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OCR for page 71
c
How Cities Grew in the Western
World: A Systems Approach
LYNN HOLLEN LEES AND PAUL M. HOHENBERG
If there is a single defining characteristic of urban life, it is dependence.
Not only are citizens interdependent, but the truly isolated city is both
unviable and pointless. Unable to sustain itself, it would have no outlets
for the fruits of specialization and complex organization. In the words of
B. J. L. Berry, "Cities are systems within systems of cities" (1964, p.
1471. During the last millennium, as settlement in Europe became pre-
dominantly urban, city systems of great complexity evolved as population
grew. As conduits for goods, people, and information, they helped to
distribute resources throughout vast territories. In fact, the very stuff of
urban life is exchange, and the exchange process has generated extensive
infrastructures to aid the distribution of commodities, ideas, and popu-
lation.
The complexity of urban systems poses a challenge to planners and
urban scholars. How can the interactions of market towns, capitals, ports,
resorts, and manufacturing cities as well as their functions be captured by
an analytical model? Because of the varied quality of urban processes, no
single schema will suffice. Drawing on the disciplines of economics,
geography, and history, we propose that a dual model of interurban re-
lationships captures many important distinctions and offers a tool through
which changes over time and variations among city types can be explained.
It is important to note that urban growth has been neither automatic nor
uniform but has exhibited consistent patterns linked to structure and func-
tion. Many of the dynamic influences on city size demographic change,
migration, transportation, technology, and communications- have af
71
OCR for page 72
72
LYNN [IOLLE1V LEES AND PAUL M. HOHENBERG
fected urban fortunes through processes referred to as the central place
system and the network system (Hohenberg and Lees, 19851.
A DUAL MODEL OF URBAN SYSTEMS: ECONOMIC EXCHANGE
AND SPATIAL CONFIGURATIONS
The notion of a town as a central place is well established (Berry and
Pred, 1961; Christaller, 1933, Losch, 1954; Tinbergen, 19681. As a center
for the exchange of goods and services, a town serves the needs of a
farming area, for example, by offering an outlet for surplus production
and by housing artisans as well as purveyors of cultural and political
products. The central place concept can also be applied to a set of settle-
ments. Because people need complex goods and services less frequently
but are willing to travel longer distances for them, such items are offered
only in larger settlements. Differing types and intensities of demand create
a hierarchy of settlements in which larger towns serve territories also
organized by smaller central places. Through a regular nesting and inter-
dependence of centers, urbanization creates integrated regions that are
more than the sum of their parts. Roads and railroads make visible the
multiple linkages that tie a large array of settlements together. Nations
and kingdoms can be visualized as groups of regions, beginning with the
hinterlands of small markets and progressing through the territories di-
rected by administrative centers to the major economic and political cap-
itals, which in some countries coincide and in others do not.
Medieval Leicester is a good example of a regional marketplace (Brown,
1970; Hoskins, 1955; Simmons, 19741. Located approximately in the
center of the English county of Leicestershire, it served as the county's
commercial and cultural capital. Fairs, schools, and charities regularly
brought outsiders into the town, and city dwellers themselves provided
goods and services to a wide area. Besides producing staples, the city's
workers made substantial amounts of woolen cloth for sale in the region.
Smaller market towns, roughly equidistant from Leicester, offered simpler
goods and services to the surrounding villages, but the county's highest
order central place was the only locus of political authority, as well as
the site of courts and tax collections. Royal administrators working from
London contacted officials in Leicester, who spread information through-
out the region.
Leicester also had external ties that cannot be explained through a central
place model. Note the city's location at the place where a Roman road
forded the river Soar. Leicester was one link in a chain of cities that
stretched to London and were finally connected to central Italy. The
principal activity of Leicester merchants in the later Middle Ages was the
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HOW CITIES CREW I1V THE WESTERN WORLD
73
sale of raw wool to distant cloth makers, and the amounts of wool traded
were far greater than what would have been necessary to buy indispensable
imports or to pay the taxes and rents due the Earl of Leicester and the
English king. Leicester therefore linked its region to a larger commercial
network, which stretched from English east coast ports to the Low Coun-
tries and from London to manufacturing towns throughout Europe.
