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OCR for page 17
2
The Pine Bluff Non-Stockpile Facility
In this chapter, the committee describes the basic de-
sign configuration of the Pine Bluff Non-Stockpile Facil-
ity (PBNSF), outlines the intended operation, and dis-
cusses a number of issues related to facility design and
operation. In conducting its review, the committee exam-
ined the initial design documents for the facility (35 per-
cent design) and the permit application submitted to the
Arkansas Department of Environmental Quality and re-
ceived briefings and updates from the Army. The com-
mittee also had follow-up meetings with the Army and its
design contractors, and members had many technical dis-
cussions among themselves.
The committee relied on generally accepted construction
practices and benchmarks, such as the Construction Industry
Institute Best Capital Practices. However, a project like
PBNSF cannot easily be reviewed using such practices, be-
cause the entire project has been heavily driven by schedule
and the need to use alternative technologies that are fairly
new. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, which is construct-
ing this project, is active in organizations such as Construc-
tion Industry Institute and says it will incorporate as far as
practicable such best practices in the design and construc-
tion phases. However, owing to the nature of the PBNSF
project, the committee could not prepare a detailed compari-
son of the project's stages against generally accepted prac-
tices and benchmarks. As discussed below, the main factor
driving this construction project the treaty deadline is by
and large beyond the control of the Corps and the non-stock-
pile program.
BUILDING AND SITE LAYOUT
The PBNSF site will occupy approximately 25 acres that
previously were used for disposing of construction fill. As
currently configured, the main process facility will be a
40,000 ft2 building (see Figure 2-1) surrounded by an 8-ft
chain-link security fence (U.S. Army, 2003b). The process
facility will comprise the following:
17
receiving dock
· munitions warming and storage room
· unpack area
· fill extraction preparation area
· fill extraction area
· agent treatment area containing:
two explosive containment chambers (ECC-1 and a
larger ECC-2) for removing the chemical agent fill
from an item that has an energetic component at-
tached and from which the agent can be drained
a chemical process trailer (CPT) with two neutraliza-
tion reactors for destroying the chemical agent fill
emptied from the items in the ECC-1 and ECC-2
a detonation chamber (DET) for the destruction of
energetic components that do not contain agent and
are not contaminated with agent
a projectile washout system (PWS) for removing
chemical agent from nonexplosively configured
munitions
· decontamination room
· repacking room
· storage room and associated handling areas
The PBNSF relies mostly on legacy equipment from the
abandoned Munitions Management Device (MMD) project,
including the ECC units, the CPT, and the DET. This equip-
ment consists of trailer-mounted units that can be disas-
sembled, transported by road or by air, and reassembled at
new locations. The decision to reuse this equipment has ne-
cessitated continuing modifications, particularly to the ECC
units, as well as accessibility constraints in the CPT.
All processing areas will operate under negative pressure
to provide chemical vapor containment in the event of a re-
lease. The exhaust air from all spaces that could contain
agent will be passed through high-efficiency particulate air
and carbon filter systems for purification before being passed
to the atmosphere. All areas where chemical materiel is
handled and processed will be sealed to prevent the migra-
OCR for page 18
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3 1NIC:
ASSESSMENT OF THE ARMY PLAN FOR THE PINE BLUFF NON-STOCKPILE FACILITY
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FIGURE 2-1 Diagram of the PBNSF processing area layout. SOURCE: U.S. Army (2003b).
tion of agent or vapor to or from other areas in the event of a
release.
The Product Manager for Non-Stockpile Chemical Mate-
riel (PMNS CM) has defined the maximum credible event
(MCE) for the PBNSF design as the detonation of a fully
configured German Traktor rocket (GTR) motor and war-
head combination while being processed in the PBNSF.
While it is difficult to estimate the likelihood of the occur-
rence of the MCE, it is important to review such a low-prob-
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ability event and investigate designs that protect against it
when consequences may be severe.
The committee recognizes that the PBNSF design calls
for the MCE to be completely contained, but only when the
GTR is being processed within the ECC-2. However, should
the MCE occur within the PBNSF but outside the ECC-2,
there could be a release of fragments and agent to the imme-
diate area outside the PBNSF building; there are similar con-
cerns should a fully configured GTR be detonated during
OCR for page 19
THE PINE BLUFF NON-STOCKPILE FACILITY
transit. However, nothing in this report should be construed
as expressing the view that such a release is likely.
The Army, citing the containment requirements in De-
partment of the Army Pamphlet 385-61, Section 6.6 (U.S.
Army, 2002a), has reported that this condition (less than to-
tal containment) is the required level of protection for both
the stockpile and the non-stockpile disposal programs.
Should the MCE occur outside the ECC-2, it would almost
certainly result in severe worker injuries or fatalities and trig-
ger a public reaction and regulatory review. Such a review
would seriously delay completion of the PBNSF task regard-
less of the impact on workers or the environment. For this
reason the committee's judgment is that this less-than-total-
containment for the PBNSF building is not satisfactory. This
containment situation bears out the committee's recommen-
dation to develop a system that would decouple the GTR
motor/warhead combinations in a separate facility designed
to contain both explosions and releases of lethal chemicals
and minimize transportation and handling.
The Army is already evaluating the possibility of
decoupling fully configured GTRs in existing igloos prior to
their treatment in PBNSF. If this effort is unsuccessful, the
committee urges the Army to (1) develop a transport system
that would contain the explosion in the event of GTR deto-
nation in transit and (2) revisit the PBNSF design and/or
engineering controls to ensure the safety of workers who
might be outside the building if a GTR detonated inside
PBNSF as well as the safety of the general public.
Ancillary features and areas that would be located on the
proposed site include these:
· storage tanks for neutralent and the spent decontami-
nation solution, including spent wastewater and neu-
tralized wastes
chemical supply tanks
process chillers
two standby generators
a minibunker for storage of explosive charges
a waste storage and handling area
an administrative building
a gatehouse
The process facility building, the fence, and support struc-
tures and utilities are being designed and built by contractors
to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers' Little Rock District
based on the criteria provided by the PMNSCM.
The processing steps that a munition or other item will
undergo as it is transferred into the system are discussed in
the following sections.
CONFIRMATION OF MUNITION CONTENTS
The contents of recovered chemical weapon materiel
items at PBNSF will be confirmed in two steps. The first
step in assessment of the munitions is performed in the Pine
19
Bluff Munitions Assessment System (PBMAS), a facility
separate from the PBNSF. The munitions will be unpacked,
examined, analyzed, classified, and repacked into overpacks,
each containing only a single munition, for storage and sub-
sequent transportation to PBNSF. Adjacent to PBMAS is an
explosive destruction system (EDS) that will destroy muni-
tions considered too hazardous to move into storage for fu-
ture destruction in PBNSF. The second step of the assess-
ment occurs when the munition is first unpacked in PBNSF
prior to disposal. The details of these two steps are described
in the following sections.
Characterization in the Pine Bluff Munitions Assessment
System
Each munition to be processed in PBNSF will be charac-
terized individually in PBMAS by nonintrusive methods,
primarily x-rays and portable isotopic neutron spectroscopy
(PINS).
The x-ray scan provides two kinds of information. It reg-
isters the presence of energetic materials such as a fuze, a
burster, explosives, or propellant and detects whether the
munition contains a chemical agent.
The PINS measurement provides qualitative information to
assist in the identification of the chemical agent contained in the
item based on the presence of elements such as sulfur, arsenic,
chlorine, and nitrogen. The PINS characterization is generally
accurate, but interpretation of the results may be affected by the
presence of corrosion products and other effects.
The PBMAS operations allow the munitions to be segre-
gated into those containing energetics only, chemical agent
only, or both (with the agent assessed as drainable or gelled).
This characterization within PBMAS allows the appropriate
processing steps within PBNSF to be selected. The muni-
tions are also classified by agent type because PBNSF pro-
cessing will be performed in campaigns based on the nature
of the agents contained in a set of munitions. Following char-
acterization in PBMAS, the items will be packed into indi-
vidual overpacks that are color coded to denote the risk asso-
ciated with future handling and transferred to storage until
they can be processed in PBNSF.
