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OCR for page 1
Executive Summary
The U.S. Army requested the National Research Council
(NRC) to form a committee to review the design for the fa-
cility intended to dispose of some 1,200 recovered non-
stockpile munitions in storage at its Pine Bluff (Arkansas)
Arsenal (PBA). These munitions, consisting mostly of 4.2-in.
mortar rounds containing sulfur mustard agent and 15-cm
German Traktor rockets (GTRs) containing a variety of fills,
account for most of the non-stockpile inventory located
there. Non-stockpile chemical materiel (NSCM) is materiel
not in the current U.S. inventory of chemical munitions. It
includes buried and recovered materiel (munitions or other),
components of binary chemical weapons, former production
facilities, and miscellaneous materiel. Much of the NSCM
was buried at current and former military installations in 31
states, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and the District of Columbia
(U.S. Army, 1996~.
This executive summary discusses the committee's pri-
mary recommendations only; additional recommendations
are found in Chapters 2 through 6.
NON-STOCKPILE MATERIEL AT THE PINE BLUFF
ARSENAL
The non-stockpile inventory at PBA (Table 1-1) accounts
for about 85 percent of the known non-stockpile materiel in
the United States. About 97 percent of this materiel was either
recovered from excavated burial pits on the PBA site or has
always been in storage at the site. The other 3 percent was
transported from other sites around the country. The most
problematic items are the 1,200-plus recovered munitions
filled with agent or containing residual amounts of agent.
Many of these munitions also contain energetic materials
whose stability may have deteriorated over time. The Pine
Bluff Non-Stockpile Facility (PBNSF) is designed to handle
the destruction of these recovered munitions. Other means will
be used to destroy the other non-stockpile items at PBA.
The PBNSF site will occupy approximately 25 acres. As
currently configured, the main process facility will be a
1
40,000 ft2 building containing accessing and treatment fa-
cilities, along with support facilities (see Chapter 2~.
PBNSF relies in large part on legacy equipment from the
discontinued Munitions Management Device (MMD)
project, as well as on processing equipment developed un-
der the Assembled Chemical Weapons Assessment
(ACWA) program, which examined alternatives to incin-
eration for stockpile disposal. The PBNSF equipment con-
sists of trailer-mounted units that can be transported to new
locations and assembled. The decision to reuse existing
MMD equipment has resulted in continuing modifications,
particularly to the explosive containment chamber (ECC)
units, and in constraints on accessibility within the chemi-
cal processing trailer. PBNSF will employ neutralization
and/or oxidation technologies to destroy the chemical
agents. A process flow diagram of the PBNSF is shown in
Figure ES-1.
THE TASK FOR THE COMMITTEE AND THE
COMMITTEE'S FINDINGS
In accordance with the statement of task (see Preface),
the committee reviewed engineering design plans for the
construction of PBNSF and plans for its operation. The com-
mittee did not identify any single event or action that has a
high probability of preventing the implementation of PBNSF
but also concluded that the basic design of PBNSF, as con-
figured at the time this report was finalized, is incomplete. In
addition, the committee noted that because the PBNSF
schedule must adhere to the munitions destruction require-
ments of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), there
is very little slack in the time available for construction, test-
ing, and operation of the PBNSF. As an alternative solution,
the committee asserts that use of multiple explosive destruc-
tion system (EDS) units will work better, with less risk, and
in a more timely manner.
The following issues remain to be resolved if PBNSF is
to achieve the goal of destroying recovered chemical war-
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2
ASSESSMENT OF THE ARMY PLAN FOR THE PINE BLUFF NON-STOCKPILE FACILITY
MUNITIONS FROM
_ ~ STORAGE IGLOOS
WORKLOAD
Uncontaminated I
Overpacks to |
Reuse or-- - ~ ~ __ . SAMPLING &
~ 4 LEA is, UNPACK
STATION ]~ Leaking munition
Process Water _
1
I Safe munitions |
.
1-'--''-~ ' 1
STORAGE
WARh/IING
ok munition ~ * *
r ~ Drained Agent ~
ECC ~ Auxilla gent Sensate - - '
I , PV~ ~ Pacers fig Vessel __ *~ jP~
. I Drained Agent ,,, ~ ~ `_ ~ *t I
ff> ~ munition body Neutralized
v' . . . - ~ . , ~ ~ _' ~ Waste
>' ~ ~ ~ _ ~ ~
n I ~~~ i-' '~--~ munitiorl body '' ~ HELL DISSOLVING [
_
tc
lows ~
~ ~—
METAL DECON ~
UNITS l l-
.= Non-Energetic|
munition body
. , , ,, '*
~ ~ ~ CUTTING
... ... .. _=. ~ . . .
