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1 Marine Corps S&T Program as a Whole PROGRAM STRUCTURE The Marine Corps Science and Technology (MCS&T) program, administered and directed by the Expeditionary Warfare Operations Technology Division (Code 353) of the Office of Naval Research (ONR), has three primary parts: (1) the Littoral Combat (LC) component of the Littoral Combat and Power Projection Future Naval Capability (FNC), (2) Core Thrusts, and (3) Basic Research. In this chapter the committee provides general observations on the overall MCS&T program and high-level recommendations for improvement. The next three chapters discuss each of the three parts of ONR Code 353's MCS&T program the LC-FNC, Core Thrusts, and Basic Research in order of program size beginning with the largest. Each chapter begins with a discussion of research areas followed by a detailed discussion of the projects assessed. Beginning in FY99, ONR initiated a reorganization of its funding classifications and initiatives to create two primary organizational elements: (1) Future Naval Capabilities, to which was to be allocated all of ONR's advanced technology development (6.3) budget and roughly half of its applied research (6.2) budgets and (2) Discovery and Invention (D&I), to which was to be allocated the remainder of ONR's 6.2 budget and all of its basic research (6.1) budget. Since FY99, the first category has been expanded into what is now known as Exploitation and Deployment, which contains the FNCs as a subcategory, along with a new group of large non-FNC programs known as Naval Innovations, which includes such efforts as the UCAV-N, X-Craft, Electric Ship, and Electromagnetic Gun. Avoiding these distinctions, ONR presented Code 353's program as divided into three parts: (1) the LC-FNC, (2) Core Thrusts, which included both 6.2 and 6.3 funding but which were not part of the FNC, and (3) 6.1 Basic Research. As described by ONR the objectives of the MCS&T program and its constituent parts are detailed in Table 1.1. In FY03, the MCS&T program was funded at $61.6 million. Currently, not all 6.3 funds are committed to the FNCs. 14

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MARINE CORPS S&T PROGRAM AS A WHOLE TABLE 1.1 Marine Corps Science and Technology Program Areas 15 Program Area Objective Littoral Combat Future Naval Capability Enabling Capability 1, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) for the Amphibious Force Enabling Capability 2, Expeditionary Fire Support for the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) Enabling Capability 3, MAGTF Maneuver in the Littorals Enabling Capability 4, Command and Control (C2) Core Thrusts Maneuver Firepower Mine Countermeasures Support the development of naval Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare (EMW) via the application of technologies that enhance the ability of the Navy-Marine Corps team to achieve assured access and sustained operations in the littorals as the naval portion of a joint campaign. Provide enhanced autonomous and semiautonomous ISR capabilities to elements of a MAGTF. These enhanced capabilities will be locally tasked and controlled. Develop tactical systems to increase the ISR capabilities of tactical units (regiment and below). Provide enhanced fire support to elements of a MAGTF operating ashore. Develop an expeditionary fire support system with improved ammunition and integrate all legacy and future fires systems into a Naval Fires Network. Enhance expeditionary fires at the element level of the MAGTF. Provide enhanced maneuverability of surface-landed elements of the MAGTF. Provide knowledge-based situational awareness to assault forces embarked on maneuver platforms. Allow assault forces to dynamically plan and adaptively execute the conduct of Ship-to-Objective Maneuver (STOM) operations. Improve mine and obstacle breaching capabilities from the beach exit zone to the objective to enhance maneuverability of surface-landed assault forces. Provide the MAGTF commander with a C2 capability that can command all elements of the MAGTF. Provide increased reliability of beyond-line-of-sight communications, provide near-real-time situational awareness to all elements of the MAGTF that is scalable to the requirements of the specific MAGTF element, and optimize the flow of information over an improved data network. Conduct research and development of advanced technologies for tactical combat vehicles in the areas of mobility, survivability, electric technologies, and unmanned ground vehicles. Develop advanced technologies for application on current and future Marine Corps expeditionary weapons and targeting systems. Develop research areas to enable technologies for detecting, localizing, identifying, and neutralizing mines in the littoral environment. Continues

