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Appendix B Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms 289

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Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms* Signed at Vienna June 18, 1979 The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, herein- after referred to as the Parties, Conscious that nuclear war would have devastating consequences for all mankind, Proceeding from the Basic Principles of Relations Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of May 29, 1972, Attaching particular significance to the limitation of strategic arms and determined to continue their efforts begun with the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limita- tion of Strategic Offensive Arms, of May 26, 1972, Convinced that the additional measures limiting strategic offensive arms provided for in this Treaty will contribute to the improvement of relations between the Parties, help to reduce the risk of outbreak of nuclear war and strengthen international peace and security, Mindful of their obligations under Article Vl of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Guided by the principle of equality and equal security, Recognizing that the strengthening of strategic stability meets the interests of the Parties and the interests of international security, Reaffirming their desi re to take measures for the further li mitation and for the further reduction of strategic arms, having in mind the goal of achieving general and complete d isarmament, Declaring their intention to undertake in the near future negotiations further to limit and further to reduce strategic offensive arms, Have agreed as follows: The text of the SALT I I Treaty and Protocol, as signed in Vienna, is accompanied by a set of Agreed Statements and Common Understandings, also signed by Presidents Carter and Brezhnev, which is prefaced as follows: I n connection with the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, the Parties have agreed on the following Agreed Statements and Common Understandings undertaken on behalf of the Government of the United States and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. As an aid to the reader, the texts of the Agreed Statements and Common Under- standings are beneath the articles of the Treaty or Protocol to which they pertain. 290

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SALT II TREATY 291 Article I Each Party undertakes, in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty, to limit strategic offensive arms quantitatively and qualitatively, to exercise restraint in the development of new types of strategic offensive arms, and to adopt other measures provided for in this Treaty. Article II For the purposes of this Treaty: 1. Intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launchers are land-based-launchers of ballistic missiles capable of a range in excess of the shortest distance between the northeastern border of the continental part of the territory of the United States of America and the northwestern border of the continental part of the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, that is, a range in excess of 5,500 kilometers. First Agreed Statement. The term "intercontinental ballistic missile launchers," as defined in paragraph 1 of Article II of the Treaty, includes all launchers which have been developed and tested for launching ICBMs. If a launcher has been developed and tested for launching an ICBM, all launchers of that type shall be considered to have been developed and tested for launching ICBMs. First Common Understanding. If a launcher contains or launches an ICBM, that launcher shall be considered to have been developed and tested for launching ICBMs. Second Common Understanding. If a launcher has been developed and tested for launching an ICBM, all launchers of that type, except for ICBM test and training launchers, shall be included in the aggregate numbers of strategic offensive arms provided for in Article lil of the Treaty, pursuant to the provisions of Article Vl of the Treaty. Third Common Understanding. The one hundred and seventy-seven former Atlas and Titan I ICBM laurtchers of the United States of America, which are no longer operation- al and are partially dismantled, shall not be considered as subject to the limitations provided for in the Treaty. Second Agreed Statement. After the date on which the Protocol ceases to be in force, mobile ICBM launchers shall be subject to the relevant limitations provided for in the Treaty which are applicable to ICBM launchers, unless the Parties agree that mobile ICBM launchers shall not be deployed after that date. 2. Submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launchers are launchers of ballistic missiles installed on any nuclear-powered submarine or launchers of modern ballistic missiles installed on any submarine, regardless of its type. Agreed Statement. Modern submarine-launched ballistic missiles are: for the United States of America, missiles installed in all nuclear-powered submarines; for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, missiles of the type installed in nuclear-powered sub- marines made operational since 1965; and for both Parties, submarine-launched ballistic missiles first flight-tested since 1965 and installed in any submarine, regard- less of its type.

