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Appendix B
Treaty Between the United
States of America and the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics on
the Limitation of Strategic
Offensive Arms
289
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Treaty Between the United States of America
and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on
the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms*
Signed at Vienna June 18, 1979
The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, herein-
after referred to as the Parties,
Conscious that nuclear war would have devastating consequences for all mankind,
Proceeding from the Basic Principles of Relations Between the United States of
America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of May 29, 1972,
Attaching particular significance to the limitation of strategic arms and determined
to continue their efforts begun with the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile
Systems and the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limita-
tion of Strategic Offensive Arms, of May 26, 1972,
Convinced that the additional measures limiting strategic offensive arms provided
for in this Treaty will contribute to the improvement of relations between the Parties,
help to reduce the risk of outbreak of nuclear war and strengthen international peace
and security,
Mindful of their obligations under Article Vl of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons,
Guided by the principle of equality and equal security,
Recognizing that the strengthening of strategic stability meets the interests of the
Parties and the interests of international security,
Reaffirming their desi re to take measures for the further li mitation and for the further
reduction of strategic arms, having in mind the goal of achieving general and complete
d isarmament,
Declaring their intention to undertake in the near future negotiations further to limit
and further to reduce strategic offensive arms,
Have agreed as follows:
The text of the SALT I I Treaty and Protocol, as signed in Vienna, is accompanied by
a set of Agreed Statements and Common Understandings, also signed by Presidents
Carter and Brezhnev, which is prefaced as follows:
I n connection with the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, the
Parties have agreed on the following Agreed Statements and Common
Understandings undertaken on behalf of the Government of the United States and
the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
As an aid to the reader, the texts of the Agreed Statements and Common Under-
standings are beneath the articles of the Treaty or Protocol to which they pertain.
290
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SALT II TREATY
291
Article I
Each Party undertakes, in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty, to limit
strategic offensive arms quantitatively and qualitatively, to exercise restraint in the
development of new types of strategic offensive arms, and to adopt other measures
provided for in this Treaty.
Article II
For the purposes of this Treaty:
1. Intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launchers are land-based-launchers of
ballistic missiles capable of a range in excess of the shortest distance between the
northeastern border of the continental part of the territory of the United States of
America and the northwestern border of the continental part of the territory of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, that is, a range in excess of 5,500 kilometers.
First Agreed Statement. The term "intercontinental ballistic missile launchers," as
defined in paragraph 1 of Article II of the Treaty, includes all launchers which have
been developed and tested for launching ICBMs. If a launcher has been developed and
tested for launching an ICBM, all launchers of that type shall be considered to have
been developed and tested for launching ICBMs.
First Common Understanding. If a launcher contains or launches an ICBM, that
launcher shall be considered to have been developed and tested for launching ICBMs.
Second Common Understanding. If a launcher has been developed and tested for
launching an ICBM, all launchers of that type, except for ICBM test and training
launchers, shall be included in the aggregate numbers of strategic offensive arms
provided for in Article lil of the Treaty, pursuant to the provisions of Article Vl of the
Treaty.
Third Common Understanding. The one hundred and seventy-seven former Atlas and
Titan I ICBM laurtchers of the United States of America, which are no longer operation-
al and are partially dismantled, shall not be considered as subject to the limitations
provided for in the Treaty.
Second Agreed Statement. After the date on which the Protocol ceases to be in force,
mobile ICBM launchers shall be subject to the relevant limitations provided for in the
Treaty which are applicable to ICBM launchers, unless the Parties agree that mobile
ICBM launchers shall not be deployed after that date.
2. Submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launchers are launchers of ballistic
missiles installed on any nuclear-powered submarine or launchers of modern ballistic
missiles installed on any submarine, regardless of its type.
Agreed Statement. Modern submarine-launched ballistic missiles are: for the United
States of America, missiles installed in all nuclear-powered submarines; for the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics, missiles of the type installed in nuclear-powered sub-
marines made operational since 1965; and for both Parties, submarine-launched
ballistic missiles first flight-tested since 1965 and installed in any submarine, regard-
less of its type.
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292
APPENDIX B
3. Heavy bombers are considered to be:
(a) currently, for the United States of America, bombers of the B-52 and B-1
types, and for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, bombers of the Tupolev-95
and Myasishchev types;
(b) in the future, types of bombers which can carry out the mission of a heavy
bomber in a manner similar or superior to that of bombers listed in subparagraph (a)
above;
(c) types of bombers equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of
600 kilometers; and
(d) types of bombers equipped for ASBMs.
First Agreed Statement. The term "bombers," as used in paragraph 3 of Article 11 and
other provisions of the Treaty, means airplanes of types initially constructed to be
equipped for bombs or missiles.
Second Agreed Statement. The Parties shall notify each other on a case-by-case basis
in the Standing Consultative Commission of inclusion of types of bombers as heavy
bombers pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 3 of Article 11 of the Treaty; in this
connection the Parties shall hold consultations, as appropriate, consistent with the
provisions of paragraph 2 of Article XVII of the Treaty.