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16 TABLE 1.1 Continued 2003 ASSESSMENT OF ONR'S MARINE CORPS SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM Program Area Objective Logistics Human Performance, Training, and Education C4ISR Basic Research Develop, demonstrate, and transition technologies that will support U.S. Marine Corps future warfighting concepts (EMW and Sea-Based Logistics). Enhance human decision making, increase frequency and information content of training and education, and enable warriors to win and survive. Enable network-centric warfare at the tactical level in support of the warfighting concepts of EMW, STOM, and OMFTS. Create new technical possibilities that permit expansion of the range of potential operational capabilities and concepts for the Marine Corps "after next" (2020-2030~. SOURCE: U.S. Marine Corps, Future Naval Capabilities Coordination Office. 2003. Marine Corps Science and Technology Newsletter, p. 3. Of this amount, $26.5 million went to Code 353's Basic Research (6.1 $3.4 millions and Core Thrusts (6.2 $11.9 million, 6.3 $11.2 million), and $35.1 million went to the LC-FNC (6.2 $21.8 million, 6.3 $13.3 millions (see Table 1.2~.2 Together the three parts of the MCS&T program accounted for approximately 17 percent of ONR's Expeditionary Warfare Department (Code 35) FY03 budget.3 OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS The ONR MCS&T program and Code 353 have changed in positive and productive ways since the initial MCS&T review conducted by the Naval Studies Board (NSB) in 2000.4 At that time, a signifi- cant portion of the MCS&T program had just been assigned to Code 353,5 and the overall program needed focus. In the current review, the committee was favorably impressed by the high quality of many of the MCS&T program components presented and by the strength of the interactions that have devel- oped between Code 353 and the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory (MCWL), as well as by the capabilities, optimism, and evident motivation of the presenters. 2These estimates are based on the FY03 budget and include business operation costs, congressionally directed projects, and mandated projects. 3The committee also noted that the ONR (and the MCS&T program) budget relies heavily (~15 percent for MCS&T) on annual congressional plus-ups. The committee expressed concern at this practice because it can make it more difficult to establish long-range planning within the MCS&T program. 4Naval Studies Board, National Research Council. 2000. 2000 Assessment of the Office of Naval Research's Marine Corps Science and Technology Program, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C. 5The Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory retains some 6.3-funded programs that are related primarily to demonstration, experimentation, and integration of S&T products in support of concepts and future capabilities development.

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MARINE CORPS S&T PROGRAM AS A WHOLE TABLE 1.2 Marine Corps Science and Technology Program Funding for Fiscal Year 2003 (millions of dollars) 17 6.2 6.3 Percentage Component 6.1 Greena Blueb Greena Blueb Total of Total Littoral Combat Future Naval Capability EC 1: ISR for the Amphibious Force 8.3 0.5 0.0 0.0 8.8 14.3 EC 2: Expeditionary Fire Support for the MAGTF 4.6 0.7 3.5 2.8 11.6 18.8 EC 3: MAGTF Maneuver in the Littorals 1.8 0.4 1.0 1.6 4.8 7.8 EC 4: Command and Control 2.9 2.6 1.6 2.8 9.9 16.1 Total FNC Funding 17.6 4.2 6.1 7.2 35.1 57.0 Core Thrusts Maneuver 2.3 1.6 3.9 6.3 Firepower 1.5 1.0 2.5 4.1 Mine Countermeasures 1.3 1.6 2.9 4.7 Logistics 1.6 2.4 4.0 6.5 Human Performance, Training, and Education 3.2 2.0 5.2 8.4 C4ISR 2.0 2.6 4.6 7.5 Total Core Funding 11.9 11.2 23.1 37.5 Basic Research 3.4 3.4 5.5 Total Funding (Green and Blue) 3.4 33.7 24.5 61.6 100.0 NOTE: These budget estimates are based on the FY03 budget and include business operation costs, congressionally directed projects, and mandated projects. For definitions of acronyms, see Appendix C. aDenotes Marine Corps-supported research funds. bDenotes Navy-supported research funds. ONR and Code 353's Relationship with the Marine Corps Code 353's relationship with the Marine Corps is evolving into a workable and effective partner- ship. The Commanding General of the MCWL (the original home of all MCS&T) is also Vice Chief of Naval Research, which allows high-level collaboration across Marine Corps development and research interests and Marine Corps influence and leveraging of broad ONR initiatives. In addition, Marine Corps officers are regularly assigned to the MCS&T program office and are consciously embedded throughout ONR. The Marine Corps demonstrates a good understanding of the importance of commu- nicating its vision to and cooperating with the Chief of Naval Research and the personnel in ONR. Six Marine Corps general officers co-chair various FNCs, and Marine Corps personnel are members of the integrated product teams (IPTs) for other FNCs.6 Participation in the IPTs is extremely important because the IPT, as a group, decides on the final makeup of projects supported through a given FNC. The direct involvement of Marine Corps officers in the S&T process constitutes a valuable and long- 6An IPT comprising members of the operational, acquisition, science and technology, requirements, and resources com- munities is established for each FNC in order to align and partner the relevant communities and give the FNC products a better chance to transition into operational use. In addition to administering the LC-FNC, Code 353 serves as the IPT science and technology lead.

