Below are the first 10 and last 10 pages of uncorrected machine-read text (when available) of this chapter, followed by the top 30 algorithmically extracted key phrases from the chapter as a whole.
Intended to provide our own search engines and external engines with highly rich, chapter-representative searchable text on the opening pages of each chapter.
Because it is UNCORRECTED material, please consider the following text as a useful but insufficient proxy for the authoritative book pages.
Do not use for reproduction, copying, pasting, or reading; exclusively for search engines.
OCR for page 10
1
Background and Overview
Since World War I, the United States has maintained an
extensive array of weapons containing chemical agents. To-
day, as a result of the United States' decision to sign and
ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC),~ the long-
term storage of aging chemical warfare materiel (CWM) is
no longer allowed. Also, the public is concerned about the
risks associated with the long-term storage of CWM. Conse-
quently, the United States and other signatories of the CWC
are in the process of destroying all declared2 CWM by the
treaty deadline of April 29, 2007.3
U.S. law and international treaties have divided CWM
into two categories: "stockpile" and "non-stockpile." Stock-
pile materiel includes all chemical agents available for use
on the battlefield, including chemical agents assembled into
weapons and in bulk ton containers. Stockpile materiel is
stored at eight locations in the United States.
Non-stockpile materiel is a diverse category that includes
all other chemical weapon-related items.4 Much of this ma-
iFormally, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Pro-
duction, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and Their Destruction.
The treaty was signed by the United States on January 13, 1993, and ratified
by the U.S. Congress on Apnl 25, 1997. The CWC specifies the time period
within which covered categories of Chemical Warfare Matenel (CWM)
must be destroyed.
2CWM that remains buried is not subject to the treaty. Once the CWM
has been recovered and charactenzed, it must be declared under the CWC
and then be destroyed as soon as possible.
3Under the CWC, countries may apply for an extension of the deadline of
up to 5 years. Late in the report review process, the Army announced that the
U.S. would not meet the 45 percent chemical weapons stockpile destruction
deadline of Apnl 29, 2004, and requested an extension of the deadline until
December 2007 (DoD, 2003). However, the Product Manager for Non-Stock-
pile Chemical Matenel has stated that the non-stockpile program intends to
meet the Apnl 29,2007, deadline. Even if the non-stockpile destruction dead-
line were extended, the schedule for construction of the Pine Bluff Non-
Stockpile Facility would be relatively tight. However, for this report, the
committee assumed that Apnl 29, 2007, is the official deadline.
4The category includes buried chemical warfare materiel, recovered
chemical warfare materiel, binary chemical weapons, former production
facilities, and miscellaneous chemical warfare matenel.
10
teriel was buried on current and former military sites but is
now being recovered as the land is remediated. Some CWM
also is buried at current and former test and firing ranges.
Recovered chemical weapons materiel (RCWM) is now
stored at several military installations across the United
States. According to the CWC, non-stockpile CWM items in
storage at the time of treaty ratification in April 1997 must
be destroyed within 2, 5, or 10 years, depending on the type
of chemical weapon and the type of agent. Non-stockpile
CWM recovered after treaty ratification must be declared
under the CWC and destroyed "as soon as possible" (U.S.
Army, 2001a). Generally, non-stockpile items that are re-
covered have been transported to the nearest stockpile site
for safe storage.5
THE NON-STOCKPILE CHEMICAL MATERIEL
DISPOSAL PROGRAM
Before 1991, the U.S. effort to dispose of CWM was lim-
ited to stockpile materiel. The Defense Appropriations Act
of 1991 directed the Secretary of Defense to establish the
Product Manager for Non-Stockpile Chemical Materiel
(PMNS CM) with responsibility for the destruction of non-
stockpile CWM.
The Pine Bluff Arsenal Non-Stockpile Inventory
About 85 percent of the non-stockpile materiel in the
United States is stored at the Pine Bluff Arsenal (PBA) in
Arkansas, which is also a stockpile storage sited About
5An exception is recovered chemical agent identification sets, which
contain small quantities of chemical agents and militarized industrial chemi-
cals, used for training purposes. These are sometimes stored at the site where
they are recovered.
