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OCR for page 38
8
Coming to Closure
Lennard Fisk opened the final session for general discussion and invited all participants to offer
comments on the principal messages and themes that they saw emerging from the workshop.
Edward Stone said that NASA's role was clear when it was founded. The agency had to help make
the United States a space-faring nation. Now the United States is a space-faring nation, and if there was
no NASA now, it would still be a space-faring nation. So the question has to be asked' Why NASA?
Stone said that in his opinion, space is still the newest realm of human activity. NASA's job is to
continue to expand the frontiers in this realm, with its international partners when appropriate. Stone said
there are five frontiers in space, namely:
The physical frontier,
2. The knowledge frontier,
3. The technology frontier,
4. The human frontier, and
5. The applications frontier.
In Stone's opinion, it is NASA's role to
.
Invest in these frontiers, to learn about them, and to expand
them. Such learning entails risk, but if we demonstrate that we are learning new things then we have a
way to measure risks, benefits, and costs. Stone said this is technical risk, not institutional risk. Each
program at NASA has to expand one or more of these frontiers. Because these frontiers are immense,
choices must be made. Among the criteria for such choices is the extent to which expanding a frontier
contributes to the achievement of a Tonger-term goal. Human spaceflight should expand the physical
frontier, eventually extending that frontier to Mars. The United States is not ready to go to Mars yet,
though the space program first has to expand the human frontier by learning about the psychology and
physiology of Tong-term spaceflight. That should be the role of the ISS.
In expanding these frontiers, Stone said that the United States should pay special attention to its rate
of learning. The rate of learning suggests an exit criterion when you stop learning you move on to the
next step. The rate of learning in human spaceflight has to be greater than in other areas, given its level of
investment and high risk.
To learn most effectively, Stone said that the United States should move away from the occasional,
large systems with very Tong development times and move toward systems that tackle these frontiers on
shorter time scales. NASA should establish 5-year programs, or similar concepts, which focus on the
engineering of new systems, a high rate of learning, and then preparation for moving on to the next step.
The success of the space sciences at NASA has demonstrated that when NASA can make good progress
and demonstrate real success, the progress will be rewarded. NASA can demonstrate real Fortress
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date or to a specific location. But ~t that goal does not become Inevitable, it will never be reached, and it
will never become inevitable if the United States does not push these frontiers.
Fink followed up on Stone's remarks by saying that the nation needs an architecture and that perhaps
the frontiers idea can serve as the basis for that architecture. The frontiers can help identify what steps are
needed to get to Mars or any other destination. However, Fink pointed out that there has to be a full-time
effort to plan how to progress along these frontiers. Only a full-time effort can produce the interim steps
that are technically feasible and that can fit into the political environment. Hinners agreed and indicated
that he thought NASA's science programs have had success because they actively involve the science
community. There is a peer review process, and there is some measure of tension between the space
agency and the scientific community. This tension and interaction ultimately improve science. The
human spaceflight part of NASA is missing this constructive tension, as he called it, and Hinners
38
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wonclerect about who couict acict it. Who couict be involved on a permanent basis? Fisk agreed and said he
believed that the architecture for Tong-term goals or plans should not necessarily be left to NASA alone.
Giacconi incticatect that he also agreed with Stone and said that it is important to have a precise goal,
because without it small steps and good learning can continue on in a way that is similar to the space
program's current lack of direction.
Giacconi then commented on what he saw as a defeatist attitude, which was something he found very
strange. He asked how it couict be that the United States couict have a space agency with a $15 billion
budget and not have the boldness to articulate goals for that agency. The U.S. space program must have a
goal. NASA and the space community should not go to Congress and ask, "Do you want us to do
something like this?" Rather, NASA should approach Congress and say, "We want to do this." Then let
Congress make its decision. He wanted the people in the room to be enthusiastic, saying that ultimately
the space program can't please everyone, but it must take a stanct.
Craig Wheeler agreed with the need to establish a clear goal as well. Wheeler also agreed that it
would be wrong to specify a time line for the goal, but argued that we should begin by setting out along
the frontiers clefinect by Stone. Wheeler incticatect that Mars is sometimes mentioned with reticence
because of its high cost, and it has to be taken out of the closet. There are ways to define excellent science
questions about Mars to specifically define Stone's frontiers. A particular issue to pursue with new and
renewed vigor is the question of whether Mars has in the past harbored life or floes now harbor life. A
single example of Martian life, like it or not, would fire the public's imagination. The quest for life on
Mars could help identify how best to integrate both robots and humans. In Wheeler's minct, this kind of
approach would require more openness from NASA than it has offered in the past. It would require
candor about how to salvage the ISS. Wheeler believed that NASA cannot afford to be viewed as less
than fully open and honest in establishing its next goal.