DETONATION .. _ Metal neuron
CHAMBER Large Metal Pieces
1 ~
Metal Pieces _
~ Decon Sup:
~ .. ... _-
Reagent ~ 1
~3
Tl
'R3
Process Water T II
| | I | Process Water |
Process water l l
1
STORAGE
TANKS
Spent
I Decon
| Solution
~ *| TREATMENT |
Liquid Waste to
treatment,
storage, and
disposal facility
Repackaged Metal
~ ~ ~ P'ecesto Rock
Metal ~ PREPACKAGING ~ ~ *, Island Arsenal
I Smelter or
1
~ elsewhere
FIGURE ES-1 Process flow diagram of the PBNSF. SOURCE: U.S. Army (2002b).
fare materiel (RCWM) safely and in accordance with the
schedule defined in the CWC:
The ability of the PBNSF processing equipment to pro-
cess energetically configured 4.2-in. mortar rounds
containing gelled or solidified mustard agent has not
been demonstrated.
The current PBNSF design has not been demonstrated
to be able to neutralize the arsenical fills in some of the
GTRs.
While the Army has determined the design to be con-
sistent with Army safety regulations, the inability of
the building as designed to withstand the maximum
credible event (MCE) seems inconsistent with the con-
gressional mandate to provide "maximum protection
for the environment, the general public, and the per-
sonnel who are involved in the destruction of the lethal
chemical agents and munitions" 50 U.S.C. Section
1521(c)~1~(A).i
i"Maximum protection for the environment" is discussed in Appendix
D of Review of the Army Non-Stockpile Chemical Materiel Disposal Pro-
gram: Disposal of Chemical Agent Identification Sets (NRC, 1999).
In addition to having concerns about the unresolved de-
sign issues that will affect the currently proposed schedule,
the committee has serious reservations about the ability to
meet this schedule even if no further changes are made to the
design. An assessment by the Army Corps of Engineers,
Little Rock District, independently confirms these reserva-
tions and leaves no doubt that even minor issues such as a
delay of more than 5 minutes per trip in accessing the site or
the effect of rainfall on the workability of the soil, two issues
raised by the Corps of Engineers would result in a failure
to meet the proposed schedule (see Chapter 2~.
Recommendation 2-1: If the current design for the Pine
Bluff Non-Stockpile Facility is pursued, a realistic schedule
should be developed based on the time required to properly
perform the engineering, construction, commissioning, and
processing steps. As part of this task, the required basic de-
sign criteria must be finalized. In addition, process hazard
analyses must be completed and any issues raised by them
resolved.
The committee has serious reservations about the desir-
ability of implementing the PBNSF design concept. In this
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
report, the committee sets forth its reservations about worker
safety, the risk of failure to achieve the April 2007 deadline
set by the CWC, cost, complexity, and the relative lack of
robustness that is inherent in the current design.
The committee recommends that the Army promptly
evaluate multi-EDS alternatives (described in Chapter 6) for
destroying the PEA non-stockpile inventory. Based on ex-
isting information, this alternative could perform most if not
all of the tasks intended for PBNSF as currently envisaged,
doing so via a demonstrated technology, with improved
safety and simplicity and lower costs.
EFFECTS OF THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION
DEADLINE
The Army is constrained by the CWC treaty and legisla-
tive mandates to destroy the munitions assigned to PBNSF
by April 29, 2007.2 This constrant imposes an arbitrary
deadline and creates serious conflicts. The April 29, 2007,
deadline is independent of budget constraints imposed by
Congress and does not take into account the unique com-
plexity of disassembling aging, unstable weapons that con-
tain not only deadly chemical agent but also explosives and
energetics. In addition, the deadline does not recognize the
technological limitations of the nonincineration technologies
that are used to destroy the chemical agents or the challenge
of satisfying both the regulatory requirements and the
public's desire that these weapons be destroyed in as safe a
manner as possible.
