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l The FuTu re of Arms Control Marvin . Go~clberger Preclicting the future is a mug's game. Who could have predicted a Gorbachev, a Reykjavik, or the Reagan Star Wars speech 5 years ago? But despite the ever-present possibility of the unexpected, it is important for us to think very hard about what the future might hold for arms control and the role it may play in the continuing quest for world peace. We normally think about arms control as the effort to achieve the following objectives: (~) to reduce the risk of war; (2) to limit damage, should it occur; and (3) to lower the costs of maintaining a military establishment. Most often, we couple the term arms control with (disarmament. Yet this need not necessarily be the case in the sense that, for example, the risk of war might be recluced by the deployment of a more nearly invulnerable weapon system. Without getting into Talmudic arguments, it seems clear that what we are interested in discussing is the various steps that can be taken to avoid annihilation and the destruction of our civilization. A mathematically rigorous definition of arms control is not really very interesting in this light. 58

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59 FUTURE OF ARMS CONTROL The Past of Arms Control Triumphs and ~ Missed! Opportunities I am not an historian, and I shall make no attempt to go back to ancient times in exploring the past of arms control. Instead, ~ will begin with July 17, 1945, the day after the first nuclear bomb test at Almagordo. Leo Szilard sent a petition to President Truman on that day that said If after this war a situation is allowed to develop in the world which permits rival powers to be in uncontrolled possession of these new means of destruction, the cities of other nations will be in continuous danger of sudden annihilation. All the resources of the United States, moral and material, may have to be mobilized to prevent the advent of such a world situation. Wise words; but unfortunately, we were not able to mobilize those moral forces, and the threat of mutual destruction is what the United States and the Soviet Union face and in fact have faced for the past 35 years or more. I shall use most of this space to discuss those aspects of arms control that relate to the special dangers to humanity poser! by nuclear weapons. Yet this is only part of the problem of international security, and if we ever achieve some of the drastic cuts in nuclear weaponry that have been discussed here, many deeper issues that may be even less tractable will have to be considered. The truly grand opportunity to virtually eliminate nuclear weapons came with the so-called Baruch plan developed by Bernard Baruch, Robert Oppenheimer, Dean Acheson, and David Lilienthal and presented to the United Nations in 1946. The proposal wouIc! have placer! all the nuclear resources of the world under the ownership or control of an independent international authority, which would conduct its own inspections and would have jurisdiction over all stages of nuclear weapons manufacture. Once the machinery was in place, the United States would surrender its nuclear arsenal. The large majority of UN members supported the plan, but the Soviet Union objected to the ownership, staging, and enforcement provi- sions. Their own verification provisions were deemed altogether inadequate, and the negotiations became deadlocked. This was a tragedy. The next great opportunity for a profound step was in connection with the decision in October 1949 to embark on a crash program to

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60 REYKJA VIK AND BEYOND develop thermonuclear weapons. Many are un(loubteclly familiar with the history of the famous report of the General Advisory Committee to the Atomic Energy Commission chaired by Robert Oppenheimer. This committee pointed out that there was no military requirement for such weapons because goon! of OCR for page 58
61 FUTURE OF ARMS CONTROL year, the Soviets two or three. We might have compromised on four or five but Khrushchev die! not want to discuss the matter at that time and Ormsby Gore, Kuznetsov, ant! Bill Foster took very rigid positions on the inspections. Kennedy was anxious to get an agreement (as was Khrushchev) after the Cuban Missile Crisis anc! was unsure of his political clout in being able in this country to face clown Senator Richard Russell and the Joint Chiefs of Staff who were very leery about any treaty. Ultimately, with McNamara playing a central role, the Chiefs reluctantly went along with the LTB although they exacter! a heavy price in clolIars for maintaining a full test regime readiness (in case the treaty had to be abrogated anc! a commitment to a vigorous unclergrouncI test program. McNamara feels now that there was virtually no possibility of convincing them to embrace a CTB at that time. Needless to say the structure of our strategic forces wouict have been quite different hac! testing stopped in 1963; in my opinion, we may have hac! more stable and survivable weapons systems. One of the early questions that came up in connection with unclergrounc} testing had to do with the idea of decoupling the explosion of a nuclear weapon from the surrounding earth by setting it off in a big hole anc} hicting the otherwise distinct seismic signal. This technical possibility was seized on by treaty opponents who argued that the Soviets would cheat and thus gain some advantage over us. ~ mention this only because potential Soviet cheating is frequently raised in connection with treaties. It turns out that digging an adequate hole with clirt volumes of the orcler of the great pyramids is hare} to do clandestinely. Another relatecI cheating mode was to set off a bomb during one of the big earthquakes that the Soviet Union has in gooc! supply. The point I want to make here is the absurdity of the iclea, analogous to that of testing behind the moon, that by a few tests that had a high probability of being cletected anyway, the Soviets couIcl gain a serious military advantage. This issue comes up over and over again in arms control history. We always insist that we must have some large number of tests for one or another weapons clevelopment that the Soviets, we say, can accomplish with a few cIanclestine tests under the most clifficult . . cone citrons.