Third Agreed Statement. The criteria the Parties shall use to make case-by-case deter-
minations of which types of bombers in the future can carry out the mission of a heavy
bomber in a manner similar or superior to that of current heavy bombers, as referred to
in subparagraph 3(b) of Article 11 of the Treaty, shall be agreed upon in the Standing
Consultative Commission.
Fourth Agreed Statement. Having agreed that every bomber of a type included in
paragraph 3 of Article 11 of the Treaty is to be considered a heavy bomber, the Parties
further agree that:
(a) airplanes which otherwise would be bombers of a heavy bomber type shall not be
considered to be bombers of a heavy bomber type if they have functionally related
observable differences which indicate that they cannot perform the mission of a heavy
bomber;
(b) airplanes which: otherwise would be bombers of a type equipped for cruise
missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers shall not be considered to be
bombers of a type equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600
kilometers if they have functionally related observable differences which indicate that
they cannot perform the mission of a bomber equipped for cruise missiles capable of a
range in excess of 600 kilometers, except that heavy bombers of current types, as
designated in subparagraph 3(a) of Article 11 of the Treaty, which otherwise would be of
a type equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers shall
not be considered to be heavy bombers of a type equipped for cruise missiles capable
of a range in excess of 600 kilometers if they are distinguishable on the basis of exter-
nally observable differences from heavy bombers of a type equipped for cruise missiles
capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers; and
(c) airplanes which otherwise would be bombers of a type equipped for ASBMs shall
not be considered to be bombers of a type equipped for ASBMs if they have function-
ally related observable differences which indicate that they cannot perform the mission
of a bomber equipped for ASBMs, except that heavy bombers of current types, as
designated in subparagraph 3(a) of Article 11 of the Treaty, which otherwise would be of
a type equipped for ASBMs shall not be considered to be heavy bombers of a type
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SALT II TREATY
293
equipped for ASBMs if they are distinguishable on the basis of externally observable
differences from heavy bombers of a type equipped for ASBMs.
First Common Understanding. Functionally related observable differences are differ-
ences in the observable features of airplanes which indicate whether or not these
airplanes can perform the mission of a heavy bomber, or whether or not they can
perform the mission of a bomber equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in
excess of 600 kilometers or whether or not they can perform the mission of a bomber
equipped for ASBMs. Functionally related observable differences shall be verifiable by
national technical means.To this end, the Parties may take,as appropriate, cooperative
measures contributing to the effectiveness of verification by national technical means.
Fifth Agreed Statement. Tupolev-142 airplanes in theircurrent configuration, that is, in
the configuration for anti-submarine warfare, are considered to be airplanes of a type
different from types of heavy bombers referred to in subparagraph 3(a) of Article II of
the Treaty and not subject to the Fourth Agreed Statement to paragraph 3 of Article I I of
the Treaty. This Agreed Statement does not preclude improvement of Tupolev-142
airplanes as an anti-submarine system, and does not prejudice or set a precedent for
designation in the future of types of airplanes as heavy bombers pursuant to subpara-
graph 3(b) of Article II of the Treaty or for application of the Fourth Agreed Statement
to paragraph 3 of Article II of the Treaty to such airplanes.
Second Common Understanding. Not later than six months after entry i nto force of the
Treaty the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will give its thirty-one Myasishchev
airplanes used as tankers in existence as of the date of signature of the Treaty function-
ally related observable differences which indicate that they cannot perform the mission
of a heavy bomber.
Third Common Understanding. The designations by the United States of America and
by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for heavy bombers referred to in subpara-
graph 3(a) of Article II of the Treaty correspond in the following manner:
Heavy bombers of the types designated by the United States of America as the B-52
and the B-1 are known to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics by the same desig-
nations;
Heavy bombers of the type designated by the Union of Socialist Republics as the
Tupole.v-95 are known to the United States of America as heavy bombers of the Bear
type; and
Heavy bombers of the type designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as
the Myasishchev are known to the United States of America as heavy bombers of the
Bison type.
4. Air-to-surface ballistic missiles (ASBMs) are any such missiles capable of a range
in excess of 600 kilometers and installed in an aircraft or on its external mountings.
5. Launchers of ICBMs and SLBMs equipped with multiple independently targetable
reentry vehicles (MlRVs) are launchers of the types developed and tested for launching
ICBMs or SLBMs equipped with MlRVs.
First Agreed Statement. If a launcher has been developed and tested for launching an
ICBM or an SLBM equipped with MlRVs, all launchers of that type shall be considered
to have been developed and tested for launching ICBMs or SLBMs equipped with
MlRVs.
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294
APPENDIX B
First Common Understanding. If a launcher contains or launches an ICBM or en SLBM
equipped with MlRVs, that launcher shall be considered to have been developed and
tested for launching ICBMs or SLBMs equipped with MlRVs.