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18 2003 ASSESSMENT OF ONR'S MARINE CORPS SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM needed link between the Marine Corps and ONR, although the quality and the capabilities of the individual marines assigned are key to the success of this stratagem. Code 353 has now had nearly 4 years of experience working with Marine Corps challenges and is becoming attuned to the S&T needs underlying Marine Corps concepts of operations (see Box 1.1~. Yet, although many of the individual efforts under way in Code 353 pursue worthwhile objectives, their relationship to key Marine Corps warfighting concepts (e.g., Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare (EMW), Operational Maneuver From the Sea (OMFTS), Ship-to-Objective Maneuver (STOM), and so forth) was often unclear in presentations made to the committee. Selection of many of the topics addressed by current and planned Code 353 programs appeared to have been ad hoc and opportunistic. At the same time, the committee found a lack of evidence that the Marine Corps has consistently laid out its vision of EMW and the subordinate concept of STOM to ONR in a manner that would permit the formulation of an imaginative and effective program of science and technology research. The committee noted that this situation is beginning to change. The Marine Corps has recently completed guidance for achieving the goals of EMW7 and is in the process of drafting a Marine Corps S&T plan- both of which will enable Code 353 to better support development of Marine Corps capability require- ments. Review of the Marine Corns new S&T implementing documents shows that it Provides anorooriate responsibility, accountability, authority, and process definition by which to develop and manage near-, mid-, and far-term S&T strategies in a naval context. Scheduled to start during the summer of 2003, implementation of these processes will include the above-mentioned EMW guidance, in the form of a capability list, as one of the first results. The committee enthusiastically supports these organizational and process initiatives as a mechanism for managing S&T as a Marine Corps enterprise asset. Operational synergy between the Marine Corps and the Navy appears to have grown since establish- ment of the Naval Operating Concept (see Box 1.1~. The Naval Operating Concept includes the critical naval concepts of Sea Basing, Sea Shield, Sea Strike, and FORCEnet and their integration with the Marine Corps capstone concept EMW and its constituent operational concepts, OMFTS and STOM, thus providing a vision toward which the two Services can plan to develop a coherent program, ranging from basic research through advanced technology development, in order to support the Navy/Marine Corps team. As a result of this increasing synergy, Code 353 should be better positioned to refocus its MCS&T program to support the fast-changing missions and operations of the Naval Services. Code 353 is heading in the right direction and is attempting to pursue Marine Corps objectives, although more coordination with the Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC) and MCWL may be necessary to ensure more effective management of the MCS&T program. ~ in, 7LtGen Edward Hanlon, Jr., USMC, Deputy Commandant, Combat Development. 2003. Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare Capability List (ECLJ. Expeditionary Force Development Center, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Quantico, Va., June 16. Available online at . Accessed on December 12, 2003. 8Gen James L. Jones, USMC, Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps. 2002. Marine Corps Order 3900.15A, Marine Corps Expeditionary Force Development System, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Washington, D.C., November 26.

