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Urban Governance: The New Politics of Entrepreneurship JOHN J. KIRLIN and DALE ROGERS MARSHALL Perhaps for the first tune in two decades of breathless announce- ments of a "new eras in urban governance, in national urban policy, or in intergovernmental relations, there is some evidence of important changes in city governance and in governmental roles in the federal political system. Most fundamentally, the emerging changes in urban governance involve increases in the importance of local political and economic factors and policies. National policies are of less importance in part because the funding (and sometimes the scope) of such policies has been reduced. They are also less important because the policy ap- proaches involved have not proven effective in addressing the issues of job creation and economic growth, issues that loom large on the policy agendas of most cities. It is also very important to recognize that policies that address the pursuit of economic growth are being made in ways quite differ- ent from policies that address the delivery of traditional services. It is not much of an overstatement to argue that a bifurcation in policy processes is occurring, with two distinct sectors emerging. One sector is focused on traditional service delivery through tax-supported pub kc employees (e.g., public education). The other sector is focused on economic growth/infrastructure provision/land use and increasingly achieves its purposes without the expenditure of tax funds and with less intensive use of public employees. The two sectors are not only 348
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THE NEW POLITICS OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP 349 different in goals, resource base, and dependence on public bureau- cracies. They also differ in participants, beneficiaries, and political styles. The two sectors are competitors for resources and space on the public policy agenda. They also complement each other and interact in several ways, so the conflict is not one of zero-sum. Increasingly, the national government is reducing its direct policy involvement with local economic growth and job creation. National fiscal, monetary, tax, and defense procurement policies affect lo- cal economies but with much less place-specific intent than was the case with sewer grants, urban development action grants, or even community development block grants and grants from the Economic Development Administration. The national government remains in- volved in locally delivered programs that affect residents of cities as individuals, programs such as welfare, medical care, and education. But these policies should not be considered a "national" urban policy; they simply have too little direct impact on the economics, physical design, and politics of cities. States vary in the extent of their pol- icy involvement with cities as political units and economies, but the same pattern of commitment to programs that benefit individuals (e.g., public education, welfare, or health) is often seen. This paper looks at the changes strengthening urban governance capacity, examines some theoretical explanations of their causes, and explores the strength and consequences of the new patterns. To establish the setting, we first present an analysis of the dominant approach to urban policy of the 1965-1980 period. This analysis is followed by an assessment of the dimensions of the changes that are occurring and an exploration of ways to analyze those changes. These analyses provide a framework in which to conceptualize the major causes and features of the changes, emphasizing a shift in dom- inant theory from service delivery-focused "public administration" to economic growth-focused "public entrepreneurship." Public en- trepreneurs try to maintain local business and employment growth- and thus local government revenues by stimulating private sector involvement in local economic development projects and urban ser- vice delivery. CONTINUITIES IN POLICY THEORIES AND PRACTICES Despite some apparent changes in national urban policies, in approaches to federalism, and even in officeholders, the 1965-1980 period was characterized by substantial continuities. The persistent
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350 John J. Kirlin and Dale Rogers Marshall patterns are easiest to see in formal national urban or intergovern- mental programs, but we believe they also existed at the local level. Challenges to these practices began to emerge in the later 1970s; such challenges have gathered momentum as the 1980s pass. During the mid-1960s, a major expansion in the role of the na- tional government occurred. This expansion took the form of greatly increased numbers of national intergovernmental grant programs, increased appropriations to grants, and increased national regula- tions placed upon state and local governments, either directly as mandates or as conditions on grants-in-aid (Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, 1980~. The major elements of these urban programs - that is, their essential policy theory (definition of the problem and how to solve it) and political dynamics remained virtually intact into the 1980s. There is much diversity in the detail of the programs, and yet there Is much similarity in the policy theory underlying them. Most share, for example, the following attributes, which are derived from the service delivery-focused public administration orientation to gov- ernment: . definition of the "problem" as requiring direct action by pub kc employees, usually with little attention to the potential role of a private individual, firm, or organization; ∑ policy strategies that rely on service provision to achieve the desired ends; ~ program designs based on implementation through highly formalized, functionally specific organizations supported by general tax revenues (i.e., public bureaucracies); and an emphasis on the distributive and redistributive elements of choices, as opposed to choices intended to change the available resources. The national policies of the 1965-1980 period shared not only a common theoretical orientation but also similar origins. Individual members of Congress were overwhelmingly the most important fac- tor in the origination of intergovernmental grant programs (Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, 1981:11-13~. The in- stitutional constraints on and incentives to the members of Congress and the institutional features of intergovernmental bureaucracies in- teracted to encourage the continuation of categorical grants (Chubb, 1985~.