Second Common Understanding. If a launcher has been developed and tested for
launching an ICBM or an SLBM equipped with MlRVs, all launchers of thattype, except
for ICBM and SLBM test and training launchers, shall be included in the corresponding
aggregate numbers provided for in Article V of the Treaty, pursuant to the provisions of
Article Vl of the Treaty.
Second Agreed Statement. ICBMs and SLBMs equipped with MlRVs are ICBMs and
SLBMs of the types which have been flight-tested with two or more independently
targetable reentry vehicles, regardless of whether or not they have also been flight-
tested with a single reentry vehicle or with multiple reentry vehicles which. are not
independently targetable. As of the date of signature of the Treaty, such ICBMs and
SLBMS are: for the United States of America, Minuteman lil ICBMs, Poseidon C-3
SLBMs, and Trident C-4 SLBMs; and for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
RS-16, RS-18, RS-20 ICBMs and RSM-50 SLBMs.
Each Party will notify the other Party in the Standing Consultative Commission on a
case-by-case basis of the designation of the one new type of light ICBM, if equipped
with MlRVs, permitted pursuant to paragraph 9 of Article IV of the Treaty when first
flight-tested; of designations of additional types of SLBMs equipped with MlRVs when
first installed on a submarine; and of designations of types of ASBMs equipped with
MlRVs when first flight-tested.
Third Common Understanding. The designations by the United States of America and
by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for ICBMsand SLBMsequipped with MlRVs
correspond in the following manner:
Missiles of the type designated by the United States of America as the Minuteman lil
and known to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics by the same designation, a light
ICBM that has been flight-tested with multiple independently targetable reentry
vehicles;
Missiles of the type designated by the United States of America as the Poseiden C-3
and known to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics by the same designation, an
SLBM that was first flight-tested in 1968 and that has been flight-tested with multiple
independently targetable reentry vehicles;
Missiles of the type designated by the United States of America as the Trident C-4
and known to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics by the same designation, an
SLBM that was first flight-tested in 1977 and that has been flight-tested with multiple
independently targetable reentry vehicles;
Missiles of the type designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics es the RS-
16 and known to the United States of America as the SS-17, a light ICBM that has been
flight-tested with a single reentry vehicle and with multiple independently targetable
reentry vehicles;
Missiles of the type designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics es the RS-
18 and known to the United States of America as the SS-19, the heaviest in terms of
launch-weight and throw-weight of light ICBMs, which has been flight-tested with a
single reentry vehicle and with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles;
Missiles of the type designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as the RS-
20 and known to the United States of America as the SS-18, the heaviest in terms of
launch-weight and throw-weight of heavy ICBMs, which has been flight-tested with a
single reentry vehicle and with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles;
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SALT II TREATY
295
Missiles of the type designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as the
RSM-50 and known to the United States of America as the SS-N-18, an SLBM that has
been flight-tested with a single reentry vehicle and with multiple independentlytarget-
able reentry vehicles.
Third Agreed Statement. Reentry vehicles are independently targetable:
(a) if, after separation from the booster, maneuvering and targeting of the reentry
vehicles to separate al m points along trajectories which are unrelated to each other are
accomplished by means of devices which are installed in a self-contained dispensing
mechanism or on the reentry vehicles, and which are based on the use of electronic or
other computers in combination with devices using jet engines, including rocket
engines, or aerodynamic systems;
(b) if maneuvering and targeting of the reentry vehicles to separate aim points along
trajectories which are unrelated to each other are accomplished by means of other
devices which may be developed in the future.
Fourth Common Understanding. For the purposes of this Treaty, all ICBM launchers in
the Derazhnya and Pervomaysk areas in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics are
included in the aggregate numbers provided for in Article V of the Treaty.
Fifth Common Understanding. If ICBM or SLBM launchers are converted, constructed
or undergo significant changes to their principal observable structural design features
after entry into force of the Treaty, any such launchers which are launchers of missiles
equipped with MlRVs shall be distinguishable from launchers of missiles not equipped
with MlRVs, and any such launchers which are launchers of missiles not equipped with
MlRVs shall be distinguishable from launchers of missiles equipped with MlRVs, on the
basis of externally observable design features of the launchers. Submarines with
launchers of SLBMs equipped with MlRVs shall be distinguishable from submarines
with launchers of SLBMs not equipped with MlRVs on the basis of externally observa-
ble design features of the submarines.
This Common Understanding does not require changes to launcher conversion or
construction programs, or to programs including significant changes to the principal
observable structural design features of launchers, underway as of the date of signa-
ture of the Treaty.
6. ASBMs equipped with MlRVs are ASBMs of the types which have been flight-
tested with M I RVs.
First Agreed Statement. ASBMs of the types which have been flight-tested with MlRVs
are all ASBMs of the types which have been flight-tested with two or more independ-
ently targetable reentry vehicles, regardless of whether or not they have also been
flight-tested with a single reentry vehicle or with multiple reentry vehicles which are not
independently targetable.
