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OCR for page 36
4
Operational and Risk Implications of Anomalies
INTRODUCTION
Chapters 1, 2, and 3 present an historical overview
of stockpile anomaly occurrences to the extent these
could be discerned from Army records. The text and
data in the Stockpile Tracking System Lot Book, Final
Revision 2, dated July 2001 (the STS Lot Book) were
especially helpful in the current effort (U.S. Army,
2001a). This publication, from the office of the PMCD,
was the single most complete and authoritative source
of both qualitative and quantitative material on stock-
pile composition and condition.
This chapter considers all types of anomalies from the
perspective of their effect on disposal operations, includ-
ing their risk implications. It considers (in addition to
leakers) the occurrences of atypical agent and munition
handling anomalies during processing and the corrective
actions employed to respond to unexpected conditions.
U.S. Army records, primarily as presented in the
STS Lot Book and end-of-campaign reports for
JACADS and TOCDF, are insufficient to quantify the
observations and effects on stockpile disposal opera-
tions attributable to the processing of anomalous muni-
tions and containers. While these records provide an-
ecdotal information and discussions of corrective
actions taken, they do not quantify the effects on sched-
ule, cost, or worker risk. Some limited quantitative in-
formation has been developed, however, and is pre-
sented later in the chapter.
36
This chapter covers the risk implications of the vari-
ous anomalies, corrective actions that have been taken
to facilitate the processing of anomalous items, and-
in a qualitative way the effects of those anomalies on
cost and schedule. Effects on worker safety and stake-
holder perceptions are also covered but here, too
only in a qualitative way.
RISK IMPLICATIONS COVERED IN
QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENTS
In accordance with the PMCD Guide to Risk Man-
agement Policy and Activities (U.S. Army, 1998b), the
storage, worker, and general public risks from agent
exposure were extensively investigated in developing
Phase 1 and Phase 2 quantitative risk assessments
(QRAs) for the baseline incineration facilities at the
Tooele, Anniston, Umatilla, and Pine Bluff sites.
In the final analysis, the public risks calculated in all
of the QRAs performed to date show that the risk asso-
ciated with continued storage, while quite small, is
much larger than the risk associated with disposal op-
erations. Thus, public risk is substantially dependent
on the duration of the potential exposures from stored
stockpile components. Recognizing this risk, the Army
has an extensive program for monitoring and manag-
ing stockpile integrity.
Risk assessment can be thought of as the systematic
approach to answering three questions: What can go
OCR for page 37
OPERATIONAL AND RISK IMPLICATIONS OF ANOMALIES
wrong? What is the likelihood of something going
wrong? What are the consequences? Each set of an-
swers to these questions defines a scenario. A com-
plete set of scenarios forms the basis for defining risk
(Kaplan and Garrick, 1981~. This framework is also
valuable in considering changes in risk such as may
occur through degradation.
Chemical mechanisms related to stockpile degrada-
tion are discussed in Chapter 2. Activities that address
the risks posed by degraded stockpile items are consid-
ered in the Phase 1 and Phase 2 QRAs for the four
baseline incineration sites and the Aberdeen and New-
port sites. The end result of all these assessments is that
degradation-related mechanisms and activities contrib-
ute very little to risk across all sites. The degradation
anomalies discussed in this report cause processing
complications that increase worker risk and delay dis-
posal, prolonging public exposure to storage risk. Be-
cause the greatest number of leaking M55 GB rockets
is at Anniston, the fraction of the total risk due to deg-
radation across all sites is highest for that site, although
the absolute risk of this fraction is small. The assessed
degradation-related risk at Anniston is less than 0.1
percent of the total assessed risk from disposal opera-
tions at the site and much less than 0.1 percent of the
total risk of storage. As represented in the QRAs, this
risk from anomalous munitions primarily derives from
the longer time munitions remain in storage when dis-
posal campaigns are extended.
Degradation mechanisms for which risk consider-
ations have been investigated or postulated by the
Army in the site-specific QRA include these: (1) leak-
ing M55 rockets, (2) increased energetics sensitivity,
(3) degraded ton containers, and (4) autoignition of
M55 rockets.
Leaking M55 Rockets
Leakage occurs in both storage and processing ar-
eas. QRA analysts say there has been no clear evi-
dence for an increase in the rate of leakage. The QRAs
therefore assumed that the historical leakage rate over
several decades for each munition type would remain
constant. The potential for accidents during leaker
processing increases as more leakers are encountered.
iSAIC responses to committee degradation risk questions, Au-
gust 14, 2002.