Characterization in the Pine Bluff Non-Stockpile Facility
When the overpacked munitions are received in PBNSF,
they are again assessed by x-ray in the receiving room and
are checked for agent leakage by sampling the air in the over-
pack (U.S. Army, 2003a). Subsequently, once the agent
chamber in the munition has been accessed, a headspace
vapor sample is withdrawn to confirm the identity of the
agent by coupled gas chromatography-mass spectroscopy.
This reconfirmation step is important for ensuring that the
chemical agent undergoes the appropriate neutralization
treatment and that suitable monitoring devices are in place
for worker protection. The munition is then sent to the next
OCR for page 20
20
processing module, which is selected based on munition con-
figuration (agent and explosive content) and condition
(clean, corroded, and so forth).
The nature of the non-stockpile disposal program is such
that a wide variety of materials must be dealt with, and there
is considerable uncertainty surrounding the characteristics
of these materials. For example, originally it was assumed
that the overwhelming majority of the 4.2-in. mortar rounds
containing mustard agent did not contain an explosive com-
ponent (fuze, burster tube, etc.~. This situation would have
allowed these mortars to be processed in the PWS after the
bottom of the munition was cut off to allow access for power
washing the agent fill out of the munition body. However,
more recent test data indicate that there is so much uncer-
tainty about the presence of a fuze or explosive in a burster
tube that it is prudent to assume that all of these 4.2-in. mor-
tar rounds contain fuzes and/or bursters.i Because it is not
possible to definitively determine whether the burster tubes
in the mortar rounds contain energetic material or inert ma-
terial or whether they are empty, it must be assumed that any
mortar round containing a burster tube may also contain en-
ergetics. In addition, experience from the stockpile disposal
facilities has shown that in many munitions mustard agent
has gelled or solidified, which prevents the agent from drain-
ing and leads to formation of heels. This combination of
agent heel in an explosively configured item could make it
impossible to achieve the anticipated destruction rate using
the PBNSF equipment as presently configured.2
It should be noted however, that in a recent PINS assess-
ment of the contents of the munitions to be processed at the
PBNSF (Verrill and Salcedo, 2001),597 of 733 4.2-in. mor-
tar rounds were empty and 218 of the 399 GTRs that did not
contain propellant were also empty. Of a total of 1,231 mu-
nitions evaluated, 865 were empty. According to communi-
cations from the Army, "empty" in this context does not
mean that an item does not have trace or residual contamina-
tion. For classification purposes that is, to select a process-
ing campaign "empty" means no liquid is seen in the x-ray.
Since some munitions that are "empty" may indeed contain
residual or trace quantities of agent that are not detectable by
PINS, the munitions will have to be processed in the PBNSF
(or in the EDS) as if they do contain agent. If they contain
explosives, they will be drilled and drained in an ECC; if
they are inert, they will be cut open and washed out in the
PWS. In either case, any residual agent will be treated with a
reagent in the neutralization reactor.
iDarryl Palmer, Office of the Product Manager for Non-Stockpile
Chemical Matenal, "Multi-pack 4.2-in. mortars," e-mail to the committee
on June 5, 2003.
2Chapter 6 addresses possible options for the modification of the facility
to maintain schedule in view of the reassessment that marry, if not all, 4.2-in.
mortar rounds should be assumed to be explosively configured.
ASSESSMENT OF THE ARMY PLAN FOR THE PINE BLUFF NON-STOCKPILE FACILITY
PROCESS DESCRIPTION
Accessing the Chemical Agent
The first step in processing a munition at PBNSF is to
temperature-condition the contents by letting
stay in the warming room for at least several hours. This step
is necessary because HD agent freezes at 58°F and would
not drain from a cold mortar or rocket. The warmed muni-
tion will then be x-rayed to ascertain the amount and condi-
tion (liquid, solid, or gel) of the agent fill. After this charac-
terization, the munition may be stored in the warming and
storage room until it can be accepted in the unpack and fill
extraction areas.
Based on the presence or absence of energetic materials
and on an assessment of the Trainability of the agent, two
options exist for gaining access to the chemical agent con-
tained within a munition. In general, munitions without en-
ergetics will go to the PWS for cutting, draining, and wash-
out. For example, nonexplosively configured 4.2-in. mortar
rounds and GTR warheads might be sent to the PWS for
accessing the agent. Alternatively, the same inert mortar
round could be sent to the ECC-1 for drilling and draining.
Similarly, an inert GTR could be sent to the larger ECC-2
for drilling and draining.
Rockets or mortar rounds that contain energetics will ordi-
narily be processed in one of the two ECC units, which are
designed to contain the force of an explosion should one occur
during the drilling and draining operations. However, such an
explosion would severely damage the internals of the ECC,
and the operation of the PBNSF would be severely impacted
by the loss of capacity and by an incident investigation.
Processing via Explosive Containment Chamber Units
Energetically configured munitions containing agent will
be processed in the ECC units (the ECC-1 and the larger
ECC-2~. These contain an auxiliary processing vessel
(APV) a small, movable pressure vessel that contains
drills, agent extracting devices, and neutralent injection and
drainage capabilities into which the munition is loaded.
This drill-and-drain assembly (containing the munition) is
then loaded into an ECC unit, which is essentially a large
pressure vessel that will contain any explosion up to the de-
sign loading (see Figure 2-2~. As stated previously, these
ECC units were developed as part of the MMD program and
are currently being modified to improve their accessibility
and operability (see Figure 2-3~.
The procedure for handling an energetically configured
munition is to manually load it into the APV. The APV is
highly complex and consists of numerous hoses, motors, and
movable parts, all of which must work as required within the
ECC to drill and drain the munition. The APV containing the
munition is then moved into the ECC unit for drilling, sam-
pling, and draining. All processes are performed within the
OCR for page 21
THE PINE BLUFF NON-STOCKPILE FACILITY
21
FIGURE 2-2 Auxiliary processing vessel removed from explosive containment chamber. Note the number of hoses, connections, etc.
associated with the requirement to drill and drain munitions remotely when the APV (containing the munition) is inside the ECC containment
vessel.
sealed ECC. The first hole is drilled into the top of the muni-
tion to allow the collection of a vapor sample to confirm the
identity of the agent. Another hole is then drilled in the bot-
tom to drain the agent. The drained agent will be piped di-
rectly to a neutralization reactor in the CPT or to a holding
tank if neither of the two neutralization reactors is available
at the time. If the agent is gelled there is no provision in the
current design to enable the agent to be removed from the
munition within the ECC.
The drained munition is rinsed with a neutralization re-
agent appropriate for the particular chemical agent.3 The
neutralent is also sent to the CPT or a holding tank to be
processed along with the neat agent.
3The rinsing with neutralization reagent is performed in the ECC and
not in the PWS, as the ability to apply large amounts of flushing water into
the munition is limited in the ECC by the small size and fixed location of the
nozzle. This limitation does not apply to the PWS, where full access and a
large amount of water are available.
The operation of the ECC assumes that the agent will
drain from the munition when the drilling is completed. This
assumption is currently being reassessed by PMNSCM based
on the experience of the stockpile disposal facilities with
heels of gelled mustard agent (see Finding 2-2~. This reas-
sessment may require a redesign of the ECC units to include
a high-pressure water wash system. The Army is assessing
various methods of washing out any gelled or solidified agent
that will not drain, but this work was not available for review
by the committee. However, the problems associated with
ensuring removal of the gelled agent through the small ac-
cess holes available, or even smaller holes if a probe has to
be inserted to maintain a seal, are significant. At the time this
report was prepared, no practicable design for this system
had been developed. A completely different approach may
be required to overcome the problem of gelled mustard agent,
which might be exacerbated by the construction of the 4.2-
in. mortar rounds. These rounds have internal baffle plates
welded to the sides of the agent cavity. This feature could
make it difficult to wash out the additional surface areas upon
OCR for page 22
22
ASSESSMENT OF THE ARMY PLAN FOR THE PINE BLUFF NON-STOCKPILE FACILITY
:j',,'<-. v?; ~ ~ ~
FIGURE 2-3 Internal layout of the chemical Process trailer. Note the complexity and congestion of the piping and instruments.
which heel can be deposited. An Army test report states,
"the interstices between the baffle central core and the
burster well walls could present areas difficult to cleanse
even by high-pressure water" (U.S. Army, 2002c).