The example of Leicester shows how a city's trade may involve an
exchange of goods with both local and distant destinations. Neither size
nor position in a central place system is sufficient to predict the long-
distance linkages of a settlement. Indeed, even small villages may engage
in the specialized production of a traded staple, which an urban system
then helps to distribute. The network of exchange thus generated is still
hierarchic, but a regular geometric ordering of centers is replaced by a
series of nodes, junctions, and outposts arranged according to a core-
periphery logic (Figure 3-lb). Rather than a contiguous group of regions,
often centrally administered, such urban systems comprise loosely linked
cities that anchor trade routes. We call this type of linkage the network
system (Hohenberg and Lees, 19851. Both Braudel (1979) and Waller-
stein's (1974) visions of a world economy are consonant with this model.
In a network system, maritime empires and urban leagues rival one an-
other. Their wealth and influence depend not on the control of the territory
but on access to long-distance transportation, luxury goods, information,
and human capital. Few places in early Europe illustrate this alternative
urban system better than Venice, the Queen of the Adriatic.
Venice began on an unpromising site as a small gathering of boatmen
who produced fish and salt (Lane, 1973; Luzzatto, 19614. Building on its
ties to Constantinople, the city became the trading gateway between a
rapidly developing European periphery and a thriving eastern economy
that stretched through Arab and Byzantine lands to China. In time, mer-
cantile wealth and naval power reinforced one another to undermine the
dominance of the Middle East and to create a Venetian maritime empire.
Despite meager resources and a limited population, Venice was able to
preserve its autonomy, if not its influence, until the early nineteenth
century.
In spatial terms the central place system is territorial and geometric.
Distances between cities of a given size or rank are more or less uniform,
as is the relation of city size to the dimensions of the territory served
(Figure 3-la). Topographic irregularities of course modify this mosaic,
but for the most part the spacing of the cities in central place systems is
regular. By contrast the network system consists of linkages dictated by
profit and facilitated by water transport, which blunt the effects of distance.
Even in the transfer of ideas, a case in which bulk is not an issue, distance
OCR for page 74
74
LYNN HOLLEN LEES AND PAUL M. HOHENBERG
O Major center
O City in question /' X X
/
O Lesser city ~X
X Small town
Coastline
-
-
a. Central Place System
core periphery
-
hinterland ,/lx
~ 1:
friend
b. Network System
to
j
to\-I\x
X ~ X /'
umland ~
FIGURE 3-1 Patterns of interaction for cities in two different urban systems:
central place system (3-la) and network system (3-lb). From Hohenberg and
Lees (1985~. Reprinted by permission.
proves a greater barrier to exchange in the central place system than in
the network system. In the latter, principal centers may well be clustered,
as in northern Italy and the Low Countries during the Middle Ages or
along the East Coast in contemporary America; or they may surround an
inland sea, each serving as a gateway to a region of the interior, as Braudel
(1966) so vividly illustrated for the case of the Mediterranean. Indeed,
the clustering of major centers in wealthy areas, compared to their wider
spacing in many agriculturally rich but less economically active territories,
is a phenomenon that the central place model cannot explain. Because
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HOW CITIES GREW IN THE WESTERN WORLD
75
this model implies that each large city commands a region in which internal
exchange is more intense than external trade, it deals poorly with the
active, long-distance exchanges of people and goods directed through
highly urbanized areas.
An urban system does not require geographic compactness or symmetry.
Instead, transportation linkages can overcome the barrier of distance, and
infrastructures can be created to support asymmetrical flows of commod-
ities and population. The huge port areas of Rotterdam and Hamburg or
the railway yards in Essen were built not for the economic exchanges of
a central place region but for an international trading system.
