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Appendix C
Treaty Between the United
States of America and the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics on
the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic
Missile Systems
323
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Treaty Between the United States of America and the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of
Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems
Signed at Moscow May 26, 1972
Ratification advised by U.S. Senate August 3, 1972
Ratified by U.S. President September 30, 1972
Proclaimed by U.S. President October 3, 1972
Instruments of ratification exchanged October 3, 1972
Entered into force October 3, 1972
The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
hereinafter referred to as the Parties,
Proceeding from the premise that nuclear war would have devastating
consequences for all mankind,
Considering that effective measures to limit anti-ballistic missile systems would be a
substantial factor in curbing the race in strategic offensive arms and would lead to a
decrease in the risk of outbreak of war involving nuclear weapons,
Proceeding from the premise that the limitation of anti-ballistic missile systems, as
well as certain agreed measures with respect to the limitation of strategic offensive
arms, would contribute to the creation of more favorable conditions for further
negotiations on li miti ng strateg ic arms,
Mindful of their obligations under Article Vl of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons,
Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the
nuclear arms race and to take effective measures toward reductions in strategic arms,
nuclear disarmament, and general and complete disarmament,
Desiring to contribute to the relaxation of international tension and the strengthen-
ing of trust between States,
Have agreed as follows:
Article I
1. Each party undertakes to limit anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems and to adopt
other measures in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty.
2. Each Party undertakes not to deploy ABM systems for a defense of the territory of
its country and not to provide a base for such a defense, and not to deploy ABM
systems for defense of an individual region except as provided for in Article 111 of this
Treaty.
Article 11
1. For the purpose of this Treaty an ABM system is a system to counter strategic
ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory, currently consisting of:
(a) ABM interceptor missiles, which are interceptor missiles constructed and
deployed for an ABM role, or of a type tested in an ABM mode;
324
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SALT I ABM TREATY
325
(b) ABM launchers, which are launchers constructed and deployed for launching
ABM interceptor missiles; and
(c) ABM radars, which are radars constructed and deployed for an ABM role, or of
a type tested in an ABM mode.
2. The ABM system components listed in paragraph 1 of this Article include those
which are:
(a) operational;
(b) under construction;
(c) undergoing testing;
(d) undergoing overhaul, repair or conversion; or
(e) mothbal led.
Article 111
Each Party undertakes not to deploy ABM systems or their components except that:
(a) within one ABM system deployment area having a radius of one hundred and fifty
kilometers and centered on the Party's national capital, a Party may deploy: (1 ) no more
than one hundred ABM launchers and no more than one hundred ABM interceptor
missiles at launch sites, and (2) ABM radars within no more than six ABM radar
complexes, the area of each complex being circular and having a diameter of no more
than three kilometers; and
(b) within one ABM system deployment area having a radius of one hundred and
fifty kilometers and containing ICBM silo launchers, a Party may deploy: (1 ) no more
than one hundred ABM launchers and no more than one hundred ABM interceptor
missiles at launch sites, (2) two large phased-array ABM radars comparable in
potential to corresponding ABM radars operational or under construction on the date
of signature of the Treaty in an ABM system deployment area containing ICBM silo
launchers, and (3) no more than eighteen ABM radars each having a potential less than
the potential of the smaller of the above-mentioned two large phased-array ABM
radars.
Article IV
The limitations provided for in Article 111 shall not apply to ABM systems or their
components used for development or testing, and located within current or
additionally agreed test ranges. Each Party may have no more than a total of fifteen
ABM launchers at test ranges.
Article V
1. Each Party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM systems or
components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based.
2. Each Party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM launchers for launch-
ing more than one ABM interceptor missile at a time from each launcher, not to
modify deployed launchers to provide them with such a capability, not to develop, test,
or deploy automatic or semi-automatic or other similar systems for rapid reload of
ABM launchers.
Article Vl
To enhance assurance of the effectiveness of the limitations on ABM systems and
their components provided by the Treaty, each Party undertakes:
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326
APPENDIX C
(a) not to give missiles, launchers, or radars, other than ABM interceptor missiles,
ABM launchers, or ABM radars, capabilities to counter strategic ballistic missiles or
their,elements in flight trajectory, and not to test them in an ABM mode; and
(b) not to deploy in the future radars for early warning of strategic ballistic missile
attack except at locations along the periphery of its national territory and oriented
outward.
Article V11
Subject to the provisions of this Treaty, modernization and replacement of ABM
systems or their components may be carried out.
