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Executive Summary
Administered through the Expeditionary Warfare Operations Technology Division (Code 353) of
the Office of Naval Research's (ONR's) Naval Expeditionary Warfare Department (Code 35), the
Marine Corps Science and Technology (MCS&T) program has three parts:
· The Littoral Combat (LC) component of the Littoral Combat and Power Projection Future Naval
Capability (FNC),~ funded for FY03 at $21.8 million for applied research (6.2) and at $13.3 million for
advanced technology development (6.3~;
· Core Thrusts, funded at $11.9 million for 6.2 work and at $11.2 million for 6.3 work; and
· Basic Research, funded at $3.4 million for 6.1 work.
These budget figures are summarized in Table ES.1. As a whole, the MCS&T program, whose
mission is to exploit the technology opportunities that will produce enhanced expeditionary warfighting
capabilities for the Naval Services, represents approximately 17 percent of Code 35's FY03 budget.2
As a result of its assessment, the Committee for the Review of ONR's Marine Corps Science and
Technology Program developed three sets of findings and recommendations. Its general findings and
recommendations for the MCS&T program as a whole and for each of the program's three parts the
LC-FNC, Core Thrusts, and Basic Research (reviewed in order of program size) are presented below
as well as in Chapters 1 through 4. The committee' s recommendations for the more than 80 individual
projects it reviewed are presented in Chapters 2, 3, and 4.
1 The other component of the Littoral Combat and Power Projection FNC is focused on expeditionary logistics and is
administered by ONR's Industrial and Corporate Programs Department (Code 36~.
2The committee noted that the ONR (and the MCS&T program) budget relies heavily (~15 percent for MCS&T) on annual
congressional plus-ups. The lack of certainty regarding the availability of these additional funds concerned the committee
because of the difficulties this situation presents in establishing long-range planning within the MCS&T program.
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2003 ASSESSMENT OF ONR'S MARINE CORPS SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM
TABLE ES.1 ONR Code 353 Marine Corps Science and Technology Program Budget for FY03
(millions of dollars)
Portion of Program 6.1 6.2 6.3 Total
Littoral Combat Future Naval Capability 21.8 13.3 35.1
Core Thrusts 11.9 11.2 23.1
Basic Research 3.4 3.4
Total funding 3.4 33.7 24.5 61.6
NOTE: Beginning in FY99, ONR initiated a reorganization of its initiatives to create two primary elements: (1) Future Naval
Capabilities (FNCs), which was to receive all of ONR's 6.3 budget and roughly half of its 6.2 budget (currently, not all 6.3
funds are committed to the FNCs), and (2) Discovery and Invention (D&I), to which is allocated the remainder of ONR's 6.2
budget and all of its 6.1 budget. For the purposes of this review the D&I effort of the MCS&T program comprises Basic
Research and the 6.2-funded projects of the Core Thrusts.
MARINE CORPS SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM AS A WHOLE
General Observations
Code 353 has changed in positive and productive ways since the Naval Studies Board's initial
review of the MCS&T program in 2000.3 At that time, a significant portion of the program had just been
assigned to Code 353 and needed focus. In the current review, the committee was favorably impressed
by the quality of many of the MCS&T program's components and by the strength of the interaction that
has developed between Code 353 and the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory,4 as well as by the
capabilities and evident motivation of the presenters.
Many of the individual projects in the MCS&T program pursue worthwhile objectives; however,
their relationship to key Marine Corps warfighting concepts Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare (EMW)5
and its components, Operational Maneuver From the Sea (OMFTS)6 and Ship-to-Objective Maneuver
(STOMA was often unclear in the presentations made to the committee. Yet, the Marine Corps
demonstrates a good understanding of the importance of communicating its vision to and cooperating
with the Chief of Naval Research and the personnel in ONR and, as a result, Code 353 is positioned to
focus the MCS&T program on supporting the fast-changing missions and operational needs of the future
Marine Corps. In general Code 353 is heading in the right direction and is attempting to pursue Marine
Corps objectives, although better coordination is always desirable.