Second Agreed Statement. Reentry vehicles are independently targetable:
(a) if, after separation from the booster, maneuvering and targeting of the reentry
vehicles to separate aim points along trajectories which are unrelated to each otherare
accomplished by means of devices which are installed in a self-contained dispensing
mechanism or on the reentry vehicles, and which are based on the use of electronic or
other computers in combination with devices using jet engines, including rocket
engines, or aerodynamic systems;
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296
APPENDIX B
(b) if maneuvering and targeting of the reentryvehiclestoseparateaim pointsalong
trajectories which are unrelated to each other are accomplished by means of other
devices which may be developed in the future.
7. Heavy ICBMs are ICBMs which have a launch-weight greater or a throw-weight
greater than that of the heaviest, in terms of either launch-weight or throw-weight,
respectively, of the light ICBMs deployed by either Party as of the date of signature of
this Treaty.
First Agreed Statement. The launch-weight of an ICBM is the weight of the fully loaded
missile itself at the time of launch.
Second Agreed Statement. The throw-weight of an ICBM is the sum of the weight of:
(a) its reentry vehicle or reentry vehicles;
(b) any self-contained dispensing mechanisms or other appropriate devices for
targeting one reentry vehicle, or for releasing or for dispensing and targeting two or
more reentry vehicles; and
(c) its penetration aids, including devices for their release.
Common Understanding. The term "other appropriate devices," as used in the defini-
tion of the throw-weight of an I CBM in the Second Ag reed Statement to paragraph 7 of
Article II of the Treaty, means any devices for dispensing and targeting two or more
reentry vehicles; and any devices for releasing two or more reentry vehicles or for
targeting one reentry vehicle, which cannot provide their reentry vehicles or reentry
vehicle with additional velocity of more than 1,000 meters per second.
8. Cruise missiles are unmanned, self-propelled, guided, weapon-delivery vehicles
which sustain flight through the use of aerodynamic lift over most of their flight path
and which are flight-tested from or deployed on aircraft, that is, air-launched cruise
missiles, or such vehicles which are referred to as cruise missiles in subparagraph 1 (b)
of Article IX.
First Agreed Statement. If a cruise missile is capable of a range in excess of 600 kilo-
meters, all cruise missiles of that type shall be considered to be cruise missiles capable
of a range in excess of 600 kilometers.
First Common Understanding. If a cruise missile has been flight-tested to a range in
excess of 600 kilometers, it shall be considered to be a cruise missle capable of a range
in excess of 600 kilometers.
Second Common Understanding. Cruise missiles not capable of a range in excess of
600 kilometers shall not be considered to be of a type capable of a range in excess of
600 kilometers if they are distinguishable on the basis of externally observable design
features from cruise missiles of types capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers.
Second Agreed Statement. The range of which a cruise missile is capable is the maxi-
mum distance which can be covered by the missile in its standard design mode flying
until fuel exhaustion, determined by projecting its flight path onto the Earth's sphere
from the point of launch to the point of impact.
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SALT II TREATY
297
Third Agreed Statement. If an unmanned, self-propelled, guided vehicle which
sustains flight through the use of aerodynamic lift over most of its flight path has been
flight-tested or deployed for weapon delivery, all vehicles of that type shall be con-
sidered to be weapon-delivery vehicles.
Third Common Understanding. Unmanned, self-propelled, guided vehicles which
chin flight through the use of aerodynamic lift over most of their flight path and are
~ . .- . _~-_1__ &~6 :~ ~ ~il~tl=~<~ ~lli~ \mhir~l~c shall not he
not weapon-delivery venicles, Inal IS, unarmed, ,u''w`~;~, yueu=~ vat, -,.~., ,.~. ~~
considered to be cruise missiles if such vehicles are distinguishable from cruise mis-
siles on the basis of externally observable design features.
Fourth Common Understanding. Neither Party shall convert unarm-cd, pilotless,
guided vehicles into cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers, nor
shall either Party convert cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers
into unarmed, pilotless, guided vehicles.
Fifth Common Understanding. Neither Party has plans during the term of the Treaty to
flight-test from or deploy on aircraft unarmed, pilotless, guided vehicles which are
capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers. In the future, should a Party have such
plans, that Party will provide notification thereof to the other Party well in advance of
such flight-testing or deployment. This Common Understanding does not apply to
target drones.
Article l l l
1. Upon entry into force of this Treaty, each Party undertakes to limit ICBM launch-
ers, SLBM launchers, heavy bombers, and ASBMs to an aggregate number not to
exceed 2,400.
2. Each Party undertakes to limit, from January 1, 1981, strategic offensive arms
referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article to an aggregate number not to exceed 2,250,
and to initiate reductions of those arms which as of that date would be in excess of this
aggregate number.
3. Within the aggregate numbers provided for in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article
and subject to the provisions of this Treaty, each Party has the right to determine the
composition of these aggregates.
