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1
Reykjavik and Beyond:
implications of Deep Reductions
in Strategic Nuclear Arsenals and the
Future Direction of Arms Control
Wolfgang K. H. Panofsky
On March 23, 1983, President
Ronald Reagan appealed to scientists to make "nuclear weapons
impotent and obsolete." He said: "Is it not worth every investment
necessary to free the world from the threat of nuclear war?" On
January 15, 1986, General Secretary MikhaiT Gorbachev made a
worldwide appeal for the abolishment of nuclear weapons. Both
leaders based their statements on a common conviction that the
doctrine of nuclear deterrence could not be a permanent basis for
our security. Recently, during the large meeting of dignitaries and
scientists on February 14, 1987, Gorbachev stated: "There is probably
no one in this hall or elsewhere who considers nuclear weapons
innocuous; however, quite a few people sincerely believe them an
evil necessary to prevent a greater evil war." He then continued:
"We would have to admit that the nuclear safeguard is not fail-safe
or of endless duration."
Thus, the two leaders appear to agree on the ends in this matter,
but they drastically diverge on the means. The Committee on
international Security and Arms Control (CISAC) of the National
Academy of Sciences devoted a seminar at the Academy's 1985
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REYKJA VIK AND BEYOND
annual meeting to a discussion of whether dedicated strategic defenses
deployed against ballistic missiles could meet President Reagan's
objective. The general conclusion of that seminar and the emerging
consensus of almost all informed individuals in the technical com-
munity is that unilaterally deployed strategic defense does not
constitute either a feasible or stable path toward the elimination of
nuclear weapons. However, there remains some disagreement as to
what role, if any, strategic defenses should play when we consider
lesser objectives, or in the event that they were deployed by mutual
consent after large reductions on both sides.
At Reykjavik the two leaders reached consensus again on the goal
of eliminating some categories of nuclear weapons. There appeared
to be disagreement on which categories were to be eliminated and
there continued to be major disagreement on strategic defense. After
the meeting the U.S. position was that in 10 years strategic ballistic
missiles should be eliminated; the Soviet position called for the
elimination of all strategic nuclear weapons. What was actually
agreed to during the meeting on this subject remains to some extent
contentious and at this point possibly not relevant.
What this dialogue has done, however, is to stimulate more
intensive deliberation within the military establishment, among the
United States and its allies, and within that part of the intellectual
community concerned with strategic matters on which paths might
be followed toward drastic reductions of nuclear weapons systems.
It is somewhat paradoxical that, whereas the arms control community
has dedicated considerable effort to analyzing and generally criticizing
strategic defense, little has been done to study the more customary
path to arms control; that is, limiting, decreasing, and eventually
eliminating certain categories of weapons. Analysts have stayed clear
of really facing the possibility of major success along this road; in
other words, the community has considered the possibility of making
nuclear weapons "impotent and obsolete" through defenses and
most have found the concept wanting, but it has not analyzed the
possibility of achieving success along the direction of the traditional
path of arms control.
This seminar is dedicated to exploring that latter direction as
triggered by the deliberations at Reykjavik. Let me warn you from
the outset not to expect any ringing declarations or the identification
. .
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IMPLICA TIONS OF DEEP RED UC TIONS
of clear solutions. Although the problem is to some extent tractable
to a level of arms reductions that goes much further than those now
on the bargaining table in Geneva, it is difficult to foresee the total
elimination of nuclear weapons from this earth without drastic
changes in the international order.
The reason for this somewhat pessimistic conclusion lies in the
nature of nuclear weapons. It is not based on any particular strategic
or political doctrine or policy; neither does it depend on any particular
form of social organization as long as sovereign states remain.
Nuclear weapons have increased by a factor of over one million the
amount of explosive power that can be concentrated into a weapon
of a given size and weight. Thus, the delivery and explosion of even
a quite small number of nuclear weapons can wreak unspeakable
havoc. As discussed in previous seminars, this has not only greatly
tilted the traditional balance between offense and defense in favor of
the offense, but it has also made the power of even a tiny fraction
of the worId's existing offensive arsenals extremely large. These two
factors have the consequence that, however distasteful or even
immoral the so-called "doctrine" of nuclear deterrence may be to
some, one has to conclude that, considering the size of today's
nuclear stockpiles, it is not really a doctrine but a physical fact
beyonc! the reach of political authority to deny. Therefore, the
context of the following discussion is that mutual deterrence will be
a fact of life for the foreseeable future but that a great deal can be
done to decrease both the burdens and dangers of nuclear armament
and nuclear war.