In addition to these conceptual design issues, the ECC
drill-and-drain assembly is already a highly complex sys-
tem. Adding complexity in the form of a new wash system
may affect the reliability of the system.
Processing via the Projectile Washout System
The PWS is an equipment assembly acquired from the
Assembled Chemical Weapons Assessment (ACWA) pro-
gram. The ACWA program demonstrated the ability of this
equipment to effectively cut open and wash out 4.2-in. mor-
tar rounds that do not contain any energetic material (fuze,
burster, etc.~.4 Eighty-five such rounds were processed in
4The ability of a high-volume, high-pressure water wash to effectively
clean out the munition in the PWS eliminates the requirement to use a
neutralent wash, which is used for cleaning munitions in the ECC.
PWS testing; the test report (U.S. Army, 2002c) said, "the
agent cavity of all 85 munitions was inspected after wash-
out. All 85 were visibly clean and metal bright." The test
report also said, "The minute amount of agent heel in the
munitions after washout did, however, affect observation of
the system's ability to destroy HD." The system referred to
is a thermal metal parts treater (not part of PBNSF) that uses
superheated steam to bring the munition body to a 5X condi-
tion following washout in the PWS.5 The point, however, is
that regardless of the metal parts treater's ability to decon-
taminate the munition body, some agent heel may remain in
the munition following washout in the PWS (U.S. Army,
2002c).
55X refers to a level of decontamination at which solids may be released
for general use or sold (e.g., as scrap metal) to the general public in
accordance with applicable federal, state, and local regulations. A common
misconception is that 5X means simply that the solid has been placed in a
temperature zone of 1000°F or higher for 15 min. In fact, a 5X condition
indicates that the solid has been completely heated to and then held at a
temperature of at least 1000°F for 15 min.
OCR for page 23
THE PINE BLUFF NON-STOCKPILE FACILITY
The PWS is a glove box system containing equipment to
drill, cut, drain, and pressure-wash projectiles (no neutralent
rinsing is performed owing to the proven effectiveness of the
pressure wash in the PWS). It is not designed to handle ener-
getic material. After the munition is drilled to obtain a sample
of the agent vapor for analysis, the base of the munition is
cut off with a pinch roller, which allows full access for wash-
ing (unlike the ECC, which allows very limited access). The
drained liquid agent is then piped to the CPT for neutraliza-
tion, as is done with drained agent from the ECC. After the
agent is drained, the munition body is pressure-washed with
water to flush out residual agent and solid residues. The
washings are piped to the spent decontamination solution
(SDS) reactors for neutralization along with decontamina-
tion solutions from other operations. These reactors are new
units and are to be located in a separate section of PBNSF.
The original design intent was for inert mortar rounds
(i.e., those with no energetic material) and GTRs to be pro-
cessed in the PWS (U.S. Army, 2002b). The original assess-
ment of the materiel to be disposed of at PBNSF was that the
overwhelming majority of the 4.2-in. mortar rounds contain-
ing mustard agent were inert. Recent analysis suggests that
this assumption may be incorrect and that it may instead
have to be assumed that almost all of the 4.2-in. mortar
rounds contain energetic material. This change will signifi-
cantly impact the ability of the PWS to process munitions. If
it is concluded that the most recent assessment is correct,
then the PWS (as currently configured) will not be able to
process the large number of 4.2-in. mortar rounds specified
in the current schedule.
To maintain the current schedule, one of two actions
would be needed:
.
.
Agent-containing 4.2-in. mortar rounds would have to
be processed in another item of equipment (e.g., in a
modified ECC with a power washing capability added,
or in an EDS unit in addition to the one attached to
PBMAS); the 597 rounds that do not contain agent can
be processed as planned in unmodified ECC units fol-
lowed by heel-washing and detonation, or
The PWS would have to be modified to allow it to be
remotely operated within a pressure vessel able to con-
tain an explosion of the energetic material that is, the
PWS becomes a modified version of the ECC.
The effect on schedule and cost of redesigning either the
ECC or the PWS is unknown but would probably be signifi-
cant because of the associated development time, the cost of
demonstrating the effectiveness of the modifications, and the
need to conduct process safety studies and hazard analyses.
Neutralizing the Agents
The CPT unit was also obtained from the discontinued
MMD project. The equipment is contained in a trailer so that
23
it is transportable by road. The requirement that the unit be
transportable has led to congestion in the interior of the trailer
(see Figure 2-3~. Equipment located behind the reactors and
on the ceiling may be difficult to access for repair or mainte-
nance, particularly when the operating staff must wear Level
A personal protective equipment (PPE) inside the CPT (see
Figure 2-4~.
The CPT contains two continuously stirred tank reactors,
one large and one small (123 gal and 66 gal, respectively).
Each is agitated by stirring as well as by circulating the reac-
tor contents through an external loop. The neutralization is
carried out in much the same way as in the mobile MMD-1;
in fact, much of the MMD-1 neutralization hardware is to be
used in the PBNSF CPT. The MMD-1 system was demon-
strated extensively in Utah (Cash et al., 2001~. The MMD-1
testing was performed using phosgene6 as the agent and di-
lute sodium hydroxide as the reagent/neutralent. While phos-
gene should not be encountered in the munitions to be pro-
cessed through PBNSF, extensive bench-scale testing with
mustard agent was performed at Edgewood Arsenal under
conditions applicable to the MMD-1 and PBNSF neutraliza-
tion processes. Neutralization of mustard agent with MEA
containing 10 percent water produced a neutralent solution
containing 67-89 percent MEA, 9-10 percent water, varying
amounts of MEA hydrochloride, and a sulfur compound de-
rived from reaction of the mustard agent with MEA (see the
chemical equation later in this section). No residual mustard
agent was detectable by an analytical procedure with a de-
section limit of 50 parts per billion (ppb). Small amounts of
organic sulfur compounds and chlorinated hydrocarbons
were detected. These compounds probably arose from impu-
rities in the HD agent or from high-explosive degradation
products. The results of these neutralizations are summa-
rized in a National Research Council report (NRC, 2001b).
The drained agent and the reagent neutralent rinses are
accumulated in one of the two neutralization reactors until
the volume is sufficient for the agitator to function effi-
ciently. Additional neutralization reagent is added as needed
to ensure destruction of the agent. Agitation and circulation
through the external loop are begun, and the reactor is
warmed to about 50°C to initiate the reaction (U.S. Army,
2001a). Since the neutralization reaction is exothermic, no
heat input is required once the reaction begins. In the
MMD-1, neutralization of HD resulted in peak temperatures
of about 80°C. Cooling via the external circulation loop may
be required, so this is provided for in the equipment design.
The reactor contents are held at the desired temperature for
90 min after adding the contents of the agent fill from the
last munition of the batch in order to complete the neutral-
ization reaction. The reactor contents are cooled and sampled
6Phosgene, an asphyxiating gas, was used extensively as an antiperson-
nel agent in World War ~ and is found in some recovered weapons of World
War IT vintage.
OCR for page 24
24
ASSESSMENT OF THE ARMY PLAN FOR THE PINE BLUFF NON-STOCKPILE FACILITY
FIGURE 2-4 Reactor vessel in the chemical process trailer. In this view note the proximity of the reactor vessel to the wall of the trailer and
the consequent restricted access for inspection, maintenance, or repair of the pumps and instrumentation.
to ensure that agent concentration has been reduced to a level
below the release standard 50 parts per million (ppm) for
blister agents such as HD, HN-3 (nitrogen mustard), or
phenyldichloroarsine (PD). The reactor contents are drained
into a waste retention tank for storage until the agent con-
centration has been established. If the concentration exceeds
the release standard, the batch is returned to the neutraliza-
tion reactor for additional treatment. When the concentra-
tion is determined to be less than the release standard, the
neutralent is transferred to a neutralized waste storage tank
to await shipment to a treatment, storage, and disposal facil-
ity for final disposal.