37
This is expressed in the QRA analysis by extending
the duration of the agent campaigns for leaker pro-
cessing.2
Examples of risks associated with leaking M55 rock-
ets that were addressed in the QRAs include those aris-
ing from overpacking operations during storage.3 Also,
because overpacked munitions involve more extensive
handling during demilitarization, they lengthen the dis-
posal campaigns, thus increasing the time in storage of
the remaining munitions.
The risk associated with routine monitoring of ig-
loos is not explicitly considered in the QRA analyses;
this risk is considered by the analysts to be "very small"
owing to (1) the exterior monitoring that is done before
workers enter the igloos and (2) the protective clothing
worn by the workers.4 Nevertheless, an increase in
leakage frequency would mean an increased number of
entries by workers, which in turn would result in in-
creased risk to workers, however small.
Energetics Sensitivity
The potential effect of agent on the energetic com-
ponents of M55 rockets was addressed in a 1996
PMCD study (U.S. Army, 1996a). Seven compounds
were identified as being potential by-products of reac-
tions in the fuze and warhead section of leaking rock-
ets. Each by-product compound was categorized in
terms of its likelihood of formation and the resulting
hazard that such formation would present. Three of the
compounds formed cuprous azide, cupric azide, and
lead picrate were identified as the most hazardous
because of their great sensitivity and theoretically pos-
sible reaction chemistries. However, the study con-
cluded that mechanical barriers within the rocket make
it highly unlikely that the required reactants would
come together. For that reason, the QRAs ignore the
effects of agent on burster sensitivity.5
Tests performed on rocket propellant following con-
tamination by GB agent showed that changes in the
2SAIC responses to committee degradation risk questions, Au-
gust 14, 2002.
3SAIC responses to committee degradation risk questions, Au-
gust 14, 2002.
4SAIC responses to committee degradation risk questions, Au-
gust 14, 2002.
sSAIC responses to committee degradation risk questions, Au-
gust 14, 2002.
OCR for page 38
38 EFFECTS OF DEGRADED AGENT AND MUNITIONS ANOMALIES ON CHEMICAL STOCKPILE DISPOSAL OPERATIONS
impact sensitivity were minimal and thus would not be
a factor in the risk analysis (U.S. Army, 2000a).
Container Degradation
In 1998, an assessment of degradation of the plugs
on ton containers concluded that corrosion of plugs is
not expected until after 2005 at the Tooele site and af-
ter 2015 at the Anniston, Aberdeen, Pine Bluff, and
Umatilla sites (Bizzigotti et al., 1998~.6
Although there has been some evidence of plug deg-
radation for GB and mustard agent ton containers, no
increased incidence of leakage has been observed, i.e.,
the leakage rate remains very small and apparently
stable. In addition, many of the brass plugs used have
already been replaced with steel plugs, thus reducing
the likelihood of corrosion and leakage in the future.7
No degradation of VX-filled ton containers has been
documented since storage in this type of container was
begun more than 40 years ago. Regular inspections of
VX-filled ton containers at Newport and other storage
sites have not shown any degradation of the contain-
ers.8 Consequently, degradation mechanisms for these
containers have not been identified in over 40 years of
observation, and they have not been represented in haz-
ard and operability studies or QRAs conducted in
preparation for disposal facility operation.
In mustard agent ton containers, attack on the steel
surfaces by hydrogen chloride or by the mustard agent
itself is a degradation mechanism. The possibility of
corrosion-induced failure is addressed in the hazard and
operability studies but was not deemed to specifically
warrant consideration in the QRAs. The committee
believes that periodic monitoring of the containers will
improve the probability of early detection and thus
avoid any significant impact from this failure mecha-
n
msm.>
Autoignition of M55 Rockets
As discussed in Chapter 2, the components of the
M28 propellant used in M55 rockets degrade slowly
under storage conditions, generating heat and nitrogen
oxides. This degradation can be accelerated if the pro-
pellant is contaminated with GB and/or the rocket is
overpacked.
The median frequency of autoignition of M55 rock-
ets has been estimated to be 1.0 to 5.9 x 10-5 per year
for overpacked rockets (see Table 4-1) and 1.8 x 10-7
to 1.4 x 10-6 for nonoverpacked (undetected) leakers
(see Table 4-2~. Table 4-3 compares these estimated
frequencies with the total estimated frequencies of
other causes of ignition, which are 1.4 to 5.3 x 1 o-3 per
year.~° In addition, the QRAs indicate that the sce-
narios associated with storage of M55 rockets repre-
sent the largest contribution to the public health risk
(U.S. Army, 2002c).