Last year's annual meeting seminar dealt with one facet of the
problem that is at some level independent of the nature of the
arsenals themselves: crisis management in the nuclear age. Today's
seminar examines the path toward deep reductions of nuclear
weapons.
Although the Reykjavik Summit has provided the incentive for
analyzing this question in greater depth, the meeting had a mixed
outcome. It broke up in discord on the matter of strategic defense,
and there were no documented specific agreements. Yet both leaders,
for political reasons of their own, declared the meeting a success
after a brief period of apparent dejection. Again, in the words of
Gorbachev during the February 17, 1987, gathering of luminaries,
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REYKJA VIK AND BEYOND
"It was not a success, it was a breakthrough
a momentous
opportunity to embark on the path leading to a nuclear weapon-free
world was glimpsed." Statements within the West were less mon-
olithic. Some Defense Department spokesmen attacked the "nuclear-
free" concept outright and European leaders sucldenly found them-
seIves confronted by a possible folding up of the nuclear umbrella,
which would leave them with a more uncertain future determinecl
by the balance of conventional forces.
Let me review briefly the actual accomplishments and nonaccom-
plishments from Reykjavik, using what ~ might call a "score sheet"
of the deliberations.
As shown in Figure I, the results from Reykjavik can be categorized
into three essential segments:
I. Agreement on limiting or eliminating intermediate nuclear
forces in Europe ant] reducing central strategic systems by what is
billed to be 50 percent but that is actually somewhat less. This
program is to be accomplished fully in 5 years.
2. To reduce "something" to zero by the end of a 10-year period,
whether that something is ballistic missiles, according to the U.S.
version, or strategic nuclear weapons, according to the Soviet version.
3. Proposals on strategic defenses from the two sicles, resulting
In unresolved disagreement at the end of the meeting.
The first set of agreements is generally billed as a success, although
one should recall that a great deal remained uncliscussec3 or only
partly discussed at Reykjavik. There was agreement on basic num-
bers. In particular, the Soviets accepted what was originally the U. S.
"zero-zero" proposal for zero intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF)
cleployment in Europe, with each side retaining 100 warheads that
could be deployed within the United States and East Asia, respec-
tively. (Both sides have since agreed not to retain the 100 TNF
missiles outside of Europe.) Progress was made on agreements for
the reduction of central strategic systems, in particular with respect
to the hitherto controversial issue of how to count nuclear weapons
on strategic bombers. What was left were verification issues, sea-
launched cruise missiles, and the incorporation of the fate of shorter-
range missiles in the INF agreement. At the time of the Reykjavik
meeting the Soviets insisted that progress along all these lines should
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IMPLICA TIONS OF DEEP RED UC TIONS
REPORTED
"AGREEMENT"
OPEN ISSUES
Intermediate-Range
Nuclear Forces
(INF)
No INF delivery vehicles
in Europe; 100 warheads
permitted elsewhere
Verification details
Shorter-range missiles
/ 1,600 Strategic delivery
Strategic Arms vehicles (cut from 2,400)
6,000 Warheads cut from
R e c I u c t i o n s T a l k s 1 0 , 0 0 0 ~ S u b c a t e g o r ~ e s
In 5 ears Counting rules for
Y . Submar~ne-launched cruise
weapons on strategic
missiles
bombers
How to get there?
. Verification?
Zero strategic weapons or
. . . Conventional balance?
In 10 years zero ballistic missiles
Aircraft, cruise missiles not
~ specified
Comprehensive Start talking again No CTB until ballistic
Test Ban (CTB) missiles eliminated
(United States)
\ _ _
Staging?
Verification?
U.S. POSITION
SOVIET POSITION
Strategic Defense "New" interpretation of Laboratory work only, and
Initiative (SDI) ABM treaty (permits (?) traditional
testing and interpretation of ABM
development) treaty, such as testing
from fixed sites
Abrogate ABM treaty in Discuss future of ABM
10 years; deploy ABM treaty in 10 years; treaty
system if developed still in force
FIGURE 1 The Reykjavik "score sheet."
be linked to an agreement on ballistic missile defense, and shortly
after Reykjavik they deepened their commitment to that linkage.
Only the subsequent agreement by the Soviets to unlink consideration
of INF from limits on the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) has led
to the recent discussions that are viewed with so much hope by the
woricl and may result in a signed TNF treaty by the end of 1987.