3Naval Studies Board, National Research Council. 2000. 2000 Assessment of the Office of Naval Research's Marine Corps
Science and Technology Program, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C.
4The Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory retains 6.3-funded programs related to demonstration, experimentation, and
integration of S&T products in support of concepts and future capabilities development.
5Gen James L. Jones, USMC, Commandant of the Marine Corps. 2001. Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare, Department of
the Navy, November 10.
6Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps. 1996. Operational Maneuver From the Sea, U.S. Government Printing Office, Wash-
ington D.C., January 4.
7LtGen Paul K. Van Riper, USMC (Beth. 1997. "A Concept for Ship-to-Objective Maneuver," Marine Corps Gazette,
Marine Corps Association, Quantico, Va., November.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
3
LC-FNC Planning and S&T Investment Strategy
The LC-FNC's dual-track planning near- and long-term oriented began with an emphasis on
STOM.8 The near-term projects (18 to 36 months), intended to produce rapid results in response to
critical needs identified by the Marine Corps and Code 353 prior to the creation of the LC-FNC, were
designed to get the LC-FNC off to a quick start. Most of the projects presented to the committee were in
this category. Longer-term projects (36 to 60 months) are scheduled to receive funding beginning in
FY04.9 Presentations on a number of FY04 new starts did not, however, show any direct linkage of
these new starts to specific findings of the long-term planning activities.
Near-term planning also led to the establishment of four LC-FNC enabling capabilities (ECs) under
which the various product lines and projects are grouped: EC 1 Intelligence, Surveillance, and Recon-
naissance (ISR) for the Amphibious Force; EC 2 Expeditionary Fire Support for the Marine Air-
Ground Task Force (MAGTF); EC 3 MAGTF Maneuver in the Littorals; and EC 4 Command and
Control (Cal. These four ECs appear to the committee to provide a reasonable set of topic areas to
coordinate and categorize the STOM shortfalls identified by Code 353 in planning activities.
The committee believes that the longer-term top-down planning process established by Code 353 to
help convert LC-FNC goals into a science and technology (S&T) investment strategy is conceptually
excellent—particularly in its heavy up-front involvement with the Marine Corps user community.
Nevertheless, improvements in its implementation are needed.
To identify and prioritize shortfalls in STOM capability, Code 353 used panels of experts (users,
technologists, and so on) engaged in war gaming and other similar concept-generation exercises. These
exercises resulted in a series of Broad Agency Announcement (BAA) solicitations seeking innovative
technologies to address critical shortfalls. Several teams of potential users then took part in a STOM-
based technology insertion game to assess and prioritize the technology improvements proposed in the
BAA responses.
Although this approach represents an excellent start, the committee expressed two concerns about it:
1. Relying exclusively on BAA responses as the source of candidate technologies for an S&T
investment strategy is a fundamental flaw in the process. A collection of BAA responses does not
guarantee that all critical issues are being addressed, and simply rearranging the responses does not in
itself constitute a strategy.
2. The proposed S&T investment strategy should not be definitively evaluated by a group of users
such as the technology insertion group. Users and technologists often have dramatically differing
visions of the role of S&T and how best to leverage S&T to support military operations.
The gap between users and the S&T community can be bridged by "bilingual" people who have the
ability to understand and to listen to users, comprehend what they are seeking, and then communicate
those requirements to the S&T community. By understanding the state of the art of the relevant tech-
nologies, such people are able to help identify a series of specific projects that support the needs
expressed by users.
8Thomas O'Leary, Director, Expeditionary Warfare Operations Technology Division, Office of Naval Research, "ONR's
Marine Corps Science and Technology Program: The Context," slide 11, presentation to the committee on May 13, 2003.
9See in Chapter 1 the section titled "LC-FNC Planning and Investment Strategy."
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2003 ASSESSMENT OF ONR'S MARINE CORPS SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM
Recommendation. Code 353 should take the following steps to strengthen the LC-FNC strategy for
investing in S&T.