These technological challenges, combined with the unre-
solved design issues for PBNSF, outlined above, increase
uncertainty about whether the Army can attain the April 29,
2007, treaty deadline with the existing PBNSF approach. If
the design criteria that are finally agreed upon require modi-
fications to the initial assumptions and result in delays, the
pressure on the schedule will increase still further. This could
result in even less time for performing the engineering tasks
required to design, construct, and systemize PBNSF than is
available under the present schedule. The Army Corps of
Engineers, Little Rock District, appears to share this con-
cern. In a letter to the Product Manager for Non-Stockpile
Chemical Materiel (PMNS CM), it expresses the concern that
the development of the basic design is proceeding in parallel
with (rather than prior to) the design of the building.
Recommendation 2-3: As soon as possible, the Army
should systematically review the design integration and op-
eration of all the equipment in the Pine Bluff Non-Stockpile
2Late in the report review process, the Army announced that the United
States would not meet the 45 percent chemical weapons stockpile destruc-
tion deadline of April 29, 2004, and requested an extension of the deadline
until December 2007 (DoD, 2003). However, the Product Manager for Non-
Stockpile Chemical Materiel has stated that the non-stockpile program in-
tends to meet the April 29, 2007, deadline.
3
Facility (including piping, connections, and vessels) to find
ways for simplifying the processing taking place there. This
review should identify ways of (1) minimizing the chances
for equipment or operational or human failures, using pre-
ventive redesign and related measures to reduce reliance on
protective clothing and (2) optimizing the reliability of the
Pine Bluff Non-Stockpile Facility processes.
PINE BLUFF NON-STOCKPILE FACILITY
CONTAINMENT DESIGN
The Product Manager for Non-Stockpile Chemical Mate-
riel has defined the MCE for the PBNSF design as the deto-
nation of a fully configured GTR motor and warhead combi-
nation while being processed in the PBNSF. The MCE is
important because it is used as the basis for facility design.
While it is difficult to predict the likelihood of the MCE with
any degree of certainty, it is important to review such poten-
tial events and investigate designs that protect against even
low probability risks when consequences might be severe.
The committee recognizes that the PBNSF design calls
for the MCE to be completely contained, but only when that
GTR is actually being processed within the ECC-2. How-
ever, should the MCE occur within PBNSF but outside the
ECC-2, there would be a release of fragments and agent to
the immediate area outside the PBNSF building; there are
similar concerns should a fully configured GTR be detonated
in transit. Nothing in this report should be construed as ex-
pressing the view that such a release is likely to occur.
The U.S. Army, citing Department of the Army Pamphlet
385-61 (U.S. Army, 2002a) Section 6.6 requirements with
respect to containment, reports that this condition MCE
containment only when occurring within the ECC is the
required level of protection for both the stockpile and the
non-stockpile disposal programs. However, should the MCE
occur outside the ECC-2, it would almost certainly result in
severe worker injuries or death and trigger a public outcry
and regulatory review that would seriously delay the comple-
tion of the PBNSF task regardless of the impact on the per-
sonnel and the environment. For this reason, the committee
believes that it would be preferable to design the entire
PBNSF to contain the MCE. The possibility of the MCE
occurring outside the ECC-2 also supports the committee's
recommendation to develop a system to decouple the GTR
motor/warhead combinations in a separate facility designed
to contain both explosions and releases of lethal chemicals
with a minimum of transportation and handling.
Separating the GTR warhead from the rocket motor and
processing only the warhead in PBNSF would increase the
safety of the PBNSF operation by eliminating the only situ-
ation where the energetic capacity of the munition exceeds
the containment capacity of the building.
Recommendation 3-2: The German Traktor rocket war-
heads should be separated from the rocket motors and only
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4
the warheads should be allowed to enter the Pine Bluff Non-
Stockpile Facility so as to reduce the maximum credible
event to a level that can be fully contained by the structure.
The Army should continue to investigate thoroughly the fea-
sibility of separating the German Traktor rocket motors from
their warheads to determine how and where these operations
can be accomplished safely.
Confirming the contents of RCWM items at PBNSF will
occur in two stages:
.
· The munition will be unpacked, examined, analyzed,
and classified at the Pine Bluff munitions assessment
system (PBMAS) and then returned to storage.
The munition will be assessed by x-ray and checked
for leakage in the receiving room when the munition is
first unpacked in the PBNSF facility prior to disposal.
The munition is then sent to the next processing module,
which is determined based upon its configuration (agent and
explosive content) and condition (clean, corroded, etc.~.