6The Army is building a version of its baseline incineration system at
PEA to destroy the stockpile materiel stored there. However, due to regula-
tory and schedule issues, as well as public opposition, the stockpile incin-
OCR for page 11
BA CKGRO UND AND OVERVIEW
FIGURE 1-1 Diagram of the 4.2-in. mortar cartridge. SOURCE: U.S. Army (2003a).
97 percent of this materiel was either recovered from
excavated burial pits on the PBA site or has always been in
storage at the site; the other 3 percent was transported from
other sites around the country. Table 1-1 presents the most
current information available to the committee regarding the
numbers, types of agent fills, and explosive configurations
of recovered items currently stored at PBA.
Recoverecl Munitions at the Pine Bluff Arsenal
This report is concerned with the facilities and operations
that will destroy the first item category in Table 1 - 1 recov-
ered munitions. These 1,200-plus recovered munitions are
the most problematic items in storage at PBA because (1)
they contain full or residual amounts of agent and (2) nearly
all of them also contain energetic materials whose stability
may have deteriorated over time. Most of these are either
4.2-in. mortars containing sulfur mustard agent or 15-cm
orator is not available for use in destroying the non-stockpile CWM stored
at PBA, except perhaps for special cases in which the non-stockpile agent is
identical to the stockpile agent being destroyed in a particular campaign and
the non-stockpile vessel or munition is easily accommodated by the
processing equipment of the baseline incineration system.
German Traktor rockets (GTRs) containing a variety of fills,
including nitrogen mustard agent and arsenical-based fills.7
A diagram of the 4.2-in. mortar round is shown in Figure
1-1. The round is 21 in. long with fuze and 4.19 in. in diam-
eter. The overall weight with mustard agent fill is approxi-
mately 23 lb, including approximately 6 lb of agent. The
burster extends the length of the body cavity and contains
0.73 lb of tetryl (U.S. Army, 1998~.
A diagram of the 15-cm GTR is shown in Figure 1-2. The
rocket motor is at the head of the projectile, with the rear
section, which contains the chemical fill, threaded to the
motor section. If the rockets are in good condition, the motor
and fill sections can be easily separated with the proper tools.
The intact rocket head (motor) contains seven sticks of pro-
pellant powder weighing 2 lb each. The chemical constitu-
ents of the propellant are 62.5 percent nitrocellulose,33 per-
cent nitroglycerine, and 4.5 percent other fillers. The total
length of a GTR is 40 in., and the diameter is 6.2 in. The
7The arsenical fills appear to be mixtures of diphenylchloroarsine (DA),
phenyldichloroarsine (PD), and small amounts of triphenylarsine (TPA).
DA is classified as a vomiting agent (nonlethal) and is not covered by the
CWC; PD is a blistering and vomiting agent, and it is not yet clear how it
will be classified under the CWC or how the Army will dispose of it.
OCR for page 12
2
ASSESSMENT OF THE ARMY PLAN FOR THE PINE BLUFF NON-STOCKPILE FACILITY
TABLE 1-1 Inventory of Non-Stockpile Items at the Pine Bluff Arsenal
No. Containing a Chemical(s)
No. H/HD/ Total No.