· Avoid relying solely on Broad Agency Announcement solicitations and reorganization of the
responses; instead, use a "translation" team of bilingual people skilled in understanding and interpreting
the users' concerns and needs as the basis for identifying a series of specific projects representing a final
S&T investment strategy.
· Ensure that the final review of the resulting S&T investment strate~v is done hv another indenen-
dent group of appropriately bilingual (user/technologist) experts.
At,
Although the committee thought that most of the projects presented during the current review were
of interest to the Marine Corps, it also believed that greater cohesion was necessary to develop the
balance of effort necessary to support the overall Marine Corps mission. The entire MCS&T program
(including the Core Thrusts and Basic Research) would benefit from consistent use of the approach
recommended above for developing an S&T investment strategy. Such a planning process should better
enable Code 353 to identify critical Marine Corps capability gaps and to systematically plan technology
efforts to fill these gaps.
Recommendation. Code 353 should develop a robust process for formulating an S&T investment
strategy based on planning of the kind recommended for the LC-FNC and focused on supporting Marine
Corps capabilities needed for Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare. Code 353 should then apply that
strategy to all aspects of the MCS&T program.
Effect of the LC-FNC on the Core Thrusts
The LC-FNC appears to have greatly benefited Code 353 through its sustained funding, its atten-
tion from the Navy, its strong focus on Marine Corps problems, and its creation of a promising S&T
investment planning process. However, establishment of the LC-FNC also appears to have had an
adverse impact on the content of the MCS&T program's Core Thrusts.
While valuable in themselves, the FNCs are also intended to complement the Discovery and Inven-
tion (D&I) portion of ONR's portfolio. However, the committee observed that the necessary separation
of time horizons (near- versus long-term) and mission focus (transition versus discovery) between the
FNC and D&I elements appears to have been weakened in many of the Core Thrust projects reviewed.
In particular, Code 353 seems to have initiated a strong Core Thrust focus on Marine Corps
technology needs, but several of the resulting projects have transition plans and short-term expectations
similar to those for FNC projects.~° In addition, many of the short-term Core Thrust projects appear to
the committee to offer minor improvements to existing hardware or are focused on integration of
existing systems, and thus are not developing base-level technologies necessary for significant improve-
ments in capabilities. To complicate matters further, Code 353 has planned to allocate approximately
$15 million annually through FY07 to non-FNC 6.3 projects; this effort was a source of concern to the
committee since it seems to be FNC-like in character and thus confounds the division of mission
between the LC-FNC and the Core Thrusts elements of the MCS&T program.
10One example is the tactical unmanned ground vehicle project, which was briefed to the committee as part of Code 353's
Core Thrusts yet is also listed on other ONR documents as a project supported through ONR's Autonomous Operations FNC.
1lThomas O'Leary, Director, Expeditionary Warfare Operations Technology Division, Office of Naval Research, "ONR's
Marine Corps Science and Technology Program: The Context," slide 14, presentation to the committee on May 13, 2003.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
s
The above concerns were first brought to the attention of Code 353 in the 2000 review of the
MCS&T program. Among other things, that review recommended that Code 353 "eliminate . . . Efrom
the Core Thrusts] activities that do not conform to the usual ONR S&T standards of innovation and
technical aggressiveness . . . [and] embark on a discovery program to identify and refine technologies
that can have a substantial payoff in achieving OMITS." Although the Core Thrusts need not exclude
all demonstration and transition initiatives, those supported should meet ONR's standards for quality
and should remain more flexible in terms of program requirements and timelines than is typical for
FNCs.
Recommendation. Code 353 should ensure that the MCS&T program's Core Thrusts and Basic Re-
search components support the mission of discovery and invention, that is, exploration aimed at the
long-term development of base-level technologies that could support future FNC and Marine Corps
Warfighting Laboratory program initiatives. Thus, Code 353 should remove from the Core Thrusts and
Basic Research portfolios short-term, transition-oriented initiatives.
Aspects of Transitioning Products to Use
Transitioning products to use in the field involves a few potential problems that must be avoided.