The Army has concluded that existing procedures
adequately address the potential degradation of the
propellant used in 105-mm cartridges and 4.2-inch
mortar rounds. The committee believes that if contin-
ued monitoring of the propellant for these munitions
indicates degradation, then the propellant and chemi-
cal agent can be easily separated using existing main-
tenance procedures.
Chapter 3 outlines how statistical analysis can be
used to characterize GB rockets by agent subtype. A
distinguishing feature of these subtypes is the relative
frequency with which leakers have occurred. As addi-
tional leakers occur, the time required to completely
6The analysis of Bizzigotti et al. (1998) indicates that the first
plug failure due to corrosion is not expected at the Tooele site until
after 2005. For the 6,398 HD ton containers with a total of 38,388
plugs at Tooele, 66 plug failures from corrosion were predicted
from 2006 through 2015. This represents a 0.17 percent failure rate
of the plugs, or a 1.0 percent failure rate for the ton containers,
which have six plugs each.
7SAIC responses to committee degradation risk questions, Au-
gust 14, 2002.
Newport Chemical Agent Demilitarization Facility answers to
committee questions on degradation risk, August 14, 2002.
9Aberdeen Chemical Agent Demilitarization Facility responses
to committee questions on degradation risk, August 14, 2002.
i°Median frequencies of 1.0 to 5.9 x 10-s per year are equivalent
to one chance in 100,000 to one chance in 16,950 per year. Median
frequencies of 1.0 x 10-7 to 1.4 x 10-6 per year are equivalent to
one chance in 5,600,000 to one chance in 710,000. Frequencies of
1.4 to 5.3 x 10-3 per year are equivalent to one chance in 710 to one
chance in 190 per year.
~ iDraft of an assessment of the chemical weapons stockpile gen-
erated by the Army in 1992, provided to the committee by PMCD
on February 27, 2002.
OCR for page 39
OPERATIONAL AND RISK IMPLICATIONS OF ANOMALIES
TABLE 4-1 Median Site-Specific Annual Autoignition
Probability for Overpacked Rockets
Probability of Autoignition in Each Year
2000
2005
2010
2020
Anniston
Umatilla
Blue Grass
Pine Bluff
2.9 x 10-5
9.8 x 10-6
.Ox 10-5
.Ox 10-5
4.2 x 10-5
1.5 X 10-5
1.3 x 10-5
1.3 x 10-5
5.0 X 10-5
1.9 x 10-5
1.5 X 10-5
1.4x 10-5
5.9 X 10-5
2.3 x 10-5
1.7 x 10-5
1.6 x 10-5
Source: Adapted from U.S. Army (2002c).
TABLE 4-2 Median Site-Specific Annual Autoignition
Probability for Nonoverpacked Leaking Rockets
Probability of Autoignition in Each Year
2000
2005
2010
2020
Anniston
Umatilla
Blue Grass
Pine Bluff
1.4x 10-6
5.6 x 10-7
4.9 x 10-7
1.8 x 10-7
1.3 x 10-6
6.8 x 10-7
5.6 x 10-7
2.4x 10-7
1.2 x 10-6
7.7 x 10-7
6.1 x 10-7
2.8 x 10-7
1.2 x 10-6
8.9 x 10-7
6.8 x 10-7
3.2 x 10-7
Source: Adapted from U.S. Army (2002c).
TABLE 4-3 Comparison of Site-Specific Autoignition Probabilities with the Probabilities
of Other Accidental Ignition Events (probability in 1 year)
Overpacked Rocket Nonoverpacked Earthquake
Autoignition Rocket Autoignition Lightning Initiation Initiation
Probability Probability Probabilitya Probabilitya
Anniston 3x10-5 1x10-6 2x 10-3 1 xlO-4
Umatilla 1 x 10-5 6 x 10-7 6 x 10-4 8 X 10-4
Blue Grass 1 x 10-s 5 x 10-7 2 x 10-3 2 x 10-4
Pine Bluff 1 x 10-5 2 x 10-7 5 X 10-3 3 x 10-4
aLightning and earthquake initiation probabilities are from the following QRA reports: for Anniston (SAIC,
1997a), for Umatilla (SAIC, 1996), for Blue Grass (SAIC, 1997b), and for Pine Bluff (SAIC, 1997c). These
numbers may change as the QRAs for these sites are updated.
Source: Adapted from U.S. Army (2002b).
39
OCR for page 40
40 EFFECTS OF DEGRADED AGENT AND MUNITIONS ANOMALIES ON CHEMICAL STOCKPILE DISPOSAL OPERATIONS
destroy the M55 inventory, as well as the overall stock-
pile, probably will be extended. Such delays in destroy-
ing the stockpile, especially the M55 rockets, prolong
public risk. Prioritizing the destruction of M55 rockets
by GB subtype at each site could be an option for re-
ducing the disposal risk to the public if such schedul-
ing does not otherwise adversely affect the overall
scheduling for M55 rocket disposal and increase expo-
sure to storage risk.