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292 APPENDIX B 3. Heavy bombers are considered to be: (a) currently, for the United States of America, bombers of the B-52 and B-1 types, and for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, bombers of the Tupolev-95 and Myasishchev types; (b) in the future, types of bombers which can carry out the mission of a heavy bomber in a manner similar or superior to that of bombers listed in subparagraph (a) above; (c) types of bombers equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers; and (d) types of bombers equipped for ASBMs. First Agreed Statement. The term "bombers," as used in paragraph 3 of Article 11 and other provisions of the Treaty, means airplanes of types initially constructed to be equipped for bombs or missiles. Second Agreed Statement. The Parties shall notify each other on a case-by-case basis in the Standing Consultative Commission of inclusion of types of bombers as heavy bombers pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 3 of Article 11 of the Treaty; in this connection the Parties shall hold consultations, as appropriate, consistent with the provisions of paragraph 2 of Article XVII of the Treaty. Third Agreed Statement. The criteria the Parties shall use to make case-by-case deter- minations of which types of bombers in the future can carry out the mission of a heavy bomber in a manner similar or superior to that of current heavy bombers, as referred to in subparagraph 3(b) of Article 11 of the Treaty, shall be agreed upon in the Standing Consultative Commission. Fourth Agreed Statement. Having agreed that every bomber of a type included in paragraph 3 of Article 11 of the Treaty is to be considered a heavy bomber, the Parties further agree that: (a) airplanes which otherwise would be bombers of a heavy bomber type shall not be considered to be bombers of a heavy bomber type if they have functionally related observable differences which indicate that they cannot perform the mission of a heavy bomber; (b) airplanes which: otherwise would be bombers of a type equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers shall not be considered to be bombers of a type equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers if they have functionally related observable differences which indicate that they cannot perform the mission of a bomber equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers, except that heavy bombers of current types, as designated in subparagraph 3(a) of Article 11 of the Treaty, which otherwise would be of a type equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers shall not be considered to be heavy bombers of a type equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers if they are distinguishable on the basis of exter- nally observable differences from heavy bombers of a type equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers; and (c) airplanes which otherwise would be bombers of a type equipped for ASBMs shall not be considered to be bombers of a type equipped for ASBMs if they have function- ally related observable differences which indicate that they cannot perform the mission of a bomber equipped for ASBMs, except that heavy bombers of current types, as designated in subparagraph 3(a) of Article 11 of the Treaty, which otherwise would be of a type equipped for ASBMs shall not be considered to be heavy bombers of a type

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SALT II TREATY 293 equipped for ASBMs if they are distinguishable on the basis of externally observable differences from heavy bombers of a type equipped for ASBMs. First Common Understanding. Functionally related observable differences are differ- ences in the observable features of airplanes which indicate whether or not these airplanes can perform the mission of a heavy bomber, or whether or not they can perform the mission of a bomber equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers or whether or not they can perform the mission of a bomber equipped for ASBMs. Functionally related observable differences shall be verifiable by national technical means.To this end, the Parties may take,as appropriate, cooperative measures contributing to the effectiveness of verification by national technical means. Fifth Agreed Statement. Tupolev-142 airplanes in theircurrent configuration, that is, in the configuration for anti-submarine warfare, are considered to be airplanes of a type different from types of heavy bombers referred to in subparagraph 3(a) of Article II of the Treaty and not subject to the Fourth Agreed Statement to paragraph 3 of Article I I of the Treaty. This Agreed Statement does not preclude improvement of Tupolev-142 airplanes as an anti-submarine system, and does not prejudice or set a precedent for designation in the future of types of airplanes as heavy bombers pursuant to subpara- graph 3(b) of Article II of the Treaty or for application of the Fourth Agreed Statement to paragraph 3 of Article II of the Treaty to such airplanes. Second Common Understanding. Not later than six months after entry i nto force of the Treaty the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will give its thirty-one Myasishchev airplanes used as tankers in existence as of the date of signature of the Treaty function- ally related observable differences which indicate that they cannot perform the mission of a heavy bomber. Third Common Understanding. The designations by the United States of America and by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for heavy bombers referred to in subpara- graph 3(a) of Article II of the Treaty correspond in the following manner: Heavy bombers of the types designated by the United States of America as the B-52 and the B-1 are known to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics by the same desig- nations; Heavy bombers of the type designated by the Union of Socialist Republics as the Tupole.v-95 are known to the United States of America as heavy bombers of the Bear type; and Heavy bombers of the type designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as the Myasishchev are known to the United States of America as heavy bombers of the Bison type. 4. Air-to-surface ballistic missiles (ASBMs) are any such missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers and installed in an aircraft or on its external mountings. 5. Launchers of ICBMs and SLBMs equipped with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MlRVs) are launchers of the types developed and tested for launching ICBMs or SLBMs equipped with MlRVs. First Agreed Statement. If a launcher has been developed and tested for launching an ICBM or an SLBM equipped with MlRVs, all launchers of that type shall be considered to have been developed and tested for launching ICBMs or SLBMs equipped with MlRVs.

