|
Items in cart [0] |
Questions? Call 888-624-8373 |
| ||||||||||||
| Copyright © 2009. National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved. Terms of Use and Privacy Statement |
Below are the first 10 and last 10 pages of uncorrected machine-read text (when available) of this chapter, followed by the top 30 algorithmically extracted key phrases from the chapter as a whole.
Intended to provide our own search engines and external engines with highly rich, chapter-representative searchable text on the opening pages of each chapter.
Because it is UNCORRECTED material, please consider the following text as a useful but insufficient proxy for the authoritative book pages.
Do not use for reproduction, copying, pasting, or reading; exclusively for search engines.
OCR for page 14
1
Marine Corps S&T Program as a Whole
PROGRAM STRUCTURE
The Marine Corps Science and Technology (MCS&T) program, administered and directed by the
Expeditionary Warfare Operations Technology Division (Code 353) of the Office of Naval Research
(ONR), has three primary parts: (1) the Littoral Combat (LC) component of the Littoral Combat and
Power Projection Future Naval Capability (FNC), (2) Core Thrusts, and (3) Basic Research. In this
chapter the committee provides general observations on the overall MCS&T program and high-level
recommendations for improvement. The next three chapters discuss each of the three parts of ONR
Code 353's MCS&T program the LC-FNC, Core Thrusts, and Basic Research in order of program
size beginning with the largest. Each chapter begins with a discussion of research areas followed by a
detailed discussion of the projects assessed.
Beginning in FY99, ONR initiated a reorganization of its funding classifications and initiatives to
create two primary organizational elements: (1) Future Naval Capabilities, to which was to be allocated
all of ONR's advanced technology development (6.3) budget and roughly half of its applied research
(6.2) budgets and (2) Discovery and Invention (D&I), to which was to be allocated the remainder of
ONR's 6.2 budget and all of its basic research (6.1) budget. Since FY99, the first category has been
expanded into what is now known as Exploitation and Deployment, which contains the FNCs as a
subcategory, along with a new group of large non-FNC programs known as Naval Innovations, which
includes such efforts as the UCAV-N, X-Craft, Electric Ship, and Electromagnetic Gun.
Avoiding these distinctions, ONR presented Code 353's program as divided into three parts: (1) the
LC-FNC, (2) Core Thrusts, which included both 6.2 and 6.3 funding but which were not part of the
FNC, and (3) 6.1 Basic Research. As described by ONR the objectives of the MCS&T program and its
constituent parts are detailed in Table 1.1. In FY03, the MCS&T program was funded at $61.6 million.
Currently, not all 6.3 funds are committed to the FNCs.
14
OCR for page 15
MARINE CORPS S&T PROGRAM AS A WHOLE
TABLE 1.1 Marine Corps Science and Technology Program Areas
15
Program Area
Objective
Littoral Combat Future Naval Capability
Enabling Capability 1, Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR)
for the Amphibious Force
Enabling Capability 2, Expeditionary Fire
Support for the Marine Air-Ground
Task Force (MAGTF)
Enabling Capability 3, MAGTF Maneuver
in the Littorals
Enabling Capability 4, Command and
Control (C2)
Core Thrusts
Maneuver
Firepower
Mine Countermeasures
Support the development of naval Expeditionary Maneuver
Warfare (EMW) via the application of technologies that
enhance the ability of the Navy-Marine Corps team to
achieve assured access and sustained operations in the
littorals as the naval portion of a joint campaign.
Provide enhanced autonomous and semiautonomous ISR
capabilities to elements of a MAGTF. These enhanced
capabilities will be locally tasked and controlled. Develop
tactical systems to increase the ISR capabilities of tactical
units (regiment and below).
Provide enhanced fire support to elements of a MAGTF
operating ashore. Develop an expeditionary fire support
system with improved ammunition and integrate all legacy
and future fires systems into a Naval Fires Network. Enhance
expeditionary fires at the element level of the MAGTF.
Provide enhanced maneuverability of surface-landed elements
of the MAGTF. Provide knowledge-based situational
awareness to assault forces embarked on maneuver platforms.
Allow assault forces to dynamically plan and adaptively
execute the conduct of Ship-to-Objective Maneuver (STOM)
operations. Improve mine and obstacle breaching
capabilities from the beach exit zone to the objective to
enhance maneuverability of surface-landed assault forces.