Article V111
ABM systems or their components in excess of the numbers or outside the areas
specified in this Treaty, as well as ABM systems ortheircomponents prohibited bythis
Treaty, shall be destroyed or dismantled under agreed procedures within the shortest
possi ble ag reed period of ti me.
Article IX
To assure the viability and effectiveness of this Treaty, each Party undertakes not to
transfer to other States, and not to deploy outside its national territory, ABM systems or
their components limited by this Treaty.
Article X
Each Party undertakes not to assume any international obligations which would
conflict with this Treaty.
Article Xl
The Parties undertake to continue active negotiations for limitations on strategic
offensive arms.
Article Xll
1. For the purpose of providing assurance of compliance with the provisions of this
Treaty, each Party shall use national technical means of verification at its disposal in a
manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law.
2. Each Party undertakes not to interfere with the national technical means of
verification of the other Party operating in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article.
3. Each Party undertakes not to use deliberate concealment measures which
impede verification by national technical means of compliance with the provisions of
this Treaty. This obligation shall not require changes in current construction,
assembly, conversion, or overhaul practices.
Article X111
1. To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this Treaty, the
Parties shall establish promptly a Standing Consultative Commission, within the
framework of which they will:
(a) consider questions concerning compliance with the obligations assumed and
related situations which may be considered ambiguous;
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SALT I ABM TREATY
327
(b) provide on a voluntary basis such information as either Party considers
necessary to assure confidence in compliance with the obligations assumed;
(c) consider questions involving unintended interference with national technical
means of verification;
(d) consider possible changes in the strategic situation which have a bearing on
the provisions of this Treaty;
(e) agree upon procedures and dates for destruction or dismantling of ABM
systems or their components in cases provided for by the provisions of this Treaty;
(f) consider, as appropriate, possible proposals forfurther increasing the viability
of this Treaty; including proposals for amendments in accordance with the
provisions of this Treaty;
(9) consider, as appropriate, proposals for further measures aimed at limiting
strategic arms.
2. The Parties through consultation shall establish, and may amend as appropriate,
Regulations for the Standing Consultative Commission governing procedures,
composition and other relevant matters.
Article XIV
1. Each Party may propose amendments to this Treaty. Agreed amendments shall
enter into force in accordance with the procedures governing the entry into force of
this Treaty.
2. Five years after entry into force of this Treaty, and at five-year intervals thereafter,
the Parties shall together conduct a review of this Treaty.
Article XV
1. This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration.
2. Each Partyshall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the rightto withdrew
from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of
this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give notice of its decision to
the other Party six months prior to withdrawal from the Treaty. Such notice shall
include a statement of the extraordinary events the notifying Party regards as having
jeopardized its supreme interests.
Article XVI
1. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification in accordance with the constitutional
procedures of each Party. The Treaty shall enter into force on the day of the exchange
of instruments of ratification.
2. This Treaty shall be registered pursuant to Article 102 of the Charterof the United
Nations.
DONE at Moscow on May 26, 1972, in two copies, each in the English and Russian
languages, both texts being equally authentic.
FOR THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA
RICHARD NIXON
President of the United
States of America
FOR THE UNION OF SOVIET
SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
L. 1. BREZHNEV
General Secretary of the Central
Committee of the CPSU
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Agreed Statements, Common Understandings, and Uni-
lateral Statements Regarding the Treaty Between the
United States of America and the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic
Missiles
1. Agreed Statements
The document set forth below was agreed upon and initialed by the Heads of the
Delegations on May 26, 1972 (letter designations added);
AGREED STATEMENTS REGARDING THE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON
THE LIMITATION OF ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE SYTEMS
[A]
The Parties understand that, in addition to the ABM radars which may be deployed in
accordance with subparagraph (a) of Article l l l of the Treaty, those non-phased- array
ABM radars operational on the date of signature of the Treaty within the ABM system
deployment area for defense of the national capital may be retained.
[B]
The Parties understand that the potential (the product of mean emitted power in
watts and antenna area in square meters) of the smaller of the two large phased-array
ABM radars referred to in subparagraph (b) of Article lil of theTreatyisconsidered for
purposes of the Treaty to be three million.
[C]
The Parties understand that the center of the ABM system deployment area centered
on the national capital and the center of the ABM system deployment area containing
ICBM silo launchers for each Party shall be separated by no less than thirteen hundred
kilometers.