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294 APPENDIX B First Common Understanding. If a launcher contains or launches an ICBM or en SLBM equipped with MlRVs, that launcher shall be considered to have been developed and tested for launching ICBMs or SLBMs equipped with MlRVs. Second Common Understanding. If a launcher has been developed and tested for launching an ICBM or an SLBM equipped with MlRVs, all launchers of thattype, except for ICBM and SLBM test and training launchers, shall be included in the corresponding aggregate numbers provided for in Article V of the Treaty, pursuant to the provisions of Article Vl of the Treaty. Second Agreed Statement. ICBMs and SLBMs equipped with MlRVs are ICBMs and SLBMs of the types which have been flight-tested with two or more independently targetable reentry vehicles, regardless of whether or not they have also been flight- tested with a single reentry vehicle or with multiple reentry vehicles which. are not independently targetable. As of the date of signature of the Treaty, such ICBMs and SLBMS are: for the United States of America, Minuteman lil ICBMs, Poseidon C-3 SLBMs, and Trident C-4 SLBMs; and for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, RS-16, RS-18, RS-20 ICBMs and RSM-50 SLBMs. Each Party will notify the other Party in the Standing Consultative Commission on a case-by-case basis of the designation of the one new type of light ICBM, if equipped with MlRVs, permitted pursuant to paragraph 9 of Article IV of the Treaty when first flight-tested; of designations of additional types of SLBMs equipped with MlRVs when first installed on a submarine; and of designations of types of ASBMs equipped with MlRVs when first flight-tested. Third Common Understanding. The designations by the United States of America and by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for ICBMsand SLBMsequipped with MlRVs correspond in the following manner: Missiles of the type designated by the United States of America as the Minuteman lil and known to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics by the same designation, a light ICBM that has been flight-tested with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles; Missiles of the type designated by the United States of America as the Poseiden C-3 and known to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics by the same designation, an SLBM that was first flight-tested in 1968 and that has been flight-tested with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles; Missiles of the type designated by the United States of America as the Trident C-4 and known to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics by the same designation, an SLBM that was first flight-tested in 1977 and that has been flight-tested with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles; Missiles of the type designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics es the RS- 16 and known to the United States of America as the SS-17, a light ICBM that has been flight-tested with a single reentry vehicle and with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles; Missiles of the type designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics es the RS- 18 and known to the United States of America as the SS-19, the heaviest in terms of launch-weight and throw-weight of light ICBMs, which has been flight-tested with a single reentry vehicle and with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles; Missiles of the type designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as the RS- 20 and known to the United States of America as the SS-18, the heaviest in terms of launch-weight and throw-weight of heavy ICBMs, which has been flight-tested with a single reentry vehicle and with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles;

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SALT II TREATY 295 Missiles of the type designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as the RSM-50 and known to the United States of America as the SS-N-18, an SLBM that has been flight-tested with a single reentry vehicle and with multiple independentlytarget- able reentry vehicles. Third Agreed Statement. Reentry vehicles are independently targetable: (a) if, after separation from the booster, maneuvering and targeting of the reentry vehicles to separate al m points along trajectories which are unrelated to each other are accomplished by means of devices which are installed in a self-contained dispensing mechanism or on the reentry vehicles, and which are based on the use of electronic or other computers in combination with devices using jet engines, including rocket engines, or aerodynamic systems; (b) if maneuvering and targeting of the reentry vehicles to separate aim points along trajectories which are unrelated to each other are accomplished by means of other devices which may be developed in the future. Fourth Common Understanding. For the purposes of this Treaty, all ICBM launchers in the Derazhnya and Pervomaysk areas in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics are included in the aggregate numbers provided for in Article V of the Treaty. Fifth Common Understanding. If ICBM or SLBM launchers are converted, constructed or undergo significant changes to their principal observable structural design features after entry into force of the Treaty, any such launchers which are launchers of missiles equipped with MlRVs shall be distinguishable from launchers of missiles not equipped with MlRVs, and any such launchers which are launchers of missiles not equipped with MlRVs shall be distinguishable from launchers of missiles equipped with MlRVs, on the basis of externally observable design features of the launchers. Submarines with launchers of SLBMs equipped with MlRVs shall be distinguishable from submarines with launchers of SLBMs not equipped with MlRVs on the basis of externally observa- ble design features of the submarines. This Common Understanding does not require changes to launcher conversion or construction programs, or to programs including significant changes to the principal observable structural design features of launchers, underway as of the date of signa- ture of the Treaty. 6. ASBMs equipped with MlRVs are ASBMs of the types which have been flight- tested with M I RVs. First Agreed Statement. ASBMs of the types which have been flight-tested with MlRVs are all ASBMs of the types which have been flight-tested with two or more independ- ently targetable reentry vehicles, regardless of whether or not they have also been flight-tested with a single reentry vehicle or with multiple reentry vehicles which are not independently targetable. Second Agreed Statement. Reentry vehicles are independently targetable: (a) if, after separation from the booster, maneuvering and targeting of the reentry vehicles to separate aim points along trajectories which are unrelated to each otherare accomplished by means of devices which are installed in a self-contained dispensing mechanism or on the reentry vehicles, and which are based on the use of electronic or other computers in combination with devices using jet engines, including rocket engines, or aerodynamic systems;