The above are the only distinct anomalies evaluated
in the QRAs. Other anomalies, such as frothing mus-
tard agent munitions, can impact schedule, but they
were not evaluated in the QRAs.
SUMMARY OF IMPLICATIONS OF ANOMALIES
AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
General
Stockpile anomalies can be categorized into two
main groups:
.
Stable defects are those originating during manu-
facture or from handling mishaps. They do not
cause further degradation once they occur and are
often of a mechanical nature.
Progressive defects are the result of chemical ac-
tivity subsequent to manufacture. These defects
include leakers, gelled agent, corrosion, and the
frothing of agent from the agent cavity during ei-
ther storage or disassembly.
Agent and munitions defects (anomalies) by their
very nature can be disruptive and dangerous and can
have adverse impacts on processing. Their causes can
be complex and are often interactive. They are often
associated with specific agent and/or munition lots;
this is reflected in the STS Lot Book, which records
lot number along with anomaly descriptions. Stable
defects may or may not be identifiable in storage. If
the defect can be isolated in advance, a timely deci-
sion to accept the impact on processing operations or
to attempt to mitigate the impact through process and/
or equipment modification will lead to minimum
schedule disruption. Similarly, if progressive defects
are identified during storage by monitoring, sampling,
and testing, a timely decision to accept the impact or
to implement special handling procedures and/or
other process and equipment modifications can be
made. Information on anomalous items in the stock-
.
.
.
pile, when systematically collected and tabulated, can
yield the data points needed for statistical analysis and
trend detection aimed at mitigating operational dis-
ruption. For this purpose, it is desirable that reporting
protocols and formats be standardized for consistency
in gathering and recording information across all stor-
age sites. Available records, such as end-of-campaign
reports, do not allow linking system and equipment
downtimes directly to the processing of anomalous
stockpile items.
Corrective actions employed to address anomaly
conditions of all types include the following:
- Modification of process rate, sequence, schedule,
and standard operating procedures, as required,
to minimize risk and mechanical disruption;
- Modification of the RCRA permit to enable a facil-
ity to handle an anomaly efficiently (by, for ex-
ample, allowing a different processing sequence);
Modification and/or replacement of equipment;
Revisions of operator training and improvement
of procedures;
Notification and education of stakeholders; and
Rejection, isolation, and eventual special process-
ing of munitions.
Nearly every anomaly encountered during process-
ing will interrupt or slow disposal operations. More-
over, investigations to determine root causes and de-
velop corrective actions and operational changes also
contribute to delays in processing. The magnitude of
such activities depends on the type of anomaly, its po-
tential effect on worker and public safety, and its im-
pact on operations. The types of anomalies that have
been found are discussed briefly below.
Progressive (Chemical-Related} Anomalies
Progressive anomalies include the following:
- agent and propellant stabilizer depletion
gelling of agent
- crystallization of agent
sludging of agent
- high-solids-content agent
frothing and foaming mustard agent
- hydrogen formation
- propellant contamination
- external leakage of agent
- internal leakage of agent
OCR for page 41
OPERATIONAL AND RISK IMPLICATIONS OF ANOMALIES
The chemistry that causes some of these anomalies is
presented in Chapter 2; only the actions taken during
processing will be covered here. The last two leakage
anomalies were discussed at length in Chapter 3 and
will not be discussed in this chapter except insofar as
they cause secondary effects.
Corrective actions that have been taken for progres-
sive anomalies include the following (Thomas, 2002b).
Ge//ed or Crysta//ized GB Agent
Gelled or crystallized GB agent requires adjustment
of the processing rate and modification of the RCRA
permit to allow agent to be destroyed along with the
body of the munition in the deactivation furnace sys-
tem (DFS) or the metal parts furnace (MPF), depend-
ing on the munition involve.
High So/ids Content HO
Mustard agent that has a high solids content requires
adjustment of the processing rate to reflect extended
agent drain time, modification of the RCRA permit to
allow increased agent loading in the MPF, and destruc-
tion of the agent along with the body of the munition in
the MPF. Among the problems encountered was dam-
age to the multipurpose demilitarization machine
(MDM) equipment when crimped burster tubes could
not be reinserted into projectile bodies because of ex-
cessive agent heel. Workers in demilitarization protec-
tive ensemble (DPE) suits would then have to service
the equipment to remedy the breakdown (U.S. Army,
l999b).