Provide the MAGTF commander with a C2 capability that
can command all elements of the MAGTF. Provide increased
reliability of beyond-line-of-sight communications,
provide near-real-time situational awareness to all elements
of the MAGTF that is scalable to the requirements of the
specific MAGTF element, and optimize the flow of
information over an improved data network.
Conduct research and development of advanced technologies
for tactical combat vehicles in the areas of mobility,
survivability, electric technologies, and unmanned ground
vehicles.
Develop advanced technologies for application on current
and future Marine Corps expeditionary weapons and targeting
systems.
Develop research areas to enable technologies for detecting,
localizing, identifying, and neutralizing mines in the littoral
environment.
Continues
OCR for page 16
16
TABLE 1.1 Continued
2003 ASSESSMENT OF ONR'S MARINE CORPS SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM
Program Area
Objective
Logistics
Human Performance, Training, and Education
C4ISR
Basic Research
Develop, demonstrate, and transition technologies that will
support U.S. Marine Corps future warfighting concepts
(EMW and Sea-Based Logistics).
Enhance human decision making, increase frequency and
information content of training and education, and enable
warriors to win and survive.
Enable network-centric warfare at the tactical level in support
of the warfighting concepts of EMW, STOM, and OMFTS.
Create new technical possibilities that permit expansion of
the range of potential operational capabilities and concepts
for the Marine Corps "after next" (2020-2030~.
SOURCE: U.S. Marine Corps, Future Naval Capabilities Coordination Office. 2003. Marine Corps Science and Technology
Newsletter, p. 3.
Of this amount, $26.5 million went to Code 353's Basic Research (6.1 $3.4 millions and Core Thrusts
(6.2 $11.9 million, 6.3 $11.2 million), and $35.1 million went to the LC-FNC (6.2 $21.8 million,
6.3 $13.3 millions (see Table 1.2~.2 Together the three parts of the MCS&T program accounted for
approximately 17 percent of ONR's Expeditionary Warfare Department (Code 35) FY03 budget.3
OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The ONR MCS&T program and Code 353 have changed in positive and productive ways since the
initial MCS&T review conducted by the Naval Studies Board (NSB) in 2000.4 At that time, a signifi-
cant portion of the MCS&T program had just been assigned to Code 353,5 and the overall program
needed focus. In the current review, the committee was favorably impressed by the high quality of many
of the MCS&T program components presented and by the strength of the interactions that have devel-
oped between Code 353 and the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory (MCWL), as well as by the
capabilities, optimism, and evident motivation of the presenters.
2These estimates are based on the FY03 budget and include business operation costs, congressionally directed projects, and
mandated projects.
3The committee also noted that the ONR (and the MCS&T program) budget relies heavily (~15 percent for MCS&T) on
annual congressional plus-ups. The committee expressed concern at this practice because it can make it more difficult to
establish long-range planning within the MCS&T program.
4Naval Studies Board, National Research Council. 2000. 2000 Assessment of the Office of Naval Research's Marine Corps
Science and Technology Program, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C.
5The Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory retains some 6.3-funded programs that are related primarily to demonstration,
experimentation, and integration of S&T products in support of concepts and future capabilities development.
OCR for page 17
MARINE CORPS S&T PROGRAM AS A WHOLE
TABLE 1.2 Marine Corps Science and Technology Program Funding for Fiscal Year 2003 (millions
of dollars)
17
6.2 6.3 Percentage
Component 6.1 Greena Blueb Greena Blueb Total of Total
Littoral Combat
Future Naval Capability
EC 1: ISR for the Amphibious Force 8.3 0.5 0.0 0.0 8.8 14.3
EC 2: Expeditionary Fire Support for the
MAGTF 4.6 0.7 3.5 2.8 11.6 18.8
EC 3: MAGTF Maneuver in the Littorals 1.8 0.4 1.0 1.6 4.8 7.8
EC 4: Command and Control 2.9 2.6 1.6 2.8 9.9 16.1
Total FNC Funding 17.6 4.2 6.1 7.2 35.1 57.0
Core Thrusts
Maneuver 2.3 1.6 3.9 6.3
Firepower 1.5 1.0 2.5 4.1
Mine Countermeasures 1.3 1.6 2.9 4.7
Logistics 1.6 2.4 4.0 6.5
Human Performance, Training, and Education 3.2 2.0 5.2 8.4
C4ISR 2.0 2.6 4.6 7.5
Total Core Funding 11.9 11.2 23.1 37.5
Basic Research 3.4 3.4 5.5
Total Funding (Green and Blue) 3.4 33.7 24.5 61.6 100.0
NOTE: These budget estimates are based on the FY03 budget and include business operation costs, congressionally directed
projects, and mandated projects. For definitions of acronyms, see Appendix C.
aDenotes Marine Corps-supported research funds.
bDenotes Navy-supported research funds.