The reagent used to neutralize the sulfur (HD) and nitro-
gen mustard (HN-3) agents in the continuously stirred tank
reactor is 90 percent MEA and 10 percent water, the same
solution as that chosen for the MMD project and the EDS
mobile destruction systems. This reagent is miscible with
water, is a good solvent for the agents (even better than a 100
percent water wash), and reacts readily with them. It also
does not produce significant quantities of products listed as
Schedule 2 compounds under the Chemical Weapons Con-
vention (CWC). From an engineering viewpoint, it has low
corrosivity with stainless steel under the chosen operating
conditions and has low flammability.7 The main chemical
reaction with sulfur mustard is this:
7There exists a broad base of experience with MEA in the chemical indus-
try. In addition to its industrial uses, aqueous MEA has been extensively
studied for chemical demilitarization applications by both the U.S. (Durst et
al., 1988) and Russian (Petrov et al., 1998) demilitarization programs.
OCR for page 25
THE PINE BLUFF NON-STOCKPILE FACILITY
S(CH2CH2C1)2 + 2H2NCH2CH2OH ~ S(CH2CH2)2NCH2CH2OH. HC1 + MEA.HC1
HD MEA
The choice of neutralization reagent for the arsenic-con-
taining agents in the GTRs is more complex. Some rockets
may contain Winterlost, a solution of HD, PD, and diphenyl-
chloroarsine (DA). The planned destruction of Winterlost at
PBNSF is based on the operating protocol for the EDS
(Verrill and Salcedo, 2001~; it uses 90 percent MEA as when
treating HD alone. Other GTRs are reported to contain a
mixture of PD, DA, arsenic bichloride, and triphenylarsine.
Although the initial plan for treating such mixtures involved
reaction with 10 percent aqueous sodium hydroxide (NaOH),
it is not clear that this reagent will completely destroy the
phenylarsenic compounds in the mixture. Current research
indicates that treatment with the proprietary reagent HPO28
can destroy the phenylarsenic compounds, but this method
may require conditions that are unacceptably severe from an
engineering viewpoint.9 However, neutralization of the ar-
senic-containing agents generates a liquid waste containing
arsenic, the toxicity of which cannot be mitigated by chemi-
cal treatments.
The small amounts of mustard agent washed from the
PWS, the ECCs, the heel-dissolving tanks, and the metal
decontamination units (MDUs) using hot water or alkaline
decontamination solution will give rise to some thiodiglycol.
This compound has relatively low toxicity but is a Schedule 2
precursor under the CWC (cf. Chapter 5) because it can be
reconverted to mustard agent under some circumstances. The
thiodiglycol concentration in the effluent from the SDS re-
actor is expected to be quite variable depending on the source
of the washings but always less than 1 percent.
Rinsing the Munition Boclies
Once the chemical agent has been drained from the muni-
tions in the ECC, the munition bodies are rinsed with neu-
tralizing reagent to remove gross quantities of agent adher-
ing to the interior surfaces. (As described previously, rinsing
munitions with neutralizing reagent is not performed in the
PWS.) As noted earlier, these first rinses are combined with
drained agent for treatment in the CPT. The munition bodies
are then cleaned to remove trace amounts of agent as well as
residues of corrosion products and agent decomposition
products. The latter include heels the tarry or solid agent
material that has been found in many HD-containing muni-
tions in the stockpile disposal program. The intent of the
rinses and washes is to prepare the metal parts for further
handling and disposal.
UPON is formulated from Oxone (a formulation of potassium
monopersulfate) and aqueous hydrogen peroxide.
9Lucy Forrest, Non-Stockpile Chemical Materiel Product, "Traktor
Rocket Sampling," briefing to the committee on April 22, 2003.
25
Munitions Treatecl in the Explosive Containment Chamber
Once the munition has been drained and rinsed with neu-
tralizing reagent in the ECC, it is rinsed with three portions
of a decontamination solution, typically dilute NaOH solu-
tion injected via the drill assembly. The rinse water from this
final rinse of the munition before its removal from the ECC
is piped to an SDS reactor for treatment. The rinsed muni-
tion is sent to one of five heel-dissolving tanks, where any
solid residues that remain are dissolved with hot, circulating
10 percent NaOH solution during an overnight soak. The
HD solids dissolve in the hot caustic solution, enabling the
residuals to pass through the small drainage channels cre-
ated by the drilling. The nearly agent-free munition body is
then rinsed with water and sent to the DET, where an explo-
sive charge is used to destroy the energetics remaining in the
. .
mun~t~on.
The contents of the SDS reactor will be heated, recircu-
lated, sampled, and analyzed for chemical agent (U.S. Army,
2003a). If the agent exceeds the 50 ppm standard set for
blister agent, 20 percent NaOH solution will be added to the
reactor and the treatment will be repeated until the agent
concentration falls below the release standard. The solution
will then be held in an SDS storage tank pending shipment to
a treatment, storage, and disposal facility for disposal.
Munitions Treatecl in the Projectile Washout System
In the PWS, the drained mortar round or rocket warhead
will be pressure-washed with hot water only, which has been
demonstrated to be fully effective because the internals of
the munition are fully accessible in the PWS. The agent-
contaminated water will be sent to an SDS reactor, where it
will be treated along with the aqueous rinses from the ECC
processing.
Solids Handling
After rinsing (for munitions processed in the ECC) and
washing to remove chemical agent and other residues, the
munition bodies undergo several steps to prepare them for
shipment off-site for ultimate disposal. The exact sequence
of steps depends on whether the munition bodies contain
energetics such as bursters or propellants.
Munitions Containing Energetics
Rocket or mortar bodies containing energetics that have
been washed in tanks to dissolve any agent heels will be
sent to the DET, where an explosive charge will detonate
the energetics and fragment the munition body. The DET is
an existing item of equipment from the discontinued MMD
program. It is not designed to destroy munitions that con-
tain a significant quantity of agent, although the tempera-
ture generated within it by the explosion will destroy agent
OCR for page 26
26
to some extent. The efficacy of the detonation procedure
will be assessed by visual inspection of the fragments and
residues.
Large metal pieces will be sent to a metal cutting station,
where they are reduced in size with a remotely operated saw
in a controlled atmosphere enclosure. Small metal fragments
from the DET, along with size-reduced pieces from the cut-
ting station, are sent to the MDUs.
In the MDUs, the metal parts will again be washed with
10 percent NaOH solution and rinsed with water. (The de-
contamination solution and rinse water will be sent to the
SDS reactors for decontamination.) After the metal parts
have been dried in the MDU, the atmosphere in the unit will
be tested. If no agent is detected by headspace sampling with
a MINICAMSi° unit after 4 hours at 70°F, the metal pieces
are designated 3Xii and can be shipped under Army control
to another site. Typically, they would go to the Rock Island
Arsenal for thermal decontamination and smelting to recycle
the metal. Thermal treatment at 1000°F for 15 minutes is
defined as leading to a 5X condition, which means that the
metal can be released from Army control. If 5X thermal treat-
ment can be done in an existing furnace at the Pine Bluff
Arsenal, the scrap metal could be released directly to a
recycler.
Munitions Not Containing Energetics
Rocket warheads and mortar rounds not containing ener-
getics that have been drained and washed with water in the
PWS will be sent to the metal cutting stations for size reduc-
tion. Munition bodies that are heavily corroded will undergo
an additional step to remove rust and scale that might entrap
chemical agent. The corroded parts will be sent to a station
in which they are blasted with solid carbon dioxide (dry ice)
pellets. The impact of the CO2 pellets will flake off the cor-
rosion products to leave a relatively clean metal surface. The
clean metal parts will be sent to the metal cutting station or
directly to the MDUs, depending on size. The fine-grain cor-
rosion debris deposited after evaporation of the CO2 will be
transferred to a drum of 10 percent NaOH decontamination
solution to destroy any residual agent. The resulting slurry
of debris in decontamination solution will be tested for the
presence of agent before being sent off-site for further treat-
ment (if necessary) and disposal.
i°MINICAMS is a low-level, near-real-time monitor typically used to
provide early warning of airborne exposure hazards. According to the U.S.
