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Nontechnical Considerations
In addition to questions of the technical and scientific merit of specific
approaches, the committee examined challenges to the HEI concerning
infrastructure and management, ways in which HEI might stimulate the ed-
ucational process, questions of international cooperation and collaboration,
and ways to look at the costs of such an undertaking.
INFRASTRUCTURE CONSIDERATIONS
The Responsible Federal Entity
Under the Space Act of 1958, NASA was assigned the lead federal
responsibility for the conduct of the nation's civil space program for research
and exploration. In support of its assigned role, it also undertakes selected
developmental and operational functions with Administration direction and
budgetary approval.
NASA is currently well below the peak manpower and budget that it
had during the Apollo era, yet it carries a number of demanding tasks.
These include the operation of the Space Transportation System (STS); the
conduct of a major series of Earth-orbital and planetary scientific missions,
including Galileo, the Hubble Space Telescope, and Mission to Planet
Earth; the operation of a major space and terrestrial communication system;
the aeronautics research and development program; the development of
Space Station Freedom; and a large number of smaller programs.
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HUAL4N EXPLORATION OF SPACE
The major responsibilities listed above leave little room to assume
responsibility for a program that could, in some variants, equal in size and
complexity nearly all of the existing programs in aggregate. This raises
questions of whether NASA should be expanded (via some combination
of increases in civil service manpower, contractor support, or support from
other federally supported entities), whether the responsibilities for HEI
should be spread across several agencies, or whether all or some of the
responsibilities should be transferred to a new or existing organization.
In the committee's view, NASA has the organizational expertise and
demonstrated capability to conduct human space exploration. The devel-
opment of that expertise and the associated laboratories and other facilities
has been hard won at great national expense. ~ attempt to replicate such
expertise elsewhere would be costly and time consuming. Yet, the long-term
human exploration initiative will require that NASA and the nation develop
a whole new generation of management and technological leadership.
The NASA Infrastructure
This is not to say that NASA should automatically be authorized to
return to Apollo-era civil service staff levels (or even greater) to lead
the HEI, although an increase may be part of some options. ~ proceed
effectively with the HEI, the Administration should develop a plan to
incorporate other federal resources that can support the HEI, as well
as devise innovative uses of the private sector, universities, and federally
supported research centers. It is conceivable that a new federally supported
center in the mold of Bellcom, the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, the Mitre
Corporation, or the Aerospace Corporation may have a role to play in
various aspects of the program, although this requires further examination.
Efficient conduct of the HEI will require a number of management en-
hancements, some of which must counter difficulties that are government-
wide.
First, NASA's procurement process should be carefully scrutinized to
identify means of expediting it so it is less burdensome to both NASA
and those bidding for NASA tasks. Some procurement processes, which
are not unique to NASA, absorb time and increase costs. Administrative
procedures must be subjected to the same cost-benefit analysis as technical
approaches. Solutions to this difficulty are not within NASA's author-
ity, although NASA can lead an analysis for joint NASA-Administration-
Congressional action. NASA now has an opportunity to study and possibly
implement techniques to simplify and improve procedures, and these ap-
proaches should be included in the HEI or any de novo program.
Second, it is too costly for the nation to rethink its objectives in
space on an annual basis. Long-term objectives must be set and technical
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NONTECHNICAL CONSIDERATIONS
29
program managers given the consistent support required for the efficient
pursuit of the challenging engineering and scientific objectives to meet the
President's goals. Recent experience on programs such as Space Station
Freedom has demonstrated the difficulties that result when a program's
entire management team is consumed by phasing, rephasing, planning,
replanning, rescoping, and descoping a program in ceaseless variation.
Third, proceeding with the HEI will require that the Administration
and Congress give serious attention to restoring or at least retaining the
basic attractiveness of NASA employment, including competitive salaries.
While NASA has exciting programs that interest the nation's engineering
and science communities and many young people, NASA like other fed-
eral agencies—is losing its appeal as an employer. In addition, the skills
of NASA personnel, who offer an important long-term continuity in the
execution of programs, need continual enhancement.
Fourth, positive steps are needed to encourage young people to enter
science and engineering careers, some of whom will enter NASA, space-
related industry, or university programs. A program of the size and scope
of the extended human exploration of the Moon and Mars will severely tax
a US educational system that is already strained and that is producing a
declining number of trained engineers and scientists. Early in the history
of the US space effort, a direct stimulus expanded the participation by uni-
versities in space activities and increased the number of graduate students
studying and researching space-related subjects. It again appears essen-
tial to revitalize such activities if the human resources are to be available
that the exploration mission will require. Such a revitalization could have
the additional benefit of attracting more young people into scientific and
. .
engineering careers.
International Considerations
The committee considered the goals and proposed implementation
of the HEI from the viewpoint of US interests and national capabilities
only, using the same assumptions as the NASA 90-Day Study in this
regard. Thus, the findings and conclusions here are consistent with an
all-US exploration program. However, it is apparent that several important
benefits could accrue from international cooperation and collaboration on
these programs.
The current technical and political climate is different from that which
existed earlier in the space age. The European Space Agency (ESA) has
developed considerable applicable expertise for human space flight through
Spacelab and its development of Columbus and Hermes. Japan has sim-
ilarly developed expertise in pressurized modules. Both ESA and Japan
have independent launch capabilities and growing expertise and interest
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HUAL4N EXPLORATION OF SPACE
in space exploration. Canada's contribution in remote manipulators and
robotics could prove very valuable in remote lunar and Mars exploration.