Two options exist for gaining access to the chemical agents
contained within the munitions. In general, munitions that
contain energetics will be processed in one of the two ECC
units, which are designed to contain the force of an explosion,
should one occur during the drilling and draining operations.
Those without energetics will typically be processed in the
projectile washout system (PWS) developed under the ACWA
program, which has a much higher capacity but is not config-
ured to withstand an accidental detonation. Complete descrip-
tions of these operations are in Chapter 2.
MANAGEMENT OF SECONDARY WASTES
The primary agent neutralization operations in PBNSF
will be treatment of arsenicals using caustic or an oxidant as
the neutralizing agent, treatment of nitrogen mustard using
monoethanolamine as the neutralizing agent, and treatment
of sulfur mustard, again using monoethanolamine as the neu-
tralizing agent. While substantial in volume, the quantities
of neutralent and decontamination solution generated will
be small in comparison with those routinely handled by com-
mercial treatment, storage, and disposal facilities.
The Army plans to dispose of secondary waste from
PBNSF at offsite locations through a contract awarded to
Shaw Environmental, Inc. Shaw is required to team with one
or more commercial hazardous waste treatment, storage, and
disposal facilities to transport and dispose of secondary
wastes from all Non-Stockpile Chemical Materiel Product
(NSCMP) projects, including PBNSF. The contract states
that nonincineration treatment is preferred to incineration
treatment. The preference for nonincineration technology is
part of a decades-long trend, first toward incineration as a
preferred treatment technology, then away from incineration
(NRC, 1994, 2002a).
ASSESSMENT OF THE ARMY PLAN FOR THE PINE BLUFF NON-STOCKPILE FACILITY
REGULATORY APPROVAL AND PERMITTING
Before PBNSF can be constructed and operated, regula-
tors and the public must be satisfied that planned operations
can be carried out within the federal and state regulatory and
legal framework. The regulatory approval and permitting
process involves in-depth examination of the Army's pro-
posed treatment technologies and the requirements they must
meet, and provides opportunities for public involvement in
the decision making.
Under Arkansas regulations, since the parent agent wastes
are not listed as hazardous waste on the basis of agent con-
tent (see Chapter 5), neither would be any secondary wastes
that result from primary treatment. However, the non-stock-
pile items themselves, along with the neutralent and most
other secondary wastes, will most likely fall in the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act category of ignitable, corro-
sive, toxic, or reactive waste and will on that basis (not be-
cause of agent content) be specified as hazardous waste.
Recommendation 5-1: For non-stockpile materiel to be pro-
cessed at the Pine Bluff Non-Stockpile Facility, the Army
should describe risk-based treatment goals for chemical
agent destruction in publicly available documentation. The
Army should also describe agent-related treatment goals for
secondary wastes treated at offsite treatment, storage, and
disposal facilities (e.g., for Schedule 2 compounds) in pub-
licly available documentation. Treatment goals for related
non-stockpile operations at the Pine Bluff Arsenal for ex-
ample, the rapid response system and the explosive destruc-
tion system should also be discussed in publicly available
documents.
PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT
The involvement of the public in significant, potentially
controversial activities such as the NSCMP is not only a
legal requirement but also a key element of mission success.
Public involvement means working with a range of "pub-
lics," or stakeholders. It has three components: (1) early pro-
vision of public information; (2) outreach, or opening chan-
nels of communication to allow the public to articulate its
values, concerns, and needs; and (3) involvement, or provid-
ing mechanisms that engage the public and allow it to pro-
vide input and influence agency decisions (NRC, 2002a).
The committee commends the Army for its continued
commitment to working effectively with the Core Group (a
group established by NSCMP to exchange information and
opinions on non-stockpile issues) in addressing issues raised
among stakeholders at the national level; for improving co-
ordination among the various chemical weapons programs
at local installations; and for increasing the visibility of non-
stockpile activities at Pine Bluff and informal public-Army
interactions. The committee believes that the NSCMP is in a
position to build upon both the Pine Bluff area community's
. .
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
unusually positive, or at least accepting, view of its proposed
activities, as well as on its effective working relationships
with national-level stakeholders.