Several participants followed up on Wheeler's remarks about the need for a clear Tong-term goal, and
about how to achieve that goal. They saw a connection between the issue of whether NASA is viewed as
being entirely honest and Giacconi's remarks regarding a defeatist attitude. They incticatect that there is a
trust issue related to NASA. These participants felt that perhaps this lack of trust contributed to the
attitude clescribect by Giacconi.
SSB member Michael Freilich ctiscussect what he saw as points that were reinforced by the
discussion. The first was a ctistinct lack of institutionalization of a process for the infusion of new people
and new icleas in the human spaceflight program. This floes not refer to the astronaut corps, but to the
upper level. Some risk comes with new people and new icleas they might make mistakes. However,
they might not make the same mistakes over again. They might not "normalize deviance," a process
clescribect by Diane Vaughan in her booki about the Challenger accident and referred to again as part of
the Columbia accident investigation. New people and new ideas might make the program safer in the
end. There is no institutional plan to bring in new icleas at the top for human spaceflight. The Rogers
Commission report on the Challenger accident, the CAIB report, the Augustine Report none of them
found that NASA has such a plan. Freilich agreed with Hinners that the process of peer review and the
kind of interaction that NASA's science program has with the scientific community both improve the
program, because they are a way of bringing in those new ideas at the top.
Freilich's second point was that NASA in general has not clone a good enough job in technology
clevelopment. Referring to the Space Act, Freilich said NASA is supposed to be a technology
development agency, among its other responsibilities, but it floes not send out missions that use the
newest possible technology. Somehow NASA has lost sight of how best to develop the newest
technology, and this affects the willingness of the next generation of scientists and engineers to work in
the space program. Frosch agreed, commenting on the value of external people to abet new ideas for
program and technology development, as well as for careful reexamination of the processes within the
agency.
~ Vaughan, Diane, The Challenger Launch Decision. Risky Technology, Culture, & Deviance at NASA, University
of Chicago Press, 1996.
39
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Ingber elaborated on Freilich's comments about technology development. Acivancect technology
clevelopment is what is important, not just to the space aspects of national security and commercial
successes, but to the broacler national security and commercial needs of the United States as well. NASA
in the beginning ctict develop acivancect technologies, but now it is a shuttle maintenance program and a
station maintenance program, so acivancect technology clevelopment doesn't seem to happen anymore.
But the potential for space technology to strive new technology is overwhelming, and that's what NASA
should be cloing. Ingber believed that this could be a way of helping to prove the value of the program to
the nation, similar to the way that the National Institutes of Health can justify its programs to the nation-
the money put in brings back so much value. If technology can strive short-term goals along the lines of
the frontiers, that could help generate the next technology wave that will push the country forward. Space
exploration can generate systems engineering projects that mix robotics, biology, physics, chemistry,
engineering, and complex systems. These projects can bring a new level of excitement and new young
people into the program.
SSB member Roger Blanciforct offered his own summation by saying that he could not recall a
meeting where he ctisagreect so little with what was being said or hearct so much agreement on some of the
general principles the need for a clear, well-enunciatect goal, the need for a clear set of steps toward that
goal basest on learning, the need for better technology development, and the embracing of the general
principles of Stone's frontier moclel. He sensed that there was a real willingness in the room to continue
human exploration. He felt that this was an important point that there were harct-core scientists in the
room who agreed on the need to do exploration and the value of exploration, scientists who tract
previously been antagonistic toward the Gannett space program. He also was happy to hear an agreement
to stop the debate over humans versus robots and to start thinking about how to integrate humans and
robotics in order to explore the solar system in the most optimal manner. Furthermore, he felt that he
hearct shared views that it is premature to set an absolute ciate for a destination that there is still much to
learn, but there is value in proceeding in stages and learning along the way. He said that to enunciate a
specific goal is not necessarily the job of the Space Studies Board or the workshop. The specific goal will
be cleciclect through the political process. But, he saint, the Board and the workshop can inform that
process.
Fisk brought the workshop to a close by congratulating the participants on an open, frank, and
articulate discussion. He offered seven general conclusions that he strew from the workshop discussions,
as follows:
1. There are five space activities in the United States: national reconnaissance; military space;
commercial space; unmanned space and Earth science; and human spaceflight. The first four have clearly
clefinect goals and motivations. Human spaceflight needs better clefinect and articulated goals.
2. The primary motivation for the human spaceflight program should be to explore. There is a
visceral sense, a perhaps unclocumentect but strongly held belief, that there is an innate human need to
explore, which the human spaceflight program can satisfy.
3. There is no longer a need for the human space program to be a demonstration of U.S.
technological prowess; there are many other such demonstrations. But there is a role for human
spaceflight to be a demonstration of U.S. leadership and goodwill. This is particularly important at a time
when many in the world view the United States with suspicion. However, to be a leacler there must be
others who are active participants. We should not pursue a human spaceflight program on behalf of
humankind that is another form of arrogance but together with the other nations.
4. Exploration is a legitimate form of science, if properly concluctect. There is a need to incorporate
clefenclable, legitimate science into the human exploration endeavor. It has to be clone with robotics and
humans in concert.
