. "Appendix D: Russian Background Paper." Overcoming Impediments to U.S-Russian Cooperation on Nuclear Non-Proliferation: Report of a Joint Workshop. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, 2004.
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Overcoming Impediments to U.S.-Russian Coorperation on Nuclear Nonproliferation: Report of a Joint Workshop
such an important, but very complicated and controversial matter, as nuclear nonproliferation much easier.
So far, the exchanges have been occasional and one-sided: only Russian officers have been trained at the U.S. military colleges and academies. To live up to the expectations of the U.S.-Russian cooperation on nuclear nonproliferation, it is recommended that such training exchanges be introduced on a symmetrical and regular basis.
Regular exchanges by groups of officers for a short-term training at institutions dealing with nuclear nonproliferation.
Exchanges by students and post-graduate students for education on relevant subjects at institutions specializing in political science and international affairs.
Exchanges by groups of scientists for advanced training at research centers studying issues related to national security.
Enhanced exchanges by scientists to give lectures on topical problems related to nuclear nonproliferation.
Organization of bilateral conferences and workshops on nuclear nonproliferation on a regular basis.
Development of new joint programs for training exchanges would contribute to the establishment of closer contacts and mutual understanding between the specialists of the U.S. and Russia involved in the implementation of bilateral projects on nuclear nonproliferation.
3.7.1. Funding of the absolute majority of the U.S.-Russian nuclear nonproliferation programs is not sufficiently transparent. As a rule only an aggregate total amount allocated by the U.S. Congress for assistance to Russia and CIS countries is released. Sometimes an overall amount to be spent on the nuclear nonproliferation programs in Russia is known. In most cases the funding allocated for a specific ministry is hard to assess.
It would be very useful if information on the expenditure patterns and funding of specific contracts could be summarized yearly and made available. It could give a fair picture of the assistance.
On the one hand knowledge of the expenditures could contribute to strengthening confidence between the sides and, on the other hand, give an opportunity to analyze the ways the funds have been spent. The transparency of the use of funds may reduce indirect expenses in favor of the base-line activities.
The above is also important because in line with the laws of the R.F., the R.F. Minatom and other agencies have to prove the intended use of resources exempted from taxation.
The U.S. side is believed to be equally interested in the intended use of their technical assistance funds granted to Russia. The transparency of financial flows would help Russian agencies in auditing the use of the funds and equipment received via technical assistance programs.