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MARINE CORPS S&T PROGRAM AS A WHOLE 19 LC-FNC Planning and Investment Strategy The LC-FNC began with a dual-track planning process. One track emphasized developing near- term projects (18 to 36 months long, begun in FY02) focused on rapid returns to meet critical needs (which had been identified by the Marine Corps and Code 353 prior to the creation of the LC-FNC) and designed to get the LC-FNC off to a quick start.9 The other track initiated a more formal planning process to generate and prioritize longer-term projects (36 to 60 months long) that are to receive funding beginning in FY04. The committee noted that the LC-FNC is still in an early stage of development, and the projects that were presented seemed to come from the near-term branch of the dual-track process. A number of FY04 new starts were presented to the committee as being results of the long-term planning process; however, the presentations did not show any direct linkage of these new starts to specific findings of the planning activities. The near-term planning also led to the establishment of four LC-FNC enabling capabilities (ECs) as organizational elements: EC 1 Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) for the Amphibi- ous Force; EC 2 Expeditionary Fire Support for the MAGTF; EC 3 MAGTF Maneuver in the Littorals; and EC 4 Command and Control (Cal. These four ECs appear to the committee to provide a reasonable set of topic areas for coordinating and categorizing the STOM shortfalls identified by Code 353 during the LC-FNC planning process. LC-FNC Process for Formulating an Investment Strategy Code 353 also established a longer-term, formal, top-down process for converting LC-FNC goals into an S&T investment strategy (Figure 1.1~. In addition, the LC-FNC investment strategy formulation process has resulted in a useful means for connecting Code 353 with the Marine Corps user community. To identify and prioritize current STOM capability shortfalls, Code 353 included a combination of expert panels (users, technologists, and so on) engaged in war gaming and other similar concept genera- tion exercises. These exercises resulted in a series of Broad Agency Announcement (BAA) solicitations seeking innovative improvements that address critical shortfall technologies. Finally, several teams of potential users took part in a STOM-based technology insertion game (TIG) to assess and prioritize the technology improvements proposed in the BAA responses. Attempting to identify capabilities shortfalls through a war game is an excellent idea. Code 353 engaged a group of users in STOM-based war games to identify those gaps in current Marine Corps capabilities that, if overcome, would enhance the ability of Marine Corps forces in the proposed mis- sions. However, as presented to the committee, the war games did not involve broader issues in EMW- that is, issues other than STOM. The inclusion of members of the MCCDC Doctrine and Equipment Requirements Division, as users, was a welcome sign that the MCS&T program was becoming inte- grated within the broader Marine Corps community. A panel of experienced technologists began with the resulting shortfalls list and reorganized and prioritized the related S&T areas for investigation. The committee commends use of the Technologist Panel and strongly supports its continuing to assist Code 353 in developing the LC-FNC S&T invest- ment strategy. This priority list resulted in a series of BAAs for innovative solutions in the shortfall areas. While 9Thomas O'Leary, Director, Expeditionary Warfare Operations Technology Division, Office of Naval Research, "ONR's Marine Corps Science and Technology Program: The Context," slide 11, presentation to the committee on May 13, 2003.

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20 2003 ASSESSMENT OF ONR'S MARINE CORPS SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM

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MARINE CORPS S&T PROGRAM AS A WHOLE 2

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22 2003 ASSESSMENT OF ONR'S MARINE CORPS SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM FNG Goal Enabling Capabilities N~r~term Ef~ns Tool tcdu~b 1~ MAY Wl~i' 6.~. Sew U mo~bol~s 'AX m~ ~? FO4:I~S~0 ~6 ma 1~ Lion Hiram fe~aGl~jes Path ENA33L~G CApAulldnE5 ~L, FY ~2 Nea~Term Products AN JO Den ~ Ex~sich Pla Oamo~l~ Pam Technologists cane Industry Solicitation White Papers FEW War Game Studies TIG Investment Strategy FIGURE 1.1 LC-FNC process for formulating an S&T investment strategy. SOURCE: Thomas O'Leary, Direc- tor, Expeditionary Warfare Operations Technology Division, Office of Naval Research, "ONR's Marine Corps Science and Technology Program: The Context," slide 10, presentation to the committee on May 13, 2003. NOTE: Acronyms are defined in Appendix C. BAAs are a good mechanism for discovering novel ideas, overreliance on them as a source of all ideas that might be developed into an S&T investment strategy is a concern to the committee. Responses to BAAs are somewhat unpredictable. Because there is no guarantee that all areas of interest have been covered, simply rearranging the BAA responses does not constitute a valid planning process. In a TIG, teams of users assessed the potential benefits of the BAA-proposed solutions in a STOM scenario. Those BAA solutions that TIG users judged would be of the greatest benefit to STOM operations (as represented in the war game) were then given the highest priority for support. The results of this exercise, did not, however, appear to the committee to have been used extensively to select new research for the FNC to support. For example, the top-ranked BAA proposal, for develop- ment of a buoyant stratospheric vehicle, received no support from the MCS&T program office. Code 353 called this vehicle an "Army interest," and the LC-FNC offered no support for the effort. The second-ranked proposal, for advanced data compression, saw some funding but was not supported at a level commensurate with its high rankings. Development of Iridium phones for Marine Corps use had the lowest priority, but in recent action in Iraq, the Marine Corps praised Iridium highly and noted strong support for it or an equivalent technology.~ 1OMarine Corps Combat Development Command. 2003. Field Report Marine Corps Systems Command Liaison Team, Central Iraq (April 20-25, 2003J, Quantico, Va., May.

