Readiness

Finding

  • Navy readiness for chemical and biological warfare defense needs improvement in the following areas: establishment, validation, and enforcement of standards, performance and material condition of installed protective systems, availability and condition of protective equipment, shelf life of medical countermeasures, field exercise programs, basic and unit training, and readiness reporting.

    Recommendations for the Navy

  • The Navy should institute a system of exercises, training, assessment, and reporting aimed at meeting high standards of chemical and biological warfare defense readiness. Central to its effort is the requirement to define appropriate standards of readiness in each of its mission areas; these standards should be derived from the operational requirements generated by the recommended operational net assessments. Specific actions should include the following:

  • The Commander, Fleet Forces Command, should coordinate the establishment, validation, and promulgation of readiness standards for CW and BW defense. These standards should be comprehensive and should include exercise frequency, chemical/biological equipment stock levels, C-rating criteria with perishability standards, and reporting requirements.

  • The CNO should include chemical and biological warfare defense readiness reporting in the Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS) for the operating forces and in an appropriate parallel system for the shore establishment.

  • The CNO should direct increased attention to the upkeep and maintenance of Collective Protection Systems and countermeasure washdown systems, with the assistance of the president of the Navy’s Board of Inspection and Survey.

  • The Navy Warfare Development Command should develop and conduct innovative and provocative CW- and BW-relevant wargames and exercises, such as the “Breeze” series set up for the Commander, Fifth Fleet, and the Commander, Pacific. As an interim measure, it is recommended that CW and BW special weapons and tactics (SWAT) teams be set up by CFFC to validate readiness standards; training; exercises; and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) for the fleet and shore establishment.

  • Both the Navy and Marines should attach special urgency to the readiness of shore installations and bases. The CNO’s Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Plans, Policy and Operations) (N3) and Director of Naval Reserve (N095) should support regional commanders to access and leverage, where possible, active and/or reserve consequence management units with specialized chemical and biological capabilities that could assist in this area, or to add new units if necessary.

  • The CNO’s Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Logistics) (N4) and the Naval Facilities Engineering Command should continue to assess biological and chemical threats to their logistics chain and take action to defend essential support as well as to mitigate the consequences in case of an attack.



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