ONR and Code 353's Relationship with the Marine Corps
Code 353's relationship with the Marine Corps is evolving into a workable and effective partner-
ship. The Commanding General of the MCWL (the original home of all MCS&T) is also Vice Chief of
Naval Research, which allows high-level collaboration across Marine Corps development and research
interests and Marine Corps influence and leveraging of broad ONR initiatives. In addition, Marine
Corps officers are regularly assigned to the MCS&T program office and are consciously embedded
throughout ONR. The Marine Corps demonstrates a good understanding of the importance of commu-
nicating its vision to and cooperating with the Chief of Naval Research and the personnel in ONR.
Six Marine Corps general officers co-chair various FNCs, and Marine Corps personnel are members
of the integrated product teams (IPTs) for other FNCs.6 Participation in the IPTs is extremely important
because the IPT, as a group, decides on the final makeup of projects supported through a given FNC.
The direct involvement of Marine Corps officers in the S&T process constitutes a valuable and long-
6An IPT comprising members of the operational, acquisition, science and technology, requirements, and resources com-
munities is established for each FNC in order to align and partner the relevant communities and give the FNC products a
better chance to transition into operational use. In addition to administering the LC-FNC, Code 353 serves as the IPT science
and technology lead.
OCR for page 18
18
2003 ASSESSMENT OF ONR'S MARINE CORPS SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM
needed link between the Marine Corps and ONR, although the quality and the capabilities of the
individual marines assigned are key to the success of this stratagem.
Code 353 has now had nearly 4 years of experience working with Marine Corps challenges and is
becoming attuned to the S&T needs underlying Marine Corps concepts of operations (see Box 1.1~. Yet,
although many of the individual efforts under way in Code 353 pursue worthwhile objectives, their
relationship to key Marine Corps warfighting concepts (e.g., Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare (EMW),
Operational Maneuver From the Sea (OMFTS), Ship-to-Objective Maneuver (STOM), and so forth)
was often unclear in presentations made to the committee. Selection of many of the topics addressed by
current and planned Code 353 programs appeared to have been ad hoc and opportunistic.
At the same time, the committee found a lack of evidence that the Marine Corps has consistently
laid out its vision of EMW and the subordinate concept of STOM to ONR in a manner that would permit
the formulation of an imaginative and effective program of science and technology research. The
committee noted that this situation is beginning to change. The Marine Corps has recently completed
guidance for achieving the goals of EMW7 and is in the process of drafting a Marine Corps S&T plan-
both of which will enable Code 353 to better support development of Marine Corps capability require-
ments.
Review of the Marine Corns new S&T implementing documents shows that it Provides anorooriate
responsibility, accountability, authority, and process definition by which to develop and manage near-,
mid-, and far-term S&T strategies in a naval context. Scheduled to start during the summer of 2003,
implementation of these processes will include the above-mentioned EMW guidance, in the form of a
capability list, as one of the first results. The committee enthusiastically supports these organizational
and process initiatives as a mechanism for managing S&T as a Marine Corps enterprise asset.
Operational synergy between the Marine Corps and the Navy appears to have grown since establish-
ment of the Naval Operating Concept (see Box 1.1~. The Naval Operating Concept includes the critical
naval concepts of Sea Basing, Sea Shield, Sea Strike, and FORCEnet and their integration with the
Marine Corps capstone concept EMW and its constituent operational concepts, OMFTS and STOM,
thus providing a vision toward which the two Services can plan to develop a coherent program, ranging
from basic research through advanced technology development, in order to support the Navy/Marine
Corps team.
As a result of this increasing synergy, Code 353 should be better positioned to refocus its MCS&T
program to support the fast-changing missions and operations of the Naval Services. Code 353 is
heading in the right direction and is attempting to pursue Marine Corps objectives, although more
coordination with the Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC) and MCWL may be
necessary to ensure more effective management of the MCS&T program.
~ in,
7LtGen Edward Hanlon, Jr., USMC, Deputy Commandant, Combat Development. 2003. Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare
Capability List (ECLJ. Expeditionary Force Development Center, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Quantico,
Va., June 16. Available online at . Accessed on December 12, 2003.