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MARINE CORPS S&T PROGRAM AS A WHOLE Concerns About the Current Process and Recommendations for Improvements 23 While the current process, with its reliance on war games and external group review, is an excellent start on a much-needed formal process for developing an appropriate S&T investment strategy, the committee had two major concerns about which it has suggestions for improvement: The exclusive reliance on BAA responses to provide the candidate elements of a valid S&T strategy is a fundamental flaw in the process. Collecting BAA responses does not guarantee that all critical issues are being addressed, and simply rearranging them does not constitute a plan. The final evaluation of the proposed S&T investment strategy should not be made by a group of users (in this case, participants in the TIG). Users and technologists often have dramatically differing visions of the role of S&T and how best to leverage S&T to support military operations. The issue of constructing valid S&T plans from user inputs touches on one of the major difficulties encountered at the interface between users and S&T each community (S&T and users) speaks a different language. Each has its own goals, objectives, priorities, terminology, definitions of success, and so forth, and often one simply does not understand the other. Users typically want "things" that do something, are reliable, and are delivered on time, at cost, and with user manuals and other logistics support. The S&T community, on the other hand, more often delivers technologies and technical capabilities that allow the users to envision the "things" they seek. Only rarely does an S&T project result in an immediately useful gadget. A good example is the cell phone. It was built on a base of hundreds, if not thousands, of small technology advances in plastics, analog and digital electronic circuits, communication algorithms, infrastructure (e.g., relay towers, antennas, and land lines), soft- ware, and so on. The cell phone did not emerge from a single S&T project. The key to translating mission needs into S&T research lies in bringing to bear the talents of certain unusual people who understand and speak the languages of both communities. Such "bilingual" indi- viduals listen to users, understand what they are seeking, and then turn to the S&T community with a knowledge of how the S&T research and development process works. By understanding the state of the art of the relevant technologies, they are able to help identify a series of specific projects that support the needs expressed by the users. It is hoped that Code 353 will continue to have as its director such an individual. Such people are often found among S&T workers who have undertaken management re- sponsibilities that have brought them into intimate contact with the user community. To improve the planning process, it is recommended that following a review of capability gaps by the panel of technologists, ONR replace the BAA solicitations and TIG analysis with a team of users/ technologists who will consider user concerns, as expressed in the list of critical shortfalls identified at the front part of the process. Then, with the current state of the art and the capabilities of the organization in mind, they will propose a series of specific projects that represent the final S&T investment strategy. BAAs are a reasonable adjunct but should not be the only inputs considered. In addition, before it is submitted for approval by the LC-FNC IPT, the resulting investment strategy should be reviewed not by users but by another independent group of bilingual technologists. In some contexts it was clear that ONR 353 had generalized to other planning exercises the basic structure of the planning process used for the FNC. The committee strongly supports this approach. The same comments on improving the process hold true for these other applications as well. With the back end of the process strengthened, this would certainly be an excellent and broadly applicable model for S&T planning. Relevant to these suggestions, the committee notes that in parallel with the above LC-FNC planning

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24 2003 ASSESSMENT OF ONR'S MARINE CORPS SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM process, Code 353 also supported an Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) study to identify critical capability shortfalls specific to STOM command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I1.~ The outnut of that study was another component for the LC-FNC investment strate~v. In many 1 ~ 1 0 ~ ways the IDA study's approach duplicated the formal planning process that is, it started with opera- tional concepts and experience and ended with the identification of critical STOM deficiencies and candidate S&T initiatives to supply the needed capabilities. Importantly, no BAA process was invoked: The authors of the IDA study thought for themselves, and, thus, IDA's process closely resembles the modified planning process the committee is recommending to Code 353. Recommendation. Code 353 should take the following steps to strengthen the LC-FNC strategy for investing in S&T. Avoid relying solely on Broad Agency Announcement solicitations and reorganization of the responses; instead, use a "translation" team of bilingual people skilled