[D]
In order to insure fulfillment of the obligation not to deploy ABM systems and their
components except as provided in Article lil of the Treaty, the Parties agree that in the
event ABM systems based on other physical principles and including components
capable of substituting for ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars
are created in the future, specific limitations on such systems and their components
would be subject to discussion in accordance with Article Xlil and agreement in
accordance with Article XIV of the Treaty.
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SALT I ABM TREATY
329
[E]
The Parties understand that Article V of the Treaty includes obligations not to
develop, test or deploy ABM interceptor missiles for the delivery by each ABM
interceptor missile of more than one independently guided warhead.
[F]
The Parties agree not to deploy phased-array radars having a potential (the product
of mean emitted power in watts and antenna area in square meters) exceeding three
million, except as provided for in Articles lil, IV and Vl of the Treaty, or except for the
purposes of tracking objects in outer space or for use as national technical means of
verification.
[G]
The Parties understand that Article IX of the Treaty includes the obligation of the US
and the USSR not to provide to other States technical descriptions or blue prints
specially worked out for the construction of ABM systems and their components
limited by the Treaty.
2. Common Understandings
Common understanding of the Parties on the following matters was reached during
the negotiations:
A. Location of ICBM Defenses
The l I ~ nPIQnation made the following statement on May 26, 1972:
~ · en ~~ . A. ~ ~` y ~ ' '7 ~
Article lil of the ABM Treaty provides for each side one ABM system deployment
area centered on its national capital and one ABM system deployment area contain-
ing ICBM silo launchers. The two sides have registered agreement on the following
statement: "The Parties understand that the center of the ABM system deployment
area centered on the national capital and the center of the ABM system deployment
area containing ICBM silo launchers for each Party shall be separated by no less
than thirteen hundred kilometers." In this connection, the U.S. side notes that its
ABM system deployment area for defense of ICBM silo launchers, located west of
the Mississippi River, will be centered in the Grand Forks ICBM silo launcher de-
ployment area. (See Agreed Statement [C] . )
B. ABM Test Ranges
The U.S. Delegation made the following statement on April 26, 1972:
Article IV of the ABM Treaty provides that "the limitations provided forin Article lil
shall not apply to ABM systems or their components used for development or testing,
and located within current or additionally agreed test ranges." We believe it would be
useful to assure that there is no misunderstanding as to current ABM test ranges. It is
our understanding that ABM test ranges encompass the area within which ABM
components are located for test purposes. The current U.S. ABM test ranges are at
White Sands, New Mexico, and at Kwajalein Atoll, and the current Soviet ABM test
range is near Sary Shagan in Kazakhstan. We consider that non-phased array radars
of types used for range safety or instrumentation purposes may be located outside of
ABM test ranges. We interpret the reference in Article IV to "additionally agreed test
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330
APPENDIX C
ranges" to mean that ABM components will not be located at any other test ranges
without prior agreement between our Governments that there will be such additional
ABM test ranges.
On May 5, 1972, the Soviet Delegation stated that there was a com man
understanding on what ABM test ranges were, that the use of the types of non-ABM
radars for range safety or instrumentation was not limited under the Treaty, that the
reference in Article IV to "additionally agreed" test ranges was sufficiently clear, and
that national means permitted identifying current test ranges.
C. Mobile ABM Systems
On January 29, 1972, the U.S. Delegation made the following statement:
Article V(1 ) of the Joint Draft Text of the ABM Treaty includes an undertaking not
to develop, test, or deploy mobile land-based ABM systems and their components.
On May 5, 1971, the U.S. side indicated that, in its view, a prohibition on deployment
of mobile ABM systems and components would rule out the deployment of ABM
launchers and radars which were not permanent fixed types. At that time, we asked
for the Soviet view of this interpretation. Does the Soviet side agree with the U.S.
side's interpretation put forward on May 5, 1971?
On April 13, 1972, the Soviet Delegation said there is a general common
understanding on this matter.
D. Standing Consultative Commission
Ambassador Smith made the following statement on May 22, 1972:
The United States proposes that the sides agree that, with regard to initial
implementation of the ABM Treaty's Article Xlil on the Standing Consultative
Commission (SCC) and of the consultation Articles to the Interim Agreement on
offensive arms and the Accidents Agreement,, agreement establishing the SCC will
be worked out early in the follow-on SALT negotiations; until that is completed, the
following arrangements will prevail: when SALT is in session, any consultation
desired by either side under these Articles can be carried out by the two SALT
Delegations; when SALT is not in session, ad hoc arrangements for any desired
consultations under these Articles may be made through diplomatic channels.