Users who agree to accept a product in transition from the S&T community generally expect to receive
something that can be fielded rapidly, that is, a product that is well on its way to providing a full suite of
"-ilities," which include such product issues as reliability, availability, manufacturability, maintainabil-
ity, and so on (e.g., a product that provides corrosion and shock resistance and comes with detailed
drawings, user guides, repair manuals, and the like). It was clear that the need for these capabilities was
not being considered in any of the current projects for which presenters described having (or generating)
technology transition plans. Evidently it was assumed that such capabilities could be supplied later
during acquisition. However, it is the experience of the committee that inclusion of the "-ilities" often
has a significant impact on the S&T design goals for a product and must be planned for early on.
Another critical aspect of transitioning products within the Navy/Marine Corps development and
acquisition communities is that almost all fielded naval equipment is supplied by contractors and not by
the Navy or the Marine Corps itself. Thus it is critical that ONR-developed technology and products find
their way as quickly as possible into the contractor community. Many of Code 353's projects aim to
connect with and transition into this community, as much of the S&T work is performed out-of-house
through various, often competing contractors. The committee encourages this effort.
Recommendation. For S&T development products intended for transition, Code 353 should develop
technology transition plans that include up-front considerations of the "-ilities," such as product reliabil-
ity, manufacturability, maintainability, and other capabilities necessary in the overall fielding of prod-
ucts to the user community.
Responses to Issues from the 2000 NSB Assessment
Some of this committee's comments and recommendations correspond substantively to those made
in 2000.~3 At the same time, the committee was pleased to see that Code 353 responded explicitly to
12Naval Studies Board, National Research Council. 2000. 2000 Assessment of the Office of Naval Research's Marine Corps
Science and Technology Program, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C., p. 20.
13Naval Studies Board, National Research Council. 2000. 2000 Assessment of the Office of Naval Research's Marine Corps
Science and Technology Program, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C.
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Representative terms from entire chapter:
corps science
6
2003 ASSESSMENT OF ONR'S MARINE CORPS SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM
many of the 2000 assessment's recommendations. Listing and discussing issues raised in 2000, the
presentations indicated which recommendations had been implemented, and to what degree.
The 2000 review identified a number of high-level technical deficiencies in the overall MCS&T
program. By and large the current program is in the process of addressing these issues some vigor-
ously and effectively, others less so, but all are being addressed.
MARINE CORPS SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM THE THREE PARTS
LC-FNC
The LC-FNC planning process described above explicitly emphasized the STOM concept as a focus
point for identifying shortfalls in Marine Corps capabilities. Recently, the Marine Corps and the Navy
co-authored the overarching Naval Operating Conceptfor Joint Operations,~4 which contains EMW as
a critical naval concept. The committee was concerned that the LC-FNC seems not to be responding
strongly enough to implications of EMW beyond those contained within STOM; sea basing, in particu-
lar, is emphasized in EMW as well as in the Navy's capstone concept, Sea Power 21,~5 and has recently
been called out by the Commandant of the Marine Corps as one of his top priorities. However, sea
basing receives no direct or leveraged support through the MCS&T program.
Following the establishment of the LC-FNC, the Department of the Navy's Science and Technology
Corporate Board,~7 which approves and prioritizes all FNCs, also established Expeditionary Logistics
(ExLog) as a separate component of the Littoral Combat and Power Projection FNC to address critical
logistical capability gaps, including deployment from and reconstitution of a sea base, for naval forces
engaged in expeditionary operations. Both the LC-FNC and the ExLog-FNC are intended to support
S&T that will enable future expeditionary military operations, but the two have separate integrated
product teams, separate performing organizations (the ExLog-FNC S&T lead is ONR Code 36
Industrial and Corporate Programs), and separate funding. The committee saw little or no interaction
occurring between these two FNC efforts. Considering the critical role logistics plays in enabling
OMFTS and STOM, this separation seems unwise.