in understanding and interpreting the users' concerns and needs as the basis for identifying a series of specific projects representing a final S&T investment strategy. Ensure that the final review of the resulting S&T investment strategy is done by another indepen- dent group of appropriately bilingual (user/technologist) experts. During the current review the committee felt that most of the projects presented (not just in the LC- FNC, but in Core Thrusts and Basic Research as well) were of interest to the Marine Corps. However? it also believed that more cohesion was necessary to develop the balance of effort needed to support the overall Marine Corps mission. In particular the committee thought that the entire MCS&T nro~ram ____ _ _ _ O including the Core Thrusts and Basic Research, would benefit from the consistent application of an S&T investment strategy formulation process based on the one recommended here for the LC-FNC. This overall planning process should enable Code 353 to identify critical Marine Corps capability gaps and to systematically plan S&T efforts to fill them. Recommendation. Code 353 should develop a robust process for formulating an S&T investment strategy based on planning of the kind recommended for the LC-FNC and focused on Marine Corps capabilities needed for Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare. Code 353 should then apply that strategy to all aspects of the MCS&T program. Effect of the LC-FNC on the Core Thrusts The LC-FNC appears to have greatly benefited Code 353 through its sustained funding, its attention from the Navy, its strong focus on Marine Corps problems, and its creation of a promising S&T investment planning process. At the same time, however, the establishment of the LC-FNC also appears to have had an adverse impact on the content of Code 353's Core Thrusts efforts. FNCs, in general, are focused on the near-term transitioning of products to address established and prioritized requirements rather than on the broad development of technology. ONR's D&I initiative 1lInstitute for Defense Analyses. To be published. Science and Technology Initiatives to Support Maneuver Planning and Execution in Naval Expeditionary Warfare, draft, Arlington, Va. 12CAPT Stephen Hancock, USN, Head, Naval Expeditionary Warfare Science and Technology Department, Office of Naval Research, "Overview of Discovery and Invention and Future Naval Capabilities Programs," slide 8, presentation to the committee on May 13, 2003.

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MARINE CORPS S&T PROGRAM AS A WHOLE 25 (which includes Basic Research and Core Thrusts), on the other hand, is closer to ONR's original mission and is intended to focus on long-term, basic scientific discovery to support the S&T base necessary for future Navy and Marine Corps technology exploitation and to engage in preliminary exploration leading to new technologies. While valuable in themselves, the FNCs are intended to complement the remaining D&I portion of ONR's portfolio. However, the committee observed that the intended separation of efforts with different time horizons (near- versus long-term) and a different mission focus (transition versus discovery) into the FNC and D&I elements appears to have been weakened in many of the Core Thrust projects reviewed. In particular, while Code 353 seems to have initiated in the Core Thrusts a strong focus on Marine Corps technology needs, several of the resulting projects have transition plans and short-term goals similar to those of FNC projects.~3 In addition. many of the short-term projects annear to the committee ' ~ 1 -1 1 1 to emphasize minor Improvements to excising hardware or to be focused on the Integration of excising systems, which means that they are not developing the base-level technologies necessary for significant improvements in capabilities. It should be noted, in this context, that Code 353 plans to allocate approximately $15 million annually through FY07 to non-FNC 6.3 programs.~4 This support for FNC- like elements within Core Thrusts was a source of concern to the committee since it complicates the division of mission between the LC-FNC and the Core Thrusts elements of the MCS&T program. The above concerns were first brought to the attention of Code 353 in the NSB 2000 review of the MCS&T. Among other things, that review recommended that Code 353 "eliminate . . . Efrom the Core Thrusts] activities that do not conform to the usual ONR S&T standards of innovation and technical noore..~.~ive.ne..~.~ tonal e.mh~rk on ~ Hi.~.nve.rv nrnornm tniHe.ntifv and re.fine.te.~.hnolnaie..~th~tr.nn ~~_vv~ _vv ,~ , _ _.-,-. A ~ _._ _ __ _ ~ have a substantial payoff in achieving OMFTS."