THE DYNAMICS OF GROWTH AND CHANGE
Long waves of population growth provided the human material for city
building. Although statistical data for medieval and early modern times
are often incomplete and unreliable, the combination of tax records, house-
hold listings, demographic registers, and censuses yields plausible esti-
mates for the sizes of major cities and for overall patterns of growth and
decline (Bairoch, 1985; de Vries, 1984; Russell, 19721. Demographers
estimate that the European population rose steadily from around the year
1000 to 1350, after which it declined. Increases predominated from 1450
to 1600, and accelerated growth resumed well after 1700. Tabulations for
the period 1600-1700 are disputed, but regional variations probably add
up to a slight decline in overall population. Changes in the sizes of Eu-
ropean regional capitals illustrate both the timing and the magnitude of
growth (Figure 3-24. The demographic engine produced in Europe three
periods when increasing numbers of people had to be accommodated by
social and economic systems and by urban infrastructures. The first and
third witnessed large jumps in the urban share of population; the second
was marked by shifts within a more static urban sector.
Historical patterns of urbanization reflect the interaction of geography
and economic development with the availability of human capital. The
first, post-Roman wave of city creation rested on the secure base of rising
agricultural productivity. At a time of relatively low population density
and weak political centralization, the most common urban type was the
market town in which the predominantly rural population could sell its
surplus and buy locally manufactured goods. Central place systems of
cities fed by short-distance and step-by-step migration grew up in most
parts of western and southern Europe, as well as England. Long-distance
trade also encouraged urban growth, primarily along waterways and sea-
coasts. Between the years 1000 and 1350, thousands of settlements; ac-
quired the social, economic, and legal characteristics of cities, becoming
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76
LYNN HOLLEN LEES AND PA UL M. HOHENBERG
Population (log scale)
2,000,000
1,000,000
1 00,000
,~':
,, ~
Milan
/Lyons /
'/ / ~__
/ r Cologne
10,000 ~, , Date
1000 1200 1400 1600 1800 1950
Figure 3-2 Growth of provincial capitals, 100~1950. Data from Chandler and
Fox (19741. From Hohenberg and Lees (19851. Reprinted by permission.
important forces in an essentially rural, sometimes feudal environment.
City creation and the rapid buildup of central place urban networks were
the order of the day. Castle towns and settlements with newly granted
market rights multiplied all the way from Ireland through eastern Europe.
The next phase of urban development, between 1450 and 1650, was
markedly different. Population growth remained relatively slow, hindered
by plague, war, and famine. Economic competition undermined the pros-
perity of Mediterranean towns; empires in the Americas brought both costs
and benefits to cities along the Atlantic coast (Hohenberg and Lees, 19851.
The result was a redistribution of the urban population among regions and
types of towns (de Vries, 19841. Few new cities were founded, and overall
rates of urban growth slowed. Revival from the demographic losses of
the fourteenth century was concentrated among the larger market towns
and regional capitals. Hundreds of medieval towns, particularly in southern
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HOW CITIES GREW IN THE WESTEW WORLD
77
France and central Europe, disappeared or became villages once more.
But capital cities and ports grew explosively. Short-term declines in the
urban populations of Italy, Spain, and the Low Countries were counter-
balanced by the rising urbanization of England and Scandinavia. In the
sixteenth century, a northern core of towns displaced the older southern
cities, and rivalries among Antwerp, Amsterdam, and London replaced
earlier Italian competitions for influence (Braudel, 19791.
During this period when Europe asserted its leadership over an enlarged
world economy, network system linkages brought more growth than did
local trade. Nevertheless, the fastest growth of city populations at this
time occurred in the capitals and court cities of dynastic states, the cap-
stones of central place systems (Table 3-11. The political centralization
of kingdoms, with the associated power to levy increased taxes and rents,
brought growth to the top levels of urban hierarchies at the expense of
smaller towns. In several cases for example, France, Spain, and southern
Italy centralization and exploitation led to primacy in urban size distri-
butions as oversized capitals (Paris, Madrid, Naples) dominated an oth-
erwise static urban ensemble. These early metropolises drew resources
from the rest of the kingdom without stimulating economic growth else-
where (Ringrose, 19831. London, which was also England's principal
seaport and manufacturing town, is one of the few exceptions to the
hypothesis that, at this time, great size and rapid expansion in a political
capital were a sign of poor rather than good economic health in the urban
system as a whole.