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296 APPENDIX B (b) if maneuvering and targeting of the reentryvehiclestoseparateaim pointsalong trajectories which are unrelated to each other are accomplished by means of other devices which may be developed in the future. 7. Heavy ICBMs are ICBMs which have a launch-weight greater or a throw-weight greater than that of the heaviest, in terms of either launch-weight or throw-weight, respectively, of the light ICBMs deployed by either Party as of the date of signature of this Treaty. First Agreed Statement. The launch-weight of an ICBM is the weight of the fully loaded missile itself at the time of launch. Second Agreed Statement. The throw-weight of an ICBM is the sum of the weight of: (a) its reentry vehicle or reentry vehicles; (b) any self-contained dispensing mechanisms or other appropriate devices for targeting one reentry vehicle, or for releasing or for dispensing and targeting two or more reentry vehicles; and (c) its penetration aids, including devices for their release. Common Understanding. The term "other appropriate devices," as used in the defini- tion of the throw-weight of an I CBM in the Second Ag reed Statement to paragraph 7 of Article II of the Treaty, means any devices for dispensing and targeting two or more reentry vehicles; and any devices for releasing two or more reentry vehicles or for targeting one reentry vehicle, which cannot provide their reentry vehicles or reentry vehicle with additional velocity of more than 1,000 meters per second. 8. Cruise missiles are unmanned, self-propelled, guided, weapon-delivery vehicles which sustain flight through the use of aerodynamic lift over most of their flight path and which are flight-tested from or deployed on aircraft, that is, air-launched cruise missiles, or such vehicles which are referred to as cruise missiles in subparagraph 1 (b) of Article IX. First Agreed Statement. If a cruise missile is capable of a range in excess of 600 kilo- meters, all cruise missiles of that type shall be considered to be cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers. First Common Understanding. If a cruise missile has been flight-tested to a range in excess of 600 kilometers, it shall be considered to be a cruise missle capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers. Second Common Understanding. Cruise missiles not capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers shall not be considered to be of a type capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers if they are distinguishable on the basis of externally observable design features from cruise missiles of types capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers. Second Agreed Statement. The range of which a cruise missile is capable is the maxi- mum distance which can be covered by the missile in its standard design mode flying until fuel exhaustion, determined by projecting its flight path onto the Earth's sphere from the point of launch to the point of impact.

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SALT II TREATY 297 Third Agreed Statement. If an unmanned, self-propelled, guided vehicle which sustains flight through the use of aerodynamic lift over most of its flight path has been flight-tested or deployed for weapon delivery, all vehicles of that type shall be con- sidered to be weapon-delivery vehicles. Third Common Understanding. Unmanned, self-propelled, guided vehicles which chin flight through the use of aerodynamic lift over most of their flight path and are ~ . .- . _~-_1__ &~6 :~ ~ ~il~tl=~<~ ~lli~ \mhir~l~c shall not he not weapon-delivery venicles, Inal IS, unarmed, ,u''w`~;~, yueu=~ vat, -,.~., ,.~. ~~ considered to be cruise missiles if such vehicles are distinguishable from cruise mis- siles on the basis of externally observable design features. Fourth Common Understanding. Neither Party shall convert unarm-cd, pilotless, guided vehicles into cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers, nor shall either Party convert cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers into unarmed, pilotless, guided vehicles. Fifth Common Understanding. Neither Party has plans during the term of the Treaty to flight-test from or deploy on aircraft unarmed, pilotless, guided vehicles which are capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers. In the future, should a Party have such plans, that Party will provide notification thereof to the other Party well in advance of such flight-testing or deployment. This Common Understanding does not apply to target drones. Article l l l 1. Upon entry into force of this Treaty, each Party undertakes to limit ICBM launch- ers, SLBM launchers, heavy bombers, and ASBMs to an aggregate number not to exceed 2,400. 2. Each Party undertakes to limit, from January 1, 1981, strategic offensive arms referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article to an aggregate number not to exceed 2,250, and to initiate reductions of those arms which as of that date would be in excess of this aggregate number. 3. Within the aggregate numbers provided for in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article and subject to the provisions of this Treaty, each Party has the right to determine the composition of these aggregates. 4. For each bomber of a type equipped for ASBMs, the aggregate numbers provided for in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article shall include the maximum number of such missiles for which a bomber of that type is equipped for one operational mission. 5. A heavy bomber equipped only for ASBMs shall not itself be included in the aggregate numbers provided for in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article. 6. Reductions of the numbers of strategic offensive arms required to comply with the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article shall be carried out as provided for in Article Xl. Article IV 1. Each Party undertakes not to start construction of additional fixed ICBM launch- ers. 2. Each Party u ndertakes not to relocate f ixed I CB M lau nchers. 3. Each Party undertakes not to convert launchers of light ICBMs, or of ICBMs of older types deployed prior to 1964, into launchers of heavy ICBMs of types deployed after that time. 4. Each Party undertakes in the process of modernization and replacement of ICBM silo launchers not to increase the original internal volume of an ICBM silo launcher by