8Gen James L. Jones, USMC, Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps. 2002. Marine Corps Order 3900.15A, Marine Corps
Expeditionary Force Development System, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Washington, D.C., November 26.
OCR for page 19
MARINE CORPS S&T PROGRAM AS A WHOLE
19
LC-FNC Planning and Investment Strategy
The LC-FNC began with a dual-track planning process. One track emphasized developing near-
term projects (18 to 36 months long, begun in FY02) focused on rapid returns to meet critical needs
(which had been identified by the Marine Corps and Code 353 prior to the creation of the LC-FNC) and
designed to get the LC-FNC off to a quick start.9 The other track initiated a more formal planning
process to generate and prioritize longer-term projects (36 to 60 months long) that are to receive funding
beginning in FY04. The committee noted that the LC-FNC is still in an early stage of development, and
the projects that were presented seemed to come from the near-term branch of the dual-track process. A
number of FY04 new starts were presented to the committee as being results of the long-term planning
process; however, the presentations did not show any direct linkage of these new starts to specific
findings of the planning activities.
The near-term planning also led to the establishment of four LC-FNC enabling capabilities (ECs) as
organizational elements: EC 1 Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) for the Amphibi-
ous Force; EC 2 Expeditionary Fire Support for the MAGTF; EC 3 MAGTF Maneuver in the
Littorals; and EC 4 Command and Control (Cal. These four ECs appear to the committee to provide a
reasonable set of topic areas for coordinating and categorizing the STOM shortfalls identified by Code
353 during the LC-FNC planning process.
LC-FNC Process for Formulating an Investment Strategy
Code 353 also established a longer-term, formal, top-down process for converting LC-FNC goals
into an S&T investment strategy (Figure 1.1~. In addition, the LC-FNC investment strategy formulation
process has resulted in a useful means for connecting Code 353 with the Marine Corps user community.
To identify and prioritize current STOM capability shortfalls, Code 353 included a combination of
expert panels (users, technologists, and so on) engaged in war gaming and other similar concept genera-
tion exercises. These exercises resulted in a series of Broad Agency Announcement (BAA) solicitations
seeking innovative improvements that address critical shortfall technologies. Finally, several teams of
potential users took part in a STOM-based technology insertion game (TIG) to assess and prioritize the
technology improvements proposed in the BAA responses.
Attempting to identify capabilities shortfalls through a war game is an excellent idea. Code 353
engaged a group of users in STOM-based war games to identify those gaps in current Marine Corps
capabilities that, if overcome, would enhance the ability of Marine Corps forces in the proposed mis-
sions. However, as presented to the committee, the war games did not involve broader issues in EMW-
that is, issues other than STOM. The inclusion of members of the MCCDC Doctrine and Equipment
Requirements Division, as users, was a welcome sign that the MCS&T program was becoming inte-
grated within the broader Marine Corps community.
A panel of experienced technologists began with the resulting shortfalls list and reorganized and
prioritized the related S&T areas for investigation. The committee commends use of the Technologist
Panel and strongly supports its continuing to assist Code 353 in developing the LC-FNC S&T invest-
ment strategy.
This priority list resulted in a series of BAAs for innovative solutions in the shortfall areas. While
9Thomas O'Leary, Director, Expeditionary Warfare Operations Technology Division, Office of Naval Research, "ONR's
Marine Corps Science and Technology Program: The Context," slide 11, presentation to the committee on May 13, 2003.
OCR for page 20
20
2003 ASSESSMENT OF ONR'S MARINE CORPS SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM
OCR for page 21
MARINE CORPS S&T PROGRAM AS A WHOLE
2
OCR for page 22
22
2003 ASSESSMENT OF ONR'S MARINE CORPS SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM
FNG Goal
Enabling
Capabilities
N~r~term
Ef~ns
Tool
tcdu~b 1~ MAY Wl~i' 6.~. Sew U
mo~bol~s
'AX m~ ~?
FO4:I~S~0 ~6 ma 1~—
Lion Hiram fe~aGl~jes Path
ENA33L~G CApAulldnE5 ~L,
FY
~2
Nea~Term
Products
AN
JO Den ~
Ex~sich Pla
Oamo~l~ Pam
—
Technologists
cane
Industry
Solicitation
White
Papers
FEW War
Game
Studies
TIG
Investment
Strategy
FIGURE 1.1 LC-FNC process for formulating an S&T investment strategy. SOURCE: Thomas O'Leary, Direc-
tor, Expeditionary Warfare Operations Technology Division, Office of Naval Research, "ONR's Marine Corps
Science and Technology Program: The Context," slide 10, presentation to the committee on May 13, 2003.
