3.7.6. However, projects where procurement of dual-purpose goods and technologies liable to export control is involved are the greatest impediment in the ISTC projects.

In compliance with the R.F. legislation in the export control area, the delivery of nuclear or dual-purpose goods and technologies is only allowed if an export license is available. However, the ISTC’s status prohibits the transfer of such controlled goods and technologies because the latter, due to their specific properties, can potentially be used to fabricate weapons of mass destruction—in other words, to contribute to nuclear proliferation.

At the same time it is obvious, that the implementation of projects related to the development of advanced nuclear energy facilities having nothing to do with nuclear weapons programs and contributing to nuclear nonproliferation would allow the redirection of many nuclear scientists from military subjects. Most likely, a similar situation exists in other industries dealing with dual-purpose technologies.

Thus, bringing the interests of the international economic, scientific and technical cooperation on the use of nuclear energy in compliance with the requirements of nuclear nonproliferation represents one of the most important and complicated tasks.

Conclusions and Recommendations

  1. An ultimate objective of the international nuclear nonproliferation regime is to prevent nuclear weapons from spreading in the world. Therefore the bilateral U.S.-Russian cooperation programs on nuclear nonproliferation and impediments to it should be considered in terms of this international context, i.e., how they affect and reduce the proliferation risk. Bilateral programs with such an objective most meet the interests of both sides, and, therefore, are least subject to the changeable political goals of different administrations, which is a necessary (but not sufficient) prerequisite to make them a success.

  2. The U.S.-Russian cooperation programs on nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation are of key importance for strengthening strategic stability in the world and meeting the vital interests of both countries, and for that reason the linkage of their implementation to political or other conditions having no direct bearing on the objectives and contents of the cooperation is believed to be counterproductive.

  3. The coincidence of interests of both sides in achieving the political, scientific, and technical objectives of U.S.-Russian cooperation in nuclear nonproliferation and the appropriateness and achievability of the scientific and technical objectives are important factors. The practice of thorough joint examination of need and achievability in the early stages of the cooperation programs has proved justified.

  4. A cooperation program has a better chance of success, if its major goals, subject scope, organization, and management issues have been discussed and agreed upon in intergovernmental agreements, and, if necessary, ratified by the U.S. Congress and the State Duma of the Russian Federation.

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