4. For each bomber of a type equipped for ASBMs, the aggregate numbers provided
for in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article shall include the maximum number of such
missiles for which a bomber of that type is equipped for one operational mission.
5. A heavy bomber equipped only for ASBMs shall not itself be included in the
aggregate numbers provided for in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article.
6. Reductions of the numbers of strategic offensive arms required to comply with the
provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article shall be carried out as provided for in
Article Xl.
Article IV
1. Each Party undertakes not to start construction of additional fixed ICBM launch-
ers.
2. Each Party u ndertakes not to relocate f ixed I CB M lau nchers.
3. Each Party undertakes not to convert launchers of light ICBMs, or of ICBMs of
older types deployed prior to 1964, into launchers of heavy ICBMs of types deployed
after that time.
4. Each Party undertakes in the process of modernization and replacement of ICBM
silo launchers not to increase the original internal volume of an ICBM silo launcher by
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298
APPENDIX B
more than thirty-two percent. Within this limit each Party has the right to determine
whether such an increase will be made through an increase in the original diameter or
in the original depth of an ICBM silo launcher, or in both of these dimensions.
Agreed Statement. The word "original" in paragraph 4 of Article IV of the Treaty refers
to the internal dimensions of an ICBM silo launcher, including its internal volume, as of
May 26, 1972, or as of the date on which such launcher becomes operational, which-
ever is later.
Common Understanding. The obligations provided for in paragraph 4 of Article IV of
the Treaty and in the Agreed Statement thereto mean that the original diameter or the
original depth of an ICBM silo launcher may not be increased by an amount greater
than that which would result in an increase in the original internal volume of the ICBM
silo launcher by thirty-two percent solely through an increase in one of these dimen-
sions.
5. Each Party undertakes:
(a) not to supply ICBM launcher deployment areas with intercontinental ballistic
missiles in excess of a number consistent with normal deployment, maintenance,
training, and replacement requirements;
(b) not to provide storage facilities for or to store ICBMs in excess of normal
deployment requirements at launch sites of ICBM launchers;
(c) not to develop, test, or deploy systems for rapid reload of ICBM launchers.
Agreed Statement. The term "normal deployment requirements," as used in paragraph
5 of Article IV of the Treaty, means the deployment of one missile at each ICBM
lau Ocher.
6. Subject to the provisions of this Treaty, each Party undertakes not to have under
construction at any time strategic offensive arms referred to in paragraph 1 of Article l l l
in excess of numbers consistent with a normal construction schedule.
Common Understanding. A normal construction schedule, in paragraph 6 of Article IV
of the Treaty, is understood to be one consistent with the past or present construction
practices of each Party.
7. Each Party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ICBMs which have a launch-
weight greater or a throw-weight greater than that of the heaviest, in terms of either
launch-weight or throw-weight, respectively, of the heavy ICBMs, deployed by either
Party as of the date of signature of this Treaty.
First Agreed Statement. The launch-weight of an ICBM is the we
missile itself at the time of launch.
light of the fully loaded
Second Agreed Statement. The throw-weight of an ICBM is the sum of the weight of:
(a) its reentry vehicle or reentry vehicles;
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SALT II TREATY
299
(b) any self-contained dispensing mechanisms or other appropriate devices for
targeting one reentry vehicle, or for releasing or for dispensing and targeting two or
more reentry vehicles; and
(c) its penetration aids, including devices for their release.
Common Understanding. The term "other appropriate devices," as used in the defini-
tion of the throw-weight of an ICBM in the Second Ag reed Statement to paragraph 7 of
Article IV of the Treaty, means any devices for dispensing and targeting two or more
reentry vehicles; and any devices for releasing two or more reentry vehicles or for
targeting one reentry vehicle, which cannot provide their reentry vehicles or reentry
vehicle with additional velocity of more than 1,000 meters per second.
8. Each Party undertakes not to convert land-based launchers of ballistic missiles
which are not ICBMs into launchers for launching ICBMs, and not to test them for this
pu rpose.
Common Understanding. During the term of the Treaty, the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics will not produce, test, or deploy ICBMs of the type designated by the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics as the RS-14 and known to the United States of America
as the SS-16, a light ICBM first flight-tested after 1970 and flight-tested only with a
single reentry vehicle; this Common Understanding also means that the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics will not produce the third stage of that missile, the reentry
vehicle of that missile, or the appropriate devicefortargeting the reentry vehicle of that
missile.
9. Each Party undertakes not to flight-test or deploy new types of ICBMs, that is,
types of ICBMs not flight-tested as of May 1, 1979, except that each Party may flight-
test and deploy one new type of light ICBM.
First Agreed Statement. The term "new types of ICBMs," as used in paragraph 9 of
Article IV of the Treaty, refers to any ICBM which is different from those ICBMs flight-
tested as of May 1, 1979 in any one or more of the following respects:
(a) the number of stages, the length, the largest diameter, the launch-weight, or the
throw-weight, of the missile;
(b) the type of propellant (that is, liquid or solid) of any of its stages.