NOTE: Acronyms are defined in Appendix C.
BAAs are a good mechanism for discovering novel ideas, overreliance on them as a source of all ideas
that might be developed into an S&T investment strategy is a concern to the committee. Responses to
BAAs are somewhat unpredictable. Because there is no guarantee that all areas of interest have been
covered, simply rearranging the BAA responses does not constitute a valid planning process.
In a TIG, teams of users assessed the potential benefits of the BAA-proposed solutions in a STOM
scenario. Those BAA solutions that TIG users judged would be of the greatest benefit to STOM
operations (as represented in the war game) were then given the highest priority for support.
The results of this exercise, did not, however, appear to the committee to have been used extensively
to select new research for the FNC to support. For example, the top-ranked BAA proposal, for develop-
ment of a buoyant stratospheric vehicle, received no support from the MCS&T program office. Code
353 called this vehicle an "Army interest," and the LC-FNC offered no support for the effort. The
second-ranked proposal, for advanced data compression, saw some funding but was not supported at a
level commensurate with its high rankings. Development of Iridium phones for Marine Corps use had
the lowest priority, but in recent action in Iraq, the Marine Corps praised Iridium highly and noted strong
support for it or an equivalent technology.~°
1OMarine Corps Combat Development Command. 2003. Field Report Marine Corps Systems Command Liaison Team,
Central Iraq (April 20-25, 2003J, Quantico, Va., May.
OCR for page 23
MARINE CORPS S&T PROGRAM AS A WHOLE
Concerns About the Current Process and Recommendations for Improvements
23
While the current process, with its reliance on war games and external group review, is an excellent
start on a much-needed formal process for developing an appropriate S&T investment strategy, the
committee had two major concerns about which it has suggestions for improvement:
· The exclusive reliance on BAA responses to provide the candidate elements of a valid S&T
strategy is a fundamental flaw in the process. Collecting BAA responses does not guarantee that all
critical issues are being addressed, and simply rearranging them does not constitute a plan.
· The final evaluation of the proposed S&T investment strategy should not be made by a group of
users (in this case, participants in the TIG). Users and technologists often have dramatically differing
visions of the role of S&T and how best to leverage S&T to support military operations.
The issue of constructing valid S&T plans from user inputs touches on one of the major difficulties
encountered at the interface between users and S&T each community (S&T and users) speaks a
different language. Each has its own goals, objectives, priorities, terminology, definitions of success,
and so forth, and often one simply does not understand the other. Users typically want "things" that do
something, are reliable, and are delivered on time, at cost, and with user manuals and other logistics
support. The S&T community, on the other hand, more often delivers technologies and technical
capabilities that allow the users to envision the "things" they seek. Only rarely does an S&T project
result in an immediately useful gadget. A good example is the cell phone. It was built on a base of
hundreds, if not thousands, of small technology advances in plastics, analog and digital electronic
circuits, communication algorithms, infrastructure (e.g., relay towers, antennas, and land lines), soft-
ware, and so on. The cell phone did not emerge from a single S&T project.
The key to translating mission needs into S&T research lies in bringing to bear the talents of certain
unusual people who understand and speak the languages of both communities. Such "bilingual" indi-
viduals listen to users, understand what they are seeking, and then turn to the S&T community with a
knowledge of how the S&T research and development process works. By understanding the state of the
art of the relevant technologies, they are able to help identify a series of specific projects that support the
needs expressed by the users. It is hoped that Code 353 will continue to have as its director such an
individual. Such people are often found among S&T workers who have undertaken management re-
sponsibilities that have brought them into intimate contact with the user community.
To improve the planning process, it is recommended that following a review of capability gaps by
the panel of technologists, ONR replace the BAA solicitations and TIG analysis with a team of users/
technologists who will consider user concerns, as expressed in the list of critical shortfalls identified at
the front part of the process. Then, with the current state of the art and the capabilities of the organization
in mind, they will propose a series of specific projects that represent the final S&T investment strategy.
BAAs are a reasonable adjunct but should not be the only inputs considered. In addition, before it is
submitted for approval by the LC-FNC IPT, the resulting investment strategy should be reviewed not by
users but by another independent group of bilingual technologists.
In some contexts it was clear that ONR 353 had generalized to other planning exercises the basic
structure of the planning process used for the FNC. The committee strongly supports this approach. The
same comments on improving the process hold true for these other applications as well. With the back
end of the process strengthened, this would certainly be an excellent and broadly applicable model for
S&T planning.