Other nations less active in previous joint space ventures may also wish to
participate in this long-term venture. Most importantly, the USSR has sub-
stantial relevant capability, demonstrated continued interest in Mars, and
an apparent strong desire for cooperation with the US in Mars exploration.
The USSR has substantial experience in long-duration (one year) human
exposure to weightlessness, and the capability, with its space station Mir,
to undertake multiyear studies and evaluations of countermeasures. The
Energy has a considerable heavy lift capability, launched from its current
facility. This capability would be reduced were Earth orbit rendezvous with
Space Station Freedom desired because of the power and maneuverability
required to dramatically change the spacecraft orbit.
Several potential advantages of international participation in HEI are
evident. These include cost sharing, additional technical expertise, and
peaceful cooperation in a multidecade program of interest to all mankind.
Some potential disadvantages include possible dependence on foreign coun-
tries for critical activities, concern over transfer of US technology, and more
complex management interfaces.
Considerations of the advantages and disadvantages should recognize
that international collaboration requires long-term policy stability, and
that the US record is not exemplary in this regard. If collaboration is
contemplated, care must be taken to ensure that the enabling agreements
are supported at the highest possible levels in the participating governments,
with as much breadth as is feasible, and that detailed technical agreements
are not made final before all parties understand and agree on requirements
for the HEI or missions associated with it.
As noted earlier, the climate for international cooperation is changing
and is likely to continue to change. A detailed assessment is needed of
the opportunities for international cooperation that may be available and
the means to overcome technical and institutional barriers. It would be
prudent to remain alert to future opportunities that may arise.
Cost for the Human Exploration Initiative
By any measure, HEI will represent a major commitment of the na-
tion's resources; it will be a multiyear program; it will involve deliberate
risk, often difficult to identify and quantify; and it will use major portions of
the careers of many dedicated people. For HEI to be undertaken success-
fully there is a clear need for a unique long-term commitment by successive
Administrations and the Congress. In the committee's view, estimates of
the costs likely to be incurred in carrying out the HEI are uncertain and
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31
are likely to remain so for some time. The initiative is an ambitious under-
taking that requires development and implementation of new technology.
If the costs or schedule of an ambitious, daring technical advance can be
estimated accurately, it is probably using obsolete technology and is nei-
ther ambitious nor daring. Accurate cost estimates are only practical in
circumstances where experience with the technology exists. Currently, the
technologies and even the HEI mission architectures are unknown. While
the nation has experience with estimating costs of some aspects of HEI,
derived from experience with the costs of past space systems, at this time
mission cost estimates should only be taken as suggesting the rough order
of magnitude of the eventual costs.
Analyses of past major programs have shown that there is an optimum
rate of activity that results in minimum total cost. If the pace is faster,
it costs more. If the program is stretched out, the total cost can also be
greater. In most past experiences, space projects based on the logic of
development and mission requirements usually have required high peaks
in the funding profile and have resulted in demands for annual funding
greater than was considered acceptable. Therefore, most programs have
been stretched out and the total cost has not been optimized.
At this stage it may be useful to think about costs in terms of the level
of effort that is both reasonable for making progress toward the President's
goal and sustainable as a commitment of national resources over the long
run. In the peak spending year of the Apollo program, which was in the
nature of a race to the Moon, the NASA budget amounted to about 0.8
percent of the gross national product (GNP), or 3.85 percent of the total
federal budget. The total expenditure for Apollo (which averaged about 0.2
percent of the GNP) was approximately $24.5 billion ($118.1 billion in 1991
dollars). Apollo was a ground-breaking program that incurred substantial
cost to build facilities and institutions; government and industry put forth
a unique effort to fulfill the vision of President Kennedy. The HEI will
presumably build on this capacity and will almost certainly take longer.
President's Bush's vision includes a permanent presence in space, requiring
a continuing commitment of resources.
The committee believes it should be possible to return people to the
Moon and establish a human presence on Mars, at a measured pace, at a
relative rate of annual expenditure that is less than that of the peak Apollo
commitment. NASAs current budget is between 0.2 and 0.3 percent of
the GNP. The committee believes an additional national commitment of
resources of a few tenths of one percent of the GNP should be sufficient to
achieve and sustain the goal of the HEI, the permanent presence of humans
in space. A commitment of this sort, which extends far into the future,
could enable the selection of an appropriately phased mission architecture
as well as research and development strategies and would enable managers
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HUAL4N EXPLORATION OF SPACE
to establish practical schedules. Continuing analysis of the relationship
between rates of expenditure, technology development, and mission profile
is obviously warranted.
HEI will involve a continuing commitment and, for such an approach
to succeed and to maintain support from the American people, it should
set milestones and demonstrate visible accomplishments, for example every
two to three years.
A White Paper published by the National Research Council in early
1989 recommends that NASA maintain a balanced, stable base program to
ensure US competence in fundamental space activities such as astronomy,
planetary exploration, and Earth remote sensing. The committee believes
that this base program should be assured as the nation undertakes additional
large, special initiatives such as the human exploration of the Moon and
Mars. The committee believes that it is important for the funding support
for HEI and other major initiatives to continue to be distinct from that
for the remainder of the NASA budget, to avoid eroding the base of other
essential space and aeronautical capabilities.
Representative terms from entire chapter:
space station