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62 REYKJA VIK AND BEYOND There are two other treaties that have been successfully negotiated ant! are of the greatest importance, both historically and right now. These are the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) signed in July 1968 and entered into force in March 1970, ant! the ABM treaty, signed in May 1972 and entered into force in October 1972. The purpose of the NPT was to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons by forbidding the transfer of nuclear weapons to the national control of any country that did not already have them and, further, to initiate provisions designee! to prevent the diversion of nuclear materials from peaceful to weapons use. I think the fact that there are today only 6 admitted possessors of nuclear weapons rather than the 20 or so one might have predicted 25 years ago is a measure of the value of the NPT. It is worth pointing out that Article VI of the treaty states that the parties will pursue in good faith measures relating to the cessation of the arms race and to nuclear disarmament. Of course, as is often noted by nonmember states, the number of weapons in the world has increaser! since the NPT came into force. Most people believe that a CTB prohibiting testing is the only way to prevent the emergence of aclditional nuclear-weapon states. There are also those who say that Israel might provide a counterexample to this belief. It might be well to remember thar the wet non thnt destroyed Hiroshima hac! never been tested. -r The ABM treaty of 1972 has served the true national security interests of the United States very well. There are those who disagree with this statement, but they are in the minority as well as being wrong. Although, unfortunately, there has been a great increase in the number of strategic warheads since 1972, a full-blown offense- clefense arms race has been avoided. We wasted only $7 billion on our now mothballed ABM installation at Grand Forks, North Dakota. The Soviets continue to upgrade their 100 launcher system around Moscow, but that does not really cause much concern. The treaty has allowed a research program that was actually initiated at the same time as ballistic missiles were introduced (contrary to some opinions, defense did not begin with the Reagan speech on March 23, 1983) and that has enabled us to reassure ourselves on the technical assumptions about defense capabilities that underlie the treaty. Although we might have expected that with no significant

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63 FUTURE OF ARMS CONTROL ballistic missile defense, both the United States ant! the Soviet Union might have cut back or at least not increased their offensive force, this has, of course, not happened. The absence of defense has also elevated the importance of ant! concern by the Soviet Union for the strategic nuclear forces of Great Britain, France, and China. Let me close this review of past arms control efforts with two brief remarks. The unratified SALT II treaty of 1979 wouic! have put a useful cap on the strategic arms race, and although it did not have the deep implications of the ABM treaty, it was important and should have been enacted. As many know, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan caused President Carter to ask to have the treaty withdrawn from consideration for ratification in the Senate; it was later deemed by Ronalc! Reagan in the 1980 presidential campaign to be fatally flawed. The other comment is about the treaty that never wasthe one banning MIRVs or multiple indepenclently targeted reentry vehicles. In 1968 much work hacT been done on the idea of not deploying this rapidly evolving technology which appeared to be the exclusive province of the United States. Unfor- tunately, before it could be explorecl in any serious diplomatic way, the Soviet Union invaded Czechoslovakia. This was followed by the change of administrations. Ambassador Gerry Smith actually pursued internally a so-called SWWA Stop Where We Arc proposal that wouIc! have precluded U.S. MIRV deployment ant! forbidden Soviet testing and deployment. He raised the question with Secretary of State Rogers as to whether or not MIRV deploy- ment by both sides might be a very dangerous development. Unfortunately, concern over Soviet ABM activity and the pressure of the technological imperative (whatever can be built must be built) led us to deploy MIRVs, and in the characteristically mindless manner of the arms race, the Soviets responded with their own MIRVs to penetrate what by that time was a nonexistent U. S. ABM system following the ABM treaty. Clearly, Ambassador Smith's worst fears have been borne out. The reason for my dwelling so long on the past is that in contemplating the future of arms control it is important to recognize some of the irrationalities and peculiar forces that have shaped the present dilemma, which casts such a long shadow on the future. ~ .