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THE NEW POLITICS OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP 351 Urban governance also exhibited similar patterns. Local offi- cials shared the policy theories enumerated above. As local govern- ments became more dependent on federal funds, national policies and grants influenced their policy agendas, guided resource allo- cation, and shaped the structures of government. Cities defined problems as requiring direct action by public employees, emphasized service provision, and created highly formalized, functionally specific organizations. A focus solely on national grants policy is too limiting, however; it misses many of the critical public policies and private actions that shape urban areas. "Urban governance, the subject of this paper, cannot be reduced to national grants policy. Similarly, the factors affecting urban governance range far beyond Congress and intergovernmental bureaucracies. Before the 1965-1980 period, city politics was often studied in isolation from the larger political and economic context. But the growing local dependence on federal grants soon led some to see cities as only subordinate agents in a nationally dominated intergov- ernmental system, and important local dynamics were often ignored (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1984; Reagan and Sanzone, 1981~. Today, a better balance is emerging in the study of cities. Cities are recog- nized as separate political jurisdictions with their own political and economic dynamics, jurisdictions that make genuine choices within significant constraints set by the intergovernmental system and by economic and demographic trends (Stone and Sanders, 1987:3~. After carefully reviewing research on the intergovernmental sys- tem in this nation, Anton (1984) concluded that the national govern- ment plays a much more limited role in the policies and politics of local areas than is often claimed. Specifically, Anton argued that the size of local governments (measured by budget or personnel) is not determined by national policies or grants, that local governmental structures are under virtually constant review and reformulation, and that national grants are both less stimulative and less constraining of local expenditures than is sometimes suggested. Anton carefully observed that national policies and grants do have some impact on local government activities, but those effects are neither determina- tive nor global. In this nation, and in the European nations he also reviewed (although less thoroughly), intergovernmental relations are characterized by mutual dependence and not by domination.
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352 John J. Kirlin and Dale Rogers Marshall This brief analysis suggests that three factors shape urban gov- ernance: (~) theories concerning problems and policies, (2) institu- tional constraints and incentives, and (3) individual leadership and policy entrepreneurship. The 1965~1980 period was one of continuities in national ur- ban policies and in urban governance because these three factors were coaligned. Dominant theories legitimated and gave force to actions by individual policy entrepreneurs operating within facilita- tive institutions. Kirlin (1984) cans this the period of "aggressive pluralism," when a new policy often created groups whose newfound interests could be variously served by government action. Browning et al. (1984) emphasize the importance of electoral success for mi- nority groups in this period and, once elected, of participation in the dominant coalition. Individual leadership or entrepreneurship were central to the formation of both electoral and governing coalitions. The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR) has advanced similar arguments ACIR's analyses of changes in the federal political system (1981:Ch. 2) identified individual policy en- trepreneurs operating within the constraints and opportunities of context as key factors in those changes. CHANGES IN THEORIES AND CONSTRAINTS Beginning in the mid-1970s (but more fully visible in the 1980s), changes occurred in all three of the factors identified in the preceding section. Theories concerning problems and policies have changed. In- stitutional constraints and incentives have changed. And, in response to those changes, the activities of individual policy entrepreneurs have changed. Consider first the changes that have occurred in theories. Once- dominant Keynesian economic theory, which legitimated high levels of public spending and deficits and provided a nonmoral rationale for poverty, has been challenged by monetarism, supply-siders, and old- style conservatives. And even if none of these alternative economic theories has succeeded in dominating policy-making, taken together, they have broken the domination of Keynesian ideas, introducing variations and fluctuations into policy processes (Bosworth, 1980~. In another instance, welfare policies and their undergirding theories are under similar attack (I`emann, 1986; Wiseman, 1985), although such news does not reach the front pages as often as do controversies concerning economic theories and policies.
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THE NEW POLITICS OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP TABLE 1 Trends in Median Personal Income (in 1984 Dollars) for Selected Years and for the Period 1960-1984 . . . . Men Women - Full-time Full-time Year Families All Only All Only 19,711 28,167 26,433 14,311 18,830 15,600 1960 1973 1984 Change (a), 1960-1973 42.9 31.6 Change (a), 1973-1984 19,060 26,805 24,004 -6.2 -17.2 4,424 6,535 6,868 11,558 15,165 15,422 40.6 47.7 31.2 -10.4 5.1 1.7 SOURCE: Calculated from Council of Economic Advisors (1986:286). 353 Policy makers, analysts, and citizens appear less accepting of the notion that any problem we encounter can be surmounted by a public policy. Consider, for example, the growth in self-help/support groups such as Alcoholics Anonymous, or the great expenditures made by firms to educate their employees. The institutional context of policy-making is changing funda- mentally. Much of the transformation that is occurring can be traced to changes in the structure of the economy. As service and trade em- ployment increases more rapidly than manufacturing employment, the share of jobs in manufacturing declines relative to total employ- ment. For example, in California, which remains the state with the nation's largest manufacturing sector (measured in employment or value added), about 340,000 net new jobs were created in the January 1984-January 1986 period. Yet only 5 percent of those jobs were in manfacturing; 85 percent were in the categories of trade, services, and government (Kirlin, 1986~. Because median wages are lower in service and trade employment, the consequences of these shifts include pressure on the incomes of individuals and the erection of barriers to access to middle-class life styles. Table 1 reports changes in real personal income in the 196~1984 period, showing increases from 1960-1973 and then decreases in the 1973-1984 period. Women are the exception to these trends, however; their income continued to increase but still lagged behind men's income. These data suggest that fiscal limits on governments mirror the fiscal stress citizens are experiencing; far from being the work of