Recommendation. The Department of the Navy's Science and Technology Corporate Board should (1)
expand the LC-FNC's mission to include Marine Corps capability needs for all of Expeditionary
Maneuver Warfare and (2) provide a means for strongly coupling the integrated product teams for the
14ADM Vern Clark, USN, Chief of Naval Operations, and Gen Michael W. Hagee, USMC, Commandant of the Marine
Corps, 2003, Naval Operating Concept for Joint Operations, Department of the Navy, March; Gordon England, Secretary of
the Navy; ADM Vern Clark, USN, Chief of Naval Operations; and Gen James L. Jones, USMC, Commandant of the Marine
Corps, 2002, Naval Power 21...A Naval Vision, Department of the Navy, October.
1SADM Vern Clark, USN, Chief of Naval Operations. 2002. "Sea Power 21," Proceedings, Vol. 128/10, U.S. Naval
Institute, Annapolis, Md., October, pp. 32-41.
Special Projects Directorate, U.S. Marine Corps Headquarters. 2003. "The Marine Corps General," Vol. 15, April 14.
17The Department of the Navy Science and Technology Corporate Board is composed of the Vice Chief of Naval Opera-
tions, the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps, and the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development,
and Acquisition.
18Expeditionary Logistics (ExLog) component of the Littoral Combat and Power Projection Future Naval Capability
(FNC). 2002. Expeditionary Logistics, Office of Naval Research, Arlington, Va., June 3. Available online at
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
7
Littoral Combat and the Expeditionary Logistics components of the Littoral Combat and Power Projec-
tion FNC. At a minimum, it should assign Code 353 the co-S&T lead of the ExLog-FNC (with full
voting rights) while retaining Code 353 as the S&T lead of the LC-FNC.
The committee's general recommendations for each of the program areas in the LC-FNC portion of
the MCS&T program Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance for the Amphibious Force (EC
1), Expeditionary Fire Support for the MAGTF (EC 2), MAGTF Maneuver in the Littorals (EC 3), and
Command and Control (EC 4) are listed in Table ES.2 and discussed in Chapter 2.
Core Thrusts
The Core Thrust projects 6.2 and 6.3 activities not contained in the LC-FNC were generally of
high quality and seemed to address valid topics of interest to the Marine Corps. In many cases, however,
it was difficult to see a rationale for the organization, prioritization, and support of these individual
projects, which struck the committee as little more than a collection of "targets of opportunity" rather
than topics related to significant shortfalls in EMW or STOM capabilities. In addition, presenters rarely
mentioned Marine Corps needs or capability shortfalls, and when they did, the links appeared ad hoc
rather than the result of a planned process. The apparent lack of an overall S&T investment strategy for
the Core Thrusts concerns the committee. A planning process similar to that recommended for the LC-
FNC, but focused on the long-term development of technology areas, would strengthen the Core Thrusts
part of the MCS&T program.
A number of Core Thrust projects presented were leveraged against much larger U.S. Army or
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) programs, but the extent of the Code 353
contributions was in many cases unclear. In addition, in most Core Thrust areas committee members
were aware of directly relevant activities in the Navy, other Services, and/or DARPA, of which the
presenters, when asked, seemed to have little or no knowledge. The apparent lack of coordination
concerned the committee, particularly in regard to potential duplication of efforts.
Recommendation. To better structure its support for the underpinnings of Expeditionary Maneuver
Warfare as well as Ship-to-Objective Maneuver, Code 353 should establish an S&T planning process
for the MCS&T program's Core Thrusts, similar to that recommended above for the LC-FNC, that is
suitably focused on the long-term capability needs of the Marine Corps.
Recommendation. In its Core Thrust projects, Code 353 should enable broad coordination of efforts
beyond Code 35 (and beyond ONR), where possible and practical, with relevant S&T activities in the
other Services and in government agencies.
The committee's general recommendations for each of the Core Thrusts areas Maneuver; Fire-
power; Mine Countermeasures; Logistics; Human Performance, Training, and Education; and Com-
mand, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance are listed
in Table ES.2 and discussed in Chapter 3.