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64 REYKJA INK AND BEYOND The Future of Arms Control There are many critics of arms control objectives and the arms control process. We certainly have not seen great progress in Towering the risk of war, although some helpful technical steps like the Washington-Moscow Hotline have been taken. Clearly, there has not been much in the way of limiting the damage that would result if nuclear war occurred. The latter failure is obviously connected with the awesome destructive power of nuclear weapons. As Dr. Panofsky noted in his introduction, one Trident 2 submarine with optima] targeting can cause 30 million-50 million deaths, and we might have 10 or more on patrol at any one time. Why, then, do we persist in arms control? What kinds of alternative paths can we imagine to try to achieve the ultimate goal of removing war or the threat of it as an instrument for gaining national objectives? We could work toward changes in the international order. We could simply try to win the arms race, that is, become so powerful that the Soviets wouicl quit racing. We could try taking unilateral steps toward disarmament and hope that the Soviets would follow suit. We could try to work toward President Reagan's impenetrable shield put our faith in that technological "fix." The bottom line in my opinion, however, is that there is simply no way other than arms control that offers real hope for progress in the near future. On the other hand, this does not mean we should not raise questions about the process and look for new approaches, learning from the experiences of the past. Some ofthe benefits of arms control are not emphasized sufficiently because they are difficult to quantify. The very negotiating process itself builds up a momentum and the hope that a current, modest- Tooking agreement may pave the way subsequently for a more profound! one. The negotiators on the two sicles and all of those who back them upthe intelligence agencies, the diplomatic estab- lishments, and, in particular, the military leaders eventually develop a creep commitment to what is perceived as a mutually advantageous agreement, and they become powerful advocates for the agreement as well as guardians against any proposed violations. Negotiations have the effect of reducing uncertainties about each other's forces because these must be precisely stipulated and agreed upon from the

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65 FUTURE OF ARMS CONTROL beginning. There is some reason to believe that success in the arms control arena will lead to other areas of agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union the reverse of the kind of linkage usually talked about. For example, in April 1987 in Moscow, although the INF issue was central, Secretary of State Schultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze initialed an agreement on space cooperation. Now. what of the critics who. while admitting some of the ~ r '_ ~ , ~ .~ . . . concrete achievements ot arms control and the spin-offs just referred to, remain unconvinced that the positives outweigh the negatives? Line ot the shrillest criticisms by the hawks in the United States is that arms control treaties lull the country into such complacency that we will no longer support programs essential for our defense. This is a bizarre argument that is insulting to the military and political leaders entrusted with our national security. The facts of the matter simply do not support these worries. The military in the past has ensured a commitment to undiminished or even increased spending on relevant programs. The so-called safeguard provisions ~ noted in connection with the limited test ban treaty are a good example. The dovish critics of arms control make a different argument. They accept the premise that one must have something to bargain with if the negotiations are to be carried out on the assumption that additional weapons or superior performance would be advantageous to the possessor. The problem the doves see is that the need tor bargaining chins mav lead one side or the other or both to acquire ~-o~ -v - r ~ - unneeded weapons. This aspect of the process is exacerbated by the inordinate length, at least historically, of negotiations, during which weapons systems acquire momentum and constituencies and become virtually unstoppable. Finally, weapons that are not included in a particular agreement are pursued with unusual vigor to combat potential critics. Some critics thus view the whole arms control process as a means for legitimizing the arms race. The slow pace of the traditional arms control process has occa- sionally led some people to suggest that the United States try to be somewhat bolder in unilateral disarmament initiatives, one of the alternative paths ~ mentioned earlier. One can argue that the size and relative survivability of our strategic forces is so great that even