First Common Understanding. As used in the First Agreed Statement to paragraph 9 of
Article IV of the Treaty, the term "different," referring to the length, the diameter, the
launch-weight, and the throw-weight, of the missile, means a difference in excess of
five percent
Second Agreed Statement. Every ICBM of the one new type of light ICBM permitted to
each Party pursuant to paragraph 9 of Article IV of the Treaty shall have the same
number of stages and the same type of propellant (that is, liquid orsolid) of each stage
as the first ICBM of the one new type of light ICBM launched by that Party. In addition,
after the twenty-fifth launch of an ICBM of that type, or after the last launch before
deployment begins of IGBMs of that type, whichever occurs earlier, ICBMs of the one
new type of light ICBM permitted to that Party shall not be different in any one or more
of the following respects: the length, the largest diameter, the launch-weight, or the
throw-weight, of the missile.
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312 APPENDIX B
(c) consider questions involving unintended interference with national technical
means of verification, and questions involving unintended impeding of verification
by national technical means of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty;
(d) consider possible changes in the strategic situation which have a bearing on
the provisions of this Treaty;
(e) agree upon procedures for replacement, conversion, and dismantling o
destruction, of strategic offensive arms in cases provided for in the provisions of this
Treaty and upon procedures for removal of such arms from the aggregate numbers
when they otherwise cease to be subject to the limitations provided for in this Treaty,
and at regular sessions of the Standing Consultative Commission, notify each other
in accordance with the aforementioned procedures, at least twice annually, of
actions completed and those in process;
(f ) consider, as appropriate, possi ble proposals for further i ncreasing the viabi lity
of this Treaty, including proposals for amendments in accordance with the provi-
sions of this Treaty;
(9) consider, as appropriate, proposals for further measures limiting strategic
offensive arms.
3. In the Standing Consultative Commission the Parties shall maintain by category
the agreed data base on the numbers of strategic offensive arms established by the
Memorandum of Understanding Between the United States of America and the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics Regarding the Establishment of a Data Base on the
Numbers of Strategic Offensive Arms of June 18, 1979.
Agreed Statement. In order to maintain the agreed data base on the numbers of
strategic offensive arms subject to the limitations provided for in the Treaty in accord-
ance with paragraph 3 of Article XVII of the Treaty, at each regular session of the
Standing Consultative Commission the Parties will notify each other of and consider
changes in those numbers in the following categories: launchers of ICBMs; fixed
launchers of ICBMs; launchers of ICBMs equipped with MlRVs; launchers of SLBMs;
launchers of SLBMs equipped with MlRVs; heavy bombers; heavy bombers equipped
for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers; heavy bombers
equipped only for ASBMs; ASBMs; and ASBMs equipped with MlRVs.
Article XVI I I
Each Party may propose amendments to this Treaty. Agreed amendments shall enter
into force in accordance with the procedures governing the entry into force of this
Treaty.
Article XIX
1. -This Treaty shall be subject to ratification in accordance with the constitutional
procedures of each Party. This Treaty shall enter into force on the day of the exchange
of instruments of ratification and shall remain in force through December 31, 1985,
unless replaced earlier by an agreement further limiting strategic offensive arms.
2. This Treaty shall be registered pursuant to Article 102 of the Charterof the United
Nations.
3. Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw
from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of
this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give notice of its decision to
the other Party six months prior to withdrawal from the Treaty. Such notice shall
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SALT II TREATY
313
include a statement of the extraordinary events the notifying Party regards as having
jeopardized its supreme interests.
DONE at Vienna on June 18, 1979, in two copies, each in the English and Russian
languages, both texts being equally authentic.
For the United States of America:
JIMMY CARTER
President of the United States of America
For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:
L. BREZHNEV,
General Secretary of the CPSU, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme
Soviet of the U.S.S.R.
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Protocol to the Treaty Between the United States of
America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on
the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms
The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, herein-
after referred to as the Parties,
Having agreed on limitations on strategic offensive arms in the Treaty,
Have agreed on additional limitations for the period during which this Protocol
remains in force, as follows:
Article I
Each Party undertakes not to deploy mobile ICBM launchers or to flight-test ICBMs
from such launchers.
Article 11
1. Each Party undertakes not to deploy cruise missiles capable of a range in excess
of 600 kilometers on sea-based launchers or on land-based launchers.
2. Each Party undertakes not to flight-test cruise missiles capable of a range in
excess of 600 kilometers which are equipped with multiple independently targetable
warheads from sea-based launchers or from land-based launchers.
Agreed Statement. Warheads of a cruise missile are independently targetable if ma-
neuvering or targeting of the warheads to separate aim points along ballistic
trajectories or any other flight paths, which are unrelated to each other, is
accomplished during a flight of a cruise missile.