Item Empty HN/HS/HT GA/GB/GD VX DM/L CG/CK DF QL Other Unknown of Items
Chemical sample
containers
Ton container 2b 2b
4-in. cylinder lb lb
Lab sample container 2b 2b
Vial (L) lb lb
Subtotal 1 b 2b 2b 1 b 6b
Chemical agent ID set
(CAIS)
Mustard (H/HD/HS) 5,764b 5 764b
Nitrogen mustard 50b ~ 50b
(MN-1 and-3)
Lewisite (L) 397b 397b
Chloropicrin (PS) 396b 396b
Phosgene (CG) 396b 396b
Chloroacetophenone l7b l7b
(CN)
Adamsite (DM) 1 7b 1 7b
Triphosgene (TP) 1 7b 1 7b
Cyanogen chloride 33b 33b
(CK)
Diethyl malonate, etc. 33b 33b
(GS)
Subtotal 5,814b 4l4b 429b 463b 7,120b
Binary agent precursor
M20 56,820b 56,820b
Drum 7b 293b 300b
Box, container, can 3b 3b
Subtotal 56,827b 296b 57,123b
Empty ton container~ 4,375b 4,375b
Total 873a 6,146a 2b 2b 4,789b 433b 56,827b 296b 463b 37a 69,868a
NOTE: Items in the sha~d area represent the inventory to be disposed of at PBNSF.
aData from Verrill and Salcedo (2001).
bProvided to the Committee on Review and Evaluation of the Army Non-Stockpile Chemical Materiel Disposal Program by the Product Manager for Non-
Stockpile Chemical Materiel on July 10, 2001.
CInventory consists of individual CAIS items, not complete CAISs.
~Sampling of some of these containers indicated that they may be contaminated with lewisite, arsenic, and/or mercury.
OCR for page 13
BA CKGRO UND AND OVERVIEW
~~ chew
.4 c~n ~ 7 Ome
~ `.~.~w stenciled ~ 'I
~ ~ volume ~`r,~
of- ~
~ Prearm
~3 S
L'U;~e
Bt l'StCF
Large
it,..
~ opera t ease Act ca~
I
FililnO 'jfel-,lUr'
Charge
FIGURE 1-2 Diagram of the 15-cm German Traktor rocket (drawing not to scale). SOURCE: U.S. Army (2003a).
Overall weight is 79 lb, including 7 to 10 lb of chemical fill,
depending on fill type. The burster tube, which is threaded
into the aft end, contains 3.4 lb of a mixture of pentaerythritol
tetranitrate/wax (95/5) and picric acid (U.S. Army, 1998~.
The remainder of the recovered munitions in the PBA
non-stockpile inventory are small numbers of M70 bombs,
200-mm Livens projectiles, and 155-mm, 105-mm, and 75-
mm projectiles.
Significantly, many of the rounds at PBA are believed to
be empty of chemical fill, and fewer than half of the items
are believed to contain energetics. Munitions that are empty
of fill or energetics can be processed more quickly. Only 36
of the 477 GTRs contain propellant, and these GTRs with
intact motors are considered to be the biggest challenge for
disposal.8 (Various sources cited slightly differing numbers
of GTRs in submissions and presentations to the committee,
in part because the number of such rockets that need to be
destroyed has changed over time. For example, seven rock-
ets were utilized in testing access and decoupling technolo-
~William Brarlkowitz, Deputy Product Manager, Non-Stockpile Chemi-
cal Matenel Product, "Non-Stockpile Chemical Materiel Product Over-
view," beefing to the committee on March 19, 2003.
13
gies, so 470 rockets are now available, but 477 were on the
original inventory.)
Other Non-Stockpile Items at the Pine BluffArsenal
Numerically, the largest number of items (about 57,000)
listed in Table 1-1 are the binary agent precursor canisters
and drums. The Army plans to destroy these precursors by
water hydrolysis using a building and equipment left over
from the integrated binary former production facility at PBA,
with secondary wastes to be sent off-site for posttreatment at
a commercial treatment, storage, and disposal facility
(TSDF). Binary precursors will not be discussed further in
this report.
Over 7,000 chemical agent identification set (CAIS) items
are stored at PBA; these are for the most part individual vials
or bottles of training materials rather than complete CAIS
sets. They are to be characterized and then destroyed by
chemical oxidation or hydrolysis in the Rapid Response Sys-
tem (RRS), a mobile glove box that was used successfully to
destroy CAIS stored at Deseret Chemical Depot in Utah and
at Fort Richardson, Alaska. The neutralized wastes will be
sent off-site to a commercial TSDF for disposal. The de-
struction of CAIS in the RRS was reviewed in an earlier
OCR for page 14
14
National Research Council report (NRC, 1999) and is not
discussed further here.