Two dynamics of growth, each characteristic of a different urban sys-
tem, can be observed at this time. Network system centers grew on the
basis of specialized activities, often that of international trade. As a result,
they tended to stimulate development at sources of supply, for example,
in colonies or other distant places (Wallerstein, 19741. In urban distri-
butions, therefore, network systems encouraged the development of new
cities in peripheral territories as well as the development of specialized
places, such as mining towns, resorts, and ports. Growth rates were in-
versely related to size and tended to level off among the larger centers.
But in the older central place systems of western and southern Europe,
where new towns rarely arose, increasing centralization resulted in primacy
with growth rates biased toward higher order urban places (Hohenberg
and Lees, 19851.
Urban growth after 1750, during the long phase of population increase
and industrialization that continues today, has also been channeled through
both network and central place systems. Most strikingly, new cities de-
veloped in large numbers for the first time since the Middle Ages as
settlers were attracted to the sites of industrial production. In particular,
OCR for page 78
78
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OCR for page 79
HOW CITIES GREW IN THE WESTERN WORLD
79
when large coal deposits were opened up and heavy industry gathered
near the pitheads, explosive urbanization of formerly rural areas resulted.
New linkages among producers, exporters, and consumers were created
to handle the increasing volume of production and trade. The Ruhr, with
its rapidly expanding pattern of canals, railroads, roads, and towns, is the
classic example, but England's Black Country and the Belgian Borinage
should also be kept in mind (Reulecke, 1984; Steinberg, 19671. In the
territory around originally small settlements, urbanization disregarded cen-
tral place patterns of market centers and instead engulfed and absorbed
villages and small towns alike. Many of these new "cities" lacked the
urban services and functions common to central places. Financial and
other services came from outside, and the internal cultural and adminis-
trative links were forged later, if at all.
Such industrial conurbations developed in ways quite foreign to the
central place dynamic but readily accounted for in the network system
model. Specialized activity in an isolated location implies strong ties with
more distant locations because industrial settlements remained dependent
for all essentials: food, finance, markets, and even people. The steel
furnaces of the Ruhr were fed by iron from Lorraine and Asturias; yet
they also drew on Polish workers, Russian wheat, and Hungarian cattle.
Meanwhile, the region's larger banks moved to Berlin. Proximity could
not preserve the influence of the older Rhenish financial centers over the
Ruhr's industry (Reulecke, 1984; Steinberg, 19671.
Although network linkages fostered the early stages of industrial ur-
banization, a resurgence of the economic power of the larger, older central
places can be seen during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
when technological processes made it both more feasible and more at-
tractive to concentrate industrial activities in existing cities. Railways
linked the bigger towns, and electric power transmission severed the lo-
cational pull of the pithead. Ready access to labor and markets soon
outweighed the lure of cheap land and raw materials. In Europe after 1880
the result was an acceleration in the centralizing tendency of central place
systems. Growth tended to be concentrated in and on the outskirts of major
capitals and conurbations, and rapid migration from rural areas to major
cities accentuated the imbalance. Industrial activities congregated in ports
and national centers. But the expansion of service employment ranging
from retail trade and construction to intellectual, artistic, and scientific
pursuits alongside finance and administration accounted for much of the
growth. The largest cities by far were those that combined a multiplicity
of functions.
If a list of the 40 largest cities in Europe in 1750 is compared with
similar lists for 1850 and 1950, the continued dominance of political
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80
LYNN HOLLEN LEES AND PA UL M. HOHEI!iBERG
capitals is striking. A few cities from the Mediterranean area Venice,
Palermo, and Granada-disappear from the lists, and a handful of in-
dustrial cities, such as Manchester, Birmingham, and Katowice, become
urban giants. For the most part, however, the top ranks of the European
urban system continued to be occupied by political capitals, which com-
bined service and production functions with their administrative powers
(see Table 3-21.
This numerical predominance of political capitals highlights the most
important centripetal influence on urban systems, the increasing role of
information as opposed to raw labor and materials. Over time, economies
of agglomeration outweighed economies of scale and vertical integration,
so crucial to heavy industrial complexes. The proximity of government
offices, suppliers, competitors, and financiers has drawn entrepreneurs
into the major towns.
