contribute both to public health and to biosecurity. Promoting democratic approaches to governance in Russia. The interacademy projects on ethnic relations, environmental NGOs, and the international nuclear spent fuel site have underscored the important role of scientists in clarifying policy options, the consequences of value-laden decisions, and the significance of the evolution of a strong civil society. The RAS is playing an important role in these and related areas, and the ground is fertile for additional activities throughout the regions of Russia directed toward strengthening the civil society infrastructure. Although the foregoing topics are project-oriented, broader discussions about building the scientific infrastructure both for economic development and 7 An excellent overview of industrial innovation in Russia is presented in Gokhberg and Kunetsova (2001). A good discussion of the role of technology-oriented small and mediumsize enterprises and the associated intellectual property issues is included in Watkins, Bossourtrot, and Poznanskaya (2001).
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Scientists, Engineers, and Track-Two Diplomacy: A Half-Century of U.S.-Russian Interacademy Cooperation education and determining the role of scientists in a democracy threatened by terrorism will undoubtedly highlight meetings of the presidents of the academies. In summary, the future of interacademy cooperation is bright. But the National Academies, which for the present must assume the burden of providing most of the funding for travel and related costs, will find the task of raising sufficient funds to support such cooperation difficult, particularly in the nonsecurity area. The National Academies have repeatedly used limited internal funds to support interacademy activities. It is time, however, to put the cooperative nonsecurity programs on a sounder financial footing through more persuasive articulation of the importance of such programs for stability not only in Russia, but also in many peripheral countries where Russian influence is strong.
Representative terms from entire chapter: