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The Intermediate-Range 4 Nuclear Force (iNF) Negotiations INTRODUCTION The U.S.-Soviet Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force (INF) negotia- tions, which began in Geneva, Switzerland, on November 30, 1931, originated in NATO's decision in December 1979 to deploy 572 U.S. intermediate-range missiles in Europe. The NATO action, which re- sponded to the Soviet deployment of a new generation of intermediate- range weapons (SS-20 missiles and Backfire bombers), was described as a two-track decision, since in parallel with the deployment of ground- launched cruise missiles and Pershing IT ballistic missiles the United States was to seek to negotiate equal limits on these missiles with the Soviet Union. From the outset of the negotiations the two sides had fundamental differences in their assessments of the threat and the systems that should be limited. The United States sought equal worldwide levels (originally zero) on the intermediate-range missile forces of the United States and the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union sought to ban further missile deployments and to limit the Warsaw Pact and NATO, including British and French forces, to equal levels of intermediate-range mis- siles (originally aircraft as well) in the European theater. In the two years of negotiations, the two sides revised many details of their respec- tive positions but never resolved the underlying differences. In response to the initial U.S. deployments of ground-launched cruise missiles and Pershing II missiles in Europe in November 1983, the Soviet Union, as threatened, walked out of the INF negotiations. The 107

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108 NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL United States has emphasized its willingness to continue the negotia- tions but refuses to meet the Soviet precondition of first removing its recently deployed missiles from Europe. BACKGROUND The Origins Since the late 1940s, nuclear weapons have been stationed in Europe and have played an integral role in NATO's strategy to deter an attack by the Soviet Union. ~rATO's reliance on a strategy of nuclear deter- rence evolved as an alternative to the high cost and heavy manpower required to maintain an adequate conventional force to deter the Soviet Union. Taking advantage of U.S. nuclear superiority, NATO's strategy relied on the threat of massive nuclear retaliation by the United States as the main deterrent to a Soviet attack in Europe. The first nuclear weapons deployed in Europe were on U.S. bombers stationed in Britain. In the early 1950s the United States began to deploy tactical nuclear weapons in Europe intended for use against the superior Soviet conven- tional forces. In the early 1950s the Soviet Union began acquiring its own nuclear weapons. By the end of the decade it began deployment of liquid-fueled medium-range SS-4 and SS-5 missiles, which had ranges of 2,000 km and 4,000 km respectively, in the European part of the Soviet Union. These missiles were initially very vulnerable as they were unhardened and clustered. By the mid-1960s about 600 SS-4s and 100 SS-5s had been deployed. In response to the Soviet medium-range missile deployment and the perceived Soviet advantages in intercontinental ballistic missiles, the United States in 1959 deployed Thor and Jupiter missiles, which had a range of 2,500 km, in Europe. This deployment was in fact intended to reassure the alliance that the United States was prepared to defend Europe. However, the U.S. Thor and Jupiter missiles were removed from Europe in 1962 as part of the settlement of the Cuban missile . . crlsls,. With the withdrawal of these U.S. missiles from Europe, a debate arose within NATO as to the future strategy of the alliance. The United States wanted to place more emphasis on conventional defenses in Eu- rope, while European governments wanted to continue to rely on ex- tended nuclear deterrence to avoid the heavy financial and ~QgiStiC burden of conventional defense. President Charles de Gaulle, one of the major critics of the U.S. position, believed that a shift toward conven-

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THE INS NEGOTIATIONS 109 tional strength would only undermine an already questionable nuclear deterrent strategy that relied on the United States being willing to sacrifice New York for Paris. The debate culminated in 1967, after France withdrew from the integrated NATO defense, in the adoption of the so-called flexible response policy. Flexible response was a compromise. The Western European govern- ments accepted the need for a conventional response to Soviet aggres- sion, and the United States agreed to retain in Europe a nuclear force suitable for use in a controlled escalatory fashion, should the Warsaw Pact launch an attack that could not be contained conventionally. FIexi ble response, which is still NATO's basic strategy of deterrence, re- quires NATO to be able to respond to a Soviet attack with a range of options, from conventional defense alone to the use of either tactical or long-range theater nuclear forces to the ultimate use of intercontinen- tal nuclear forces. To implement this strategy the United States an- nounced that 400 warheads on Poseidon ballistic missile submarines were being committed to the European theater. By this time, Great Britain and France had also begun developing independent nuclear weapons forces. The Soviet break with China in the early 1960s and the Chinese demonstration of a nuclear capability in 1964 put further demands on Soviet theater systems. In response, the Soviet Union moved to modern- ize its vulnerable SS-4s and SS-5s and began targeting some of its new light ICBMs, the SS-11, on Europe and the Far East. During the SALT negotiations the Soviet Union sought to include in the restraints on the U.S. side American forward-based systems (e.g., medium-range bombers and missiles located in Europe or on aircraft carriers in the European theater' and the British and French nuclear forces. The So- viet Union argued that any system that could hit the homeland of either the United States or the Soviet Union should be considered a strategic system. The United States refused even to discuss those systems in the negotiations on the grounds that they were not intercontinental systems. In the SALT ~ Interim Agreement the Soviet Union was allowed a larger number of ballistic missile submarines and submarine-launched ballistic missiles than was the United States. Although the United States denied that the disparity implied any compensation for British and French forces, the Soviet Union in a unilateral statement to the accord indicated that it had received partial compensation for these forces. The Soviet Union further asserted in this statement that, if the NATO allies increased the number of their ballistic missile submarines during the period of the SALT T Interim Agreement to exceed the num-

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110 NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL hers that were operational or uncler construction as of May 26, 1972, the Soviet Union would have the right to a corresponding increase in the number of its submarines. The Soviet modernization program continued throughout the 1970s. In 1974 the Soviet Union began deploying the Backfire bomber, a sub- stantially improved medium-range bomber that was apparently in- tended to strengthen its theater nuclear capabilities. These developments, coming at a time when the Soviet Union had achieved nuclear strategic parity with the United States, raised further concerns within NATO about the imbalance in Europe and the credibility of U.S. deterrence strategy. The issue came to the forefront of the NATO policy debate in 1977, when the Soviets began deploying a new missile, the SS- 20, to replace the aging SS-4s and SS-5s. The SS-20 was an intermedi- ate-range (4,000 km) missile with three accurate MIRVed warheads on a reloadable mobile launcher. The SS-20 was to be stationed in the west- ern Soviet Union to cover all of Western Europe, in the Far East to cover Asian targets, and also east of the Ural Mountains where it could reach either region. West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt was the first Western leader to publicize the threat posed to Europe by the Soviet deployment of the SS-20. In his now famous October 1977 London speech, the chan- cellor argued that, by codifying strategic parity, the SALT ~ agreement and the SALT IT negotiations on long-range nuclear systems had neu- tralized the U.S. strategic nuclear guarantee for the defense of Western Europe. While earlier U.S. superiority in nuclear forces had compen- sated for the Soviet SS-4s, SS-5s, and SS-lls, in the new circumstances of U.S.-Soviet strategic parity nothing compensated for the SS-20s and Soviet superiority in conventional forces. Chancellor Schmidt called on NATO to respond to this growing disparity in the theater nuclear balance. NATO's Dual-Track Deployment Decision On December 12, 1979, after two years of extensive study and consul- tation, NATO unanimously decided to modernize its Tong-range theater nuclear forces by deploying 464 grouncI-launched cruise missiles (GECMs) and 108 Pershing IT ballistic missiles beginning in 1983. The Pershing II, with its very high accuracy, terminal guidance, and much greater range (1,800 km) than the Pershing {A (700 km), would be able to strike targets in the western portion of the Soviet Union in approxi- mately ten minutes. The ground-launched cruise missile, which was also to be very accurate but flew at subsonic speed, had a range of 2,500

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'THE INS NEGO'[IA'[IONS 111 km, which allowed it to attack targets deeper within the Soviet Union than the Pershing IT could reach. The NATO decision also provided for the withdrawal from Europe of 1,000 nuclear warheads of the shorter- range tactical nuclear weapons and the retirement of one existing nu- clear weapon in Europe for every new longer-range weapon deployed. NATO's deployment decision was called `'6ual track" because the alliance also pledged to pursue a parallel effort to obtain an arms con- trol agreement with the Soviet Union to limit theater nuclear forces. The NATO communique stated that limitations on U.S. and Soviet long- range theater systems should be negotiated bilaterally in a step-by-step approach using the anticipated SALT Ill framework. The immediate objective of these negotiations was to establish verifiable, equal limits on U.S. and Soviet land-based long-range theater nuclear missile systems. As NATO was nearing its modernization decision, Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev announced in October 1979 a series of arms control initiatives that included an offer to limit deployment of SS-20 missiles if NATO would defer its decision to deploy new missile systems. The alli- ance rejected BrezEnev's offer, saying a freeze was not enough. The initial Soviet reaction to NATO's dual-track decision was that it had destroyed any possibility for negotiations on theater nuclear systems. The possibility for any arms control talks was further dampened by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, after which President Carter requested that the Senate suspend consideration of the SALT [l Treaty. In July 1980, President Brezhnev reversed his earlier position and announced that the Soviet Union was prepared to enter negotiations at any time. The United States agreed, and preliminary talks between the United States and the Soviet Union began in mid-October 1980. The opening U.S. position, which reflected the NATO decision, was that attention should initially be given to establishing equal ceilings on long-range land-based theater nuclear missile systems. Those ceilings would cover the planned U.S. GECMs and Pershing ITs and the Soviet SS-20s and older SS-4s and SS-5s. The Soviet proposal, which incorpo- rated Brezhnev's call for a freeze on new deployments, took a broader approach, stating that all American systems capable of striking Soviet territory from European bases, such as the F-lll bombers stationed in Britain or aircraft on carriers in the European region, should be in- cluded, along with French and British strategic forces. The talks re- cessed after the U.S. elections in November, having simply established the positions of the two sides. While the new Reagan Administration assessed its arms control and foreign policy goals, the grass-roots antinuclear movement in Europe,

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112 NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL which opposed the deployment of new U.S. missiles, continued to gain popular support. Widespread European fears that the United States was moving toward a nuclear war fighting capability which had been kindled by the deployment decision, the 1979 controversy over the neu- tron bomb, and the Carter Administration's 1980 announcement of a new flexible targeting strategy were further fueled by the Reagan Administration's hard-Tine rhetoric and its failure to resume arms con- troT negotiations promptly. At the end of February 1981, President Brezhnev in his report to the 26th Soviet Party Congress called on the United States to join in negotiations and proposed a U.S.-Soviet morato- rium on deployment of new medium-range nuclear missile launchers in Europe and European parts of the Soviet Union. Brezhnev stated that this moratorium "could come into force immediately as soon as negotia- tions on this question commence and would be effective until a perma- nent treaty on limitation or, even better, on reduction of such nuclear facilities in Europe is concluded." The INF Negotiations Although the NATO alliance rejected Brezhnev's call for a morato- rium while negotiations were in progress, the stage was now set for the INF negotiations. It is possible to reconstruct these negotiations in detail, since both sides released their positions and leaked information in an effort to influence the public debate on the NATO deployment decision. The details of the negotiations help illuminate the underlying differences between the positions of the two sides in this area. Secretary of State Alexander Haig and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko announced on September 24, 1981, that the United States and Soviet Union would begin negotiations on November 30, 1981, in Geneva. The vague wording of the joint communique, which referred to talks "on those nuclear arms which were earlier discussed" between the two sides, made it apparent there was disagreement from the beginning about which systems the negotiations should address. Another important point of discord that became apparent before the negotiations started was the strikingly different assessments of the balance in Europe. President Brezhnev declared that there was at that time a rough balance of approximately 1,000 NATO and Soviet systems in Europe. President Reagan insisted that the Soviet Union had an "overwhelming advantage" in intermediate-range systems. The main differences in the two assessments involved the number and kinds of aircraft included by both sides and inclusion by the Soviet Union of British and French forces.

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THE INF NEGOTIATIONS 113 The fall of 1981 was a period of increased tensions in the NATO alli- ance. Demonstrations in Western Europe against the deployments be- came more frequent and numerous. European anxieties were fueled by such developments as President Reagan's statement that a nuclear war limited to Europe was possible, Secretary Haig's statement that NATO's strategy included nuclear demonstration shots, and the U.S. decision to produce the neutron bomb. Both in the United States and in Europe, dissenting views on the wisdom of the NATO modernization decision were becoming more common. Analysts argued that the Persh- ing Ifs and GECMs would inherently be extremely vulnerable because of their inability to maneuver in the densely populated, limited land area of Western Europe and because of their proximity to the Soviet Union. Some questioned whether the NATO deployments would be suf- ficiently survivable to provide a credible deterrent. Consequently, there were questions about the validity of the underlying premise that the deployment provided a link to U.S. strategic forces. On November 8, 1981, in his first major address on arms control, President Reagan sought to develop popular support at home and abroad for the alliance's approach to the upcoming negotiations. He presented the so-called zero option proposal, under which the United States would be prepared to cancel its deployment of Pershing Ifs and GECMs if the Soviet Union would dismantle all of its SS-20, SS-4, and SS-5 missiles. The NATO allies and both Democrats and Republicans on Capitol Hill warmly welcomed the President's proposal. The Soviet Union immediately criticized the proposal because it "deliberately" overlooked U.S. submarine-based systems, forward-based aircraft sys- tems, and French and British nuclear systems. A week later, Soviet President Brezhnev stated that the zero option proposal was inequita- ble to the Soviet Union. He reiterated Moscow's proposal for a morato- rium on new deployments of intermediate-range missiles in Europe and said that the Soviet Union was willing to make "radical" cuts in its forces. As the first round of the INF talks opened in Geneva, there were mass protests against U.S. and Soviet arms policies in Denmark, Switzer- land,- Italy, West Germany, and Romania. The NATO ministers re- sponded by endorsing the arms control process, stating that they planned to go ahead with the deployment of the new weapons in Europe should the negotiations fail. President Reagan asserted that it was the deployment decision that had brought the Soviet Union to the negotiat- ing table, and that the antinuclear demonstrations in Europe "were bought and paid for by the Soviet Union." President Brezhnev then proposed a two-thir(ls reduction in NATO

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114 NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL and Soviet medium-range nuclear systems. This would amount to a reduction of about 600 systems from the 1,000 systems that the Soviet Union estimated each side to have. Brezhnev also called for the "real zero option," which he defined as the removal of all tactical and me- dium-range nuclear arms, including British and French arms. He stated, however, that if the West was not ready for "radical decisions" the Soviet Union would settle for deep cuts. President Reagan rejected Brezhnev's plan and announced that the United States had presented a draft treaty incorporating the proposed zero option. The Soviet Union responded to the U.S. announcement with a state- ment from the Soviet news agency Tass that labeled the U.S. draft as "absurd" and detailed the Soviet draft position in the negotiations. The Soviet proposal sought to limit medium-range missiles, which the So- viet Union defined only as systems in Europe west of the Ural Moun- tains, forward-based nuclear-capable aircraft, and British and French systems. The main feature of this proposal was a call for phased reduc- tions from the current balance, under which both sides would reduce to totals of 300 by 1990. The U.S. State Department in turn said that the Soviet proposal was unacceptable, because it would not prevent more SS-20s from being deployed in the European part of the Soviet Union, would permit unlimited deployment of SS-20s in the Asian part of the Soviet Union, and would not permit the United States to deploy inter- mediate-range missile systems in Europe. By the end of the first round of negotiations in Geneva, it was clear that the sides differed on four fundamental issues: the United States sought to eliminate all intermediate-range nuclear missiles, whereas the Soviet Union sought to stop planned U.S. missile deployments but was not prepared to give up all of its existing intermediate-range mis- siles in return; the United States sought to limit only U.S. and Soviet systems, whereas the Soviet Union sought to include the British and French forces; the United States called for global limits on intermedi- ate-range missiles, whereas the Soviet Union proposed to limit only systems in or "intended for use" in Europe; and the United States sought to limit only intermediate-range missile systems, whereas the Soviet Union also wanted to include nuclear-capable aircraft in a single aggregate ceiling. The sides disagreed on a number of other significant issues. These issues included the following: Soviet refusal to consider U.S. proposals for limits on shorter-range missile systems; U.S. insis- tence that reduced systems be destroyed as opposed to Soviet offers to reduce systems by a combination of destruction and withdrawal from range of Europe; and U.S. desire for a treaty of unlimited duration as opposed to the Soviet position that the treaty would have to be renewed in 1990.

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THE INF NEGOTIATIONS 115 As the first round of the Geneva negotiations recessed, President Brezhnev announced in March 1982 a unilateral freeze on new medium- range missiles in the European part of the Soviet Union. He also said that some missiles already in place would be removed in the course of 1982. While restating hopes for agreement, Brezhnev issued a warning, which was to be repeated throughout the course ofthe negotiations, that the deployment of U.S. missiles in Europe capable of striking targets within the Soviet Union would compel it "to take retaliatory steps that would put the other side, including the United States itself, in its own territory in an analogous position." The White House rejected Brezhnev's unilateral moratorium, calling it "neither unilateral nor a moratorium," and charged that the proposal sought to maintain Soviet superiority, divide the West, and secure "un- challenged hegemony" for the Soviet Union over Europe. The NATO allies joined in dismissing Brezhnev's initiative and noted that existing deployments of SS-20s east of the Urals could also be targeted on Eu- rope. President Brezhnev publicly responded to the NATO allies' con- cern in a nationally televised speech in May 1981, in which he pledged that missiles withdrawn from the European part of the Soviet Union would not be redeployed east of the Ural Mountains within range of the Western European nations. The "Walk in the Woods" Formula In the second phase of the formal negotiations, which ran from May 2 through July 20, 1982, little progress was made on the major issues, although the Soviets did make a number of minor changes and addi- tions to their proposal. Meanwhile, secret informal discussions were taking place between Ambassadors Paul Nitze and Yuli Kvitsinsky in July 1982 on the major issues in the negotiations. The informal agree- ment that may have emerged from their discussions later became known as the "walk in the woods" formula. Reportedly, the formula contained the following provisions: the United States and the Soviet Union would each be limited to 225 intermediate-range missile launchers and aircraft in Europe (including the eastern slope of the Urals); each side would be limited to a subceiling of 75 intermediate- range missile launchers in Europe (including the SS-20s on the eastern slope ofthe Urals at Verknyaya Salda that could reach Europe), with the United States to deploy only cruise missiles (not Pershing IIs) within its sublimit; the Soviet Union would be limited to 90 intermediate-range missile launchers in the eastern Soviet Union outside the range of Eu- rope; each Soviet ballistic missile launcher would carry no more than three warheads; each U.S. GECM launcher would carry no more than

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116 NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL four missiles, each with one warhead; all intermediate-range missile systems in excess of the limits would be destroyed; limited aircraft would be the U.S. F-lll and FB-lll and the Soviet Backfire, Badger, and Blinder; U.S. and Soviet shorter-range INF missiles would be lim- ited to existing levels; and appropriate verification measures would be negotiated within three months. Much controversy was eventually to surround the origin of the walk- in-the-woods formula, the role of each negotiator in its preparation, and the question of which side rejected it first. According to U.S. Ambassa- dor Nitze, he and Soviet Ambassador Kvitsinsky agreed to develop jointly, without official commitment, a complete package of reciprocal concessions that would resolve all of the principal outstanding issues if accepted by both governments. Ambassador Kvitsinsky, on the other hand, maintains that Nitze unilaterally advanced a package deal along the lines of the walk-in-the-woods proposal, which Kvitsinsky agreed to send to Moscow but told Nitze would be unacceptable to the Soviet Union. Whatever the facts on the origin of the walk-in-the-woods for- mula, neither the United States nor the Soviet government embraced the concept. Nitze reports that in September 1982 Kvitsinsky returned to Geneva with instructions to reject the walk-in-the-woods formula. The U.S. press reported that after much debate within the administra- tion, President Reagan had previously rejected further exploration of the walk-in-the-woods compromise, as a result of strong opposition from the Department of Defense. After the recess of the second round, Ambassador Nitze announced that there had been "no progress on the central issue" of which weapons to include in an INF agreement. Relations between the two negotiating sides deteriorated as the United States charged the Soviet Union with violating its self-imposed moratorium on SS-20 deployments and the Soviet Union denied that it had deployed new SS-20 missiles west of the Ural Mountains. The Soviet Offer to Match British and French Missiles Shortly after the death of Leonid Brezhnev in November 1982, the new head of the Soviet government, Yuri Andropov, announced a new Soviet initiative. This proposal called for the Soviet Union to reduce the number of its medium-range missiles in Europe to about 160, equal to the number of French and British missiles, provided the United States did not deploy the 572 GECMs and Pershing Its. The new Soviet leader said that this meant that the Soviet Union "would reduce hundreds of missiles, including dozens of the latest missiles known in the West as

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THE INS NEGOTIATIONS 117 the SS-20s." When making this offer, Andropov addecI that there must also be an accord on reducing to equal levels each side's number of medium-range nuclear-capable aircraft stationed in Europe. Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko elaborated that the Soviet Union was pre- pared to negotiate on the basis of "mutuality" a reduction of its shorter- range SS-21, SS-22, and SS-23 nuclear weapon systems targeted on Western Europe. He also confirmed that "some rockets could be com- pletely destroyed and some could be redeployed behind a line in Siberia where they could no longer hit targets in Western Europe." The Reagan Administration rejected Anc3ropov's proposal, saying that it would still leave a Soviet monopoly on intermediate-range mis- siles in Europe and deny the Uniter! States "the means to deter the threat." The NATO allies also quickly rejected Anciropov's offer, and the French Foreign Minister said that he was "shocked" that the Soviet Union would attempt to include the French nuclear arsenal in U.S.- Soviet arms control talks since the French nuclear force was "indepen- dent." By the end of November 1982, when the third session of the formal negotiations ended, the two sides remained far from agreement. The series of Soviet initiatives, combined with the continuing politi- cal demonstrations in Europe and the pending elections in several Eu- ropean countries, put pressure on the United States to appear more forthcoming in the INF negotiations. Pressure from NATO for the United States to advance a position less stringent than the zero option peaked in mid-January 1983 when former U.S. Arms Control and Dis- armament Agency Director Eugene Rostow revealed that Ambassadors Nitze and Kvitsinsky had developed the informal walk-in-the-woods compromise the previous summer. Initially, the White House informed the press that the informal agreement was inadequate and could not have served as the basis for an accord. Several days later, the White House informed the press that the United States had not closed the door quite as firmly as Moscow, explaining that Secretary of State George Shultz had sought to signal Gromyko on September 28 that while the understanding was inadequate the informal channel should remain open. GromyLo rejected reports that the U.S. and Soviet negotiators had earlier reached any tentative agreement at Geneva. To reassure NATO about the sincerity of the U.S. interest in an agree- ment, Vice President George Bush publicly read a letter in Europe from President Reagan to President Andropov inviting Andropov to meet Reagan to sign a treaty banning all intermediate-range land-based mis- siles "whenever and wherever he wanted." President Reagan himself later acknowledged that the letter was not a new proposal but rather a response to the "vast" Soviet propaganda effort `'to discount the legiti-

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THE INK NEGOTIATIONS TABLE 1 U.S. arid Soviet Views of the INF Balance in 1981 125 U.S. COUNT U.S. Soviet Missiles 0 SS-20 missiles 250 F-111 fighter-bombers 164 SS-4s and SS-5s 350 F-4s 265 SS-12s and SS-22s 100 A-6s and A-7s 68 SS-N-5s 30 FB-l l Is (in U.S. for TU-26 Backfire bombers 45 use in Europe) 63 TU-16 Badgers and TU-22 Blinders 350 SU-17, SU-24, and MIG-27 fighter-bombers 2,700 TOTAL 560 3,825 Western U.S. Fighter-bombers (F-llls, F-4s, A-6s, A-7s, FB-llls) Pershing IA missiles British Polaris missiles Vulcan bombers French Land-based intermediate-range ballistic missiles Submarine missiles Mirage 4 bombers SOVIET COUNT Soviet Land-based missiles (SS-20s, SS-4s, SS-5s) Submarine missiles 555 108 64 56 18 80 33 496 (SS-N-5s) Medium-range bombers (Backfires, Badgers, Blinders) 461 18 West German Pershing IA missiles 72 TOTAL 986 975 SOURCE: The New York Times, November 30,1981, p. A12. the Soviet calculations for including the independent British and French nuclear systems. The Soviet View The Soviet Union has continued to insist that rough parity in interme- diate-range weapons existed in Europe throughout the late 1970s and early l980s until it was disrupted by the U.S. deployment of Pershing IIs and GECMs. In 1979, according to Soviet calculations, the rough parity included approximately 1,000 systems apiece for the Soviet Un- . .

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126 NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL ion and the NATO countries (see Table 11. The Soviet estimates included on their side the SS-20, SS-4, and SS-5 missiles and intermediate-range bombers; on the NATO side the Soviet estimates included the U.S. for- ward-based nuclear force (FB-l l l bombers, F-l l l and F-4 fighter- bombers, A-6 and A-7 carrier-based aircraft, and the Pershing lA missiles), together with the nuclear forces of Britain and France (ground-based French S-2 and S-3 missiles, British Polaris and French M-20 submarine-based ballistic missiles, and Vulcan, Buccaneer, and Mirage bombers). At the end of 1983, then Soviet Chief of the General Staff Marshall Ogarkov presented slightly different estimates that in- cluded 938 Soviet launchers (465 bombers and 473 missiles) and S57 NATO launch vehicles (695 aircraft and 162 British and French mis- siles). Soviet spokesmen pointed out that NATO delivery systems have a range of 1,000 to 4,000 km and thus can reach targets within the Soviet Union, making them analogous in combat potential to Soviet SS-20 . . mlssl es. The Soviet Union has argued that the SS-20 is simply a replacement on a one-for-one or one-for-two basis for the older SS-4 and SS-5 missiles, whose service lives have expired. To counter the arguments about the destabilizing nature of the upgraded SS-20s, Soviet spokesmen have noted that even though they carry three warheads, their combined yield (three times 150 kt) is less than that of one old SS-4 and SS-5 warhead (around 1 Mt). Consequently, Soviet spokesmen have repeatedly stated that the process of replacing obsolete missiles has decreased both the total number of Soviet "carriers" and the total yield of the warheads these systems could deliver. At the end of 1983 the Soviet Union stated that it had reduced its missile launchers from 600 to 473 and that the SS-5 missile had been totally withdrawn. President Andropov charged that U.S. assessments of an imbalance pretend that 1,000 medium- range U.S. and NATO nuclear systems in the European zone do not exist. The Soviet government has argued that the deployment of new U.S intermediate-range systems will disrupt the existing rough parity by giving NATO a major advantage in both the number of missile launchers and associated missile warheads. With these new deploy- ments, according to the Soviet Union, the United States is starting another exceptionally dangerous round in the arms race. The Soviet Union has also emphasized the charge that the new U.S. missiles dramatically change the nuclear balance since they can reach Soviet territory in a very short time whereas similar Soviet missiles cannot reach the United States at all. In the Soviet view, these new U.S. systems, particularly the Pershing Its, undercut the foundation of stra-

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THE INS NEGOTIATIONS 127 tegic stability because they threaten the Soviet command and control systems. More generally, the Soviet Union has argued that these new U.S. deployments in Europe are part of a larger U.S. program designed to give the United States the capability to launch a preemptive attack against the Soviet Union. In the Soviet view, the Pershing IT, in the context of the MX missile, the Trident IT D-5 missile, anti-satellite weapons, the new command and control systems, and the new ballistic missile defense initiative, will produce a destabilizing shift toward U.S. preemptive superiority. The Main Differences Between the U.S. and Soviet INF Proposals The main differences between the U.S. and Soviet proposals center on three main issues: (l) the systems to be included in the negotiations, (2) the geographic scope of the negotiations, and (3) the treatment of third- country nuclear forces. The U. S. Approach The five criteria guiding the U.S. approach to the negotiations were that an agreement (l) must entail equal limits and rights for the United States and the Soviet Union, (2) should address only U.S. and Soviet systems, (3) should apply to INF missiles regardless of location and should not shift the security problem in Europe to the Far East, (4) should not weaken the U.S. contribution to NATO's conventional deter- rence and defense, and (5) must be verifiable. The U.S. View: Systems to be Covered. In the view of the United States and its NATO allies, the chief source of the destabilizing im- balance in Europe has been the new SS-20 missile. Therefore, the open- ing U.S. position, the zero option, sought to eliminate the entire class of intermediate-range land-based missiles, together with their launchers and certain support structures and equipment. It also banned testing and production of new intermediate-range missile systems. The practi- cal implication of the zero option was that the United States, which had no system comparable with the SS-20, SS-4, or SS-5 missiles, was will- ing to forego the deployment of its Pershing Ifs and GECMs if the Soviet Union would eliminate its existing intermediate-range systems. The U.S. interim proposal covered the same land-based missiles. Throughout the negotiations the United States insisted that it must have equal rights to deploy intermediate-range systems to offset any Soviet deployments if these systems were not to be eliminated. The

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128 NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL informal walk-in-the-woods formula suggested that the United States might be prepared to forego deployment of the Pershing II missiles while proceeding with the deployments of the GECMs in exchange for certain Soviet concessions, but the U.S. government officially rejected that approach and continued to argue that both systems were necessary to offset the Soviet advantage in this area. As Tong as the Soviet Union maintained an SS-20 force, the United States argued, the right to deploy a mix of Pershing ITs and GECMs was essential to provide flexibility in delivery systems and to hedge against the possible Toss of either system. Even though the United States would not forego the right to deploy either Pershing ITs or GECMs, it did modify its position, announcing that it was willing to negotiate the mix of the planned deployment level of the Pershing ITs and GECMs. Toward the end of the negotiations the United States also acknowledged the Soviet concern about aircraft by indicating a readiness to explore limits on specific types of U.S. and Soviet aircraft. But the two sides continued to disagree over what air- craft should be counted and how aircraft should be included in the negotiations. The U.S. assessment gave the Soviet Union a five-to-one advantage in this area, whereas Soviet assessments gave NATO an advantage. The U.S. approach on intermediate-range missiles also included col- lateral restraints on shorter-range nuclear missiles. The original U.S. position included limits on Soviet missiles with ranges between those of the Soviet SS-23 and SS-12/22 (500 to 1,000 km) at the levels deployed as of January 1, 1982. The net effect of the U.S. zero option proposal would have been to ban any ground-launched nuclear missiles with ranges greater than that of the Soviet SS-12/22. The United States did not include limits on the shorter-range U.S. Pershing {A missile (700 km), on the grounds that shorter-range Soviet systems could fulfill the mis- sions of Soviet intermediate-range missiles to a much greater extent than the Pershing lA could fulfill the mission of U.S. intermediate- range systems. However, in June 1983, after the Soviet Union agreed to consider limitations on these shorter-range systems, the United States agreed to consider restraints on the Pershing IA. The U.S. View: Geographic Scope. The U.S. proposal called for worldwide limits on intermediate-range missiles because the range, mobility, and transportability of the SS-20s made these missiles a po- tential threat to the NATO allies even if deployed in the Far East. The U.S. zero option solved this problem by completely eliminating these systems. Under the interim proposal the main reason for global limits

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THE INS NEGOTIATIONS 129 was to ensure that the security threat to Europe was not shifted to the Far East. In September 1983 the United States modified its position by stating that under an agreement providing for equal global ceilings, the United States was prepared not to match the entire worldwide deploy- ment of Soviet intermediate-range missiles with U.S. missiles in Europe and offered to explore the level of these European deployments. With regard to the Soviet proposal, the United States argued that, with the range of 5,000 km it calculated for the SS-20, the line behind which the Soviets proposed to deploy SS-20s would still have them within range of Western Europe. In addition, the Soviet offer to freeze intermediate-range systems in Asia was subject to a~unilateral Soviet assessment of the strategic situation there and thus did not constitute a real limitation. The U. S. View: Third-Country Forces. The U.S. position dealt only with U.S. and Soviet systems. It excluded any limitation on or compen- sation for third-country forces. In response to the Soviet argument that British and French nuclear forces should be included, the United States maintained that these were independent forces of two sovereign nations that were not parties to the negotiations. The United States also argued that it does not determine or control the composition or employment of these forces, which are national minimum deterrents. They are for the most part submarine-based and differ in role and characteristics from the land-based intermediate-range missiles under discussion at Ge- neva. The U.S. negotiators argued that, unlike the U.S. systems, the British and French systems were not intended to deter attacks on other nonnuclear NATO countries. The U.S. negotiators also argued that the Soviet effort to include those forces violated the fundamental principle of equal rights and limits between the United States and the Soviet Union. Finally, top-level U.S. government officials noted that, while the Soviet Union had previously sought in other arms control negotiations to obtain compensation for British and French forces, it had in the past found it possible to enter into agreements with the United States even though its demands for compensation were rejected. General U.S. Criticisms of the Soviet Position. The United States consistently maintained that the basic problem with the Soviet negoti- ating position was that the Soviet Union would not acknowledge the U.S. right to parity in the area of intermediate-range nuclear force missiles. Until that right was acknowledged, there could be no agree- ment. The United States argued that the last official Soviet offer of a

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130 NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL ceiling of 420 warheads, with an implicit ceiling of 140 SS-20 launchers capable of targeting Europe and a freeze on Soviet systems in Asia, still matched Soviet forces with British and French forces while not allow- ing the United States the right to deploy any intermediate-range mis- siles. In the U.S. view, the Soviet Union would maintain a destabilizing unilateral advantage that could be used for political intimidation in a crisis in Europe. The United States also criticized the Soviet Union for its general approach to the negotiations. The Soviet Union was viewed more as fighting a propaganda war to stop U.S. deployments in Europe and disrupt the NATO alliance than as negotiating in good faith. The United States also held the image of Soviet flexibility in the negotiations to be a misperception cleverly developed by the Soviet Union, since in reality all of the Soviet proposals were merely elaborations of the original proposals presented at the first session of the negotiations. The SovietApproach The main thrust of the Soviet approach has been that there is a bal- ance of medium-range missiles in Europe between NATO and the Soviet Union and that the subject of the negotiations should be limitations on the nuclear arms of the Soviet Union and all NATO forces threatening the Soviet Union. Only this approach will assure the Soviet Union equality and equal security in Europe. The Soviet Union argued that the SS-20 had not disrupted the balance and was in fact simply a mod- ernized replacement of older systems whose service lives had come to an end. The deployment of new U.S. missiles, however, constituted a buildup of new nuclear weapons capabilities. This buildup therefore undermined the very purpose of the talks and made the negotiations meaningless in the Soviet view. The Soviet Union emphasized that no Soviet systems in Europe can target the United States, whereas the new U.S. systems can hit the Soviet Union in about ten minutes. In the Soviet view, theater forces are directly related to the overall strategic balance that was implicitly agreed to in SALT ~ and SALT Il. In these agreements, overall capabilities were pronounced equal. Soviet advantages in intercontinental ballistic missiles and theater forces off- set U.S. advantages in strategic bombers, forward-based systems threatening the Soviet Union, allied forces, and the overall quality of U.S. forces, as exemplified by its submarine-launched ballistic missiles. Any revisions of the SALT approach would have to be reciprocal and equal. Present systems would be traded for present systems; future systems would be traded for future systems.

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THE INS NEGOTIATIONS 131 The Soviet View: Systems to be Covered. From the outset of the nego- tiations the Soviet Union maintained that if the sides did not agree to remove all nuclear weapons from Europe, then an agreement should provide for equal reduced levels of both missiles and aircraft between the Soviet Union and NATO, not just the United States. Since a balance of theater forces already existed in Europe, the Soviet Union called for a ban on the deployment of new U.S. intermediate-range missiles. The Soviet Union argued that both the Pershing ITs and the GECMs would disrupt the existing balance, but it focused particular attention on the dangerous and destabilizing aspects of the Pershing Its. Although in the walk-in-the-woods formula the Soviet negotiator appeared to be agreeing to allow the United States to deploy Gl.CMs in Europe within a larger set of trade-offs, the Soviet Union officially rejected this ap- proach and reaffirmed its insistence on no U.S. deployments. The Soviet Union argued that its proposals were seeking approximate parity at Tower levels of medium-range systems. In the Soviet view, it is a false distinction to separate nuclear weapons on aircraft from those on missiles. The Soviet Union argued that it cannot ignore the thousands of nuclear weapons on U.S. aircraft in the European zone and on U.S. aircraft carriers, just as it cannot ignore the other nuclear weapons on NATO delivery systems. Although toward the end of the negotiations the United States agreed to consider aircraft, the Soviet Union argued that U.S. accounting of aircraft turned the NATO's real 50 percent advantage over Soviet me- dium-range aircraft into a fivefold advantage for the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union insisted that the United States was counting, along with Soviet medium-range bombers, a large number of tactical fighter- bombers that have never carried and cannot, as now configured, carry nuclear weapons. At the same time, it asserted that the United States excluded whole categories of U.S. forward-based aircraft capable of striking the Soviet Union. Consequently, the initial Soviet approach in the negotiations was to call for a ban on new U.S. deployments and a reduction to equal levels of U.S. and Soviet medium-range missiles and aircraft in or intended for use in Europe, with British and French sys- tems being counted under the U.S. totals. This position eventually evolved to include a subceiling for missiles and to allow warheads to be the unit of account to compare Soviet forces with existing British and French forces. The resulting warheac! ceiling of 420 would have re- quired reducing Soviet SS-20 launchers within range of Europe to 140. The Soviet View: Geography. The Soviet Union argued that the nego- tiations should not include missiles or aircraft out of range of European

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132 NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL targets, since its missiles in the Far East pose no threat to Europe. These missiles are intended to protect Soviet security in the Far East. By the end of the negotiations, the Soviet Union proposed to freeze the number of its SS-20 missiles in Asia contingent on the "strategic situa- tion." The Soviet Union stated that this geographic distinction would be assured by its proposed "zone of reduction and withdrawal" behind which, it asserted, the SS-20s could not hit European targets. In defin- ing the zone the Soviet Union claimed that the SS-20 has a range of 4,000 km, while the United States claimed that it has a range of up to 5,000 km. The Soviet View: Third-Country Forces. By the end of the negotia- tions, the Soviet claims for compensation for British and French forces became the central issue of disagreement. The Soviet Union argued that it could not be expected to ignore more than 400 warheads on British and French sea- and land-based missiles that are aimed at the Soviet Union and its allies. Moreover, these warheads are likely to increase from the present level to 1,200 by 1990 and to 2,000 by the end of the century if planned programs are carried out. Under such circum- stances, the Soviet Union argued that it was impossible to exclude these missiles from the count of NATO weapons in Europe threatening the Soviet Union. In addition, the Soviet Union claimed that its proposals addressed European concerns about the deployment of the SS-20s by reducing the warheads on Soviet intermediate-range systems to below the level that existed in 1976. The Soviet Union has not accepted the rationale that the British and French systems are independent, given British participation in NATO and vigorous French support for the decision to deploy U.S. missiles. Soviet representatives also argued that it defies logic for the United States to present the modernization decision as a NATO mandate while claiming that NATO armaments should not be counted in the negotiations. Generat Soviet Criticisms of the U.S. Proposals. The Soviet Union criticized the U.S. proposals generally on the grounds that they called for inequitable and disproportionate reductions in Soviet forces. In the Soviet view, the zero option was, in effect, an attempt to impose unilat- eral disarmament on the Soviet Union, since it would have to scrap all of its medium-range missiles while the United States and its NATO allies would retain all of their nuclear weapons in this category. The U.S. interim proposals, in the Soviet view, also ran counter to the

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THE INF NEGOTIATIONS 133 principle of equal security. The interim proposal would allow the de- ployment of U.S. Pershing IIs and GECMs in Europe, which would pose a new strategic threat to the Soviet Union and disrupt the existing balance in Europe. Thus, by proposing a trade between future U.S. systems and present Soviet systems with no constraints on British and French forces, the U.S. proposals contradicted the principles of equality and equal security and the overall balance incorporated in SALT ~ and SALT II. The Soviet Union also criticized the general U.S. approach to the negotiations, charging that the United States simply used the negotia- tions as a smokescreen for the U.S. missile deployments in Europe. In this context, Soviet spokesmen criticized the United States for reveal- ing and distorting the private negotiations for propaganda purposes. Verification Little has been said publicly about either side's approach to the verifi- cation requirements of its respective proposals. It is not clear whether any specific proposals have actually been made. Since initiating the INF negotiations with the Soviet Union, the U.S. government has stated standards for verification that go well beyond previous U.S. re- quirements for adequate verification (see Chapter 21. In any case, the limitation on INF systems raises several extremely difficult verifica- tion issues. Both the U.S. zero option and the U.S. interim proposal would apply only to cruise missiles armed with nuclear missiles; they would permit such missiles with conventional warheads. Unless ex- tremely intrusive inspection is permitted, it is not clear how this dis- tinction will be verified. Although a zero global level has been said to be easier to verify, this advantage disappears if nonnuclear missiles of the same type are permitted. The U.S. ban on excess or reload missiles, which complements the ban on launchers and missiles in the zero option proposal and the reduction of missiles and launchers in the interim proposal, would appear to re- quire intrusive on-site inspection of Soviet and U.S. production and storage facilities. Limitations on dual-capable aircraft with conventional as well as nuclear capabilities present another set of difficult verification prob- lems. Effective procedures in this area would require extensive coopera- tive measures. Besides verifying the limitations of aircraft within an agreed zone, there will be the problem of monitoring similar aircraft stationed outside the zone of limitation.

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134 The Deployment and the Future of NATO NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL The termination of the INF talks caused by the Soviet walkout at the start of the deployment of U.S. systems in Europe raises the issue of whether on balance NATO's 1979 deployment decision increased or decreased the cohesiveness of the NATO alliance. The U.S. and other NATO governments have emphasized that NATO's decision to proceed with the deployments, despite an intense four-year campaign by the Soviet Union to split the alliance, has greatly strengthened the alliance and reinforced NATO's fundamental commit- ment to collective security. The deployment represents a major victory, according to these governments, because the Soviet Union made the deployment a test of its ability to influence security decisions within the alliance. Moreover, some observers argue that the unprecedented, de- tailed consultations within NATO during the conduct of the negotia- tions strengthened the cohesiveness of the alliance. On the other hand, there is a growing belief in some quarters in Europe and the United States that the political problems created by the U.S. missile deployment may have actually reduced the cohesiveness of the NATO alliance. From this perspective, the situation may become progressively worse as deployments continue in stages over the next few years. The collapse of the negotiations contributed to what appears to be a widespread view in Europe that the new U.S. missiles will increase the threat of Soviet nuclear attack rather than deter it. Also, the process of deployment provides the Soviet Union with a continuing political target, which focuses public attention on the issue of whether the NATO nations should seek more independence from U.S. policy. The United States and the current NATO governments have been broadly criticized by opposition parties for not having tried harder to achieve agreement in the negotiations. For example, the Social Demo- crats in Germany, the Labour Party in Britain, and the Labor Party in Norway all supported the Soviet proposal to match British and French systems. Some European opposition leaders who originally supported the 1979 dual-track decision, believing that it would produce negotiated reductions in the numbers of nuclear weapons in Europe, are now call- ing for a delay in the deployments and a return to the negotiating table. Denmark has opposed the deployment, both Greece and Belgium have shown little support for the decision, and Norway and the Netherlands are having difficulties maintaining support for the deployment. These political developments suggest that the deployment decision may in the long run cause serious political problems within the alliance.

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THE INF NEGOTIATIONS 135 Integrating the START and INF Negotiations In searching for a constructive approach to resuming the INF negotia- tions, the possibility of folding these negotiations into the START nego- tiations has been considered. The United States has left open the option of merging the negotiations at a later date, but the Soviet Union has shown little interest in this approach. Critics of this approach argue that the two negotiations are dealing with separate systems that have different purposes and should there- fore be treated separately. Two separate imbalances of forces need to be redressed, one in Europe and one between the strategic arsenals of the superpowers. Therefore, merging the talks may simply result in com- promising the establishment of a balance in one area for successful negotiations in another. This is a special concern of the Europeans, who fear that their interests may be compromised in the process of negotiat- ing the strategic portion of the overall agreement. It is further argued that joining the two negotiations may complicate the arms control process to the point where no agreement is possible. Those who support integrating the two negotiations argue that the initial premise of NATO's 1979 decision was to conduct European inter- mediate-range negotiations within the context of the next round of stra- tegic arms limitations talks. In the real world, they state, the systems being discussed in the two negotiations are inherently intermingled. Therefore, the issues of each negotiation are in fact part of the same conceptual framework. Supporters of this approach also argue that an agreement is more likely to be negotiated if it is part of a larger package deal, since merging the two negotiations will provide more areas for possible trade-offs.