Recommendation 5-4: The committee recommends that the
Product Manager for Non-Stockpile Chemical Materiel en-
hance public involvement by (1) identifying and addressing
the reasons for limited participation by the public in meet-
ings at Pine Bluff; (2) establishing an informal advisory
group at Pine Bluff similar to a restoration advisory board;
(3) augmenting the national Core Group with citizen stake-
holders from Pine Bluff and from the yet-to-be determined
location of the facility that is selected to treat and dispose of
the secondary wastes from the Pine Bluff Non-Stockpile
Facility; and (4) ensuring that the contractors for disposal
of secondary wastes gores) beyond information and outreach
activities to involve local community stakeholders.
Recommendation 5-6: As part of the public involvement
process, the Army should consider preparing a new docu-
ment that describes, in layman's terms, the treatment tech-
nologies and facilities being proposed for non-stockpile ma-
teriel at Pine Bluff. These technologies include those outside
the Pine Bluff Non-Stockpile Facility and should include the
technologies ultimately selected to treat neutralent off-site.
The document might include a timeline and a summary of
the cumulative environmental impacts. It would give the
public a clear understanding of the proposed actions and help
them to understand the operation of each technology and the
interrelationships among them.
ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES
While evaluating the existing PBNSF design, the com-
mittee concluded that there are preferable alternative ap-
proaches to destruction of the non-stockpile chemical mate-
riel stored at PEA. The alternatives involve greater use of
the well-proven EDS and would be simpler, more reliable,
less expensive, and safer because of the smaller number of
munition handling steps and improved ability to meet the
CWC. That is, the simplicity and reliability of the EDS of-
fers easier operation and maintenance while improving the
safety of workers, the public, and the environment.
The new challenges that would be posed by changing to a
new operational concept at this late stage in the design plan-
ning for PBNSF should be no greater than those associated
with meeting the deadline with currently planned PBNSF
operations.
Although the committee concludes that PBNSF, as cur-
rently designed, may be workable subject to the findings
and recommendations contained in this report it has seri-
ous reservations about the desirability of doing so. Employ-
ing the complex prototype equipment inherited from the dis-
continued non-stockpile MMD program and the stockpile
ACWA program has caused many modifications to the de-
sign of an integrated system for PBNSF. Further, the com-
plexity of the current PBNSF design raises concerns about
the sheer number of munition processing and handling steps.
In addition, the current PBNSF processing procedure appears
less capable than the EDS of dealing with unexpected varia-
tions in munition type and condition. For example, a
mischaracterized munition could cause serious problems in
the ECC or in the PWS, operations where there is more
manual handling and the processing steps are more variable
than in the EDS. In contrast, the EDS explosively accesses
the munition content and, in doing so, destroys much of the
agent. Any remaining agent is destroyed via a neutralization
reaction. The key issue is the ability to access the surfaces
that contain agent, whether liquid, gelled, or solidified. The
EDS is demonstrably superior to the PBNSF drill and drain
equipment in exposing the interiors of the munitions and
allowing the reagents to contact any residual agent.
Two or three EDS units can perform most if not all of the
tasks currently planned to be performed at PBNSF. The com-
mittee considered two basic ways in which EDS systems
could replace some of the problematic aspects of the current
PBNSF design. Both options assume that EDS units can be
made available for use in destroying non-stockpile materials
intended for PBNSF.
Option 1
Option 1 would eliminate all of the processing equipment
(ECC-1, ECC-2, PWS, heel-dissolving tanks, detonation
chamber (DET), metal decontamination unit (MDU), and the
chemical processing trailer (CPT)) from the current design
for PBNSF. In their place, multiple EDS units could be used
to dispose of the non-stockpile inventory at PEA (with the
exception of GTRs, whose propellant contents exceed the
explosive containment capacity of the EDS-2~. If it is pos-
sible to remove the rocket motors from the 31 GTRs whose
rocket motors contain propellant, EDS-2 systems can be used
to dispose of the entire PEA inventory. Calculations are pro-
vided in Appendix C. In addition to the factors cited above,
an important advantage of the EDS over the current PBNSF
design is that it is a well-proven system. Complete elimina-
tion of the currently designed PBNSF processing equipment
could eliminate much manual handling, reduce exposure
potential, save much of the anticipated cost of equipment
modification, and reduce or eliminate the cost of a perma-
nent building.