Basic Research
Established in FY00 to support the discovery of new technology for enabling future capabilities in
support of the individual Marine Corps warfighter, the Basic Research portion of the MCS&T program
appears to be a useful addition to the larger Navy 6.1 program. However, some of the work presented to
the committee as basic research, although potentially useful, was not "basic." Much the same observa-
8
2003 ASSESSMENT OF ONR'S MARINE CORPS SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM
TABLE ES.2 Summary Listing of Recommendations for Program Areas Within the Marine Corps
Science and Technology Program's Three Parts
Program Area
Recommendation
Littoral Combat Future Naval Capability
Enabling Capability 1, Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR)
for the Amphibious Force
Enabling Capability 2, Expeditionary
Fire Support for the Marine Air-Ground
Task Force (MAGTF)
Enabling Capability 3,
MAGTF Maneuver in the Littorals
Enabling Capability 4,
Command and Control (C2)
Core Thrusts
· The Department of the Navy's Science and Technology
Corporate Board should (1) expand the LC-FNC's mission to
include Marine Corps capability needs for all of Expeditionary
Maneuver Warfare and (2) provide a means for strongly
coupling the integrated product teams for the Littoral Combat
and the Expeditionary Logistics components of the Littoral
Combat and Power Projection FNC. At a minimum, it should
assign Code 353 the co-S&T lead of the ExLog-FNC (with full
voting rights) while retaining Code 353 as the S&T lead of the
LC-FNC.
.
.
.
Code 353 should reexamine EC 1, ISR for the Amphibious
Force, and seek to expand its funding options beyond
sensors and platforms tied to Tier II UAV [unmanned aerial
vehicle] development.
Code 353 should establish better coordination between EC 1,
ISR for the Amphibious Force, and EC 4, Command and
Control, as well as better coordination with related intelligence
community, joint, and other Service research and development
programs.
Before FY04, Code 353 should assess the feasibility of
integrating the expeditionary fire support projects with those of
other Service components and should review relevant prior
Army and DARPA studies.
Code 353 should continue to pursue situational awareness
efforts with vigor.
Code 353 should accelerate efforts to support the needs of
mine countermeasures and military operations in urban
terrain by systematically addressing the many identified
shortfalls.
Code 353 should review all C2 enabling capability projects to
ensure coordination with ISR enabling capability projects and
alignment of the outputs of both enabling capabilities to
Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare.
· To better structure its support for the underpinnings of
Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare as well as Ship-to-Objective
Maneuver, Code 353 should establish an S&T planning process
for the MCS&T program's Core Thrusts, similar to that
recommended above for the LC-FNC, that is suitably focused on
the long-term capability needs of the Marine Corps.
In its Core Thrust projects, Code 353 should enable broad
coordination of efforts beyond Code 35 (and beyond ONR),
where possible and practical, with relevant S&T activities in the
other Services and in government agencies.
.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
TABLE ES.2 Continued
9
Program Area
Recommendation
Maneuver
Firepower
Mine Countermeasures
Logistics
Human Performance, Training,
and Education
· Code 353 should transition the reconnaissance, surveillance, and
targeting vehicle project and the tactical unmanned ground
vehicle project out of the Maneuver thrust as planned, but
should continue support of initiatives in hybrid-electric and
unmanned vehicles.
· Code 353 should immediately transition near-term projects in
the Firepower thrust to an appropriate FNC.
Code 353 should establish leveraging opportunities to support
broad ONR and/or DARPA initiatives in the area of naval
surface firepower support.
.
· Code 353 should seek to leverage research on development of
wide-area surveillance detection systems for use in mine
countermeasures.
· Code 353 should collaborate with DARPA; the Army; Naval
Sea Systems Command, PMS-210; Coastal Systems Station
(CSS) Panama City; Naval Air Systems Command, PMA-263;
and the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory, the Organic Mine
Countermeasures FNC, and the other ONR codes to address
mine countermeasures at the Naval Enterprise level with a view
beyond the 3-year horizon that seems to pervade current MCM
efforts. The S&T planning process described in Marine Corps
Order 3900.15A contains the structure to allow such
collaboration.
· Code 353 should develop an overall mine countermeasure
strategy involving all research and development programming
levels.
.