The concentration of people and activities in large and very large cit-
ies the growth of the threatening and imposing metropolis could pro-
ceed only so far, however, before cost and congestion imposed a reversal
in the trend. In the twentieth century, rising land prices in combination
with the decentralizing potential of the internal combustion engine and
the mass ownership of automobiles have permitted the dispersion of routine
production tasks. In the longer run, chemical factories shifted away from
Paris (Gaillard, 1977), and docks in central London were abandoned for
sites downriver. Nevertheless, the long-run choices of entrepreneurs for
the siting of companies are only partially explained by the direct costs of
production. The extraordinary flow of new English industry into the Lon-
don region, despite its higher wages, rents, and land prices, illustrates the
pull of the metropolis for both managers and workers (Hall, 19661. And
although the computer permits easy dispersion of personnel, the attraction
of both Silicon Valley and Boston's Route 128 for new entrants in the
industry shows economies of agglomeration at work in the United States.
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF INFRASTRUCTURES
Urban sytems are far more than physical structures. To be sure, their
roads, airports, and telephone lines have a physical existence. But re-
member that cities with six-digit populations long antedated railroads and
turnpikes. Cities were magnets for people and ideas before modern tech-
nology developed elaborate infrastructures to link them. Feet brought new
citizens from mountain villages to towns in the plain, and ships linked
Greek coastal city-states to counterparts throughout the Mediterranean.
Studies of interurban systems need to include the intangible links be-
tween central places, ties that shape the formation of physical structures.
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HOW CITIES GREW IN THE WESTERN WORLD
TABLE 3-2 Leading Cities of the European Hierarchy in 1750, 1850,
and 1950 (population in thousands)
81
1750
1850
1950
Rank City Pop. City Pop. City Pop.
1 London 676 London 2,320 London 8,860
2 Paris 560 Paris 1,310 Paris 5,900
3 Naples 324 St. Petersburg 502 Moscow 5,100
4 Amsterdam 219 Berlin 446 Ruhr 4,900
5 Lisbon 213 Vienna 426 Berlin 3,707
6 Vienna 169 Liverpool 422 Leningrad 2,700
7 Moscow 161 Naples 416 Manchester 2,382
8 Venice 158 Manchester 412 Birmingham 2,196
9 Rome 157 Moscow 373 Vienna 1,755
10 St. Petersburg 138 Glasgow 346 Rome 1,655
11 Dublin 125 Birmingham 294 Hamburg 1,580
12 Palermo 124 Dublin 263 Madrid 1,527
13 Madrid 123 Madrid 263 Budapest 1,500
14 Milan 123 Lisbon 257 Barcelona 1,425
15 Lyons 115 Lyons 254 Milan 1,400
16 Berlin 113 Amsterdam 225 Glasgow 1,320
17 Hamburg 90 Brussels 208 Liverpool 1,260
18 Marseille 88 Edinburgh 194 Naples 1,210
19 Rouen 88 Hamburg 193 Leeds 1,164
20 Copenhagen 79 Marseille 193 Copenhagen 1,150
21 Florence 74 Milan 193 Athens 1,140
22 Genoa 72 Leeds 184 Bucharest 1,100
23 Granada 70 Palermo 182 Katowice 977
24 Barcelona 70 Rome 170 Brussels 964
25 Seville 68 Barcelona 167 Amsterdam 940
26 Bologna 66 Warsaw 163 Prague 938
27 Bordeaux 64 Budapest 156 Stockholm 889
28 Turin 60 Bristol 150 Lisbon 885
29 Valencia 60 Sheffield 143 Munich 870
30 Cadiz 60 Bordeaux 142 Newcastle 830
31 Stockholm 60 Venice 141 Rotterdam 803
32 Dresden 60 Turin 138 Warsaw 803
33 Prague 58 Copenhagen 135 Kiev 800
34 Brussels 55 Munich 125 Kharkov 730
35 Edinburgh 55 Prague 117 Sheffield 730
36 Lille 54 Breslau 114 Turin 725
37 Cork 53 Wolverhampton 112 Cologne 692
38 Breslau 52 Newcastle 111 Frankfurt 680
39 Koenigsberg 52 Valencia 110 Genoa 676
40 Leiden 50 Ghent 108 Lodz 675
SOURCE: Chandler and Fox (1974).