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298 APPENDIX B more than thirty-two percent. Within this limit each Party has the right to determine whether such an increase will be made through an increase in the original diameter or in the original depth of an ICBM silo launcher, or in both of these dimensions. Agreed Statement. The word "original" in paragraph 4 of Article IV of the Treaty refers to the internal dimensions of an ICBM silo launcher, including its internal volume, as of May 26, 1972, or as of the date on which such launcher becomes operational, which- ever is later. Common Understanding. The obligations provided for in paragraph 4 of Article IV of the Treaty and in the Agreed Statement thereto mean that the original diameter or the original depth of an ICBM silo launcher may not be increased by an amount greater than that which would result in an increase in the original internal volume of the ICBM silo launcher by thirty-two percent solely through an increase in one of these dimen- sions. 5. Each Party undertakes: (a) not to supply ICBM launcher deployment areas with intercontinental ballistic missiles in excess of a number consistent with normal deployment, maintenance, training, and replacement requirements; (b) not to provide storage facilities for or to store ICBMs in excess of normal deployment requirements at launch sites of ICBM launchers; (c) not to develop, test, or deploy systems for rapid reload of ICBM launchers. Agreed Statement. The term "normal deployment requirements," as used in paragraph 5 of Article IV of the Treaty, means the deployment of one missile at each ICBM lau Ocher. 6. Subject to the provisions of this Treaty, each Party undertakes not to have under construction at any time strategic offensive arms referred to in paragraph 1 of Article l l l in excess of numbers consistent with a normal construction schedule. Common Understanding. A normal construction schedule, in paragraph 6 of Article IV of the Treaty, is understood to be one consistent with the past or present construction practices of each Party. 7. Each Party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ICBMs which have a launch- weight greater or a throw-weight greater than that of the heaviest, in terms of either launch-weight or throw-weight, respectively, of the heavy ICBMs, deployed by either Party as of the date of signature of this Treaty. First Agreed Statement. The launch-weight of an ICBM is the we missile itself at the time of launch. light of the fully loaded Second Agreed Statement. The throw-weight of an ICBM is the sum of the weight of: (a) its reentry vehicle or reentry vehicles;

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SALT II TREATY 299 (b) any self-contained dispensing mechanisms or other appropriate devices for targeting one reentry vehicle, or for releasing or for dispensing and targeting two or more reentry vehicles; and (c) its penetration aids, including devices for their release. Common Understanding. The term "other appropriate devices," as used in the defini- tion of the throw-weight of an ICBM in the Second Ag reed Statement to paragraph 7 of Article IV of the Treaty, means any devices for dispensing and targeting two or more reentry vehicles; and any devices for releasing two or more reentry vehicles or for targeting one reentry vehicle, which cannot provide their reentry vehicles or reentry vehicle with additional velocity of more than 1,000 meters per second. 8. Each Party undertakes not to convert land-based launchers of ballistic missiles which are not ICBMs into launchers for launching ICBMs, and not to test them for this pu rpose. Common Understanding. During the term of the Treaty, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will not produce, test, or deploy ICBMs of the type designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as the RS-14 and known to the United States of America as the SS-16, a light ICBM first flight-tested after 1970 and flight-tested only with a single reentry vehicle; this Common Understanding also means that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will not produce the third stage of that missile, the reentry vehicle of that missile, or the appropriate devicefortargeting the reentry vehicle of that missile. 9. Each Party undertakes not to flight-test or deploy new types of ICBMs, that is, types of ICBMs not flight-tested as of May 1, 1979, except that each Party may flight- test and deploy one new type of light ICBM. First Agreed Statement. The term "new types of ICBMs," as used in paragraph 9 of Article IV of the Treaty, refers to any ICBM which is different from those ICBMs flight- tested as of May 1, 1979 in any one or more of the following respects: (a) the number of stages, the length, the largest diameter, the launch-weight, or the throw-weight, of the missile; (b) the type of propellant (that is, liquid or solid) of any of its stages. First Common Understanding. As used in the First Agreed Statement to paragraph 9 of Article IV of the Treaty, the term "different," referring to the length, the diameter, the launch-weight, and the throw-weight, of the missile, means a difference in excess of five percent Second Agreed Statement. Every ICBM of the one new type of light ICBM permitted to each Party pursuant to paragraph 9 of Article IV of the Treaty shall have the same number of stages and the same type of propellant (that is, liquid orsolid) of each stage as the first ICBM of the one new type of light ICBM launched by that Party. In addition, after the twenty-fifth launch of an ICBM of that type, or after the last launch before deployment begins of IGBMs of that type, whichever occurs earlier, ICBMs of the one new type of light ICBM permitted to that Party shall not be different in any one or more of the following respects: the length, the largest diameter, the launch-weight, or the throw-weight, of the missile.