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354 John J. Kirlin and Dale Rogers Marshall "craziest, which was the initial reaction to California's Proposi- tion 13, fiscal limits may be a rational balancing of citizens' private economies versus those of the public sector (KirTin, 1982~. More than three-qua~ters of the states have seen one or another form of fiscal limit imposed since the late 1970s, and the Gramm-RuUman- Hollings Act, if it is triggered by high deficits on the federal budget, may limit the expenditures of the national government. Whatever the explanation that is offered, growth in public sector revenues has slowed, as is shown in Table 2, which reports growth rates in total public expenditures by decade as a percentage of the gross national product (GNP). Table 2 reveals the gradual slowing of the relative growth of the public sector vis-a-vis the total economy; yet the fiscal limits movement has also had major effects on particular jurisdictions. For example, in California, $86 billion in cumulative reductions of state and local taxes have occurred since June 1978, and Proposition 4, the Gann expenditure limit, is projected to reduce expenditures an incremental $20 billion over the next decade. The annual reductions are now approximately $18 billion and wit! increase to $25 billion within 5 years (compared with actual expenditures of $86 billion by all California governments in 1985-1986~. Another consequence of the changes in the structure of the econ- omy is a shift in the location of jobs. Since the beginning of indus- trialization, most jobs were created in central cities, but in the past several years, more jobs have been created in suburban locations than in central cities. Table 3 illustrates this phenomenon with data on job creation in San Francisco, California, and in three adjacent TABLE 2 Growth Rates in Government Receipts as a Percentage of Gross National Product D ecade Growth Rate 1929-1939 1939-1949 1949-1959 1959-1969 1969-1979 1979-1984 55 29 21 18 o o SOURCE: Calculated from Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (1987:Table 3).
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THE NEW POLITICS OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP TABLE 3 Job Creation (percentage change in nonagricultural employment) in San Francisco and in Three Adjacent Suburban Counties, by Industry, December 1980-December 1984 355 Industry Adjacent Suburban Counties San Francisco Contra Costa San Mateo Sonoma Total 0.8 13.1 4.0 15.1 Construction 3.8 16.5 0.0 7.5 Manufacturing -5.2 5.4 -10.3 18.0 Transportation and public utilities -4.5 9.2 5.1 10.9 Wholesale trade -5.9 13.6 2.9 28.6 Retail trade 6.7 13.0 13.3 19.9 Finance, insurance, and real estate -4.9 38.5 13.1 24.1 Services 7.7 23.9 12.1 20.1 Government -2.2 -3.5 -4.4 -0.5 SOURCE: Computed from data provided by the California Economic Development D apartment. suburban counties during December 1980-December 1984. As can be seen, San Francisco was stagnant overall, whereas Contra Costa and Sonoma Counties had high rates of job creation and San Mateo, a more mature economy that had grown rapidly in the past, grew modestly. These changes in the structure of the economy are major shifts from the previous patterns on which much national policy was based, patterns that provided the context for the design of institutions of city governance. Changes of this magnitude provide new institutional incentives and constraints for policy makers. In particular, fiscal resources are often scarcer, although, as will be examined shortly, some cities have discovered ways to prosper even during these periods of economic change and fiscal limits. PROCESSES O1? MOBILIZATION' INCORPORATION, AND LEADERSHIP These changes in theory and institutional context, as well as the increased importance of local political economies in supporting government services, have focused renewed attention on local gov- ernments. They highlight the fact that local governments make a dif-
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356 John J. Kirlin and Dale Rogers Marshall ference. Local political dynamics are continually producing changes in leaders, institutions, and policiesóchanges that are quite signifi- cant. Examining local governments in this larger context, we see that local politics is not issueless or groupless. Competition among cities for economic resources is important, as Peterson (1981) has effec- tively argued, but it does not eliminate intracity political controver- sies. Local politics involves continuing contention among different forces. It is the politics of coalitions, which involves periodic realign- ments over time at the local level as at the national level (Chubb and Peterson, 1985~. New events, problems, or populations create oppor- tunities for new coalitions to form and challenge more established groups (Fainstein et al., 1983; Shefter, 1985; Stone et al., 1986~. Individuals play an entrepreneurial role in the mobilization of these groups. Problems of equity, representation, and redistribution were the focus of insurgent coalitions from the 1960s through the m~-1970s. Fiscal crises moved to the top of many local agendas in the late 1970s. More recently, the emphasis of such coalitions is frequently economic development, job creation, and the generation of new revenues for the public sector. Redistribution issues have been associated with high levels of conflict, including protest demonstrations. Observing this conflict, analysts worried about the governability of the city, fearing that the social order was in serious danger and that disrup- tion threatened the established political and economic mechanisms (Banfield, 1970; Yates, 1977~. Others feared that there would not be enough conflict to transform these mechanisms (Piven and Cloward, 1971~. City fiscal crises, beginning in New York in 1975, changed the terms of the debate, and analysts found a new worry: the fiscal via- bility of the city. Bankruptcy, not group unrest, appeared to present the greatest threat to social order. City officials chose a variety of cutback strategies to bring expenditures into balance with revenues. According to Shefter (1985:220), these strategies were shaped by "the composition of the political coalitions they depend on for sup- port and the structure of political organizations and institutions in their cities. Policy entrepreneurs who played leadership roles in the reduction of fiscal strain chose adaptive mechanisms and strategies that were influenced by their ideologies, that is to say, their policy theories. Shefter has shown that in New York, periodic fiscal crises have resulted in political reorganization that allows new social forces