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66 REYKJA VIK AND BEYOND if the Soviets were to continue building ant! we were to stop, it would make no significant difference in the strategic confrontation, particularly today, when there are no defensive systems. There are naturally serious questions about such a proposal. How great a force disparity could we tolerate without incurring military risk? Would anything like this be politically acceptable? There is another type of unilateral action we could take that is related to the cliscipline we exercise on the evolution of new weapons systems and the seriousness with which we take the arms control implications of these systems. Let me list some questions that should always be addressed in this connection. I have a feeling I first heard of this approach from a CTSAC member Dr. Garwin, perhaps, or Dr. Panofsky. Nevertheless, with all due credit to whomever, the questions are pretty obvious. If a new system were developed by the United States and a few years later was initiated by the Soviets, would our net security be served by having it deployed against us? (MIRVs are an example of a system that might have failed this test.) Would a new system (for example, a hard-site ABM system with a break-out potential) make existing or projected arms control agreements more difficult to police? Would a system being proposed as a bargaining chip (e.g., Grand Forks, North Dakota) be one we really wanted on its merits? How does a proposed new system affect strategic stability? Will it increase or decrease the advantage of striking first? If it enhances the advantage to a first striker, how does it help our security? Does the system have obvious countermeasures? Is it cheaper to counter than to build? (Need ~ mention SDI in this context as one that might flunk this test?) Richard Garwin has remarked that one must make such consid- erations a part of the educational process for our future military leaders. In addition, there shouIc! not be an adversarial relationship between the military and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency or any other part of the national security establishment. In suggesting the need for better criteria for weapons, ~ am reminded of some of the arguments supporting the MX: (~) it was necessary for us to proceed with the MX to demonstrate national

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67 FUTURE OF ARMS CONTROL will; (2) and (3) it was necessary as a bargaining chip. These arguments struck me as being, respectively, silly, irrational, and cynical, hardily the nrescrintion for sound decision making. Let me turn now to some things that seem likely to be on the arms control agenda in the future and then conclude with some general observations on several topics that are not usually subsumed under the arms control rubric but that are, in fact, terribly important. First, there is the series of issues raised by Reykjavik, issues that are largely unresolved as yet. On the basis of the Shultz visit to Moscow and subsequent events, there is a reasonable presumption that an agreement is in the offing on intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) and shorter-range missiles. Obviously, in the words of Yogi Berra, it's not over 'til it's over, and it may yet be deja vu all over again. Militarily, the weapons systems involves! are in my view of dubious value, but the negotiating movement such an agreement would produce would be important. The symbolic significance of literally destroying a weapons system would be quite significant. Clearly, as evidenced by this seminar, the concept of drastic cuts In strategic nuclear forces that was touted in various although not always clear forms at Reykjavik is very much at the center of current interest. Given the complexities alluded to in our discussions here, it is clear that this item will be with us for quite a while. I am somewhat amused to recall in connection with deep cuts that there were many people who hooted in some derision when George Kennan, about 6 years ago, suggested that we should cut strategic forces by half. The recent Soviet proposal that the United States and the Soviet Union conduct weapons tests at each other's test site is very interesting. If such tests come to pass, the way may be paved, by increasing verification confidence, first for ratification by the United States of the Threshold Test Ban and the Peaceful Uses treaties and then perhaps serious motion toward a CTB. Given the relative maturity of nuclear weapons design and the possibility of assessing weapons reliability without tests, it is hard to believe that our security or that of the Soviets would be threatened by a CTB. The gains are significant psychologically for the rest of the world and the non- NPT nations in particular. In addition, of course, various potentially it was necessary to match the Soviet hard-site kill capability; --- rip r- .