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312 APPENDIX B (c) consider questions involving unintended interference with national technical means of verification, and questions involving unintended impeding of verification by national technical means of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty; (d) consider possible changes in the strategic situation which have a bearing on the provisions of this Treaty; (e) agree upon procedures for replacement, conversion, and dismantling o destruction, of strategic offensive arms in cases provided for in the provisions of this Treaty and upon procedures for removal of such arms from the aggregate numbers when they otherwise cease to be subject to the limitations provided for in this Treaty, and at regular sessions of the Standing Consultative Commission, notify each other in accordance with the aforementioned procedures, at least twice annually, of actions completed and those in process; (f ) consider, as appropriate, possi ble proposals for further i ncreasing the viabi lity of this Treaty, including proposals for amendments in accordance with the provi- sions of this Treaty; (9) consider, as appropriate, proposals for further measures limiting strategic offensive arms. 3. In the Standing Consultative Commission the Parties shall maintain by category the agreed data base on the numbers of strategic offensive arms established by the Memorandum of Understanding Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Regarding the Establishment of a Data Base on the Numbers of Strategic Offensive Arms of June 18, 1979. Agreed Statement. In order to maintain the agreed data base on the numbers of strategic offensive arms subject to the limitations provided for in the Treaty in accord- ance with paragraph 3 of Article XVII of the Treaty, at each regular session of the Standing Consultative Commission the Parties will notify each other of and consider changes in those numbers in the following categories: launchers of ICBMs; fixed launchers of ICBMs; launchers of ICBMs equipped with MlRVs; launchers of SLBMs; launchers of SLBMs equipped with MlRVs; heavy bombers; heavy bombers equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers; heavy bombers equipped only for ASBMs; ASBMs; and ASBMs equipped with MlRVs. Article XVI I I Each Party may propose amendments to this Treaty. Agreed amendments shall enter into force in accordance with the procedures governing the entry into force of this Treaty. Article XIX 1. -This Treaty shall be subject to ratification in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each Party. This Treaty shall enter into force on the day of the exchange of instruments of ratification and shall remain in force through December 31, 1985, unless replaced earlier by an agreement further limiting strategic offensive arms. 2. This Treaty shall be registered pursuant to Article 102 of the Charterof the United Nations. 3. Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give notice of its decision to the other Party six months prior to withdrawal from the Treaty. Such notice shall

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SALT II TREATY 313 include a statement of the extraordinary events the notifying Party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests. DONE at Vienna on June 18, 1979, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic. For the United States of America: JIMMY CARTER President of the United States of America For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: L. BREZHNEV, General Secretary of the CPSU, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R.