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THE NEW POLITICS OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP 357 to be integrated into the city's political makeup, often changing the balance of power. After the 1975 crisis, city banks, unions, fiscal monitors, and the mayor became the major centers of power. The new dominant coalition was weighted toward creditors and against broad citizen participation. In the 1980s, attention has focused on the economic vitality of cities. The changes in the structure of the economy reviewed earlier are one reason for this shift in focus. In addition, President Reagan's domestic policies and the 198~1982 recession have increased city interest in local economic development and the generation of local revenue. Yet, although there may be a broad consensus on the de- sirability of development, there is often also disagreement on which developments are in the city's interest. Specific proposals may gener- ate controversy concerning location, scale, or environmental impacts. Developments often have differential effects, unevenly distributing benefits and losses. In turn, the fact that benefits and losses are dis- tributed unevenly provides opportunities for policy entrepreneurship (Stone and Sanders, 1987~. These changing urban issues are associated with the processes of change in urban governanceówith the mobilization of interest groups, their representation, and their incorporation into and effects on urban political processes. The processes and policies of cities, like those of organizations, depend on the way differences are resolved; that is, on the political arrangements by which coalitions are formed and conflict is managed. Thus, attention must be paid not just to ra- tional policy choice but also to internal political relationships, ideolo- gies, and interests, all of which are important in shaping the choices of each interest group and, through their interaction, the public poli- cies that ultimately develop. In this process of mobilizing interests and melding disparate elements into effective political forces, indi- vidual policy entrepreneurs play important leadership roles. They are critical in identifying, attracting, and organizing individuals into interest groups and shaping the group's theory base, including its rationale for existence, its image of the world, and its agenda. How have these patterns of city political coalitions and leadership changed in the recent past? How have the political structures of cities been changing to adapt to new leaders and issues? It is noteworthy that available data on council members and mayors do not include information (e.g., partisan affiliation or links to various interests) that would help identify changes in coalitions. We can, however, see increases in minority (blacks and Hispanics) and female elected
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358 John J. Kirlin and Dale Rogers Marshall officials and changes in political structures. These political changes were facilitated by the Aggressive pluralism" and larger societal trends in the 1965-1980 period and are now being institutionalized in ways that interact with the other changes taking place in urban governance. Acreages In the N,~n~ber of Black and Hispanic Elected Officials The number of black and Hispanic municipal officials has con- tinued to grow in the 1980s as it did in the 1970s. In 1985 there were 2,898 blacks in municipal office, including 286 black mayors, 27 of which were in cities with populations of over 50,000. The number of black local officials has almost doubled since 1975 when there were only 1,513. A majority of black elected officials are in the South, with 196 mayors and 1,780 other municipal officials (Joint Center for Political Studies, 1985~. In addition, blacks are mayors of several large central cities, including Los Angeles, Chicago, Oakland, De- troit, Philadelphia, Atlanta, Newark, and Washington, D.C., among others. In 1985 there were 1,025 Hispanics in municipal office, includ- ing 3 Hispanic mayors in cities with populations over 50,000: San Antonio, Denver, and Miami. Hispanic officials are found primarily in the Southwest. Texas has 897 Hispanic municipal officials, New Mexico has 188, California has 165, and Arizona has 104 (National Association of Latino Elected Officials, 1986~. These trends suggest that blacks and Hispanics are continuing to mobilize, to form coalitions, and to achieve representation in city government as they did in the 1960s and 1970s, although they are still underrepresented (blacks constitute 11.7 percent and Hispanics 6.4 percent of the population) (Browning et al., 1984~. The signif- icance of race and ethnicity in local politics is not declining. Local conditions and structures, however, shape the political mobilization of minorities and governmental responsiveness to them. Compar- isons of cities show great variation in the amount of power minorities have achieved, how it was obtained, and what difference it makes for policy. The variations depend on differences in history, popula- tion, economics, political structures and processes, and leadership exercised by individuals (Browning and Marshall, 1986~. Minority politics reveals the importance of electoral organizing and coalition formation in city politics. Variations in minority in- corporation and political power are shaped by the ability to win