Minister Semenov replied that, on an ad referendum basis, he could agree that the
U.S. statement corresponded to the Soviet understanding.
E. Standstill
On May 6, 1972, Minister Semenov made the following statement:
to an effort to accommodate the wishes of the U.S. side, the Soviet Delegation is
prepared to proceed on the basis that the two sides will in fact observe the
obligations of both the Interim Agreement and the ABM Treaty beginning from the
date of signature of these two documents.
In reply, the U.S. Delegation made the following statement on May 20, 1972:
See Article 7 of Agreement to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of NuclearWar Between
the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, signed Sept.
30, 1971.
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SALT I ABM TREATY
331
The U.S. agrees in principle with the Soviet statement made on May 6 concerning
observance of obligations beginning from date of signature but we would like to
make clear our understanding that this means that, pending ratification and
acceptance, neither side would take any action prohibited by the agreements after
they had entered into force. This understanding would continue to apply in the
absence of notification by either signatory of its intention not to proceed with
ratification or approval.
The Soviet Delegation indicated agreement with the U.S. statement.
3. Unilateral Statements
The following noteworthy unilateral statements were made during the negotiations
by the United States Delegation:
A. Withdrawal from the ABM Treaty
On May 9, 1972, Ambassador Smith made the following statement:
The U.S. Delegation has stressed the importance the U.S. Government attaches to
achieving agreement on more complete limitations on strategic offensive arms,
following agreement on an ABM Treaty and on an Interim Agreement on certain
measures with respect to the limitation of strategic offensive arms. The U.S.
Delegation believes that an objective of the follow-on negotiations should be to
constrain and reduce on a long-term basis threats to the survivability of our
respective strategic retaliatory forces. The USSR Delegation has also indicated that
the objectives of SALT would remain unfulfilled without the achievement of an
agreement providing for more complete limitations on strategic offensive arms. Both
sides recognize that the initial agreements would be steps toward the achievement of
more complete limitations on strategic arms. If an agreement providing for more
complete strategic offensive arms limitations were not achieved within five years,
U.S. supreme interests could be jeopardized. Should that occur, it would constitute a
basis for withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. The U.S. does not wish to see such a
situation occur, nor do we believe that the USSR does. It is because we wish to
prevent such a situation that we emphasize the importance the U.S. Government
attaches to achievement of more complete limitations on strategic offensive arms.
The U.S. Executive will inform the Congress, in connection with Congressional
consideration of the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement, of this statement of the
U.S. position.
B. Tested in ABM Mode
On April 7, 1972, the U.S. Delegation made the following statement:
Article I I of the Joint Text Draft uses the term "tested in an ABM mode," in defining
ABM components, and Article Vl includes certain obligations concerning such
testing. We believe that the sides should have a common understanding of this
phrase. First, we would note that the testing provisions of the ABM Treaty are
intended to apply to testing which occurs after the date of signature of the Treaty,
and not to any testing which may have occurred in the past. Next, we would amplify
the remarks we have made on this subject during the previous Helsinki phase by
setting forth the objectives which govern the U.S. view on the subject, namely, while
prohibiting testing of non-ABM components for ABM purposes: not to prevent
testing of ABM components, and not to prevent testing of non-ABM components for
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332
APPENDIX C
non-ABM purposes. To clarify our interpretation of "tested in an ABM mode," we
note that we would consider a launcher, missile or radar to be "tested in an ABM
mode" if, for example, any of the following events occur: (1) a launcher is used to
launch an ABM interceptor missile, (2) an interceptor missile is flight tested against a
target vehicle which has a flight trajectory with characteristics of a strategic ballistic
missile flight trajectory, or is flight tested in conjunction with the test of an ABM
interceptor missile or an ABM radar at the same test range, or is flight tested to an
altitude inconsistent with interception of targets against which air defenses are
deployed, (3) a radar makes measurements on a cooperative target vehicle of the
kind referred to in item (2) above during the reentry portion of its trajectory or makes
measurements in conjunction with the test of an ABM interceptor missile or an ABM
radar at the same test range. Radars used for purposes such as range~safety or
instrumentation would be exempt from application of these criteria.