Over 4,000 "empty" ton containers are stored at PBA,
some of which may be contaminated with lewisite, arsenic,
and/or mercury. These will be decontaminated and subjected
to a cut-and-clean operation at PBA, with secondary wastes
to be sent off-site for posttreatment at a commercial TSDF.
The empty ton containers will not be discussed further in
this report.
Table 1-1 lists six "chemical sample" containers of vari-
ous sizes and containing several different chemical fills.
Those containing the nerve agents sarin (GB) or VX may be
destroyed by the baseline incineration facility at PBA. The
4-in. cylinder containing mustard agent and the vial contain-
ing lewisite could be destroyed either in the Pine Bluff Non-
Stockpile Facility (PBNSF) or the explosive destruction sys-
tem (EDS) (see below). The disposal of the chemical samples
will not be addressed further in this report.
Systems for Assessment and Destruction of Non-Stockpile
Chemical Weapons Materiel at the Pine Bluff Arsenal
The Army plans to construct and operate a mix of fixed
and mobile systems for assessment and destruction of the
PBA non-stockpile inventory. These systems are described
briefly below. Figure 1-3 is a flow chart summarizing the
disposition of RCWM at PBA. The dotted box highlights the
operations that are the primary focus of this report.
The Pine Bluff Munitions Assessment System
RCWM at PBA are currently stored in 30- to 85-gallon
drum overpacks in four igloos at PBA. About 10 percent of
the RCWM items are singly overpacked, and these have been
assessed by both x-ray and portable isotopic neutron spec-
troscopy systems.9 The other 90 percent of the RCWM items
is stored at up to 15 items per drum and has been assessed
only by x-ray (Figure 1-4~. Using these techniques, explo-
sive ordnance disposal representatives from the Army Tech-
nical Escort Unit determined the transportation status of each
drum and assigned it to one of three categories. Green drums
can be safely transported from their storage site to the Pine
Bluff Munitions Assessment System (PBMAS). Yellow
drums are those whose explosive train status could not be
positively determined to be safe and that therefore require
special handling during movement. Red drums denote muni-
tions whose fuze or explosive train status is determined to
pose a hazard for transporting and that therefore require spe-
cial handling during transport (Verrill and Salcedo, 2001~.
9Portable isotopic neutron spectroscopy systems spectra contain scatter-
ing peaks that indicate the presence of heavy atoms in the fill (e.g., chlorine
and arsenic) that are diagnostic of a particular fill.
ASSESSMENT OF THE ARMY PLAN FOR THE PINE BLUFF NON-STOCKPILE FACILITY
, ~ WE ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
~ /
I: ::/
:
1':~
jig
Yes ~: 1~ A~cess~d
... . . lileUtr;?li~in EDS
~ ~ .
Juno
.~ ~ ,rri~ kiwi
.1~ : 9 F .r .
~~ ~A00665 :3lrld ~ .
~ . .
it Neutralize in
~ P~B~LI~SF ~
At PBA '~ . ~ .
.~ ~ . E:
~~ . .t .
~ :~ ~ ~ ~ E ~ ~:
:AtTEDF if: . E
~ : .
~ ~ ~~ ~~ L ~ ~ L
l~ ~ r E I'
'it : .[
:: ~ I~ ~ ~ It ~ : ~
Process RRS: ~~ Poems P:~SI1F ~ ~Pror~s EDS:
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ .r
waste ~ :~f~ste ~ waste:
~ E :
*A ~~0!:-~PW ~~ -~ 2[
L ~ .
, rem ~' Ir ~ Ir
~ ~ :: : :: i: : : ::: i: ~ :
O~ff~ite~ Tre;atmer~ttDispos;31 of ::Secon~;ary Waste:
~transport? j~~
=
: =
FIGURE 1-3 Flow chart for the disposition of RCWM at PBA.