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364 John J. Kirlin and Dade Rogers Mar~haII traditional role of the delivery of municipal services to a wide range of entrepreneurial activities that are designed to stimulate economic activities, create jobs, and generate revenues. It is this pattern that leads to the conclusion that a bifurcation in policy arenas is occurring. Table 4 presents data on the revenue sources of all governments- the national, state, county, and city. Changes in the composition of fiscal-year revenues between 197~1977 (just before proposition 13) and 1983-1984 (the latest data available) are reported. The table is selective, including only intergovernmental grants (with national and state grants separated), taxes, current charges, and utilities revenues; it shows that overall, and for each type of government, taxes decreased as a revenue source. Additionally, for state, county, and city governments, intergovernmental grants from the national government declined as a percentage of total revenue. State inter- governmental grants increased in importance as revenue sources for counties and cities, however. Although taxes and grants from the national government declined, current charges and utility revenue increased in importance as revenue sources for every type of govern- ment. These patterns illustrate a shift from a tax-supported, grants- lubricated policy system toward a more entrepreneurial policy system based on charges and fees. All types of government demonstrate some entrepreneurial elements in their public finances. Even the national government received 12.1 percent of its revenues from current charges in 1983-1984, mostly from the postal service. Counties receiver] 15.3 percent of their revenues in the same period from current charges, mostly for hospitals. Cities and states provide an interesting contrast. Cities have experienced much greater constraint on their revenues than have states, as illustrated by growth rates of 79.9 percent versus 95.4 percent in total revenues, respectively, in the 1976-1977 to 1983- 1984 period. States derived 58.5 percent of their revenues in 1984 from taxes, down very slightly from 58.7 percent in 1977. In contrast, cities received 33.8 percent of their revenues from taxes in 1983-1984, down more substantially from 36.8 percent in 1976-1977. Current charges generated 11.9 percent of city revenues in 1983-1984 versus 7.7 percent of state revenues in 1984. In this period of fiscal stress, states have fared comparatively well and made the fewest changes in their fiscal systems. Total state revenues increased faster than any other type of government, tax revenues were constant as^a percentage of tote] revenues, and the increase in current charges was the smallest
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THE NEW POLITICS OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP TABLE 4 Changes in Components of Revenues (expressed as percentages of total revenues) by Type of Government 365 Revenue Component Type of Total Government Revenue Current National State Taxes Charges Utilities All lg76-1977 523.5 N.A. N.A. 80.1 10.8 2.7 1983-1984 1,015.9 N.A. N.A. 72.4 13.1 3.7 Percentage of change (growth) 90.0 N.A. N.A. 75.0 134.6 163.4 National 1976-1977 285.0 N.A. 0.5 85.6 8.8 ~ N.A 1983-1984 531.1 N.A. 0.3 78.1 12.1 N.A Percentage of change (growth) 86.3 N.A. 16.0 70.1 156.4 N.A State 1977 172.1 26.7 N.A. 58.7 7.0 0.4 1984 336.1 22.6 N.A. 58.5 7.7 0.7 Percentage of change (growth) 95.4 65.9 N.A. 94.7 113.1 281.2 County 1976-1977 41.9 12.9 34.2 37.9 11.8 0.7 1983-1984 78.2 7.3 35.3 35.7 15.3 1.1 Percentage of change (growth) 86.6 5.9 93.0 75.9 140.3 }75.6 City 1976-1977 71.8 15.7 19.8 36.3 9.6 14.9 1983-1984 129.2 10.0 20.4 S3.8 11.9 18.6 Percentage of change (growth) 79.9 14.2 85.2 67.7 123.4 -125.4 . NOTE: N.A. = not available. These figures exclude trust funds and are expressed in billions of dollars. SOURCE: Calculated from Bureau of the Census (1978-1985~. Of all governments. Intergovernmental transfers from states have increased modestly as a percentage of county and city revenues, but this increase has occurred mostly because of reduced total revenues available to those local governments and not because of the increased largess of states. Increases in grants from states to counties lag
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366 John J. Kirlin and Dale Rogers Marshall slightly behind increases in total state revenues (93 percent versus 95.4 percent); by the same measure, the states are less generous with cities, a fiscal area in which state grants increased only 85.2 percent. Strong evidence of the decline in the fiscal importance of inter- governmental grants from the national government to cities is clear in Table 4. Such grants declined from 15.7 percent of total revenues in 1976-1977 to 10 percent in 1983-1984. By 1983-1984, current charges were a larger revenue source to cities than grants from the national government. Utility revenues were smaller than national grants in 1976-1977 but nearly twice as large by 1983-1984. Cities have had strong incentives to become more entrepreneurial public financiers, and it appears they have done so reasonably successfully. Many of the most entrepreneurial activities of cities, in which the private sector now often finances an activity that would have been funded publicly a decade ago, do not appear in any available statis- tical series. (Some attention is given to this phenomenon later in this paper.) It is also important to understand the changing composition of the intergovernmental grants provided by the national government. Grants for infrastructure purposes, such as wastewater treatment facilities, have been reduced (Congressional Budget Office, 1985:5~. Increasingly, the grants systems of both the national and state gov- ernments focus on income transfers and service provision in the areas of health, education, and welfare. For example, consider the shifts within categories Kirlin (1979) used to analyze changes in grants through the mid-1970s. Those national grants categorized as focusing on structural weaknesses in the economy (for example, economic development assistance, com- munity development block grants, or the Jobs Training Partnership Act) declined from 10.1 percent of all grants in 1976-1977 to 7.9 percent in 1984-1985. More strikingly, grants that focused on reme- dying negative externalities (e.g., sewerage treatment facility grants) decreased from 6.1 percent to 2.7 percent of grants in the same pe- riod. Grants focused on countering cycles in the performance of the economy, which represented 6.9 percent of the total in 1976-1977, did not even exist in 1984-1985. At the same time, welfare state grants, including income security, health, and a variety of targeted education and social services grants programs, increased from 55.9 percent of all grants in 1976-1977 to 61.9 percent in 1984-1985.