C. No-Transfer Article of ABM Treaty
On April 18, 1972, the U.S. Delegation made the following statement:
In regard to this Article [IX], I have a brief and I believe self-explanatory statement
to make. The U.S. side wishes to make clear that the provisions of this Article do not
set a precedent for whatever provision may be considered for a Treaty on Limiting
Strategic Offensive Arms. The question of transfer of strategic offensive arms is a far
more complex issue, which may require a different solution.
D. No Increase in Defense of Early Warning Radars
On July 28, 1970, the U.S. Delegation made the following statement:
Since Hen House radars [Soviet ballistic missile early warning radars] can detect
and track ballistic missile warheads at great distances, they have a significant ABM
potential. Accordingly, the U.S. would regard any increase in the defenses of such
radars by surface-to-air missiles as inconsistent with an agreement.
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Protocol to the Treaty Between the United States of
America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on
the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems
Signed at Moscow July 3, 1974
Ratification advised by U.S. Senate November 10, 1975
Ratified by U.S. President March 19, 1976
Instruments of ratification exchanged May 24, 1976
Proclaimed by U.S. President July 6, 1976
Entered into force May 24, 1976
The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
hereinafter referred to as the Parties,
Proceeding from the Basic Principles of Relations between the United States of
America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics signed on May 29, 1972,
Desiring to further the objectives of the Treaty between the United States of America
and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile
Systems signed on May 26, 1972, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty,
Reaffirming their conviction that the adoption of further measures for the limitation
of strategic arms would contribute to strengthening international peace and security,
Proceeding from the premise that further limitation of anti-ballistic missile systems
will create more favorable conditions for the completion of work on a permanent
agreement on more complete measures for the limitation of strategic offensive arms,
Have agreed as follows:
Article I
1. Each Party shall be limited at any one time to a single area out of the two provided
in Article IlloftheTreatyfordeploymentofanti-ballisticmissile (ABM)systemsortheir
components and accordingly shall not exercise its right to deploy an ABM system or
its components in the second of the two ABM system deployment areas permitted by
Article lil of the Treaty, except as an exchange of one permitted area for the other in
accordance with Article II of this Protocol.
2. Accordingly, except as permitted by Article II of this Protocol: the United States of
America shall not deploy an ABM system or its components in the area centered on its
capital, as permitted by Article IlI(a) of the Treaty, and the Soviet Union shall not
deploy an ABM system or its components in the deployment area of intercontinental
ballistic missile (ICBM) silo launchers as permitted by Article IlI(b) of the Treaty.
Article II
1. Each Party shall have the right to dismantle or destroy its ABM system and the
components thereof in the area where they are presently deployed and to deploy an
ABM system or its components in the alternative area permitted by Article lil of the
Treaty, provided that prior to initiation of construction, notification is given in accord
333
-
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334
APPENDIX C
with the procedure agreed to in the Standing Consultative Commission, during the
year beginning October 3, 1977 and ending October 2, 1978, or during any year which
commences at five year intervals thereafter, those being the years for periodic review of
the Treaty, as provided in Article XIV of the Treaty. This right may be exercised only
once.
2. Accordingly, in the event of such notice, the United States would have the right to
dismantle or destroy the ABM system and its components in the deployment area of
ICBM silo launchers and to deploy an ABM system or its components in an area
centered on its capital, as permitted by Article l l l (a) of the Treaty, and the Soviet Union
would have the right to dismantle or destroy the ABM system and its components in the
area centered on its capital and to deploy an ABM system or its components in an area
containing ICBM silo launchers, as permitted by Article IlI(b) of the Treaty.
3. Dismantling or destruction and deployment of ABM systemsortheircomponents
and the notification thereof shall be carried out in accordance with Article Vll! of the
ABM Treaty and procedures agreed to in the Standing Consultative Commission.
Article l l l
The rights and obligations established by the Treaty remain in force and shall be
complied with by the Parties except to the extent modified by this Protocol. In
particular, the deployment of an ABM system or its components within the area
selected shall remain limited by the levels and other requirements established by the
Treaty.
Article IV
This Protocol shall be subject to ratification in accordance with the constitutional
procedures of each Party. It shall enter into force on the day of the exchange of
instruments of ratification and shall thereafter be considered an integral part of the
Treaty.
DONE at Moscow on July3, 1974, in duplicate, in the English and Russian languages,
both texts being equally authentic.
For the United States of America:
RICHARD NIXON
President of the United States of America
For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:
L. I. BREZHNEV
General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU
Representative terms from entire chapter:
abm interceptor