Foaming and Frothing HO
To handle projectiles that exhibited foaming and
frothing mustard during disassembly, vacuum nozzles
were redesigned to envelop the projectile ogive and
limit agent spillage (U.S. Army, l999b). Freezing the
munitions and processing them in the MPF with 100
percent heel proved to be feasible (NRC, 2001b). The
changed agent loading of the MPF required RCRA per-
mit modification. Processing rates were adjusted as
necessary to conform to permit limits (U.S. Army,
l999c).
12See Assessment of Processing Gelled GB MSS Rockets at
Anniston (NRC, 2003~.
41
Hydrogen Formation and Resulting Pressurization
Advance detection of pressurized conditions due to
the formation of hydrogen gas is desirable, especially
for ton containers. The Army is experimenting with
venting to safely relieve pressure. Special safety mea-
sures are required to minimize the possibility of explo-
sion when hydrogen pressurization is encountered.
Prop e//an t Contamination
Careful monitoring is necessary to detect physical
changes and temperature rise that would indicate pro-
pellant contamination by leaking agent. Separation of
the propellant from the projectiles is relatively easily
and safely accomplished for 105-mm projectiles and
4.2-inch mortar rounds. Internal leakage of M55 rock-
ets is more difficult to respond to because it is difficult
to detect.
External Agent Leakage
If a leaker is detected while the munition is in a
stockpile igloo, it is overpacked and removed to a sepa-
rate storage igloo, where it can be monitored more fre-
quently. Overpacked munitions and those developing
leaks during transport to the MDB are processed sepa-
rately by workmen in DPE suits with due concern for
the higher risk of operations with leaking munitions.
The significant schedule impact to be expected from
this type of handling is discussed later in this chapter.
/nterna/ Agent Leakage
Internal leakage is generally undetectable because
current monitoring protocols do not call for intrusive
monitoring. Consequently, no advance corrective ac-
tion is possible. If evidence of internal leakage appears
during processing, the munition may require handling
as a reject item. This involves, first, isolating the muni-
tion and, then, special processing by workmen in DPE
suits using special tools and techniques.
Stable Anomalies Related to Manufacturing and
Handling
Stable anomalies include the following:
· heavy metals in the agent
· improper fabrication of burster tubes
OCR for page 42
42 EFFECTS OF DEGRADED AGENT AND MUNITIONS ANOMALIES ON CHEMICAL STOCKPILE DISPOSAL OPERATIONS
· welding and brazing defects
· PCBs in M55 rocket shipping and firing tubes
· agent contamination from ton container reuse
· poor sample-plug fit and the use of brass con-
tainer plugs
· flawed munition casing blanks
· problems with disassembly
· corroded M23 mine adapter plates
Several corrective activities have been taken or are
planned to address these stable anomalies.
Heavy Meta/ in the Agent
The pollution abatement system (PAS) particu-
larly in third-generation baseline incineration system
facilities equipped with the activated carbon PAS filter
system (PFS ) may be effective in meeting RCRA per-
mit requirements for heavy metal control.
improper Fabrication of Burster Tube
Improper burster tube fabrication is an anomaly that
shows up in numerous ways tubes welded into the
munitions casing, imperfect agent cavity seal due to
burster tube roughness, tubes installed upside down,
out-of-specification burster tube fabrication, the use of
aluminum tubes instead of specified steel, and over-
long tubes. Corrective action involves routine process-
ing where possible but processing as a reject munition
when required.
We/ding and Brazing Defects
Welding and brazing defects can result in either ex-
ternal or internal agent leakage. Bomb casing seams
and the attachment of the lifting lug are typical prob-
lem areas. Weld or braze material has been found to be
cracked or porous in certain defective lots, permitting
agent migration and leakage. If external leakage oc-
curs, the munition must be overpacked and specially
processed. Internal leakers are handled in a manner
similar to munitions with improper burster tube fabri-
cation anomalies that is, routinely when possible; as
rejects when necessary.
PCBs in M55 Rocket Shipping and Firing Tubes
PCBs are normally destroyed during routine pro-
cessing with no special provision required for permit
compliance.
Agent Contamination from Ton Container Reuse
Cases of contamination with chemicals not coming
from the stored agent have been traced to residual ma-
terial from earlier use of the containers. The permit
needed to be modified to allow these unexpected sub-
stances to be processed at disposal facilities. Among
the substances requiring permit modification is arsenic,
which is believed to have come from earlier storage of
lewisite.
Poor Samp/e-P/ug Fit and the Use of Brass Container
Plugs
To secure an agent-tight seal, ton containers subject
to leakage at threaded plug holes have required refitted
plugs or retrofit, with steel plugs replacing brass plugs,
which are subject to acid attack when agent deterio-
rates.