Option 2
Option 2 would replace the PWS and the ECC-1 with
EDS units but retain the ECC-2 for processing the 31 com-
plete GTRs with propellant-filled rocket motors if the mo-
tors cannot be removed from the warheads safely. Use of the
ECC-2 is necessary to process the complete GTRs because
the total net explosive weight of the GTR, including propel-
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6
ASSESSMENT OF THE ARMY PLAN FOR THE PINE BLUFF NON-STOCKPILE FACILITY
lant, exceeds the containment capacity of both EDS systems. from the Environmental Protection Agency and three states
Retention of the ECC-2 necessitates retention of several aux- and that it has a good track record.
iliary facilities, including the chemical processing trailer, a
heel-dissolving tank, the DET, and an MDU. The Army is
evaluating options akin to Option 2 in which an EDS unit
would be used in addition to PBNSF to ensure destruction of
the PEA inventory of RCWM by April 2007.
Factors for Consideration
Both Option 1 and Option 2 would involve modification
of the current plan for a building to house PBNSF. In Option
2, which retains the ECC-2 and its supporting facilities, most
aspects of the building would be retained. In Option 1, it
might be possible to house the EDS units in low-cost, tem-
porary containment shelters, as was done for the Spring Val-
ley, Washington, D.C., non-stockpile disposal project com-
_
pleted in 2003. Buildings to house administrative and
laboratory facilities would also be needed, but they need not
be permanent. The temporary shelters for the EDS units
might retain their usefulness after conclusion of the PEA
activities because they could be moved to other locations
along with the EDS units that they enclose.
The committee notes that some tasks would remain, such
as validating the concept of destroying multiple rounds in
the EDS equipment, establishing whether GTR motors can
be separated from their warheads safely, and determining
how many EDS units would be required to meet the April
2007 deadline. Other tasks derive from environmental re-
quirements, including Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act and air emissions permitting, as well as demonstrating
compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act.
Both the Army and the Arkansas Department of Environ-
mental Quality have spent much time preparing and review-
ing permit applications, including both the PBNSF applica-
tion and the application for the EDS unit that will be used in
conjunction with the operation of PBMAS. Switching in
midstream to an EDS approach for PBNSF operations would
cause the expenditure of additional permitting effort and
might jeopardize the Army's CWC schedule obligations.
However, since permit application documentation already
exists for the EDS unit associated with the operation of
PBMAS, that documentation could be used as a basis for
permitting the more extensive use of EDS units at PBNSF,
limiting the additional effort. In addition, because the use of
multiple EDS units represents a simpler approach than the
current PBNSF design, permit application revisions and re-
sulting permit documentation are likely to be less onerous
and less complex. The committee also expects that the fre-
quency of permit modifications over the course of PBNSF
operations would be significantly reduced if an EDS ap-
proach were implemented. Closure of the EDS units would
also be simpler. An additional advantage of the EDS ap-
proach is that it has already received regulatory approvals
Cost Comparison
It is the committee's judgment that the multiple-EDS ap-
proach is more likely to meet the mandated destruction
schedule and to reduce the risk of delay-associated costs. A
useful perspective on the relative costs of the multiple-EDS
concept versus the current PBNSF design is that the multi-
EDS concept, at most, accelerates the acquisition of EDS
units already planned for the non-stockpile program. These
mobile EDS units should be useful for destroying non-stock-
pile materiel recovered at Army facilities or found at other
locations across the country (as, for example, at Spring Val-
ley in Washington, DICE. By contrast, the PBNSF equip-
ment would be used to destroy RCWM for less than a year.
The PBNSF building itself might have continuing utility,
but the equipment it contains is unlikely to be used again.
As summarized in Table ES- 1, the multiple-EDS alterna-
tive has several advantages (see also Chapter 6~.
Recommendation 6-1: The Army should promptly evaluate
multi-Explosive Destruction System alternatives for destroy-
ing the Pine Bluff recovered non-stockpile munitions inven-
tory. If the committee's premises are borne out, planning,
permitting, and public involvement activities aimed at utiliz-
ing existing Explosive Destruction System units should be
initiated promptly.
Finally, the committee's proposal for an alternative con-
figuration for PBNSF using multiple-EDS units is a conse-
quence of the success of EDS deployments, both technically
and with respect to public acceptability, at four non-stock-
pile sites across the United States. It is also a logical exten-
sion of the Army's efforts to enhance the efficacy of EDS
units such as multiple-round testing as well as ongoing
Army activities aimed at separating GTR warheads from
their motors and improving the characterization of the con-
tents of the recovered chemical munitions in storage at Pine
Bluff.
OCR for page 7
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eds units