NOTE: Operations in the dashed box are the focus of this report.
The PBMAS will be made up of a series of interconnected
steel rooms co-located with the larger PBNSF (see below)
and having specialized equipment for warming the drums,
opening them, removing the individual munitions, assessing
their contents, and repackaging them individually. The as-
sessment will be made by x-ray and portable isotopic neu-
tron spectroscopy systems. The individually packaged and
characterized munitions will then be distributed to the vari-
ous destruction systems for NSCM at PBA, as illustrated in
Figure 1-3. PBMAS is expected to be operational between
June 2004 and June 2005, about 2 years before PBNSF is to
become operational (June 2006 through March 2007~.
The Pine Bluff Non-Stockpile Facility
Munitions that are assessed by PBMAS as safe to trans-
port will be destroyed in the PBNSF. The current design of
this facility is the main focus of this report and is discussed
in detail in subsequent chapters. Briefly, munitions contain-
ing energetics will be drilled and drained in an explosive
containment chamber, and the fill will be piped to a reactor,
where it will be chemically neutralized. Nonexplosive 4.2-in.
OCR for page 15
BA CKGRO UND AND OVERVIEW
...
FIGURE 1-4 X-ray of 85-gal drum containing eight German
Traktor rockets. SOURCE: Verrill and Salcedo (2001~.
mortars and GTR warheads that are nonexplosive will be
accessed at a projectile washout system, where a liquid jet
will rinse the fill contents out of the munition body. Follow-
ing overnight soaking in a heel-dissolvingi° tank, munition
bodies containing energetics will be detonated in a detona-
tion chamber, and those without energetics will be cut prior
to final surface decontamination. Liquid wastes will be sent
to a commercial TSDF for posttreatment, by an alternative
treatment technology if feasible or by incineration (NRC,
2002a). Solid wastes will be further treated as required by
regulation and subsequently disposed of or recycled. PBNSF
is being designed to process 10 RCWM items per shift.
Explosive Destruction System
Munitions that are judged unsafe to transport (e.g., fuzed
and armed, or unstable due to degradation) will be destroyed
in an EDS operated in tandem with PBMAS. EDS mobile
units, which utilize explosive accessing to open the munition
and detonate the energetics, followed by chemical neutral-
ization of the fill, were successfully used to destroy RCWM
at Rocky Mountain Arsenal, Colorado; Camp Sibert, Ala-
bama; and Spring Valley, Washington, D.C.~i Secondary
i°A heel is solid or semisolid residue found in some stored munitions
and containers.
~ William Brankowitz, Deputy Product Manager, Non-Stockpile Chemi-
cal Matenel Product, "Non-Stockpile Chemical Matenel Product Program
Status Update," beefing to the committee on June 12, 2003.
15
waste streams from the EDS will be sent off-site to a com-
mercial TSDF for posttreatment.
There are two sizes of EDS. The smaller EDS Phase 1
(EDS-1) is available for destroying munitions containing less
than 1 lb trinitrotoluene-equivalent energetics. A larger EDS
Phase 2 (EDS-2) is undergoing testing; it is designed to de-
stroy munitions containing up to 3 lb trinitrotoluene-equiva-
lent energetics. The EDS and its waste streams were dis-
cussed in a previous National Research Council report (NRC,
2001a).
Other Technologies
A review of other mobile treatment systems, including
the RRS, the Single CAIS Accessing and Neutralization
System, and the Donovan Blast Chamber, was undertaken in
Systems and Technologies for the Treatment of Non-
Stockpile Chemical Warfare Materiel (NRC, 2002a). Further
review of these systems is beyond the scope of this report.
Management of Seconclary Waste Streams
Secondary waste streams from PBNSF will include liq-
uid wastes such as effluent from the agent neutralization pro-
cess, rinsate, and decontamination solution as well as solid
wastes such as spent carbon filters, munition bodies, and
workers' protective suits. The Army does not intend to
posttreat these secondary wastes on-site but will send them
instead to a commercial TSDF for treatment and final dis-
posal or recycling (U.S. Army, 2002b).