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THE NEW POLITICS OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP 367 Available statistical series do not include many forms of en- trepreneurial public finance, especially cases in which costs previ- ously borne by the public sector are shifted to the private sector. No aggregation of these expenditures is available, to the best of our knowledge, even for a single state. In California, a state in which such public-private bargains are well established, some observers believe that this is the primary method of financing public works projects, outstripping direct financing, grants, or public debt (Kir- lin and Kirlin, 1982~. New institutions are also being created to enable the private financing of infrastructure within public policy frameworks, a trend with considerable effects on land use patterns because the new financing instruments influence decisions in that arena (Misczynski, 1986~. Hard evidence on the spread of the theory of public entrepreneur- ship is difficult to find. It is important to note that there are also other contenders to replace the policy orthodoxy of the last few decades. One is ~privatization," commonly defined as turning many government functions over to the private sector, sometimes through contracts and sometimes simply by terminating the public policy or program (Saves, 1982~. The Reagan administration has advo- cated privatization, and this term has now taken on highly partisan overtones. In contrast, public entrepreneurship encourages the broadest use of public powers but has no preconceived attachment to achieving public purposes through tax-supported public bureaucracies. Most of the literature on public entrepreneurship has emphasized infras- tructure and new development, although attention is also paid to alternative forms of service delivery (Committee for Economic De- velopment, 1982; Kirlin and Kirlin, 1982; Leavitt and Kirlin, 1985; Moore, 1983~. The major associations concerned with urban manage- ment, land development, and economic development, including the Urban Land Institute, the National League of Cities, the Public Secu- rities Association, the International City Management Association, and the Municipal Finance Officers' Association, have all sponsored program sessions, training workshops, and publications concerning public entrepreneurship. To succeed, political leaders must address problems within the constraints and opportunities of their time. Policies are an instru- ment in their task of mobilizing supportive interests, of incorpo- rating those interest groups into governing coalitions, and then of influencing urban governance. In the contemporary context, public
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368 John J. Kirlin and Dale Robert Marshall entrepreneurship is attractive to urban public officials and to those who aspire to influence the course of urban governance. It addresses important problems of economic performance and job creation and does so within the fiscal constraints imposed on the public sector. A mayor of the 1960s, such as Richard Lee in New Haven, could build a coalition in which grants from the national government played a large role (Kotter and Lawrence, 1974), but today's mayors do not have that option. Instead, they are more likely to follow the path of Tom Bradley, whose approach to governing Los Angeles has emphasized building coalitions with private interests around devel- opment projects that will stimulate economic growth, job creation, and increased public revenues (Sonenshein, 1986~. Two very important factors encourage mayors and other urban leaders to embrace public entrepreneurship: the alternatives are few, and public entrepreneurs can achieve dramatic results. Concern- ing the latter point, Erieden and Sagalyn (1984) studied downtown shopping centers and concluder! that the new public-private en- trepreneurial style succeeded in the completion of such projects far more frequently than old-style (i.e., grants- and regulation-oriented) redevelopment efforts. Frieden and Sagalyn are cautious regarding the long-term economic effects of the projects they studied (most of the projects are only recently completed) and are not convinced such projects always warrant the substantial public investments made. But they are certain that the projects do not have the negative im- pacts of old-style redevelopment and that they are popular politically with the public officials involved. CHALLENGES OF PUBLIC ENTREPRENEURSHIP The changes in urban governance and the interplay among in- terest groups, dominant political theories, and the policy choices examined earlier in this paper all underscore the continued govern- ability of cities. Cities have emerged from the recent period of fiscal limits, recession, and decreases in grants-in-aid with strengthened, not diminished, capacity. Although their share of total governmental revenues has fallen, cities have diversified their revenue bases and have shifted financing responsibility for parts of their historic activi- ties to the private sector. They continue to incorporate new groups into their political processes. Cities have adapted to complex, unforeseen changes in their cir- cumstances; they play an increased role in economic development;