5. Implicit in the goal to explore is the necessity to leave Tow Earth orbit. The goal of extending
human presence beyond Earth orbit should thus define the exit strategies for the shuttle and the space
station, each of which as currently clefinect is a plead encl.
40
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6. Extending human presence beyond Earth orbit is a Tong-term goal that will be difficult to sustain.
There must be visible short-term milestones that are achieved with clemonstrable success. It is possible to
pursue a level-of-effort program to achieve these goals, one that retains public support, similar, for
example, to the support for the Tong-term goal of the National Institutes of Health to cure disease.
7. Related to the notion of a Toss of conficlence in NASA, the nation and the Congress will have to
ask some very difficult questions about the space program and its political support. We need to recognize
the current inadequacy of NASA to execute these goals for human spaceflight, and thus the most radical
change may need to be to change the structure and mission of NASA. NASA's role in developing new
technology needs to be emphasized, and trust must be earnest and returned to reinforce NASA's
capabilities to execute the nation's desire to go forth into space.
Fisk concluclect his summary by saying that he was struck by the possibility that the time may have
come when the science community, in the broadest sense, might embrace the idea that there is in fact a
role for the human spaceflight program and then steer it in the direction of efforts that will produce valid
science using science in the broadest sense of the word for exploration. If the community can say "we
want to do this", if the community can say "we as a group of scientists, we as the leaclers of the scientific
community, believe this country should invest in that activity" and then be prepared to stanct up and say
how to do it, to make a case to the world that this is a valid use of the nation's resources, then that will be
a significant milestone.
41
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PREPUBLICATION COPY
Subject to Further Editorial Correction
Freilich's second point was that NASA in general has not done a good enough job in
technology development. Referring to the Space Act, Freilich said NASA is supposed to be a
technology development agency, among its other responsibilities, but it does not send out
missions that use the newest possible technology. Somehow NASA has lost sight of how best to
develop the newest technology, and this affects the willingness of the next generation of scientists
and engineers to work in the space program. Frosch agreed, commenting on the value of external
people to add new ideas for program and technology development, as well as for careful
reexamination of the processes within the agency.
Ingber elaborated on Freilich's comments about technology development. Advanced
technology development is what is important, not just to the space aspects of national security and
commercial successes, but to the broader national security and commercial needs of the United
States as well. NASA in the beginning did develop advanced technologies, but now it is a shuttle
maintenance program and a station maintenance program, so advanced technology development
doesn't seem to happen anymore. But the potential for space technology to drive new technology
is overwhelming, and that's what NASA should be doing. Ingber believed that this could be a
way of helping to prove the value of the program to the nation, similar to the way that the
National Institutes of Health can justify its programs to the nation—the money put in brings back
so much value. If technology can drive short-term goals along the lines of the frontiers, that
could help generate the next technology wave that will push the country forward. Space
exploration can generate systems engineering projects that mix robotics, biology, physics,
chemistry, engineering, and complex systems. These projects can bring a new level of
excitement and new young people into the program.
SSB member Roger Blandford offered his own summation by saying that he could not recall
a meeting where he disagreed so little with what was being said or heard so much agreement on
some of the general principles the need for a clear, well-enunciated goal, the need for a clear set
of steps toward that goal based on learning, the need for better technology development, and the
embracing of the general principles of Stone's frontier model. He sensed that there was a real
willingness in the room to continue human exploration. He felt that this was an important
point that there were hard-core scientists in the room who agreed on the need to do exploration
and the value of exploration, scientists who had previously been antagonistic toward the manned
space program. He also was happy to hear an agreement to stop the debate over humans versus
robots and to start thinking about how to integrate humans and robotics in order to explore the
solar system in the most optimal manner. Furthermore, he felt that he heard shared views that it
is premature to set an absolute date for a destination that there is still much to learn, but there is
value in proceeding in stages and learning along the way. He said that to enunciate a specific
goal is not necessarily the job of the Space Studies Board or the workshop. The specific goal will
be decided through the political process. But, he said, the Board and workshop can inform that
process.
Fisk brought the workshop to a close by congratulating the participants on an open, frank, and
articulate discussion. He offered seven general conclusions that he drew from the workshop
discussions, as follows:
1. There are five space activities in the United States: national reconnaissance; military
space; commercial space; unmanned space and Earth science; and human spaceflight. The first
four have clearly defined goals and motivations. Human spaceflight needs better defined and
articulated goals.
2. The primary motivation for the human spaceflight program should be to explore. There
is a visceral sense, a perhaps undocumented but strongly held belief, that there is an innate human
need to explore, which the human snacefli~ht program can satisfy.
'2 . ~
J.
. ~ . `_ ~
~ nere Is no longer a need for the human space program to be a demonstration of U.S.
technological prowess; there are many other such demonstrations. But there is a role for human
S-3
Representative terms from entire chapter:
space program