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Protocol to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, herein- after referred to as the Parties, Having agreed on limitations on strategic offensive arms in the Treaty, Have agreed on additional limitations for the period during which this Protocol remains in force, as follows: Article I Each Party undertakes not to deploy mobile ICBM launchers or to flight-test ICBMs from such launchers. Article 11 1. Each Party undertakes not to deploy cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers on sea-based launchers or on land-based launchers. 2. Each Party undertakes not to flight-test cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers which are equipped with multiple independently targetable warheads from sea-based launchers or from land-based launchers. Agreed Statement. Warheads of a cruise missile are independently targetable if ma- neuvering or targeting of the warheads to separate aim points along ballistic trajectories or any other flight paths, which are unrelated to each other, is accomplished during a flight of a cruise missile. 3. For the purposes of this Protocol, cruise missiles are unmanned, self-propelled, guided, weapon-delivery vehicles which sustain flight through the use of aerodynamic lift over most of their flight path and which are flight-tested from or deployed on sea- based or land-based launchers, that is, sea-launched cruise missiles and ground- launched cruise missiles, respectively. First Agreed Statement. If a cruise missile is capable of a range in excess of 600 kilo- meters, all cruise missiles of that type shall be considered to be cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers. First Common Understanding. If a cruise missile has been flight-tested to a range in excess of 600 kilometers, it shall be considered to be a cruise missile capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers. Second Common Understanding. Cruise missiles not capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers shall not be considered to be of a type capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers if they are distinguishable on the basis of externally observable design features from cruise missiles of types capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers. 314

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SHALT II TREATY 315 Second Agreed Statement. The range of which a cruise missile is capable is the maxi- mum distance which can be covered by the missile in its standard design mode flying until fuel exhaustion, determined by projecting its flight path onto the Earth's sphere from the point of launch to the point of impact. Third Agreed Statement. If an unmanned, self-propelled, guided vehicle which sus- tains flight through the use of aerodynamic lift over most of its flight path has been flight-tested or deployed for weapon delivery, all vehicles of that type shall be con- sidered to be weapon-delivery vehicles. Third Common Understanding. Unmanned, self-propelled, guided vehicles which sustain flight through the use of aerodynamic lift over most of their flight-path and are not weapon-delivery vehicles, that is, unarmed, pilotless, guided vehicles, shall not be considered to be cruise missiles if such vehicles are distinguishable from cruise mis- siles on the basis of externally observable design features. Fourth Common Understanding. Neither Party shall convert unarmed, pilotless, guided vehicles into cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers, nor shall either Party convert cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers into unarmed, pilotless, guided vehicles. Fifth Common Understanding. Neither Party has plans during the term of the Protocol to flight-test from or deploy on sea-based or land-based launchers unarmed, pilotless, guided vehicles which are capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers. In the future, should a Party have such plans, that Party will provide notification thereof to the other Party well in advance of such flight-testing or deployment. This Common Understand- ing does not apply to target drones. Article l l l Each Party undertakes not to flight-test or deploy ASBMs. Article IV This Protocol shall be considered an integral part of the Treaty. It shall enter into force on the day of the entry into force of the Treaty and shall remain in force through December 31, 1981, unless replaced earlier by an agreement on further measures limiting strategic offensive arms. DONE at Vienna on June 18, 1979, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic. For the United States of America: JIMMY CARTER President of the United States of America For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: L. BREZHNEV General Secretary of the CPSU, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R.

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Memorandum of Understanding Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Regarding the Establishment of a Data Base on the Numbers of Strategic Offensive Arms For the purposes of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, the Parties have considered data on numbers of strategic offensive arms and agree that as of November 1, 1978 there existed the following numbers of strategic offensive arms subject to the limitations provided for in the Treaty which is being signed today. U.S.S.h. Launchers of ICBMs Fixed launchers of ICBMs Launchers of ICBMs equipped with MlRVs Launchers of SLBMs Launchers of SLBMs equipped with M I RVs Heavy bombers Heavy bombers equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers Heavy bombers equipped only for ASBMs ASBMs ASBMs equipped with MlRVs 1 ,054 1 ,054 550 656 496 574 o o o o 1 ,398 1 ,398 576 950 128 156 At the time of entry into force of the Treaty the Parties will update the above agreed data in the categories listed in this Memorandum. DONE at Vienna on June 18, 1979, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic. For the United States of America RALPH EARLE II Chief of the United States Delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics V. KARPOV Chief of the U.S.S.R. Delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks 316