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68 REYKJA VIK AND BEYOND mischievous weapons developments like x-ray lasers, for exam- plc could be foreclosed. Obviously, the whole set of issues associated with strategic defense will be part of any future arms control agenda. For the moment the critical item is preserving the integrity of the ABM treaty. The so- called broad or legally correct interpretation of the treaty advocated in some quarters of the Reagan Administration would appear to be a major obstacle to achieving any of the significant cuts in offensive forces discussed here. The role of defense in an era of recluced offenses will require much analysis and eventually difficult negoti- ations. There are a number of other obvious foci for arms control activity in the years to come, including, for example, antitactical missile defenses, cruise missile issues, the implications of mobile or con- cealable strategic weapons, conventional force reductions, and mul- tilateral negotiations involving all the major nuclear powers, partic- ularly if the superpowers significantly cut their strategic forces. There is more than enough work to be done, which leads me to the final portion of my discussion. The current unsatisfactory, unstable, and dangerous situation in which we find ourselves did not develop suddenly. In both the United States and the Soviet Union the situation evolved through a series of steps that frequently were taken for domestic or international political reasons virtually unconnected to real strategic military objectives. There are a number of culprits: the scientists who failed to communicate adequately to the public the realities of nuclear weaponry; the infatuation of the military with the power of these new gadgets and their inability to recognize that there was no way to use this power to capture a city or a country destroyed in a nuclear war is not really very important; the dynamics and momen- tum of the arms race in the United States; the military-congressional- inclustrial complex; the xenophobia and insecurity of the Soviets; their past and present harsh and aggressive policies, both internally and toward their neighbors; their own military-industrial complex; and the general aura of mistrust with which the United States and the Soviet Union regard each other. Altogether, there are no shortages of explanations; nevertheless, it is often hard to accept the collective madness that has led us to where we are.

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69 FUTURE OF ARMS CONTROL The arms control efforts we have engaged in for nearly 30 years have been aimed at extricating us from this mess in a safe and stable way. In spite of the immense amount of work that has gone into the effort, T feel that what has been lacking is a coherent, clear-cut, and overarching long-range vision of what our objectives are. We have attempted to do things one at a time first this kind of a treaty, then that one, and so forth. T once tried to pose the following question to CISAC and, T think, also to our Soviet counterparts: The time is n years from now, and the Uniter! States and the Soviet Union are at peace in a crisis-stable ant! secure relationship. Can we define that new era in some cletail, that is, what is n, and how do we get there from here? The question is easy to pose but not as easy to address. In this country, we have a recurring problem in Tong- range planning caused by the presidential electoral process. Thus, we practice arms control interruptus every 4 years. Institutions outside the government such as the universities and the various think tanks can help develop long-range policy. But there is a strong resistance on the part of people in government to outside advice, and a mechanism for analogous considerations is also necessary inside the system. In the short run, we have to survive; thus, the kind of technical arms control efforts I discussed earlier must be pursued vigorously. In a real sense, these things, although very important, are secondary issues. We are actually only buying time. There are no technical solutions to our dilemma; there really are no impenetrable shields or magic bullets. World peace will have to be based on many factors that lie outside traditional arms control. Things like technological change, regional rivalries, Third World sociopolitical evolution, and the diminishing oil supply are all part of the picture, which is a rapidly changing one. Technical and economic forces are dramatically changing our biosphere; witness the destruction of the rain forests, the destruction of the ozone layer, and the CO2 buildup. All of these issues in various ways will have a profound influence on international security, more profound in the Tong run than that poses! by nuclear weapons. The effects of history, the politics and sociology of strategic rivalries the linkages between economics and defense, ant! the v . ~ ~ . '1' ' . ~ ~ . stresses posed by the Inequalities ot living stanuaras are orner aspects ofthe problem. Tackling these issues is going to require the combined

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70 REYKJA VIK AND BEYOND efforts of physical and life scientists as well as political and social scientists, engineers, lawyers, (loctors, and businessmen. The phe- nomena are truly complex and the time available for understanding them ant! translating this understanding into policies to avoid disaster is very short. If war doesn't get us, overpopulation or some form of environmental disaster will. Insteac! of trying to make nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete, let's work to make them irrelevant. We scientists have a special responsibility. We must help to develop in a public that is largely scientifically and technically illiterate an understanding of nuclear weapon realities ant! of the host of major questions with a strong technical component. In our universities, we must help to educate students with a serious and broac! background in security issues. There is more than enough for us to clot The problem of trying to achieve a peaceful worIcl has been with us for a Tong time. If we do not blow ourselves up, it will continue for a long time. But it is important to remember that we are not dealing with a physics problem that we can abandon if it gets too tough and then work on something else. This is the problem; it will not go away, and we cannot allow ourselves to become discouraged, easy though that may be. There are some glimmerings of hope in the air anc! the absurdity of a presumably civilized society wasting nearly a trillion clolIars a year on arms throughout the world, to say nothing of the human talent diverter! from the real problems of survival on an underresourced and overpopulates! planet, finally seems to be sinking in. As Victor Hugo saicl, "An invasion of armies can be resisted, but not an idea whose time has come." Let's get on with it!