. "Appendix D: Russian Background Paper." Overcoming Impediments to U.S-Russian Cooperation on Nuclear Non-Proliferation: Report of a Joint Workshop. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, 2004.
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Overcoming Impediments to U.S.-Russian Coorperation on Nuclear Nonproliferation: Report of a Joint Workshop
focused on potential approaches, technological and organizational measures, and techniques to ensure transparent dismantlement of nuclear warheads under the conditions of future arms reductions.
The research performed at VNIITF gave an appreciable positive impetus to the better understanding of the issues and of the potential measures capable of enhancing confidence on both sides of the nuclear warheads elimination issues. The following basic proposals were drawn up:
a concept of controlled transparent dismantlement of nuclear warheads,
technical approaches to confirm authenticity of dismantled warheads and the irreversibility of their elimination,
potential scenarios of transparent dismantlement, and
experimental control methods.
These activities were mainly performed within contracts between VNIITF and the U.S. national laboratories. The development and demonstration of technologies to be potentially used to ensure transparent dismantlement of nuclear warheads were one of the results of this work:
Detection of explosives (because management of explosives necessitates a very careful treatment, instrumental methods were proposed to identify them within the structures to be dismantled)
Elimination of nuclear warhead cases
Elimination of explosive substance components.
2.8.Nuclear Material Protection, Control and Accounting
Upgrading and improving the system of nuclear materials protection, control and accounting (MPC&A) became one of the most important areas of U.S.-Russian cooperation, both on nuclear nonproliferation and on counteracting unauthorized diversion of nuclear material. Such cooperation made it possible to:
Construct new nuclear material storage facilities at R.F. Minatom enterprises and upgrade the available ones,
Develop MPC&A related standards and regulations,
Develop a federal information system for nuclear material control and accounting,
Upgrade instrumentation and methodological support of nuclear material control and accounting,
Improve radio communication for ensuring physical protection of facilities with dangerous nuclear material,
Improve safety when shipping nuclear materials,
Institute departmental security training centers,
Equip R.F. Minatom enterprise security units,
Establish departmental supervision at R.F. Minatom enterprises,