The SDI discussions were totally unproductive. I consider the
U. S. position to be essentially a move toward destroying the
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REYKJA VIK AND BEYOND
antiballistic missile (ABM) treaty. We agrees! with the Soviets to
abide by the treaty for 10 years; that is, not to invoke for a decade
the abrogation provisions spelled out in it. However, although this
was not explicitly stated, we asserted the right to live within the
treaty strictures using the so-called broad interpretation, which
permits unlimited testing and development of weapons in space.
Moreover, according to our position, the ABM treaty would be
definitely abrogated after 10 years, whereas according to the Soviet
position the continuation of the treaty after 10 years would be a
subject of discussion.
Because as a practical matter deployment of space-basecT ABM
weapons realistically could not be accomplished for 10 years at any
rate, the practical consequence of the U.S. position, had it been
accepted, would have been an immediate abrogation of the ABM
treaty. The Soviet position has been reported as one of wishing to
strengthen the ABM treaty by restricting research and development
work to the laboratory only. There remains some ambiguity as to
whether the wore! "strengthen" used by the Soviets really meant to
modify the treaty or to support it firmly in its traditional form.
There is also ambiguity as to whether the word "laboratory" is
meant to restrict experimentation to the strictly "under root?' type
or whether it would include, for instance, "laboratories" in space
or some other, more generic interpretation. Trying to define how
the provisions of the ABM treaty in its traditional interpretation
apply specifically to various technologies remains a major challenge
to the U.S.-USSR dialogue. Introclucing the broad interpretation,
or what the United States euphemistically calls the "legally correct"
interpretation, would destroy the assumptions on which the U.S.
Senate based its ratification process and contradicts the statements
and testimony of the U.S. participants in the negotiations and the
understanding that has been maintained since 1972.
The discussions on the total elimination of"something" nuclear
bear witness to the parties' lack of preparation for the summit.
Clearly, this was neither the time nor the place to reach an agreement
on something as dramatic as zero nuclear ballistic missiles, or even
zero strategic nuclear delivery systems, without prior consultation
with the Allies, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Congress. Not
surprisingly, the resultant agreement has drawn protests from all of
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IMPLICA TIONS OF DEEP RED UC TIONS
these constituencies, and spokesmen for the White House have stated
that they would "deemphasize" that subject in future talks with the
Soviets.
Nevertheless, something very positive was achieved as a result of
these zero discussions: public dialogue of quite drastic reductions
has been made respectable. Clearly, the objections voiced by the
Allies, Congress, the academic strategic community, and even
spokesmen within the administration have a sound basis. Yet these
objections should be discussed and examined on their merits. There
are indeed many questions associated with deep reductions of central
strategic forces. For example, there is the resulting increased role of
the remaining shorter-range nuclear weapons in Europe. There is
the question of verification; that is, whether or not relatively small
clandestine deployments would have great leverage. There is the
question of whether increasing the role of strategic defenses might
destabilize the situation if the offensive balance is sustained at Tower
force levels. There is the issue of the conventional force balance in
Europe, which would come more into the forefront if the nuclear
umbrella- the last recourse in case of threatened defeat—is no longer
in place. There is the problem of the nuclear forces of the Allies and
China, which would become more prominent as the superpowers'
arsenals were reduced.
Not only do these questions come to the forefront as central
strategic nuclear forces are reduced, but the basic concepts of
deterrence also require reexamination. This should not be viewed
as a problem but rather as a challenge such a reexamination is long
overdue. Our basic concepts of deterrence have drifted over the last
decades. Originally one would consider an opponent to be deterred
if by attacking first, it would face "unacceptable damage" to its
society through retaliation by the surviving forces of its adversary.
Doctrines then shifted to the "flexible response," which implied that
retaliation would not require an all-or-nothing strike but could be
tailored in magnitude to the situation faced. Flexible response gave
way to "selective targeting," which meant deterrence by threatening
to use a small number of sorties that would permit very selective
attacks on fixed enemy military or industrial targets. The concept
has changed still further to the requirement that deterrence deny the
opponent, after it attacked, the opportunity to continue the war; in
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REYKJA INK AND BEYOND
other words, a seconc! strike would have to be strong enough to
destroy the opponent's war-making potential. This progression of
doctrines requires translation into actual military planning; in regard
to the potential uses of strategic nuclear forces, such a translation
means the establishment of target lists. The target lists in turn are
translated into requirements for strategic nuclear strike delivery
systems in a somewhat arbitrary process. One of the fundamental
reasons why we have been unable to answer the question "When is
enough enough?" to the satisfaction of the military constituencies is
the evolution of such doctrines, all in the name of deterrence.