~5 Although Core Thrusts need not exclude all exploi- tation and transition initiatives, those projects supported should meet ONR's standards for quality and should remain more flexible in terms of program requirements and timelines than is typical for FNCs. Recommendation. Code 353 should ensure that the MCS&T program's Core Thrusts and Basic Re- search components support the mission of discovery and invention, that is, exploration aimed at the long-term development of base-level technologies that could support future FNC and Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory program initiatives. Thus, Code 353 should remove from the Corps Thrusts and Basic Research portfolios short-term, transition-oriented initiatives. Aspects of Transitioning Products to Use Although the concept of transitioning products to use in the field seems clear enough, it involves a few potential problems that must be avoided. Users who agree to accept a product in transition from the S&T community generally expect something that can be rapidly fielded, that is, a product similar to a fully commercial product. Such commercial products typically have integrated corrosion and shock resistance, detailed drawings, user guides, repair manuals, and the like. Reliability, manufacturability, 13One example is the tactical unmanned ground vehicles project, which was briefed to the committee as part of Code 353's Core Thrusts yet is also listed on other ONR documents as a project supported through ONR's Autonomous Operations FNC. 14Thomas O'Leary, Director, Expeditionary Warfare Operations Technology Division, Office of Naval Research, "ONR's Marine Corps Science and Technology Program: The Context," slide 14, presentation to the committee on May 13, 2003. 15 Naval Studies Board, National Research Council. 2000. 2000 Assessment of the Office of Naval Research's Marine Corps Science and Technology Program, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C., p. 2.

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26 2003 ASSESSMENT OF ONR'S MARINE CORPS SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM serviceability, and so on constitute a particular suite of capabilities, commonly referred to as the "-ilities," often found to be critical to use of products in the field. It was clear, however, that such capabilities were not being considered within any of the current products and evidently were assumed to be something that could be added later on during the acquisition program. In the committee's experience, building in capabilities such as reliability can strongly affect the fundamental design of a product and typically cannot be done after the fact. The lack of such features can affect the utility of a product or slow its adoption. For example, during Operation Iraqi Freedom, Dragon Eye, a hand-launched unmanned air vehicle (UAV) supported by ONR, was deployed with several Marine Corps units; however, some of these UAVs were not used in theater because the controlling computer failed just before the unit crossed the line of departure and no one at the scene knew how to repair the system. The impact of the "-ilities" on products intended for transition should be considered up-front by anticipating and incorporating critical design features and perhaps then consciously deciding not to implement them fully in the interest of time and money. Code 353 also must work to ensure that the user really understands just what is to be transitioned as a result of the S&T development process. Another aspect of transitioning products to use lies in the fact that almost all fielded naval equip- ment is supplied by contractors and not by the Navy or the Marine Corps itself. Thus it is critical that ONR-developed technology and products find their way as quickly as possible into the contractor community. Many of Code 353's projects aim to connect with and transition into this community, as much of the S&T work is performed out-of-house through various, often competing contractors. The committee encourages this effort. Recommendation. For S&T development products intended for transition, Code 353 should develop technology transition plans that include up-front considerations of the "-ilities," such as product reliabil- ity, manufacturability, maintainability, and other capabilities necessary in the overall fielding of prod- ucts to the user community. Optimistic Use of Technology Readiness Levels At several points during the committee's review, projects were presented with explicit timelines for meeting a series of technology readiness levels. Initially used by NASA in developing successful space and aerospace systems. the concent of technolo~v readiness levels (TRLs) now finds wide application ~ , , ~ lo, ~ , ~ ~ .. . . .. ~ . ~ ~ . . .. . . . . . ~ . . . .. throughout the Services. Most organizations have converged on mne levels ot technology readiness, from basic research to full operational use (see Appendix D), as benchmarks for assessing the maturity of a technology or product. Customized TRLs incorporating explicit references to the technologies or applications involved have been generated by various organizations, including the Army.~7 No Marine Corps- or Navy- specific definitions of TRLs were offered during the comm~ttee's review, although NASA definitions are no doubt useful. Code 353 (and perhaps ONR in general) would benefit from tailoring TRLs to Marine Corps (or Navy) use. 16Marine Corps Combat Development Command. 2003. Field Report Marine Corps Systems Command Liaison Team, Central Iraq (April 20-25, 2003J, Quantico, Va., May. 17Caroline P. Graettinger, Suzanne Garcia, and Jeannine Siviy (Software Engineering Institute, CMU), and Robert J. Schenk and Peter J. Van Syckle (U.S. Army CECOM RDEC STCD). 2002. Using the Technology Readiness Levels Scale to Support Technology Management in the DOD's ATD/STO Environments, Special Report, CMU/SEI-2002-SR-027, Software Engineering Institute, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, Pa., September. Available online at . Accessed on August 20, 2003.