F/awe d Munition Casing Blanks
In a very small number of cases, flawed steel muni-
tion casings developed cracks and subsequently leaked.
The affected munitions are overpacked and stored sepa-
rately.
Disassembly Problems
Manufacturing error, metal corrosion within
threaded sections, incompatibility of soft aluminum
projectile casings and metal gripper jaws in processing
machinery, and careless handling are generating or can
generate anomalous conditions that make disassembly
of munitions difficult or impossible with the equip-
ment intended for this purpose. One of the more suc-
cessful corrective actions was the development and
employment of the gimbal cam device at JACADS and
its subsequent deployment at other facilities. This
modification to the projectile/mortar disassembly
OCR for page 43
OPERATIONAL AND RISK IMPLICATIONS OF ANOMALIES
(PMD) equipment solved the majority of these prob-
lems without interrupting the routine processing cycle
(U.S. Army, 2000b). The few munitions that cannot be
handled in this way are set aside for special processing
at the end of the campaign. For example, nose-cone-
removal grippers that become fouled require correc-
tive action by workers wearing appropriate protective
clothing.
Corroded M23 Mine Adapler Plates
The corrective action for corroded M23 mine adapter
plates processed at JACADS was to slow the DFS rota-
tion rate so the burster would detonate in a thicker-
walled section of the kiln. Most remaining M23 mines
were fabricated with plastic rather than metal adapter
plates. The behavior of these plastic plates during pro-
cessing is not yet known (U.S. Army, 2001c).
WORKER RISK INCIDENT TO THE STORAGE AND
PROCESSING OF ANOMALOUS MUNITIONS
Facility and process design are intended to provide
maximum safety for workers, the public, and the envi-
ronment. Anomalous munitions add to the inherent risk
since they may fall outside design parameters and es-
tablished procedures. Chemical agents, with their ex-
tremely high toxicity, will always add to the existing
risk of working in a complex chemical processing fa-
cility. Thus, assuring worker safety will always be a
challenge.
During disposal operations, risks to workers from
anomalous stockpile munitions and containers can arise
for one or more reasons:
.
Exposure to leaking munitions. Leaking muni-
tions present a risk of exposure to chemical agent
in the form of a liquid, a vapor, or both. Risk to
workers is minimized by standard operating pro-
cedures that prescribe steps for handling leakers
safely. Monitoring to detect the presence of agent
before a worker can be exposed is routine. DPE
suits used during nonroutine processing of ex-
ceptional munitions, such as overpacked leakers,
are intended to minimize potential agent expo-
sure. However, additional risk is imposed through
the need for protective clothing. Even though
43
complete protection from agent exposure is pro-
vided, proper management of DPE operations is
necessary to preclude severe worker fatigue and
hyperthermia.
Operational impact from degraded agent. An ex-
traordinarily high solids content, or agent gelling,
or agent crystallization all delay or even prevent
the extraction of agent from munitions, thus ex-
tending the processing schedule. At TOCDF, the
presence of gelled GB in M55 rockets led to a
process change namely, the destruction of agent
in the DFS rather than in the LIC. As a result,
state regulatory authorities imposed a conserva-
tive limit on the rate of rocket processing that
extended the GB campaign schedule signifi-
cantly.~3 In addition to extending the processing
times, which prolongs the potential for opera-
tional exposures, risk to workers is also affected
when problems with high solids, gelled agent, or
crystallized agent must be dealt with by workers
in DPE suits.
· Maintenance and cleanup activities. Certain
anomalies encountered during processing neces-
sitate that workers clean explosives from the ex-
plosive containment room (ECR) floor at regular
intervals. Agent spills resulting from foaming and
frothing mustard and those that occur during the
correction of mechanical anomalies must be de-
contaminated by workers. Debris falling from
munitions or ejected by processing machinery
must be collected and disposed of safely. PMD
jaws require cleaning periodically, especially if
they have been used to process aluminum projec-
tile compounds. These activities must all be car-
ried out by workers in DPE suits.
· Pressurized hydrogen gas. Hydrogen gas that has
formed from mustard agent degradation in muni-
tions and containers to perhaps as high as 200
psig presents a significant risk to workers because
of its wide flammability/explosivity limits.
· Pressure fluctuations in the DFS during mine pro-
cessing. The inability to remove the energetic com-
ponents of the M23 mine can cause small detona-
tions within the DFS and consequent pressure puffs
(U.S. Army, 2001c).
13See Assessment of Processing Gelled GB MSS Rockets at
Anniston (NRC, 2003~.