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SALT II TREATY 317 Statement of Data on the Numbers of Strategic Offensive Arms as of the Date of Signature of the Treaty The United States of America declares that as of June 18, 1979 it possesses the following numbers of strategic offensive arms subject to the limitations provided for ih the Treaty which is being signed today: Launchers of ICBMs Fixed launchers of ICBMs Launchers of ICBMs equipped with M I RVs Launchers of SLBMs Launchers of SLBMs equipped with MlRVs Heavy bombers Heavy bombers equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers Heavy bombers equipped only for ASBMs ASBMs ASBMs equipped with MlRVs June 18, 1979 RALPH EARLE II 1 ,054 1 ,054 550 656 496 573 3 o o o Chief of the United States Delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks I certify that this is a true copy of the document signed by Ambassador Ralph Earle I I entiled "Statement of Data on the Numbers of Strategic Offensive Arms as of the Date of Signature of the Treaty" and given to Ambassador V. Karpov on June 18, 1979 in Vienna, Austria. THOMAS GRAHAM, JR. General Counsel United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Statement of Data on the Numbers of Strategic Offensive Arms as of the Date of Signature of the Treaty The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics declares that as of June 18, 1979, it possesses the following numbers of strategic offensive arms subject to the limitations provided for in the Treaty which is being signed today: Launchers of ICBMs Fixed launchers of ICBMs 1 ,398 1 ,398

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318 Launchers of ICBMs equipped with MlRVs Launchers of SLBMs Launchers of SLBMs equipped with MlRVs Heavy bombers Heavy bombers equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers Heavy bombers equipped only for ASBMs ASBMs ASBMs equipped with M I RVs Junel8,1979 V. KARPOV Chief of the U.S.S.R. Delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks Translation certified by: W.D. Krimer, Senior Language Officer, Division of Language Services, U.S. Department of State WILLIAM D. KRIMER APPENDIX B 608 950 144 156 o o o o

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Joint Statement of Principles and Basic Guidelines for Subsequent Negotiations on the Limitation of Strategic Arms The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, herein- after referred to as the Parties, Having concluded the Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, Reaffirming that the strengthening of strategic stability meets the interests of the Parties and the interests of international security, Convinced that early agreement on the further limitation and further reduction of strategic arms would serve to strengthen international peace and security and to reduce the risk of outbreak of nuclear war, Have agreed as follows: First, The Parties will continue to pursue negotiations, in accordance with the principle of equality and equal security, on measures for the further limitation and reduction in the numbers of strategic arms, as well as for their further qualitative limitation. In furtherance of existing agreements between the Parties on the limitation and reduction of strategic arms, the Parties will continue, for the purposes of reducing and averting the risk of outbreak of nuclear war, to seek measures to strengthen strategic stability by, among other things, limitations on strategic offensive arms most destabilizing to the strategic balance and by measures to reduce and to avert the risk of surprise attack. Second. Further limitations and reductions of strategic arms must be subject to adequate verification by national technical means, using additionally, as appropriate, cooperative measures contributing to the effectiveness of verification by national technical means. The Parties will seek to strengthen verification and to perfect the operation of the Standing Consultative Commission in order to promote assurance of compliance with the obligations assumed by the Parties. Third. The Parties shall pursue in the course of these negotiations, taking into con- sideration factors that determine the strategic situation, the following objectives: significant and substantial reductions in the numbers of strategic offensive arms; 2) qualitative limitations on strategic offensive arms, including restrictions on the development, testing, and deployment of new types of strategic offensive arms and on the modernization of existing strategic offensive arms; 3) resolution of the issues included in the Protocol to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms in the context of the negotiations relating to the implementation of the principles and objectives set out herein. Fourth. The Parties will consider other steps to ensure and enhance strategic stability, to ensure the equality and equal security of the Parties, and to implement the above principles and objectives. Each Party will be free to raise any issue relative to the further limitation of strategic arms. The Parties will also consider further joint 319

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320 APPENDIX B measures, as appropriate, to strengthen international peace and security and to red duce the risk of outbreak of nuclear war. Vienna, June 18, 1979 For the United States of America JIMMY CARTER President of the United States of America For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics L. BREZHNEV General Secretary of the CPSU, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R.

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Soviet Backfire Statement On June 16,1979, President Brezhnev handed PresidentCarterthefollowingwritten statement [original Russian text was attached]: "The Soviet side informs the US side that the Soviet 'Tu-22M' airplane, called 'Back- fire' in the USA, is a medium-range bomber, and that it does not intend to give this airplane the capability of operating at intercontinental distances. In this connection, the Soviet side states that it will not increase the radius of action of this airplane in such a way as to enable it to strike targets on the territory of the USA. Nor does it intend to give it such a capability in any other manner, including by in-flight refueling. At the same time, the Soviet side states that it will not increase the production rate of this airplane as compared to the present rate." President Brezhnev confirmed that the Soviet Backfire production rate would not exceed 30 per year. President Carter stated that the United States enters into the SALT I I Agreement on the basis of the commitments contained in the Soviet statement and that it considers the carrying out of these commitments to be essential to the obligations assumed under the Treaty. CYRUS VANCE 321

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