· Code 353 should coordinate with the Expeditionary Logistics
component of the Littoral Combat and Power Projection FNC
regarding implications of Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare for
Marine Corps logistics.
· Code 353 should support new Logistics thrust projects in
expeditionary on-shore fuel logistics and on-shore materials
transportation.
· Code 353 should, in a timely manner, transition relevant
MCS&T Basic Research projects on lightweight power sources
into 6.2- and 6.3-supported programs.
Code 353 should keep abreast of ONR and other Service
investments in training and education in order to be able to
influence them. In addition, programs in intelligent tutoring
systems by ONR and the Army (especially the FY04 Science
and Technology Objective in this area managed by the Army
Research Institute) could offer significant benefits to the Marine
Corps if appropriate personnel from Code 353 were placed on
the relevant integrated product teams.
Continues
10
TABLE ES.2 Continued
2003 ASSESSMENT OF ONR'S MARINE CORPS SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM
Program Area
Recommendation
Human Performance, Training,
and Education (continued)
Command, Control, Communications,
Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and
Reconnaissance (C4ISR)
Basic Research
.
.
.
.
.
On a very basic level, the Marine Corps should monitor the
reorganization of all Navy education and training and the
deployment of asynchronous distributed learning capabilities by
both the Army and the Navy. The Marine Corps will probably
have to develop some content that is specific to its doctrine and
training needs, but the payoff from appropriate leveraging could
be very large.
Code 353 is strongly urged to leverage and influence research
on human performance assessment, both within Code 353's
current portfolio and in relation to all Marine Corps training and
education. Research on human performance assessment should
be an integral part of all human performance, training, and
education research sponsored by Code 353, could be
accomplished with relatively small investments, and would
certainly yield large dividends in terms of the feedback provided
to current and future programs.
Code 353 is encouraged to become familiar with the
Commandant of the Marine Corps's Special Projects Directorate
programs in training and education. Code 353 should also solicit
the active participation of senior Marine Corps leadership in the
S&T development process for training and education to ensure
that innovative ideas and systems can be rapidly readied for
testing by operational forces.
Code 353 should continue to invest its research resources
in C4ISR areas that are tightly coupled to the Marine Corps
operational concepts of Ship-to-Objective Maneuver and
Operational Maneuver From the Sea. Especially in the domain
of C4ISR, a small investment in a critical area, coupled with
other Service and Department of Defense investments, could
produce significant results for the Marine Corps.
Code 353 should broaden its Basic Research focus areas to
create a more robust and sustainable series of efforts. The new
focus areas should result from a careful assessment of Marine
Corps needs. A suggested reorganization of focus areas and
sample topics is provided in Table ES.3.
Code 353 should strive to set aside a small amount of
uncommitted 6.1 funds (perhaps a few hundred thousand
dollars) to foster additional flexibility in program support and
to enable quick looks (e.g., a few months to a year) at new,
unforeseen, novel concepts that arise from time to time.
Code 353 should establish a formal mechanism to allow
continuing feedback of 6.2 and 6.3 findings to the 6.1 office
to help identify fruitful new areas of 6.1 research.
Code 353 should work aggressively to expand the funding
base for Basic Research so that a coherent set of significant
Marine Corps-related projects can be supported.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
TABLE ES.2 Continued
11
Program Area
Recommendation
The Marine Corps should be involved in all aspects of the
Code 353 research and development process, including the
strategic development of the Basic Research part of the
MCS&T program. In support of this goal, Code 353 should
participate in (or encourage the Marine Corps leadership to
participate in) meetings of the Defense Committee on
Research, which currently has representatives from all the
Services except the Marine Corps.
As a means of fostering leveraging with basic research
efforts outside ONR, Code 353 should regularly review the
biennial Department of Defense Basic Research Plan.
tion was made in the 2000 review. Intended to explore fundamental questions for potential future
developments that are not yet fully formulated, basic research might also be used to assist development
work that is handicapped for want of some fundamental knowledge. In both cases feedback from 6.2 and
6.3 activities to 6.1 is essential to highlight critical technical areas. Also needed in the Basic Research
component is better coordination for transitioning 6.1 results into 6.2 and 6.3 applications.