Relevant to these suggestions, the committee notes that in parallel with the above LC-FNC planning
OCR for page 24
24
2003 ASSESSMENT OF ONR'S MARINE CORPS SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM
process, Code 353 also supported an Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) study to identify critical
capability shortfalls specific to STOM command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence
(C4I1.~ The outnut of that study was another component for the LC-FNC investment strate~v. In many
1 ~ 1 0 ~
ways the IDA study's approach duplicated the formal planning process that is, it started with opera-
tional concepts and experience and ended with the identification of critical STOM deficiencies and
candidate S&T initiatives to supply the needed capabilities. Importantly, no BAA process was invoked:
The authors of the IDA study thought for themselves, and, thus, IDA's process closely resembles the
modified planning process the committee is recommending to Code 353.
Recommendation. Code 353 should take the following steps to strengthen the LC-FNC strategy for
investing in S&T.
· Avoid relying solely on Broad Agency Announcement solicitations and reorganization of the
responses; instead, use a "translation" team of bilingual people skilled in understanding and interpreting
the users' concerns and needs as the basis for identifying a series of specific projects representing a final
S&T investment strategy.
· Ensure that the final review of the resulting S&T investment strategy is done by another indepen-
dent group of appropriately bilingual (user/technologist) experts.
During the current review the committee felt that most of the projects presented (not just in the LC-
FNC, but in Core Thrusts and Basic Research as well) were of interest to the Marine Corps. However?
it also believed that more cohesion was necessary to develop the balance of effort needed to support the
overall Marine Corps mission. In particular the committee thought that the entire MCS&T nro~ram
____ _ _ _ O
including the Core Thrusts and Basic Research, would benefit from the consistent application of an S&T
investment strategy formulation process based on the one recommended here for the LC-FNC. This
overall planning process should enable Code 353 to identify critical Marine Corps capability gaps and to
systematically plan S&T efforts to fill them.
Recommendation. Code 353 should develop a robust process for formulating an S&T investment
strategy based on planning of the kind recommended for the LC-FNC and focused on Marine Corps
capabilities needed for Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare. Code 353 should then apply that strategy to
all aspects of the MCS&T program.
Effect of the LC-FNC on the Core Thrusts
The LC-FNC appears to have greatly benefited Code 353 through its sustained funding, its attention
from the Navy, its strong focus on Marine Corps problems, and its creation of a promising S&T
investment planning process. At the same time, however, the establishment of the LC-FNC also appears
to have had an adverse impact on the content of Code 353's Core Thrusts efforts.
FNCs, in general, are focused on the near-term transitioning of products to address established and
prioritized requirements rather than on the broad development of technology. ONR's D&I initiative
1lInstitute for Defense Analyses. To be published. Science and Technology Initiatives to Support Maneuver Planning and
Execution in Naval Expeditionary Warfare, draft, Arlington, Va.
12CAPT Stephen Hancock, USN, Head, Naval Expeditionary Warfare Science and Technology Department, Office of
Naval Research, "Overview of Discovery and Invention and Future Naval Capabilities Programs," slide 8, presentation to the
committee on May 13, 2003.
OCR for page 25
MARINE CORPS S&T PROGRAM AS A WHOLE
25
(which includes Basic Research and Core Thrusts), on the other hand, is closer to ONR's original
mission and is intended to focus on long-term, basic scientific discovery to support the S&T base
necessary for future Navy and Marine Corps technology exploitation and to engage in preliminary
exploration leading to new technologies.
While valuable in themselves, the FNCs are intended to complement the remaining D&I portion of
ONR's portfolio. However, the committee observed that the intended separation of efforts with different
time horizons (near- versus long-term) and a different mission focus (transition versus discovery) into
the FNC and D&I elements appears to have been weakened in many of the Core Thrust projects
reviewed.
In particular, while Code 353 seems to have initiated in the Core Thrusts a strong focus on Marine
Corps technology needs, several of the resulting projects have transition plans and short-term goals
similar to those of FNC projects.~3 In addition. many of the short-term projects annear to the committee
' ~ 1 -1 1 1
to emphasize minor Improvements to excising hardware or to be focused on the Integration of excising
systems, which means that they are not developing the base-level technologies necessary for significant
improvements in capabilities. It should be noted, in this context, that Code 353 plans to allocate
approximately $15 million annually through FY07 to non-FNC 6.3 programs.~4 This support for FNC-
like elements within Core Thrusts was a source of concern to the committee since it complicates the
division of mission between the LC-FNC and the Core Thrusts elements of the MCS&T program.