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THE NEW POLITICS OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP 369 and city officials have discovered opportunities for successful lead- ership in apparent adversity. A theme running through all of these successful adaptations is public entrepreneurship. Cities have not succeeded by passively awaiting the manna of grants, mandates, or even policy ideas from the national or state governments. Instead, they have succeeded through strong, purposeful action. Most im- portantly, those actions have involved much more joint action with the private sector (including, among others, firms, developers, neigh- borhoods, and nonprofit organizations). The greater focus on the economic functions of cities is also appropriate: cities are critical locations of economic activity (Jacobs, 1984), and their role in eco- nomic growth warrants greater attention. Although the emergence of public entrepreneurship and the con- sequent bifurcation of policy arenas into one focused on economic growth and development and another focused on the delivery of ser- vices are positive developments, they do not answer all questions. One set of questions that continues to call for answers derives from the differences between the two sectors. Service providers and en- trepreneurs face different constraints and opportunities; they may not work effectively together even in those cases in which they can be complementary (e.g., the contribution that quality primary and sec- ondary education can make to economic growth). A major challenge to public entrepreneurship arises from the structures and routines of city government. The structures commonly fragment authority needed for successful entrepreneurship, and administrative routines (especially of personnel, finance, and procurement), which consume so much of the attention and energies of city officials, are focused on service delivery activities rather than entrepreneurship. Yet another set of challenges arises from perceived (and real) inequities and corruption that are possible in public entrepreneur- ship. A dominant definition of equity in our society is Treating equal cases alike," a definition easily met by service-delivering public bureaucracies (if you are in this category, you get these services) but often violated in the more particularistic practices of public en- trepreneurship (the freeway interchange financed by the developer will not equally improve the traffic circulation of all parts of an area). More bargaining between the public and private sectors af- fords the opportunity for corruption, in either the form of personal graft or of ceding concern for any public interest in the scramble for jobs or revenues. But most political systems have proved open to some level of corruption, and any evaluation that is made of public
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370 John J. Kirlin and Dale Rogers Marshall entrepreneurship in this regard should be against real alternatives and not against an abstract standard. Moreover, public entrepreneurship is unlikely to solve the needs of all locations or all groups. San Diego is likely to have more en- trepreneuria] opportunities than Des Moines because the former is growing. Both may do better following that strategy than any alter- native, however. The problem of the underclass has not been solvable and continues to be a critical issue in many cities, an urba~-area time bomb. Economic growth, the objective of public entrepreneurship, has not helped reduce urban poverty, despite Banfield's (1970) hopes. Lemann (1986) argues that poverty has worsened among poor blacks, not so much because of the failure of national programs, as Murray (1984) suggests, but because of deep-rooted cultural patterns made more visible and given freer rein by the movement of successful blacks out of central-city ghettos. That movement occurred in part because of successful public policies to provide economic opportunities and access for housing to blacks. Thus, the governability of cities has been demonstrated, at least in part, by redefining public policy objectives. Problems of poverty, or of equality of access, remain. These problems are unlikely to disappear from the national political arena, despite efforts by the Reagan administration to shift responsibility for them to the states. REFERENCES Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations 1980 In Brief: The Federal Role in the Federal S~ten~ 17~c Dynamics of Growth. Washington, D.C.: Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Rela- tions. 1981 An Agenda for American Federalism: Restoring Confidenec and Compe- tenec. Report A-86. Washington, D.C.: Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations. 1987 Significant Features of Fiscal Federalism, 1987 Edition. Report M-151. Washington, D.C.: Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Rela- tions. Anton, Thomas J. 1984 Intergovernmental changes in the United States: An assessment of the literature. Pp. 15-64 in Trudi C. Miller, ea., Public Sector Pcrformanec: A Conceptual lbrning Point. Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press. Banfield, Edward C. 1970 The Unheave?~ly (pity. Boston: Little, Brown. Bosworth, Barry P. 1980 Economic policy. Pp. 35-70 in Joseph A. Pechman, ea., Scttir~g National Priorities: Agenda for the 19808. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution.