Marine Corps personnel could assist in strategic planning for 6.1 work by helping to steer it not into
projects, but rather into technology areas likely to support long-term combat needs. The current Basic
Research focus areas communications, lightweight power sources, information efficiency, landmine
detection, human sensory enhancement, enhanced lethality, laser eye protection, sensing, and corrosion
prevention could be strengthened by reorganizing along the lines suggested by the committee in Table
ES.3.
In addition, to be effective, the small Marine Corps-oriented 6.1 part of the MCS&T program must
be leveraged as much as possible. Code 353 is well aware of the need for leveraging, but the current
Basic Research effort is handicapped by the low funding levels.
Recommendation. Code 353 should broaden its Basic Research focus areas to create a more robust and
sustainable series of efforts. The new focus areas should result from a careful assessment of Marine
Corps needs. A suggested reorganization of focus areas and sample topics is provided in Table ES.3. In
addition,
· Code 353 should strive to set aside a small amount of uncommitted 6.1 funds (perhaps a few
hundred thousand dollars) to foster additional flexibility in program support and to enable quick looks
(e.g., a few months to a year) at new, unforeseen, novel concepts that arise from time to time.
· Code 353 should establish a formal mechanism to allow continuing feedback of 6.2 and 6.3
findings to the 6.1 office to help identify fruitful new areas of 6.1 research.
· Code 353 should work aggressively to expand the funding base for Basic Research so that a
coherent set of significant Marine Corps-related projects can be supported.
· The Marine Corps should be involved in all aspects of the Code 353 research and development
process, including the strategic development of the Basic Research part of the MCS&T program. In
12
2003 ASSESSMENT OF ONR'S MARINE CORPS SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM
TABLE ES.3 Suggested Reorganization of Basic Research Focus Areas and Sample Topics
Focus Area
Sample Topics
Command, Controls
Communications, Computers,
and Intelligence (C4I)
Energy
Sensing
Materials
Human Factors
Oceanography and Environment
Weapons
Ad hoc wireless networking
Beyond-line-of-sight communications
Short-range, high-density, low-power communications
Antijam protection
Information assurance
Lightweight power sources and rechargeable electric storage devices
Energy-efficient devices and techniques
High-energy-density storage
Sensors for situation awareness (pre-attack)
Sensors for damage assessment (post-attack)
Sensors that work in an urban environment
Mine detection: fundamental physical mechanisms and
phenomenology in surf and on land
Unmanned surveillance/reconnaissance vehicles
Non-communications use of ultrawideband radar
Materials and structures
Sensing materials
Corrosion prevention
Non-lethal weapons
Psychological profiling to identify potential terrorists
Human sensory enhancement
Shallow-water oceanography: bottom structure in the surf zone, bottom
interactions, and surf and current characteristics
Effects on warfare of hostile or unusual climates (weather)
Enhanced lethality
Aim-point accuracy
support of this goal, Code 353 should participate in (or encourage the Marine Corps leadership to
participate in) meetings of the Defense Committee on Research, which currently has representatives
from all the Services except the Marine Corps.
· As a means of fostering leveraging with basic research efforts outside ONR, Code 353 should
regularly review the biennial Department of Defense Basic Research Plan.~9
These recommendations for the Basic Research portion of the MCS&T program are also listed in
Table ES.2.
19Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Science and Technology). 2002. Basic Research Plan (BRPJ, Depart-
ment of Defense, Washington, D.C.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
13
Summary Listing of General Recommendations and Suggestions
In addition to the general recommendations presented above for each of the MCS&T program's
three parts the LC-FNC, Core Thrusts, and Basic Research the committee developed for each part's
primary areas additional general recommendations that are presented in Chapters 2 through 4. Table ES.2
is a summary list of all these general recommendations. Table ES.3 presents the committee's sugges-
tions for reorganizing the focus areas in the Basic Research part of the MCS&T program and lists
sample topics in each area.
The committee's recommendations for the more than 80 individual projects it reviewed are presented
in Chapters 2 through 4.