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82
LYNN HOLLEN LEES AND PA UL M. HOHENBERG
For example, one basic urban service is the provision of information.
Through resident experts, schools, newspapers, and other institutions,
cities provide information to their hinterlands, and critical linkages are
forged by the movement of people and paper along regular channels of
communication. Moreover, innovations are diffused by means of urban
elites and institutions. New ideas and inventions speed across national
boundaries through the channels of the network system and then are adopted
by people and institutions connected in regional urban hierarchies. Power
plants, telephone exchanges, and printing presses have tended to appear
early in capital or very large cities and then to diffuse downward through
central place systems. Although these technologies generated a tangible
infrastructure, they only gave form to preexisting ties. In the twentieth
century, the growth of a "wired society" permits the decentralization of
many management and service activities; yet paradoxically, these activities
are just the functions that cluster in metropolitan areas. Large-scale man-
ufacturing plants, which thrive on cheap land and easy transportation, are
much more likely to decentralize than management or finance, which use
the amenities of the city to attract highly skilled workers and use its roads,
mass transit, schools, and information services to link employees in a
high-density environment. Managers have realized that creativity is fos-
tered by the propinquities of the city.
The ability of urban populations to innovate is also shaped by the
systemic, political ties of towns outside their borders. For centuries, pat-
terns of urban governance have varied with the type of interurban con-
nection. Whereas central places are economically somewhat insular, deriving
their principal activities from local service functions, they have been
politically dependent on an outside authority. Central places, after all,
administer the area around them. Except for national capitals, this function
is delegated from the top of the urban hierarchy. By contrast, the network
system forges close economic ties among cities often geographically
distant and functionally dissimilar with no necessary political ties. Ideally,
the network city is politically autonomous because governmental central-
ization inhibits the fluidity of those interurban ties on which network cities
thrive. The most economically successful trading cities of the past places
such as Venice, Hamburg, and Amsterdam remained on the peripheries
of European nation-states during their periods of dominance (Rokkan,
19751.
This contrast between the political dependence of central place towns
and the relative independence of network centers has shaped the financing
of municipal government as well as investment in major improvements.
Central places, other than national capitals, have limited resources of their
own. They act as conduits for revenues and expenditures controlled by
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HOW CITIES GREW IN THE WESTERN WORLD
83
the territorial administration. Such cities must compete, often unsuccess-
fully, for a share of national resources. Capitals, whose buildings sym-
bolize both a state and a particular regime, are best situated to profit from
this competition. There, the desire for glory or the need to maintain public
order in the face of crisis often results in physical improvements. This is
an odd but continuing story. Compare the levels of governmental spending
on streets, water supplies, and public buildings in nineteenth-century Paris
or seventeenth-century Madrid with those of smaller towns in France or
Spain (Evenson, 1969; Ringrose, 19831. In contrast, network cities, al-
though typically oligarchic rather than democratic entities, have had greater
control of their own resources as well as a lively sense of the value of
the investment in both collective and individual ventures. Local funds
built Amsterdam's canals, modernized Liverpool's port, and added parks
to central Milan (Dalmosso, 1971; Konvitz, 1985; Vigier, 19701. Whereas
formerly independent German trading cities have maintained traditions of
large-scale public investment in services and municipal buildings, the level
of such expenditures in France and Spain, countries where even network
cities have been kept under relatively strong central control, has been low.
Urban resources and the infrastructures they generate vary with the
nature of a city's exchange relations. Indeed, the adoption of new tech-
nologies depends heavily on networks of communication and finance,
which are generated by a city's regional and international position. The
analysis of infrastructures therefore requires examination of urban systems
as they have evolved through time and as they persist today.
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Representative terms from entire chapter:
hollen lees