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THE NEW POLITICS OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP .. 371 Browning, Rufus P., and Dale Rogers Marshall, eds. 1986 Minority power in city politics: A forum. PS l9(Summer):573-640. Browning, Rufus P., Dale Rogers Marshall, and David H. Tabb 1984 Protest Is Not furlough: The Struggle of Blacks arid Hi~par~ic~ for Equality ire Urban Politics. Berkeley: University of California Press. Bureau of the Census 1978 Governmental Finance ire 1g76-f9T7. Series GF80, No. 5. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Commerce. 1979 Governmental Finances ire 1977-1978. Series GF80, No. 5. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Commerce. Cavanagh, Thomas E., and Thomas L. Sundquist 1985 The new two-party system. Pp. 33-68 in John E. Chubb and Paul E. Peterson, eds., The New Direction ire American Politics. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution. Center for the American Woman and Politics 1986 Women Municipal Officer. New Brunswick, N.J.: Eagleton Institute of Politics, Rutgers University. Chubb, John E. 1985 Federalism and the bias for centralization. Pp. 273-306 in John E. Chubb and Paul E. Peterson, eds., The New Direction in American Politics. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution. Chubb, John E., and Paul E. Peterson, eds. 1985 Thc New Direction in American Politics. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution. Committee for Economic Development 1982 Public-Private Partrzership~: An Opportunity for Barbara Communities. New York: Committee for Economic Development. Congressional Budget Office 1985 Thc Federal Budget for Public Works Ir~frastructurc. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Budget Office. Council of Economic Advisers 1986 Econorruc Report of the President. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office. Fainstein, Susan S., Norman I. Fainstein, Richard Child Hill, Dennis Judd, and Michael Peter Smith, eds. 1983 Restructuring the (:7ity: Thc PoliticalEcor~omy of Urbar`Redevelopmer~t. New York: Longman. Frieden, Bernard J., and Lynne B. Sagalyn 1984 Downtown Shopping Malls and the New Public-Private Strategy. Department of Urban Studies and Planning, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 1986 Downtown shopping malls and the new public-private strategy. Pp. 130-147 in Marshall Kaplan and Peggy L. Cuciti, eds., The Great Society and Its Legacy: Twenty Years of U.S. Social Policy. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press. Heilig, Peggy, and Robert J. Mundt 1985 Your Voice at City Hall: The Politics, Procedure* and Policies of District Represer~tation. Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press. International City Management Association 1982 Municipal Yearbook, 1982. Washington, D.C.: International City Man- agement Association.
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372 John J. Kirlin and Dale Rogers Marshall Jacobs, Jane 1984 Cities and the wealth of nations. Thc Atlantic (March):41-66. Joint Center for Political Studies 1985 Black Efceted Offiicials: A National Roster. Washington, D.C.: Joint Center for Political Studies. Kirlin, John J. 1979 Adapting the intergovernmental fiscal system to the demands of an advanced economy. Pp. 77-104 in Gary A. Tobin, ea., Thc Changing Structure of the City. Vol. 16, Urban Affairs Annual Reviews. Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications. 1982 17`c Political Economy of Fiscal Limits. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books. 1984 Policy formulation. Pp. 13-24 in G. Ronald Gilbert, ea., Majoring and Managing Policy. New York: Marcel Dekker, Inc. 1986 Fiscal context. Pp. 15-32 in John J. Kirlin and Donald R. Winkler, eds., California Policy Choices, vol. 3. Sacramento: University of Southern California Press. Kirlin, John J., and Anne M. Kirlin 1982 Public Choicce-Privatc Rcsourecs. Sacramento, Calif.: Cal-Tax Founda- tion. Kotter, John, and Paul Lawrence 1974 Mayors in action. New York: Wiley. Leavitt, Rachelle, and John J. Kirlin, eds. 1985 Managing Dcoclopmcnt Through Public-Privatc Negotiation Washington, D.C.: The Urban Land Institute. Lemann, Nicholas 1986 ~ the origins of the underclass. 17`c Atlantic (June):31-55, (July):54-68. Lipset, Seymour Martin 1986 The anomalies of American politics. P5 19~2~:222-265. Miscsynski, Dean 1986 The fiscalization of land use in California. Pp. 73-105 in John J. Kirlin and Donald R. Winkler, eds., California Policy Choices, vol. 3. Sacramento: University of Southern California Press. Moore, Barbara, ed. 1983 The Entreprcncur in Local Government. Washington, D.C.: International City Management Association. Murray, Charles 1984 Losing Ground. American Social Policy, 1950-1980. New York: Basic Books. National Association of Latino Elected Officials 1986 Thc National Roster of Hispanic Elected Officials. Washington, D.C.: National Association of Latino Elected Officials. Peterson, Paul E. 1981 City Limits. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Piven, Frances F., and Richard Cloward 1971 Regulating the Poor. New York: Pantheon Books. Pressman, Jeffrey L., and Aaron B. Wildavsky 1984 Implemcntation, 3rd ed. Berkeley: University of California Press. Reagan, Michael D., and John Y. Sanzone 1981 Thc New Federalism, 2d ed. New York: Oxford University Press.
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THE NEW POLITICS OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP 373 Savas, E. S. 1982 Privatizing the Public Sector. Chatham, N.J.: Chatham House. Shefter, Martin 1985 Political ~/Fucal ~i`: Thc Collapac arid Renewal of New York City. New York: Basic Books. Sonenshein, Raphe 1986 Biracial coalition politics in Los Angeles. PS l9(Summer):582-590. Stone, Clarence N., and Heywood T. Sanders, eds. 1987 Thc Politics of Urban Dcoclopmcnt. Lawrence: University Press of Kan- sas. Stone, Clarence N., Robert K. Whelan, and William J. Murin 1986 Urban Policy and Politics in a Bureaucratic Age, 2d ed. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc. Wiseman, Michael 1985 The welfare system. Pp. 133-202 in John J. Kirlin and Donald R. Winkler, eds., California Policy Choicer, vol. 2. Sacramento: University of Southern California Press. Yates, Douglas 1977 Thc Ungoucrnabic City. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
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Representative terms from entire chapter: