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Executive Summary
For over 50 years, the United States has maintained
a stockpile of chemical agents and munitions at eight
military depots in the continental United States. Un-
der a congressional mandate in 1985, the Army insti-
tuted a program to destroy M55 chemical rockets. It
extended this program in 1992 to destroy the entire
chemical munitions stockpile.
The chemical weapons stockpile contains two types
of chemical agents: (1 ) cholinesterase-inhibiting nerve
agents (GB and VX) and (2) blister agents, primarily
various forms of mustard agent (H. HD, and HT).
The purpose of this report is to examine the effects
of leakers and other anomalies in the stored munitions
on the operation of chemical agent disposal facilities.
The Stockpile Committee evaluated the munitions' his-
tory, reviewed and evaluated leaker detection and re-
duction activities, reviewed unusual occurrences result-
ing from the delivery of atypical (i.e., anomalous)
munitions and containers to disposal facilities, re-
viewed and evaluated the implications of atypical agent
and munitions for risks to workers, and assessed pro-
grammatic impacts of these atypical munitions.
The report presents the Army's experience in track-
iThe agent and munitions at a ninth site, Johnston Island, which
is located in the Pacific Ocean about 800 miles southwest of Ha-
waii, were destroyed during a decade of disposal operations that
concluded in November 2000.
1
ing and handling anomalous munitions. It also de-
scribes data collection and data analyses by the Army
and the committee.
The report also provides a fairly detailed descrip-
tion of the degradation processes affecting chemical
agents and (to a lesser degree) propellants in stored
munitions. Stabilizers were added to the nerve agents
at the time of manufacture to retard decomposition,
but these stabilizers have degraded over time. The re-
sulting acidic decomposition products may corrode
metal containment vessels, leading to agent leakage
(particularly for GB ). The decomposition mechanism
is such that agent degradation may be expected to ac-
celerate at elevated temperatures and over longer stor-
age times.
The Stockpile Committee considered the chemical
stockpile as a whole, and the Anniston chemical stock-
pile in particular, to determine what evidence might
exist that the leaker rate is increasing with time. No
statistical evidence for this was apparent. A relatively
small number of munition types contain the bulk of the
leakers. Most of the leakers are found among GB-filled
munitions, the bulk of which are M55 rockets. The time
in years to the first leak detection is different for differ-
ent GB agent subtypes. Munitions filled with one GB
subtype, PR-RS, appear to leak earlier in their life cycle
than those filled with other GB agent subtypes. It is
possible that the VX munitions are leaking within their
OCR for page 2
2 EFFECTS OF DEGRADED AGENT AND MUNITIONS ANOMALIES ON CHEMICAL STOCKPILE DISPOSAL OPERATIONS
casings, but the externally detected VX leakage so far
has been minimal.
The discovery of anomalous munitions in the course
of destroying the chemical stockpile is well docu-
mented. Such munitions increase risk to the general
public, the environment, and especially to workers.
By their nature, they are not predictable, and in sev-
eral cases they have necessitated substantial process
and permit modification. The fact is that stockpile
degradation and the discovery of anomalies could well
continue throughout the remaining life of the stock-
pile. This will call for regular testing, monitoring, and
data recording in a standardized mode; improved sta-
tistical analysis of better databases to discover pos-
sible trends at the earliest possible time; and public
comprehension of demilitarization operations, with as
much information disclosure as can be permitted con-
sistent with security concerns. Suitable coordination
between Army personnel and emergency prepared-
ness officials to mitigate the effects of any storage
mishaps on surrounding communities is also war-
ranted. As a whole, the effects of leakers and other
anomalies can best be minimized by the earliest pos-
sible destruction of all agents at all sites.
Detailed findings and recommendations are pre-
sented in Chapter 5.
Representative terms from entire chapter:
disposal operations