3. For the purposes of this Protocol, cruise missiles are unmanned, self-propelled,
guided, weapon-delivery vehicles which sustain flight through the use of aerodynamic
lift over most of their flight path and which are flight-tested from or deployed on sea-
based or land-based launchers, that is, sea-launched cruise missiles and ground-
launched cruise missiles, respectively.
First Agreed Statement. If a cruise missile is capable of a range in excess of 600 kilo-
meters, all cruise missiles of that type shall be considered to be cruise missiles capable
of a range in excess of 600 kilometers.
First Common Understanding. If a cruise missile has been flight-tested to a range in
excess of 600 kilometers, it shall be considered to be a cruise missile capable of a range
in excess of 600 kilometers.
Second Common Understanding. Cruise missiles not capable of a range in excess of
600 kilometers shall not be considered to be of a type capable of a range in excess of
600 kilometers if they are distinguishable on the basis of externally observable design
features from cruise missiles of types capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers.
314
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SHALT II TREATY
315
Second Agreed Statement. The range of which a cruise missile is capable is the maxi-
mum distance which can be covered by the missile in its standard design mode flying
until fuel exhaustion, determined by projecting its flight path onto the Earth's sphere
from the point of launch to the point of impact.
Third Agreed Statement. If an unmanned, self-propelled, guided vehicle which sus-
tains flight through the use of aerodynamic lift over most of its flight path has been
flight-tested or deployed for weapon delivery, all vehicles of that type shall be con-
sidered to be weapon-delivery vehicles.
Third Common Understanding. Unmanned, self-propelled, guided vehicles which
sustain flight through the use of aerodynamic lift over most of their flight-path and are
not weapon-delivery vehicles, that is, unarmed, pilotless, guided vehicles, shall not be
considered to be cruise missiles if such vehicles are distinguishable from cruise mis-
siles on the basis of externally observable design features.
Fourth Common Understanding. Neither Party shall convert unarmed, pilotless,
guided vehicles into cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers, nor
shall either Party convert cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers
into unarmed, pilotless, guided vehicles.
Fifth Common Understanding. Neither Party has plans during the term of the Protocol
to flight-test from or deploy on sea-based or land-based launchers unarmed, pilotless,
guided vehicles which are capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers. In the future,
should a Party have such plans, that Party will provide notification thereof to the other
Party well in advance of such flight-testing or deployment. This Common Understand-
ing does not apply to target drones.
Article l l l
Each Party undertakes not to flight-test or deploy ASBMs.
Article IV
This Protocol shall be considered an integral part of the Treaty. It shall enter into
force on the day of the entry into force of the Treaty and shall remain in force through
December 31, 1981, unless replaced earlier by an agreement on further measures
limiting strategic offensive arms.
DONE at Vienna on June 18, 1979, in two copies, each in the English and Russian
languages, both texts being equally authentic.
For the United States of America:
JIMMY CARTER
President of the United States of America
For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:
L. BREZHNEV
General Secretary of the CPSU, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme
Soviet of the U.S.S.R.
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Memorandum of Understanding Between the United
States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics Regarding the Establishment of a Data Base
on the Numbers of Strategic Offensive Arms
For the purposes of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, the Parties
have considered data on numbers of strategic offensive arms and agree that as of
November 1, 1978 there existed the following numbers of strategic offensive arms
subject to the limitations provided for in the Treaty which is being signed today.
U.S.S.h.
Launchers of ICBMs
Fixed launchers of ICBMs
Launchers of ICBMs equipped with MlRVs
Launchers of SLBMs
Launchers of SLBMs equipped with M I RVs
Heavy bombers
Heavy bombers equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in
excess of 600 kilometers
Heavy bombers equipped only for ASBMs
ASBMs
ASBMs equipped with MlRVs
1 ,054
1 ,054
550
656
496
574
o
o
o
o
1 ,398
1 ,398
576
950
128
156
At the time of entry into force of the Treaty the Parties will update the above agreed
data in the categories listed in this Memorandum.
DONE at Vienna on June 18, 1979, in two copies, each in the English and Russian
languages, both texts being equally authentic.
For the United States of America
RALPH EARLE II
Chief of the United States Delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
V. KARPOV
Chief of the U.S.S.R. Delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
316
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SALT II TREATY
317
Statement of Data on the Numbers of Strategic Offensive Arms as of
the Date of Signature of the Treaty
The United States of America declares that as of June 18, 1979 it possesses the
following numbers of strategic offensive arms subject to the limitations provided for ih
the Treaty which is being signed today:
Launchers of ICBMs
Fixed launchers of ICBMs
Launchers of ICBMs equipped with M I RVs
Launchers of SLBMs
Launchers of SLBMs equipped with MlRVs
Heavy bombers
Heavy bombers equipped for cruise missiles capable of
a range in excess of 600 kilometers
Heavy bombers equipped only for ASBMs
ASBMs
ASBMs equipped with MlRVs
June 18, 1979
RALPH EARLE II
1 ,054
1 ,054
550
656
496
573
3
o
o
o
Chief of the United States Delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
I certify that this is a true copy of the document signed by Ambassador Ralph Earle I I
entiled "Statement of Data on the Numbers of Strategic Offensive Arms as of the Date
of Signature of the Treaty" and given to Ambassador V. Karpov on June 18, 1979 in
Vienna, Austria.