Army (2000), the "basic operation of the MINICAMS involves collection
of analyses onto a solid sorbent held in a preconcentrator tube (PCT).
Analytes collected onto the PCT are then heat-desorbed into the gas chro-
matographic column for separation before passing through a halogen selec-
tive detector (XSD)." The XSD detects the chlorine present in all the blister
agents.
~ ~ 3X refers to a level of decontamination at which solids are suitable for
transport for further processing.
ASSESSMENT OF THE ARMY PLAN FOR THE PINE BLUFF NON-STOCKPILE FACILITY
PROCESS INTEGRATION
This section considers how the existing design for PBNSF
is intended to operate in terms of material flow, the indi-
vidual equipment, and the interaction of personnel with the
system.
Material Flow
As indicated previously, PBNSF contains a variety of
trailer-housed processing equipment obtained from the dis-
continued MMD program and from the ACWA program.
Because the processing equipment and the PBNSF building
were not designed at the same time, compromises were made
that could adversely affect operations. Examples of such
compromises include these:
The location of the reactor vessels in the CPT (origi-
nally for purposes of transportability) has resulted in
limited workspace behind these vessels that may im-
pede maintenance activities (see Figure 2-4~.
· Space constraints in the trailers that carry the ECC
units limit the lengths of hoses and lines and constrain
the extent to which the APV can be removed from the
containment vessel (see Figure 2-2~. They also limit
access to the containment vessel and may increase the
time and effort needed to maintain equipment in the
ECC, particularly if problems arise with the APV's
drill/drain/wash assembly while it is within the con-
tainment vessel.
PBNSF differs from a stockpile disposal facility in sev-
eral ways:
Munitions characteristics. The munitions to be pro-
cessed in PBNSF are in variable condition, with a large
proportion being old, corroded munitions containing a
variety of fills, some of which are not encountered in
the stockpile disposal program (e.g., arsenicals and
nitrogen mustard). In some cases, the fill constituents
will not be known with certainty until intrusive sam-
pling of the munition contents is carried out. There-
fore, each munition has the potential to present unique
processing challenges, especially when explosive com-
ponents are also involved. The effect of the variability
of munition characteristics was demonstrated in the
recent reassessment of the 4.2-in. mortar rounds. The
original basis for the design of the equipment was that
the great majority of these munitions would contain
mustard agent that would drain and have no energetics
(fuzes, bursters, etch. The most recent assessment is
that the great majority of the 4.2-in. mortar rounds
might be energetically configured. For example, in one
Army assessment, 128 of 130 mortar round x-rays that
showed visible burster wells also showed that an ex-
OCR for page 27
THE PINE BLUFF NON-STOCKPILE FACILITY
plosive burster tube was present, indicating that many
more mortar rounds than expected may be explosively
configured. If this is the case, throughput could be
limited since in a single 10-hour shift, no more than
five energetically configured munitions would be pro-
cessed (U.S. Army, 2003c). The operating goal of pro-
cessing five inert and five energetic munitions per shift
may not be achievable if there are an insufficient num-
ber of inert mortar rounds to allow this mix. As a re-
sult, PBNSF might be limited to processing only five
energetically configured mortar rounds per day, which
would have adverse effects on project schedule and
cost. In another recent assessment of munition agent
contents, it was found that 597 of 733 4.2-in. mortar
rounds were nominally empty that is, they did not
have a detectable agent fill and that for GTRs, 263
of 477 rockets were also nominally empty (Verrill and
Salcedo, 2001~. Such uncertainties about the quantity
of agent in the munitions will require conservative as-
sumptions when deciding on the processing steps re-
quired to ensure safe operation of the facility.
Throughput rates. While the stockpile facilities have
been designed to process hundreds of essentially iden-
tical munitions per day, the PBNSF is designed to pro-
cess only 10 or so munitions per day. This limitation is
due to the munitions' characteristics and to the equip-
ment selected to process the munitions.
Processing sequence. In stockpile facilities the se-
quence of processing steps for a given munition type
rarely varies. In PBNSF, seemingly identical muni-
tions may be processed in a completely different man-
ner owing to uncertainties about whether agent is
present, what type of agent is in the munition when it
is accessed, and whether the munition contains, or is
thought to contain, an energetic component.
.
.
.
· _ _ O— ~ ~
average munition will be handled approximately five
times.
27
Item containing, or assumed to contain, agent that can
be drained but known to have no energetic component.
Item containing, or assumed to contain, agent that can-
not be assumed to be drainable but known to have no
energetic component.
Item containing, or assumed to contain, agent that can
be drained but known to have, or suspected of having,
an associated energetic component.
Item containing, or assumed to contain, agent that can-
not be assumed to be drainable but known to have, or
suspected of having, an energetic component.
Each configuration may require a different set of equip-
ment to safely access and neutralize the agent.
Because of the known variability of the munitions to be
processed at PBNSF, the process design attempts to provide
considerable flexibility in the sequence of unit operations.
This flexibility is intended to allow any munition/energetic
combination to be safely processed while maintaining the
overall schedule for disposal operations. The nature and con-
dition of the agent and the presence or absence of energetics
would determine the equipment to be used for processing an
individual munition.
For example, 4.2-in. mortar rounds that do not contain ener-
getics can be processed in one of two ways. They can be sent to
the PWS for cutting and a high-pressure washout or they can be
sent to one of the two ECCs for drilling and draining (assuming
the agent will drain freely). In either case, the munition would
finally be sent to the cutting station for size reduction.
The recent assessment that a large majority of the 4.2-in.
mortar rounds should be considered to be explosively con-
figured and that some will contain agent heels could, if cor-
rect, significantly increase the time required to process these
munitions. An extension of the schedule can be avoided only
if some significant modifications are made to the current
Munition handling. In PBNSF, as currently config- configuration of PBNSF. For munitions containing energet-
ured, there are a large number of manual handling tasks ics, an attempt could be made to dissolve any heels by plac-
associated with moving a munition within the facility. ing these munitions in one of the five tanks used to dissolve
This includes unpacking, placing the munition on a agent heels. However, this would increase processing time
cart, removing the munition from the cart, placing the since only one munition containing energetics can be placed
munition in a device for draininc/exPlosion~ etc. An in a tank, thus limiting the number being soaked to five per
night. It might be possible to process explosively configured
munitions in the single EDS associated with PBMAS, but
the schedule is likely to slip. It would also be possible for the
munition to be placed in the DET and explosively destroyed.
However, this would introduce agent into the DET, necessi-
tating the use of decontamination solution in the DET and
the collection, treatment, and disposal of the SDS. At present,
this option is not being considered in the design of the DET,
although it is being considered by the Army. Even if this
option were selected, it would slow down operations as a
result of the need to manually decontaminate the DET.
For inert munitions containing a solid fill, the Army could
treat the munition at the PWS and spray rinse the munition at
300 lb/ft2 gauge (psi") (low pressure) or at high pressure
Systems Integration and Facility Operations
Pl3NSF contains various pieces of equipment that will be
used in the processing steps. The processing steps will be
tailored to the configuration of the item being processed.
The possible configurations are these:
i2Darryl Palmer, Office of the Product Manager for Non-Stockpile
Chemical Material, "Multi-pack 4.2-in. mortars," e-mail to the committee
on June 5, 2003.
OCR for page 28
28
with a 10 percent NaOH solution. A PWS with a caustic
spray washout at these pressures resulted in effective re-
moval of solid mustard (HD) agent heels in the rounds tested
(U.S. Army, 2002c).
At the time this report was being prepared it had not been
decided whether the GTRs will arrive at PBNSF with the
warheads separated from the rocket motor or whether the
entire munition (warhead plus motor) will have to be pro-
cessed. If only the nonexplosively configured warheads (the
part of the GTR that contains agent) are to be processed,
they can go either to an ECC for drilling and agent draining
or to a PWS for cutting and agent washout. If the warhead
and rocket motor are not separated, they must go to the ECC-2.