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44 EFFECTS OF DEGRADED AGENT AND MUNITIONS ANOMALIES ON CHEMICAL STOCKPILE DISPOSAL OPERATIONS
CSDP PROGRAMMATIC IMPACTS
General
Anomalies, by definition, are nonroutine occur-
rences that involve nonnormal stockpile munitions or
containers. In some cases, process planning in the
CSDP was broad enough to accommodate the impact
of the anomaly. In other cases, anomalies have had a
negative effect on program execution. They have
caused schedule extensions, cost increases, permit
modifications, process modifications, stakeholder con-
fusion and loss of confidence, and greater worker risk.
Schedule and Cost
The committee recognizes that the presence of
anomalous items in the stockpile delays normal dis-
posal operations and increases the duration of expo-
sure to stockpile risk. Knowledge about the types and
locations of anomalous items helps minimize delays,
but there are limited programmatic data available to
help anticipate the extent of delays. In some cases, cost
data can be used as a surrogate for the extent of delays
and the additional operational requirements associated
with handling and disposal of anomalous items.
Since each baseline incineration system facility costs
approximately $300,000 per day to operate or to main-
tain in a standby mode, delays in conducting disposal
operations due to anomalous stockpile items can have
significant cost ramifications. Very little, if any, quan-
titative data exist on the effects of anomalous stockpile
items on the schedule or cost of the stockpile disposal
program. There is, however, significant anecdotal in-
formation that anomalous munitions and containers
extend processing schedules and increase costs. Some
cost and schedule information has been developed that
gives an idea of the significant impacts of processing
anomalous stockpile items on disposal operations.
At TOCDF, the cost of processing a standard M55
rocket was about $2,000 per rocket, and that of pro-
cessing a leaking or gelled rocket was more than three
times as high ($7,200~.~4 The impacts on cost were
essentially time related. Drainable rockets were pro-
cessed at a rate of six or more per hour, as most of the
14Tim Thomas, Program Manager for Chemical Demilitariza-
tion, personal communication to Peter Lederman, July 31, 2003.
agent was drained and processed in the LIC.~5 Gelled
rockets could only be processed at the rate of about one
per hour, a limitation imposed by RCRA permit re-
quirements.~6 The rate at which leaking rockets could
be unpacked by a team in DPE suits was a limiting
factor. Consequently, about one leaking rocket or
gelled M55 rocket was processed every hour on a sus-
tained basis, with a maximum rate of about two per
hour.
The processing of 4.2-inch mortar rounds filled with
mustard agent at JACADS encountered a number of
anomalies. These included frothing of agent and gelled
agent such that the agent could not be drained. These
and other issues, such as not being able to reseat the
burster casing, increased the time required to complete
the demilitarization of the mortar rounds from a sched-
uled 4 months to 5 months. Such prolongation signifi-
cantly increases the cost of a program for example,
the approximate cost of operating the JACADS facility
for a month was about $10 million.~7
Anomalies vary with respect to frequency, distribu-
tion, and effect. Some have been associated with spe-
cific lots, as shown in the STS Lot Book. Some occur
so infrequently that there is very little effect on the cost
and schedule of disposal operations. To the extent that
certain anomalous munitions are believed to have been
completely processed and further occurrences are con-
sidered unlikely, their effect on future operations is
moot. Others have now been reduced to routine han-
dling through the introduction of equipment or process-
ing modifications. However, there is no assurance that
old problems thought to have been solved will not re-
cur or that new problems will not be discovered. Should
this occur, the effects on stockpile disposal schedules
and costs will depend on the number and locations of
the munitions involved and the particular consequences
that would need to be addressed. Systematic, standard-
ized monitoring can help to identify new anomalies and
will allow the program to deal with them efficiently.
isTim Thomas, Program Manager for Chemical Demilitariza-
tion, personal communication to Peter Lederman, July 31, 2003.
i6The RCRA requirement for processing gelled GB MSS rock-
ets at TOCDF limited processing to 1.6 rockets per hour if only
rockets were being processed or 1 rocket per hour if the rockets
were being coprocessed with other munitions.
i7Tim Thomas, Program Manager for Chemical Demilitariza-
tion, personal communication to Peter Lederman, July 31, 2003.