THOMAS GRAHAM, JR.
General Counsel
United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
Statement of Data on the Numbers of Strategic Offensive Arms as of
the Date of Signature of the Treaty
The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics declares that as of June 18, 1979, it
possesses the following numbers of strategic offensive arms subject to the limitations
provided for in the Treaty which is being signed today:
Launchers of ICBMs
Fixed launchers of ICBMs
1 ,398
1 ,398
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318
Launchers of ICBMs equipped with MlRVs
Launchers of SLBMs
Launchers of SLBMs equipped with MlRVs
Heavy bombers
Heavy bombers equipped for cruise missiles capable of
a range in excess of 600 kilometers
Heavy bombers equipped only for ASBMs
ASBMs
ASBMs equipped with M I RVs
Junel8,1979
V. KARPOV
Chief of the U.S.S.R. Delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
Translation certified by:
W.D. Krimer,
Senior Language Officer,
Division of Language Services, U.S. Department of State
WILLIAM D. KRIMER
APPENDIX B
608
950
144
156
o
o
o
o
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Joint Statement of Principles and Basic
Guidelines for Subsequent Negotiations
on the Limitation of Strategic Arms
The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, herein-
after referred to as the Parties,
Having concluded the Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms,
Reaffirming that the strengthening of strategic stability meets the interests of the
Parties and the interests of international security,
Convinced that early agreement on the further limitation and further reduction of
strategic arms would serve to strengthen international peace and security and to
reduce the risk of outbreak of nuclear war,
Have agreed as follows:
First, The Parties will continue to pursue negotiations, in accordance with the
principle of equality and equal security, on measures for the further limitation and
reduction in the numbers of strategic arms, as well as for their further qualitative
limitation.
In furtherance of existing agreements between the Parties on the limitation and
reduction of strategic arms, the Parties will continue, for the purposes of reducing and
averting the risk of outbreak of nuclear war, to seek measures to strengthen strategic
stability by, among other things, limitations on strategic offensive arms most
destabilizing to the strategic balance and by measures to reduce and to avert the risk of
surprise attack.
Second. Further limitations and reductions of strategic arms must be subject to
adequate verification by national technical means, using additionally, as appropriate,
cooperative measures contributing to the effectiveness of verification by national
technical means. The Parties will seek to strengthen verification and to perfect the
operation of the Standing Consultative Commission in order to promote assurance of
compliance with the obligations assumed by the Parties.
Third. The Parties shall pursue in the course of these negotiations, taking into con-
sideration factors that determine the strategic situation, the following objectives:
significant and substantial reductions in the numbers of strategic offensive
arms;
2) qualitative limitations on strategic offensive arms, including restrictions on the
development, testing, and deployment of new types of strategic offensive arms and
on the modernization of existing strategic offensive arms;
3) resolution of the issues included in the Protocol to the Treaty Between the
United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the
Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms in the context of the negotiations relating to
the implementation of the principles and objectives set out herein.
Fourth. The Parties will consider other steps to ensure and enhance strategic
stability, to ensure the equality and equal security of the Parties, and to implement the
above principles and objectives. Each Party will be free to raise any issue relative to the
further limitation of strategic arms. The Parties will also consider further joint
319
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320
APPENDIX B
measures, as appropriate, to strengthen international peace and security and to red
duce the risk of outbreak of nuclear war.
Vienna, June 18, 1979
For the United States of America
JIMMY CARTER
President of the United States of America
For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
L. BREZHNEV
General Secretary of the CPSU, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme
Soviet of the U.S.S.R.
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Soviet Backfire Statement
On June 16,1979, President Brezhnev handed PresidentCarterthefollowingwritten
statement [original Russian text was attached]:
"The Soviet side informs the US side that the Soviet 'Tu-22M' airplane, called 'Back-
fire' in the USA, is a medium-range bomber, and that it does not intend to give this
airplane the capability of operating at intercontinental distances. In this connection,
the Soviet side states that it will not increase the radius of action of this airplane in such
a way as to enable it to strike targets on the territory of the USA. Nor does it intend to
give it such a capability in any other manner, including by in-flight refueling. At the
same time, the Soviet side states that it will not increase the production rate of this
airplane as compared to the present rate."
President Brezhnev confirmed that the Soviet Backfire production rate would not
exceed 30 per year.
President Carter stated that the United States enters into the SALT I I Agreement on
the basis of the commitments contained in the Soviet statement and that it considers
the carrying out of these commitments to be essential to the obligations assumed
under the Treaty.
CYRUS VANCE
321
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Representative terms from entire chapter:
cruise missiles