Deterrence is a state of mine! and is not based on specifiable
physical facts. It assumes that a rational clecisionmaker would not
be tempted to initiate a nuclear war in time of crisis or if he or she
sees an evolving uncontrollable threat. Yet there can be and is a
wide range of judgment as to what it wouIc! take to deter the
opponent under such circumstances, even if you assume that the
leaclers of the opposing nation are rational. If you go beyond that
ant! assume that the opponent's leaders are not rational, then the
concept of deterrence becomes totally indefinable.
The levels of forces required for deterrence vary drastically
depending on which of the abovementioned interpretations of de-
terrence you accept. Under the earlier definitions of deterrence, it
was argued, and ~ believe reasonably, that the potential of 30 million-
50 million dead wouicl be adequate deterrence; yet the nuclear
weapons unleashed from only a single Trident submarine against
major Soviet cities would have just that effect. Flexible response
leacis to somewhat larger force requirements but mainly challenges
command, control, and decision-making bodies. Denying the ability
to continue the war is fundamentally an open-ended prescription for
additional requirements.
Few words in the military jargon have been abused as much as
the term "requirement." One hears, for instance, such comments
as, "If we reduce our forces from the present 10,000-plus strategic
nuclear weapons to the 6,000 weapons agreed to at Reykjavik, then
only 75 percent of our 'required' targets can be struck." Anyone
familiar with the targeting situation knows that lists include many
potential targets of progressively decreasing military significance. In
a real way there continues to be a symbiotic relationship between
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IMPLICA TIONS OF DEEP RED UC TIONS
requirements and the available weapons systems military targeting
requirements leacI to the acquisition of new weapons, anc] the
existence of new military delivery systems leacis to a search for new
targets. Thus, one of the major benefits of facing the prospect of
drastic reductions wouict be an examination of just such targeting
. . . . .
priorities anc ~ strategic c .octrlnes.
If there were fewer weapons
available for deterrent purposes, fewer weapons couIc} be cleclicatec]
to missions anc! targets that are superfluous ancl in fact dangerously
clestabilizing to the funciamental concept of cleterrin~ the onnonent
,- . . . .
trom 1nltlatlng nuc. ear war.
~ . . . ... .
~ 1 1
In ~~bA~ S ce~lneratlons on this question, we have carried out
numerical stucties on purely countermilitary exchanges to examine
the retaliatory potential remaining if the current number of strategic
weapons was reclucec! to the 6,000 warheads agreed to at ReYkiavik
, ,
or by another factor of 2, which might be an example of a more
drastic regimen of cuts. Quite apart from the other issues aIreacly
cited, this lower level is likely to cleny coverage of some military
targets now incluclec! in a scenario intenclect to cleny the opponent
the opportunity to continue fighting the war. Yet when one examines,
even at the 3,000-warheac} level, the collateral civilian cteaths that
wouIct result in this type of intenclecI, purely antimilitary exchange,
one obtains numbers in the many tens of millions. Thus, one may
legitimately ask: "Is the decision faced by the national leaclership
whether and how to retaliate against nuclear attack really that
different whether one lives within an 'unacceptable damage,' 'flexible
response,' 'selective targeting,' or 'clenial of continued war-fighting'
doctrine?" Even more important may be whether the willingness of
national leaclers to initiate nuclear war in the face of certain retaliation
IS really that clepenclent on the perceived doctrine that the opponent
might follow. In short, have we not really "cloctrinecI" ourselves
into progressively increasing military requirements for deterrence
without examining whether this makes military sense, quite apart
from the basic inhumanity of this line of thinking? A reexamination
of these questions is essential if meaningful discussions on drastic
cuts are to flow from the Reykjavik experience.
One shouIc! now ciare to inquire what changes in strategic thought
anct even in the international orcler are requires! to make drastic cuts
acceptable. This seminar is clecticatecI to the examination of the
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REYKJA VIK AND BEYOND
totality of these issues. Let me say again that the audience should
have no illusion that the speakers have answers to these many
questions or that a clear message will emerge from this discussion.
However, T sincerely hope that this seminar will play a significant
role in adding an independent, reasonable voice to supplement the
chorus demanding a world moving toward freedom from nuclear
weapons.
Representative terms from entire chapter:
abm treaty