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MARINE CORPS S&T PROGRAM AS A WHOLE 27 TRLs are valuable and their use is encouraged. The committee expressed two concerns, however: (1) the levels targeted for several projects (typically TRL 5,6, or 7) seemed higher than can generally be expected for projects emerging from 6.2- or 6.3-funded efforts and (2) the time intervals for advancing between levels were unrealistically brief (1 year between each in several instances. NASA has found that for most systems an increase by one level per year in technology readiness is rarely possible.~9 To avoid disappointment, use of TRLs should be carefully reexamined in light of NASA's long experience. Recommendation. Code 353 should reexamine its use of technology readiness levels, define levels specific to Navy (or Marine Corps) missions, and develop means for estimating realistic time intervals for transitions between levels. Responses to Issues from the 2000 NSB Assessment During the current review, the committee noted that Code 353 was explicitly responsive to the recommendations made in the 2000 NSB assessment of the MCS&T program.20 The presentations consistently mentioned and discussed the issues raised, indicating which recommendations had been implemented, and to what degree. Nevertheless, despite the importance of the 2000 review's primary recommendation which was to "eliminate from the Code 353 program, at an orderly but determined pace, preacquisition and other activities that do not conform to the usual ONR S&T standards of innovation and technical aggressiveness (p. 2~" the current committee found that many existing (and nlanned) pro crams still annear to be hichlv tied to Reacquisition activities. In particular. the committee ~ , ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ is concerned that the Core Thrusts component continues to support transition-focused, short-time- horizon technology development projects. In the 2000 review, a number of high-level technical deficiencies in the overall MCS&T program were identified, including the following: A "lack of quantitative systems analyses" and of a strong two-way relationship with MCCDC (p. 11~; The "relative neglect of joint operations" that is, of network-centric operations and of non- organic support for operations" (p. 12~; The "neglect of deception and concealment" both OMFTS and STOM emphasize avoidance of the enemy (p. 12~; The "relative neglect of MOUT Military operations in urban terrain]" (p. 12~; and The use of "performer-determined goals" that is, of priorities not systematically established by Marine Corps needs because of weak connections between ONR and MCCDC (p. 13~. By and large the current program is in the process of addressing these issues some vigorously and effectively, others less so, but all nonetheless to some degree. For example, see "Microchannel Methanol Fuel Cell" under the Logistics core thrust in Chapter 3. 19Deborah J. Peisen and Catherine L. Schulz (Science Applications International Corporation), and Richard S. Golaszewski, B. David Ballard, and John J. Smith (GRA, Incorporated). 1999. Case Studies: Time Required to Mature Aeronautic Tech- nologies to Operational Readiness, Task Order 221, Final Report, National Aeronautics and Space Administration Headquar- ters, Washington, D.C., November. Available online at . Accessed on August 20, 2003. 20Naval Studies Board, National Research Council. 2000. 2000 Assessment of the Office of Naval Research's Marine Corps Science and Technology Program, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C.