Two options for the separation of the GTR rocket motors
and warheads have been proposed. The first is unscrewing
the two units, the feasibility of which depends upon the con-
dition of the body of the munition and the threads. The
second option is water jet cutting between the motor and
warhead. Neither option has been demonstrated to date,
although no conceptual obstacles are foreseen by the com-
mittee. The configuration of the GTRs (warhead and rocket
motor or warhead only) to be processed through PBNSF
could significantly affect the design basis selected for the
worst credible internal explosion event for the building.
Manual Materials Handling
Unlike chemical disposal facilities in the stockpile dis-
posal program, the munitions transport in the PBNSF pro-
cess building is not automated and uses a variety of manu-
ally operated equipment:
.
an overpack transfer cart
· a munition transfer cart
· a munition cradle cart
· a parts transfer cart
For example, energetically configured munitions travel
to and from the ECC/APV on a munitions cradle cart, while
a munition transfer cart is used for transport to the heel-dis-
solving tanks and to the DET. Following detonation, the
munition fragments are transferred to the MDUs on a parts
transfer cart. The use of such manually operated equipment
is acceptable because only 10 munitions per day are expected
to be processed, making the use of conveyors uneconomical.
In addition, the time spent moving munitions does not affect
the throughput of the facility. Elimination (where practi-
cable) or minimization of the number of manual tasks asso-
ciated with processing munitions would nonetheless signifi-
cantly reduce risk to operations personnel.
Processing Sequence
The processing sequence for treating munitions in sepa-
rate campaigns is as follows:
ASSESSMENT OF THE ARMY PLAN FOR THE PINE BLUFF NON-STOCKPILE FACILITY
· sulfur mustard
· nitrogen mustard
· arsenicals
Any leaking munitions containing the agent being pro-
cessed in a particular campaign will be treated at the end of
that campaign.
Pine Bluff Non-Stockpile Facility Design Status,
Operability, Reliability, and Accessibility by Humans
Status of the Engineering Design
At the time this report was prepared, several issues criti-
cal to the finalization of the PBNSF design had not been
resolved. First, there are the issues of whether the 4.2-in.
mortar rounds are to be assumed to contain energetic mate-
rial (fuze, burster, etc.) and whether the mustard agent that
they contain should be considered drainable or not. These
issues are important because facility equipment was selected
and the schedule was developed based on the assumption
that the 4.2-in. mortars were not energetically configured
and that the mustard agent would drain easily. The most re-
cent assessment is that the original assumptions were not
appropriate, so that the existing equipment will not be able
to process the 4.2-in. rounds fast enough to meet the intended
schedule. This is because (1) the PWS cannot be used as
currently configured owing to the anticipated presence of
energetics and (2) the ECCs cannot be used as currently con-
figured owing to the anticipated inability of the mustard
agent to drain.
If the most recent assessment of the 4.2-in. mortar rounds
is correct, then meeting the schedule will require either sig-
nificant modifications to the PWS and/or the ECC or an al-
ternative method of processing the munitions.
Modification of the PWS and/or the ECC would require
significant development and testing, which might affect the
schedule. No practicable design to enable the reliable re-
moval of gelled/solid agent from a munition in the ECC (with
the small access holes currently proposed) was presented to
the committee. Chapter 6 addresses possible alternative pro-
cessing options.
A second processing issue is the current lack of an effec-
tive neutralization process for the arsenical fills in approxi-
mately 40 percent of the GTRs. Until such a process is de-
veloped and any process modifications are designed and
implemented, the schedule will be at risk.
Another critical issue is that the maximum overpressure
the process facility building should be designed to resist has
not been finalized. This is a decision that drives the design of
the building walls and roof and the design of the heating,
ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) system. Initially,
it was thought that the design basis should be the explosion
of the energetic material in a GTR plus the GTR rocket mo-
tor, but this is being reconsidered. Eliminating the potential
OCR for page 29
THE PINE BLUFF NON-STOCKPILE FACILITY
explosion of the rocket motor components of a GTR from
the PBNSF design basis would reduce the pressure the build-
ing and HVAC would have to withstand. The cost reduction
that could be achieved by doing this was being examined by
the Army as this report was being prepared. If complete
GTRs were eliminated from processing at PBNSF, the issue
of how this munition might be otherwise processed remains.
Several options appear possible:
.
Deciding that the agent in the GTR is outside the scope
of the CWC treaty requirements and addressing its
destruction separately and at a later date. (This would
also defer the issue of the current lack of a neutraliza-
tion technology for approximately 40 percent of the
GTR fills.)
Separating the propellant charge from the agent con-
tainer. This would allow the agent to be handled in the
PWS.
Destroying the GTR in another unit (e.g., the EDS as-
sociated with PBMAS).
An associated issue is whether the building is to be de-
signed to prevent its penetration by the shrapnel from a pos-
sible explosion or whether such a penetration (and potential
agent release) will be tolerated.
The maximum agent release that the various carbon-bed
filtration systems must be capable of handling has also not
been finalized. The final design of the carbon bed filters can-
not be demonstrated until the design bases are further de-
fined.
The process hazard reviews have not been completed even
though the piping and instrument diagrams have been issued
as final. Typically, these diagrams are issued as final only
after the safety reviews have been completed and all issues
resolved. It is known that other issues will affect the current
heat and mass balance for the process, and so this document
must also be considered incomplete.
The reasons these basic design criteria and activities have
not been finalized are not clear. The 4.2-in. mortar rounds
have been available for inspection for many years, as have
the GTRs. The continuing delay in finalizing issues basic to
the design of the facility and in performing the safety studies
has put pressure on the design staff to meet the requirements
of the schedule.
On the basis of a brief review of the proposed construc-
tion schedule, several general comments can be made. First,
the schedule is based on working 6 days a week, 10 hours
per day, for the first 6 months. Although the schedule in-
cludes a 40-day margin for weather delays, working 6 10-
hour days for an extended period will place a severe strain
on the workforce and the supervisory staff productivity
might suffer, and there could be adverse impact on safety.
It would seem that the published schedule, which is based
on achieving the CWC-specified end date for disposal op-
erations, is driving the project rather than realistic estimates
29
for the completion of normal engineering tasks. The Army is
constrained by CWC treaty and legislative mandates to
achieve the destruction of the munitions assigned to PBNSF
by April 2007. However, these constraints are at cross-pur-
poses with the accepted practice for designing and building a
complex industrial facility, the budget constraints imposed
by Congress, and the need to develop a technology that sat-
isfies regulatory requirements and the public's desire that
the weapons be destroyed in a safe manner. Given the sig-
nificance and complexity of these interrelated issues, a dis-
cussion of this constraint is warranted.
Any large industrial construction project must balance the
desired schedule for completing the project, the time neces-
sary for obtaining regulatory approvals, the cost of the
project, and the need for flexibility to address inevitable un-
anticipated implementation issues. All other factors being
equal, there is generally a trade-off between the cost of a
project and the schedule for implementing the project (i.e.,
the time needed to develop the specifications or goals of the
project, the time to design the facility, and the time to build
it) (GAO, 1997~. Typically, the shorter the schedule for
implementation, the higher the project costs. A complex
project with the potential to adversely affect public safety
(such as the destruction of non-stockpile materials) simply
cannot be implemented more quickly, and for less money,
without potentially compromising effectiveness and, ulti-
mately, safety.
The Army's PBNSF project has several unusual con-
straints that differ from those of a typical industrial project;
these constraints may significantly increase costs if the cur-
rent design and deadline are maintained.
First, because certain citizen groups expressed great con-
cerns, Congress required the Army to develop technologies
other than incineration for the destruction of the non-stock-
pile chemical weapons material (NRC, 2002a). The task of
finding a promising technology and turning it into a viable
facility design has not been trivial and has consumed much
of the time allowed under the CWC. The additional tasks of
obtaining regulatory approval and permits and soliciting pub-
lic involvement for non-stockpile technologies have also
added delay and uncertainty over the ultimate technology to
be used (this is discussed more completely in Chapter 5.) In
turn, these delays and uncertainties have resulted in increased
costs and the need for an unusually long time to develop the
conceptual design and goals for PBNSF.