Typically, a TSDF would destroy these materials in a
high-temperature incinerator; however, in recent years there
has been growing public opposition to incineration in gen-
eral and incineration of CWM in particular. Therefore, the
PMNSCM has invested considerable resources in testing a
variety of alternative (nonincineration) technologies for post-
treatment of non-stockpile waste streams (NRC, 2001b). If
an alternative technology proves effective in treating these
wastes, is economically attractive, and can receive regula-
tory approval and permitting in a timely way, the Army plans
to fund the construction and permitting of such facilities at
the TSDF receiving the waste. If no alternative technology
proves feasible, the Army plans to proceed with incineration
of these wastes at the TSDF.
SCOPE OF THIS REPORT
The statement of task (see Preface) makes it clear that the
committee's focus is to be PBNSF rather than other non-
stockpile destruction systems at PBA. Nonetheless, some is-
sues surrounding the operation of ancillary facilities such as
the PBMAS, the RRS, and the EDS have a bearing on the
plans for PBNSF and, as such, are discussed. The committee
has also addressed some issues pertaining to the Army's
plans for off-site treatment of secondary wastes. Issues relat-
OCR for page 16
16
ing to other non-stockpile activities at PBA, such as destruc-
tion of the binary precursor agents DF and QL, destruction
of the former binary agent production facility, and the empty
ton container cut-and-clean operations, are beyond the scope
of the study.
Two nontechnical issues are expected to strongly affect
the operational schedule for PBNSF: (1) regulatory approval
and permitting and (2) addressing the concerns of affected
interest groups. Because the committee believes that the han-
dling of these issues will directly affect the ability of PBNSF
to accomplish its mission of destroying NSCM at PBA by
April 2007, they are reviewed here.
COMMITTEE APPROACH
As this study began, the engineering design for PBNSF
was still evolving. In fact, during the information-gathering
phase of the study, the committee had access to only 35 per-
cent of the facility design. At that stage, the gross facility fea-
tures, treatment technologies, and major equipment to be used
were specified, but some basic design matters were unre-
solved. These include the design basis for the internal pres-
sure that the building must resist, the agent and explosive con-
figuration of the 4.2-in. mortar rounds, and the operational
requirements for the explosive containment chamber and the
projectile washout system units. All of these matters impact
the finalization of the piping and instrumentation diagrams,
the structural design, and the detailed design of the facility.
Since the final design of PBNSF remained unclear and data-
collection activities were to end on August 1, 2003, the com-
ASSESSMENT OF THE ARMY PLAN FOR THE PINE BLUFF NON-STOCKPILE FACILITY
mittee believed that it could best contribute by addressing the
significant issues that needed to be considered as the final
engineering design was being prepared.
As noted above, the committee believes that nontechni-
cal issues namely, regulatory approval and permitting and
public involvement will be as important as the technical
issues in determining whether PBNSF will achieve its mis-
sion by the April 2007 CWC deadline. The committee at-
tended local meetings of the affected public and examined
the Army's plans for involving the public. It also partici-
pated in a conference call with regulators from the Arkan-
sas Department of Environmental Quality. This report
therefore contains both technical and nontechnical findings
and recommendations.
STRUCTURE OF THIS REPORT
Chapter 2 describes the building and site layouts of
PBNSF as they were presented to the committee at the time
this report was being prepared. It examines the processes
that will be used to destroy RCWM at PBNSF, the details of
their integration, and the Army's planned schedule of opera-
tions. The facility plans for protecting workers, the public,
and the environment during PBNSF operations and closure
are explored in Chapter 3. In Chapter 4, the committee evalu-
ates the Army's plans for managing the waste streams from
PBNSF. Chapter 5 examines key regulatory and public in-
volvement issues. In Chapter 6, the committee presents al-
ternative approaches to the destruction of non-stockpile
chemical materiel stored at PBA.
Representative terms from entire chapter:
chemical materiel