The above concerns were first brought to the attention of Code 353 in the NSB 2000 review of the
MCS&T. Among other things, that review recommended that Code 353 "eliminate . . . Efrom the Core
Thrusts] activities that do not conform to the usual ONR S&T standards of innovation and technical
noore..~.~ive.ne..~.~ tonal e.mh~rk on ~ Hi.~.nve.rv nrnornm tniHe.ntifv and re.fine.te.~.hnolnaie..~th~tr.nn
~~_vv~ _vv ,~ , _ _.-,-. A ~ _._ _ __ _ ~
have a substantial payoff in achieving OMFTS."~5 Although Core Thrusts need not exclude all exploi-
tation and transition initiatives, those projects supported should meet ONR's standards for quality and
should remain more flexible in terms of program requirements and timelines than is typical for FNCs.
Recommendation. Code 353 should ensure that the MCS&T program's Core Thrusts and Basic Re-
search components support the mission of discovery and invention, that is, exploration aimed at the
long-term development of base-level technologies that could support future FNC and Marine Corps
Warfighting Laboratory program initiatives. Thus, Code 353 should remove from the Corps Thrusts and
Basic Research portfolios short-term, transition-oriented initiatives.
Aspects of Transitioning Products to Use
Although the concept of transitioning products to use in the field seems clear enough, it involves a
few potential problems that must be avoided. Users who agree to accept a product in transition from the
S&T community generally expect something that can be rapidly fielded, that is, a product similar to a
fully commercial product. Such commercial products typically have integrated corrosion and shock
resistance, detailed drawings, user guides, repair manuals, and the like. Reliability, manufacturability,
13One example is the tactical unmanned ground vehicles project, which was briefed to the committee as part of Code 353's
Core Thrusts yet is also listed on other ONR documents as a project supported through ONR's Autonomous Operations FNC.
14Thomas O'Leary, Director, Expeditionary Warfare Operations Technology Division, Office of Naval Research, "ONR's
Marine Corps Science and Technology Program: The Context," slide 14, presentation to the committee on May 13, 2003.
15 Naval Studies Board, National Research Council. 2000. 2000 Assessment of the Office of Naval Research's Marine
Corps Science and Technology Program, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C., p. 2.
OCR for page 26
OCR for page 27
Representative terms from entire chapter:
core thrusts
26
2003 ASSESSMENT OF ONR'S MARINE CORPS SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM
serviceability, and so on constitute a particular suite of capabilities, commonly referred to as the
"-ilities," often found to be critical to use of products in the field. It was clear, however, that such
capabilities were not being considered within any of the current products and evidently were assumed to
be something that could be added later on during the acquisition program.
In the committee's experience, building in capabilities such as reliability can strongly affect the
fundamental design of a product and typically cannot be done after the fact. The lack of such features
can affect the utility of a product or slow its adoption. For example, during Operation Iraqi Freedom,
Dragon Eye, a hand-launched unmanned air vehicle (UAV) supported by ONR, was deployed with
several Marine Corps units; however, some of these UAVs were not used in theater because the
controlling computer failed just before the unit crossed the line of departure and no one at the scene
knew how to repair the system.
The impact of the "-ilities" on products intended for transition should be considered up-front by
anticipating and incorporating critical design features and perhaps then consciously deciding not to
implement them fully in the interest of time and money. Code 353 also must work to ensure that the user
really understands just what is to be transitioned as a result of the S&T development process.
Another aspect of transitioning products to use lies in the fact that almost all fielded naval equip-
ment is supplied by contractors and not by the Navy or the Marine Corps itself. Thus it is critical that
ONR-developed technology and products find their way as quickly as possible into the contractor
community. Many of Code 353's projects aim to connect with and transition into this community, as
much of the S&T work is performed out-of-house through various, often competing contractors. The
committee encourages this effort.
Recommendation. For S&T development products intended for transition, Code 353 should develop
technology transition plans that include up-front considerations of the "-ilities," such as product reliabil-
ity, manufacturability, maintainability, and other capabilities necessary in the overall fielding of prod-
ucts to the user community.