Second, the Army's deadline is imposed by international
treaty and U.S. domestic implementing legislation, and so is
more inflexible than for a typical industrial project. The de-
sire to shorten implementation schedules on most industrial
projects is often driven by the economics of the project. The
sooner the capital invested in a commercial project begins
returning revenue on the investment, the sooner the com-
pany will begin to reap a profit. Thus, when a schedule slips
there are economic consequences, and economic expecta-
tions must be adjusted.
OCR for page 30
30
The schedule for destroying chemical weapons cannot
slip without significant international and legal consequences
(among other things, giving other countries an excuse to de-
lay destruction of their chemical weapons), and the benefit
of destroying this component of the triad of weapons of mass
destruction (chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons) is
obvious.
It would appear that the schedule for the design, construc-
tion, systemization and destruction operations for PBNSF
has been developed by taking the April 2007 CWC deadline
as the completion date and compressing the normal design
and implementation steps into the time until then. As a re-
sult, the design process has not always followed generally
accepted practices. This conclusion is supported by a letter
from the Army Corps of Engineers, Little Rock District, not-
ing situations that will affect the proposed schedule:
· More than 40 days on which weather interferes with
construction;
Approval of the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act permit later than May 2004;
The fact that the building design and the process de-
sign for the facility are taking place concurrently, pos-
sibly necessitating modifications to the contract;
· A delay of more than 5 minutes per trip for vehicles
accessing the site;
· The known adverse effects that rain will have on the
workability of the soil; and
The lack of project funding to cover unanticipated
delays. i3
.
Given these uncertainties, there is only one certainty-
namely, that delays will occur because so many issues re-
main unresolved. It would seem that the only option avail-
able to the Army is to increase the cost of the project, perhaps
precipitously so.
Third, the Army is not a business and must operate within
the budget appropriated by Congress. The uncertainties in-
herent in developing alternative technologies to destroy the
chemical agents and resulting neutralents have led to an even
greater cost uncertainty. The federal budget allocates funds
to a particular project, and sometimes the funds must be ex-
pended by a particular date, hampering sound, long-term
planning. There may even be pressure to keep the project on
a schedule that matches the fund allocation schedule for pur-
chasing equipment, site preparation and construction, and
operations, whether or not the engineering status of the
project warrants such adherence.
Fourth, as April 2007 approaches, the more likely it is
that the PBNSF project will undergo ad hoc changes to over-
ASSESSMENT OF THE ARMY PLAN FOR THE PINE BLUFF NON-STOCKPILE FACILITY
come obstacles (e.g., making modifications to the ECC or
PWS to deal with gelled mustard in an energetically config-
ured munition) rather than moving forward in a well-
planned, integrated way. Avoiding an inefficient design is
particularly critical when human health or the environment
can be compromised by design flaws that result in accidents.
Ideally, the owner of an industrial project should consider
the environmental requirements applicable to the facility in
the design phase (NRC, 2001b). However, in the case of
PBNSF, significant regulatory requirements could be im-
posed in the future.
The committee therefore believes that the published
schedule does not reflect the relative immaturity of the engi-
neering design and is likely to be too optimistic. It reached
this conclusion after examining the project documentation
and communications from Army personnel and the Corps of
Engineers and comparing the design process for this project
with the typical design process for an industrial construction
project of a similar magnitude and complexity.
Fifth, as the schedule is shortened, there is a need for
enhanced coordination and communication between the fa-
cility design company, the construction company that will
build the facility, and the owner who will use the facility.
The approach that has been adopted by the Army is to ini-
tiate the construction phase, continue to address outstanding
issues as they arise, and refine the design up to the time
systemization is started. In theory, it is possible to execute a
project in this manner. However, experience has shown that
attempting to refine a design, perform development activi-
ties, and manage changes during construction almost always
results in confusion, delay, continual fixes, and cost over-
runs. This is particularly true where a defined end point, such
as the CWC date, and a budget allocation schedule are ap-
plying pressure to a project. This conclusion is also supported
by communications from the Army Corps of Engineers.l4
The fact that many of the key design criteria have not
been finalized (see above) increases the uncertainty as to
whether the Army can attain the April 2007 deadline with
the existing PBNSF approach. If the design criteria that are
finally agreed upon require modifications to the initial as-
sumptions or result in delays, the pressure on the schedule
will increase still further. This could result in even less time
being available to perform the engineering tasks required to
design, construct, and systemize the PBNSF than is shown
by the present schedule.
The current design of PBNSF relies on equipment located
in cramped quarters (namely the ECC units and the CPT).
Such space constraints may affect the ability of operating
staff to perform required maintenance tasks during normal
and upset conditions. The committee believes that a review
i3Benjamin H. Butler, Commander, Little Rock District Corps of Engi- i4Benjamin H. Butler, Commander, Little Rock District Corps of Engi-
neers, memorandum to James Fletcher, Product Manager for Non-Stockpile Beers, memorandum to James Fletcher, Product Manager for Non-Stockpile
Chemical Materiel, SFAE-CD-N, September 9, 2003. Chemical Materiel, SFAE-CD-N, September 9, 2003.
OCR for page 31
THE PINE BLUFF NON-STOCKPILE FACILITY
of the facility design by experienced operations personnel
from stockpile chemical demilitarization sites would be of
value.
The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Little Rock District)
is responsible for the construction of PBNSF. The Army in-
tends to offer the contract for systemization and operation of
PBNSF to competitive bidding by contractors other than the
company performing the design. To permit the bidders to
develop a realistic cost and schedule estimate, a significant
amount of documentation will have to be prepared. Given
the time constraints on the project as currently envisaged,
this requirement could retard the construction schedule.
Moreover, given all the uncertainties, contractors will find it
difficult to provide a cost estimate that accurately reflects
the required tasks. Where such uncertainties exist, contrac-
tors typically bid low and then rely on change orders to make
their profit. In addition, the time required for a new contrac-
tor to become familiar with all of the issues on the project
will substantially impact the already tight schedule. All of
these issues would tend to support retaining the design con-
tractor for the construction and operational phases of the
project. Some form of cost control would be required, but
any other option will probably result in higher costs and an
extended schedule.
In summary, the committee considers that the following
factors are now contributing (or will contribute) to the in-
ability of PBNSF (as currently proposed) to achieve the de-
struction of the non-stockpile munitions by the CWC date:
.
Several important design criteria are still undefined.
These include the condition of the 4.2-in. mortar shells
(gelled agent/explosively configured); the basis for
maximum overpressure and the design of the HVAC
system; whether the building is to be designed to con-
tain shrapnel from an internal explosion; an effective
neutralization technology for the arsenical fills in the
GTRs; and the maximum agent release that the HVAC
system must handle.
· Because the process hazard analyses have not been
completed, no recommendations have been generated
or implemented, even though the piping and instru-
ment diagrams have been designated as final.
The schedule is driven by pressure to meet the CWC
date rather than being objectively set by the time re-
quired for the design and engineering activities.
The budget cycle assumes that the CWC date will be
met and allocates monies to the project on that basis,
requiring the monies to be expended or lost. There-
fore, contracts are awarded and equipment is pur-
chased in accordance with the budget schedule and not
in accordance with the progress of the design process.
· The project has implemented a "design/build" ap-
proach. For a project with many basic design criteria
still not finalized, this will probably result in additional
schedule delays.
31
A new contractor is expected to be awarded the con-
tract to operate the facility. Given the number of exist-
ing uncertainties, attempting to hand over the project
from one contractor to another will likely result in
confusion and schedule delay.
Finding 2-la: The published schedule for the design and
implementation of the PBNSF is driven by the April 2007
congressional and CWC deadlines for destroying the chemi-
cal weapons and associated materiel. The committee consid-
ers that this schedule should not be allowed to drive the start-
up of the facility if the engineering design and the operational
design are not mature enough.