OCR for page 45
OPERATIONAL AND RISK IMPLICATIONS OF ANOMALIES
Stakeholder Perceptions and Reactions
Three anomalies have come to the public' s attention
through news stories and other sources: the occurrence
of leakers, gelled GB M55 rockets, and the potential
for autoignition of M55 rockets. Significant public at-
tention has been focused on the overall CSDP, particu-
larly the debate over baseline incineration technology
versus neutralization (hydrolysis) processes (the latter
will be used at the Aberdeen, Newport, Pueblo, and
Blue Grass sites). However, except to the extent they
might contribute to heavy metal emissions or occasion-
ally upset conditions in furnace operations, anomalies
do not appear to be a major issue with the public. The
public continues to be told about leaking munitions in
storage igloos by various news media, and although
they are a matter of concern, the public seems to be-
lieve the Army is managing the problem adequately.
The U.S. Congress started the CSDP in the mid-1980s
out of concern about the stability of M55 rockets, and
the Army has consistently told the public that the con-
tinued storage of these munitions poses the greatest
risk. However, some individuals and groups believe
that incineration (versus hydrolysis with extended stor-
age) poses a more immediate risk.
Nonetheless, there is general agreement in the pub-
lic sector that early destruction of the stockpile is a
proper objective. While the public insists on protection
during disposal operations, differences of opinion exist
among public stakeholders on the particulars of how
prompt, safe destruction can best be achieved for ex-
ample, should there be onsite or offsite disposal of sec-
ondary wastes from disposal facilities? If the stockpiles
were completely dormant, the public would probably
consider that time invested in the study of ever safer
processes was justified. However, the discovery of
leakers and the uncertainty surrounding autoignition of
rockets have strengthened some residents' insistence
on disposing of the stockpile as rapidly as possible.
In parallel with the planning, construction, and op-
eration of stockpile disposal facilities, the Army has
funded the Chemical Stockpile Emergency Prepared-
ness Program (CSEPP). This program to prepare the
communities surrounding each site for the agent dis-
posal operations has been a significant component of
the cost of the CSDP, which has a current life cycle
cost estimate of $24 billion to complete disposal activi-
ties at all storage sites. The emergency management
plans and infrastructure that guide CSEPP preparations
for disposal operations are applicable as well to unin-
45
tended releases of agent from storage areas as a conse-
quence of accidents (e.g., autoignition) or natural oc-
currences such as earthquakes or lightning strikes. As
noted previously, the significant quantities of chemical
munitions and bulk containers in the storage igloos at
each site present greater risks to the general public than
do the more limited quantities of agent that are being
handled in disposal facilities at any given time (NRC,
1994a, 2002~.
Regulatory officials have supported the concept of
prompt destruction while requiring strict adherence to
permit regulations. In most jurisdictions, the regula-
tory requirements are clear and reasonable given the
complexities that arise from legal requirements, public
concerns, and political and activist pressures.
SUMMARY
The presence of anomalous items in the aging
chemical stockpile is well documented. Anomalies
contribute to the risk that the stockpile poses to the
general public, the environment, and, especially, to
workers. Since the stockpile was originally intended
for use in battle, the impact of anomalous munitions on
disposal operations was not anticipated, and in some
cases the anomalies have necessitated substantial pro-
cess and permit modification. Moreover, there is no
assurance that all anomalies to be encountered before
the entire stockpile has been destroyed have already
been discovered. Available data do not clearly link
stockpile degradation with age; however, autocatalysis
could still emerge as an important and dangerous new
condition affecting stockpile storage risk. Anomalies,
especially leakers and the possibility of rocket auto-
ignition, are of continuing concern to the general pub-
lic, political leaders, regulatory officials, and several
activist organizations. Continuing degradation of the
stockpile involving various anomalous manifestations,
both known and possibly yet to become apparent,
will continue over the duration of the disposal program.
The extent to which anomalies will be encountered is
difficult to predict, although in some cases (e.g., solids
content, gelling), estimates have been made. This situ-
ation places a premium on the following activities:
· Regular testing, monitoring, and data recording
and interpretation in a standardized mode;
· Detailed assessment of operational risks to work-
ers using a HAZOPs analysis or QRA and devel-
OCR for page 46
46 EFFECTS OF DEGRADED AGENT AND MUNITIONS ANOMALIES ON CHEMICAL STOCKPILE DISPOSAL OPERATIONS
.
opment of procedures and training to safeguard
workers associated with identifiable anomalous
operations;
Credible statistical analysis of improved data-
bases to discover possible trends at the earliest
possible time;
Regular intersite communication through direct
contact and the program's lessons-learned data-
base to ensure that anomaly detection is made
known as soon as possible to all concerned;
Regular public advisories on demilitarization op-
erations with as much information disclosure as
can be permitted consistent with security con-
cerns; and
Sustained and systematic efforts to destroy the
aging stockpile, with emphasis on attending to
those munition types and anomalies that pose the
greatest actual or potential risks.
Representative terms from entire chapter:
ton containers
