However, the committee does offer observations on activities in the context of the near, mid-, and far term based on the technical or development difficulties associated with a particular area.
The Non-Medical Science and Technology part of the Joint CBD Program is organized in five “commodity” areas: contamination avoidance, individual protection, collective protection, decontamination, and modeling and simulation.1 The wide range of activities in each of these commodity areas is indicated in Figure 4.1; the commodity areas are further described later in this chapter and in Appendix C.
The committee attempted to gain as complete a view as possible in order to understand how well the activities of the Non-Medical Science and Technology Program are meeting the needs of the Navy—and how well the Navy is engaging the Joint CBD Program to ensure that its interests are being addressed. In the committee’s opinion, most of the issues identified in addressing these broad questions arise from a shift in the threat landscape—from an at-sea military adversary of Cold War scenarios to an adversary willing to use asymmetric techniques aimed at both military and civilian targets. It is also the committee’s belief that the Joint CBD Program and most of the Navy have not adjusted to that shift. The most important observations and recommendations relevant to nonmedical science and technology (S&T) and the implications for acquiring improved capabilities are summarized below and elaborated in the following sections.
Non-Medical Science and Technology Program. Two aspects of the Joint CBD Program appear not to serve naval needs well and can be ameliorated with appropriate attention by the Navy:
The Non-Medical Science and Technology Program has been and remains dominated by a philosophy of “contamination avoidance,” a laudable goal indeed, but one that the committee believes is unrealistic as the driving force, considering the broad range of possible asymmetric attacks (as discussed in Chapters 1 and 3). Such a philosophy requires detection to facilitate avoidance and the identification of a threat agent as early as possible, which in turn drives investments heavily toward sensor systems for both standoff and point detection to provide rapid early warning. The committee recommends that the Navy champion a fundamental change in philosophy in the Joint CBD Program—one that moves toward a risk management approach which assumes that contamination will happen and focuses on managing the response. Such a shift should result in a
Joint Science and Technology Panel for Chemical and Biological Defense. 2002. DOD Chemical and Biological Defense Program, Non-Medical Science and Technology Program, draft version 2002.01.05, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Biological and Chemical Defense Programs, Washington, D.C.