Optimistic Use of Technology Readiness Levels
At several points during the committee's review, projects were presented with explicit timelines for
meeting a series of technology readiness levels. Initially used by NASA in developing successful space
and aerospace systems. the concent of technolo~v readiness levels (TRLs) now finds wide application
~ , , ~ lo, ~ , ~ ~
.. . . .. ~ . ~ ~ . . .. . . . . . ~ . . . ..
throughout the Services. Most organizations have converged on mne levels ot technology readiness,
from basic research to full operational use (see Appendix D), as benchmarks for assessing the maturity
of a technology or product.
Customized TRLs incorporating explicit references to the technologies or applications involved
have been generated by various organizations, including the Army.~7 No Marine Corps- or Navy-
specific definitions of TRLs were offered during the comm~ttee's review, although NASA definitions
are no doubt useful. Code 353 (and perhaps ONR in general) would benefit from tailoring TRLs to
Marine Corps (or Navy) use.
16Marine Corps Combat Development Command. 2003. Field Report Marine Corps Systems Command Liaison Team,
Central Iraq (April 20-25, 2003J, Quantico, Va., May.
17Caroline P. Graettinger, Suzanne Garcia, and Jeannine Siviy (Software Engineering Institute, CMU), and Robert J.
Schenk and Peter J. Van Syckle (U.S. Army CECOM RDEC STCD). 2002. Using the Technology Readiness Levels Scale to
Support Technology Management in the DOD's ATD/STO Environments, Special Report, CMU/SEI-2002-SR-027, Software
Engineering Institute, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, Pa., September. Available online at
MARINE CORPS S&T PROGRAM AS A WHOLE
27
TRLs are valuable and their use is encouraged. The committee expressed two concerns, however:
(1) the levels targeted for several projects (typically TRL 5,6, or 7) seemed higher than can generally be
expected for projects emerging from 6.2- or 6.3-funded efforts and (2) the time intervals for advancing
between levels were unrealistically brief (1 year between each in several instances. NASA has found
that for most systems an increase by one level per year in technology readiness is rarely possible.~9 To
avoid disappointment, use of TRLs should be carefully reexamined in light of NASA's long experience.
Recommendation. Code 353 should reexamine its use of technology readiness levels, define levels
specific to Navy (or Marine Corps) missions, and develop means for estimating realistic time intervals
for transitions between levels.
Responses to Issues from the 2000 NSB Assessment
During the current review, the committee noted that Code 353 was explicitly responsive to the
recommendations made in the 2000 NSB assessment of the MCS&T program.20 The presentations
consistently mentioned and discussed the issues raised, indicating which recommendations had been
implemented, and to what degree. Nevertheless, despite the importance of the 2000 review's primary
recommendation which was to "eliminate from the Code 353 program, at an orderly but determined
pace, preacquisition and other activities that do not conform to the usual ONR S&T standards of
innovation and technical aggressiveness (p. 2~" the current committee found that many existing (and
nlanned) pro crams still annear to be hichlv tied to Reacquisition activities. In particular. the committee
~ , ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
is concerned that the Core Thrusts component continues to support transition-focused, short-time-
horizon technology development projects.
In the 2000 review, a number of high-level technical deficiencies in the overall MCS&T program
were identified, including the following:
· A "lack of quantitative systems analyses" and of a strong two-way relationship with MCCDC
(p. 11~;
· The "relative neglect of joint operations" that is, of network-centric operations and of non-
organic support for operations" (p. 12~;
· The "neglect of deception and concealment" both OMFTS and STOM emphasize avoidance of
the enemy (p. 12~;
· The "relative neglect of MOUT Military operations in urban terrain]" (p. 12~; and
· The use of "performer-determined goals" that is, of priorities not systematically established by
Marine Corps needs because of weak connections between ONR and MCCDC (p. 13~.
By and large the current program is in the process of addressing these issues some vigorously and
effectively, others less so, but all nonetheless to some degree.
For example, see "Microchannel Methanol Fuel Cell" under the Logistics core thrust in Chapter 3.
19Deborah J. Peisen and Catherine L. Schulz (Science Applications International Corporation), and Richard S. Golaszewski,
B. David Ballard, and John J. Smith (GRA, Incorporated). 1999. Case Studies: Time Required to Mature Aeronautic Tech-
nologies to Operational Readiness, Task Order 221, Final Report, National Aeronautics and Space Administration Headquar-
ters, Washington, D.C., November. Available online at . Accessed
on August 20, 2003.
20Naval Studies Board, National Research Council. 2000. 2000 Assessment of the Office of Naval Research's Marine Corps
Science and Technology Program, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C.