Finding 2-lb: Key design and safety criteria for the PBNSF
are still undefined. The key criteria include:
Enabling the handling of gelled and/or energetic 4.2-
in. mortars;
Accommodating a neutralization technology that is not
yet defined for the arsenical fills in the GTRs;
· Implementing the findings of the process hazards
analyses; and
Defining the MCE15 for the building and the HVAC
system so that it does not put personnel outside the
building at risk.
Recommendation 2-1: If the current design for the Pine
Bluff Non-Stockpile Facility is pursued, a realistic schedule
should be developed based on the time required to properly
perform the engineering, construction, commissioning, and
processing steps. As part of this task, the required basic de-
sign criteria must be finalized. In addition, process hazard
analyses must be completed and any issues raised by them
resolved.
Finding 2-2: The Army has attempted to ensure that lessons
learned in both the non-stockpile and stockpile disposal pro-
grams are shared. However, in certain areas (e.g., the recog-
nition of and response to the gelling of mustard agent), this
sharing has not been as effective as it could have been. In
another critical area the ability of maintenance workers in
PPE to access equipment in the CPT engineering and op-
erational personnel experienced in this type of activity have
not been asked for input into the design, nor have they been
asked to review it.
The purpose of such built-in peer review would be to re-
view the facility design to ensure that engineering and op-
i5The maximum credible event is defined as the worst single event that
could occur at any time, with the maximum release of a chemical agent
from a munition, container, or process as a result of an unintended, un-
planned, or accidental occurrence (U.S. Army, 1999).
OCR for page 32
32
erational lessons from the stockpile disposal facilities are
transferred appropriately.
Recommendation 2-2: The Army should increase its efforts
to share relevant experience between the non-stockpile and
stockpile disposal programs and, where appropriate, seek
outside peer review of designs. This review should include
assessment of the chemical processing trailer and the explo-
sive containment chamber units to determine which inspec-
tion and maintenance activities are feasible for personnel
wearing Level A personal protective equipment.
Systematic Design Integration Review Issues
Several specific issues that surfaced during the review of
the design may need to be addressed as the design is final-
ized and an integrated facility is constructed. The CPT is the
site of a number of systematic design integration issues.
Inspection of the CPT showed that extensive use has been
made of screwed fittings, flanges, couplings, and compres-
sion fittings. In some cases for example, where air, water,
caustic, and the like are flowing through the piping this
may be acceptable. In cases where agent or neutralized agent
could be present in the piping/tubing, a careful review of the
existing connections in the CPT should be performed. Wher-
ever possible, welded connections should be used. At a mini-
mum, only connections certified or approved for Fatal Ser-
vice should be used in such services, and they should be
installed and tested in accordance with the manufacturer's
recommendations. Although operators entering the CPT will
be in Level A PPE, proper engineering design attempts to
minimize the potential for the release of hazardous materi-
als. Historical data from plants handling phosgene and simi-
larly hazardous materials demonstrate that leakage usually
occurs from small connections and flanges rather than from
large flanges.
The design of the CPT piping systems that contain agent
calls for numerous fittings and screwed couplings, which are
more prone to leak than welded joints. Additionally, the
agent piping contains dead-legs, which could interfere with
its flushing. Also, a cursory inspection of the piping layout
showed areas where tripping hazards exist (particularly for
personnel in Level A PPE). In one case, the outlet of a relief
valve was connected to the relief valve header using a flex-
ible hose. It is questionable whether such a design could bear
the impact load should the relief valve open. The use of a
flexible hose to connect a relief valve to the relief valve
header should be carefully considered.
Access to the interior of the ECC units requires moving
the APV drill assembly inside the vessel before the operator
(wearing Level A PPE) can enter the vessel and then with-
drawing the APV drill assembly. This is a clumsy procedure
and leaves the operator vulnerable if an emergency arises. In
addition, the present design for moving the APV drill assem-
bly has no backup if the motor fails or the drive system
ASSESSMENT OF THE ARMY PLAN FOR THE PINE BLUFF NON-STOCKPILE FACILITY
breaks or jams. An Army contractor has recommended al-
lowing for the disconnection of the drill assembly from the
motor and drive assembly (possibly by a chain link system)
and adding a manual pulley for moving the APV assembly
in an emergency.
The CPT has been built but will not undergo systemiza-
tion until the second half of 2005. This means that all the
equipment, instrumentation, piping, and so forth will be left
untested and idle until then.
Several generally accepted process design approaches are
typically utilized to address the issues outlined above. For
example, a process hazard evaluation could be used to iden-
tify scenarios for which suitable layers of protection are re-
quired, but this has not been performed. Also, semiquanti-
tative techniques such as layer-of-protection analysis for a
smaller number of scenarios and, possibly, full quantitative
studies for an even smaller number of scenarios could be
performed. Since there is much human interaction with
equipment units in PBNSF, a human factors analysis could
also be performed.
This systematic design integration review would include
all of the piping, instrument connections, and vessels that
handle, or might handle, agent or neutralized agent or any
other material that would present a significant hazard to op-
erating staff. It would also include considerations for rede-
signing and specifying piping and connections to minimize
the potential for leakage in the CPT or in any other equip-
ment at PBNSF. This could involve replacement of piping
connections with welded connections wherever possible and
the use of flanges with covers, seals, or plates.
The systematic design integration review should also ex-
amine the elimination of dead-legs and tripping hazards (es-
pecially since operators will be working in heavy suits and
boots); the feasibility of eliminating flexible hoses; the suit-
ability of using a flexible hose to connect a relief valve to the
relief header; and whether the design adequately accounts
for impact loads (e.g., relief valve opening) and thermal ex-
pansion loads.
As part of this systematic design integration review, the
Army and its contractors should decide what equipment will
have to be inspected and tested to ensure that the CPT and
other equipment will be operational when required. The
Army should also consider whether the CPT system should
be functionally tested on a regular basis prior to becoming
operational to minimize the potential for failures due to
dried-out rubber or polymeric materials (e.g., seals). Addi-
tionally, the Army should carefully consider the require-
ments for accessing the internals of the ECC units.
i6Shaw Engineering, Stone & Webster, Inc., GEE Modification Recom-
mendation, sent to the committee on July 31, 2003.
OCR for page 33
THE PINE BLUFF NON-STOCKPILE FACILITY
Finding 2-3: The number of design, implementation, and
operational issues that must still be addressed before con-
struction of the PBNSF is greater than is typical for an indus-
trial facility because of the unique complexity of the techni-
cal problems, the need for first-time integration of the
systems, and the very short deadline imposed by the CWC.
Recommendation 2-3: As soon as possible, the Army
should systematically review the design integration and op-
eration of all the equipment in the Pine Bluff Non-Stockpile
Facility (including piping, connections, and vessels) to find
ways for simplifying the processing taking place there. This
review should identify ways of (1) minimizing the chances
for equipment or operational or human failures, using pre-
ventive redesign and related measures to reduce reliance on
protective clothing, and (2) optimizing the reliability of the
Pine Bluff Non-Stockpile Facility processes.
Finding 2-4: In keeping with its assigned task of assessing the
concept of operation and engineering design plans for the
PBNSF, the committee concludes that the PBNSF is unlikely
to meet the goal of destroying the non-stockpile materiel by
April 2007 for several reasons, including the following:
.
The schedule does not recognize the known uncertain-
ties in munition configuration, neutralization effective-
ness, and system design.
33
The schedule for construction of the building alone is
shorter than generally accepted.
The schedule for installation of the complex piping,
other chemical treatment, and instrument and control
systems is overly optimistic.
The schedule does not take into account the potential
damage to equipment from an unplanned detonation in
the ECC.
The schedule does not take into account the potential
for delays caused by contamination of the DET when a
munition containing solidified mustard agent is de-
stroyed.
The schedule assumes optimal operation of systems,
some of which have not been designed, e.g., hot water
washout of agent in the ECC.
Although the committee believes that implementation of
the findings and recommendations in this and subsequent
chapters might increase the likelihood that PBNSF as cur-
rently designed will meet the treaty deadline, in Chapter 6
the committee recommends an alternative approach that will
increase safety, reduce long-term costs, and increase the like-
lihood that the treaty deadline is met.
Representative terms from entire chapter:
pine bluff
