This record of high-level concern, guidance, and DOD actions was paralleled by more intense oversight from Congress in defense planning challenges associated with WMD. New committees were formed in both houses to focus legislative attention on these matters. Congressional support agencies, including both the Congressional Research Service and the Congressional Budget Office, were tasked over the decade after the Persian Gulf War with providing numerous studies and analyses to inform the oversight process. Concerned about the seemingly ineffectual and redundant technology investment efforts of the individual Services, in 1994 Congress legislated a joint approach for research, development, and acquisition. (Box 2.1 summarizes the organization of the Joint CBD Program.)
The National Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 1994 (Public Law 103160, Section 1703) stipulated that “the Secretary of Defense shall…assign responsibility for overall coordination and integration of the chemical and biological warfare defense program and the chemical and biological medical defense program to a single office within the Office of the Secretary of Defense [OSD].” Concerned about the “backwater” status of chemical and biological defense in the Services, with many redundant and subcritical efforts, Congress sought both to raise the visibility of the new program—the Joint Chemical and Biological Defense (CBD) Program—and to create critical levels of effort around common Service needs. The program integrates and controls funding for all research, development, and acquisition (RDA) but not operations and maintenance or training, which remain the responsibilities of each Service.
The program is managed through a complicated joint Service/OSD committee structure that separately addresses medical and non-medical defensive measures. In the non-medical area, the program is further broken down into requirements and materiel groups, each organized around five “commodity” areas: contamination avoidance, individual protection, collective protection, decontamination, and modeling and simulation. Each committee is governed by the “one Service, one vote” principle. Total funding for the program in Fiscal Year (FY) 2001 was approximately $870 million, with about 45 percent in research, development, testing, and evaluation (RDT&E) and the rest in procurement. Funding for FY 2002 remained at about the same level, but reversed the split between RDT&E and procurement. The Army serves as the executive agent, but a Service lead executes each program.
As of the writing of this report, the management structure of the Joint CBD Program is undergoing change at the direction of the under secretary of defense for acquisition, technology, and logistics. The requirements committee (the Joint Service Integration Group) has been replaced by a single office in the J8 (plans and programs) section of the Joint Staff that will develop the joint requirements documents in keeping with the norm for joint programs. The materiel process for RDA is still undergoing reorganization, but one step taken is that of reassigning the lead role for RDA to the Defense Threat Reduction Agency.