Naval Forces’ Defense Capabilities Against Chemical and Biological Warfare Threats

Committee for an Assessment of Naval Forces’ Defense Capabilities Against Chemical and Biological Warfare Threats

Naval Studies Board

Division on Engineering and Physical Sciences

NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES

THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES PRESS
Washington, D.C. www.nap.edu



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Naval Forces’ Defense Capabilities Against Chemical and Biological Warfare Threats Naval Forces’ Defense Capabilities Against Chemical and Biological Warfare Threats Committee for an Assessment of Naval Forces’ Defense Capabilities Against Chemical and Biological Warfare Threats Naval Studies Board Division on Engineering and Physical Sciences NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES PRESS Washington, D.C. www.nap.edu

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Naval Forces’ Defense Capabilities Against Chemical and Biological Warfare Threats THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES PRESS 500 Fifth Street, N.W. Washington, DC 20001 NOTICE: The project that is the subject of this report was approved by the Governing Board of the National Research Council, whose members are drawn from the councils of the National Academy of Sciences, the National Academy of Engineering, and the Institute of Medicine. The members of the committee responsible for the report were chosen for their special competences and with regard for appropriate balance. This study was supported by Contract No. N00014-00-G-0230, DO #9, between the National Academy of Sciences and the Department of the Navy. Any opinions, findings, conclusions, or recommendations expressed in this publication are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the organizations or agencies that provided support for the project. International Standard Book Number 0-309-08872-0 (Book) International Standard Book Number 0-309-50860-6 (PDF) Copies available from: Naval Studies Board The Keck Center of the National Academies 500 Fifth Street, N.W., Room WS904 Washington, DC 20001 Additional copies of this report are available from the National Academies Press, 500 Fifth Street, N.W., Lockbox 285, Washington, DC 20055; (800) 624-6242 or (202) 334-3313 (in the Washington metropolitan area); Internet, http://www.nap.edu. Cover photo courtesy of the U.S. Navy. Copyright 2004 by the National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America

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Naval Forces’ Defense Capabilities Against Chemical and Biological Warfare Threats THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES Advisers to the Nation on Science, Engineering, and Medicine The National Academy of Sciences is a private, nonprofit, self-perpetuating society of distinguished scholars engaged in scientific and engineering research, dedicated to the furtherance of science and technology and to their use for the general welfare. Upon the authority of the charter granted to it by the Congress in 1863, the Academy has a mandate that requires it to advise the federal government on scientific and technical matters. Dr. Bruce M. Alberts is president of the National Academy of Sciences. The National Academy of Engineering was established in 1964, under the charter of the National Academy of Sciences, as a parallel organization of outstanding engineers. It is autonomous in its administration and in the selection of its members, sharing with the National Academy of Sciences the responsibility for advising the federal government. The National Academy of Engineering also sponsors engineering programs aimed at meeting national needs, encourages education and research, and recognizes the superior achievements of engineers. Dr. Wm. A. Wulf is president of the National Academy of Engineering. The Institute of Medicine was established in 1970 by the National Academy of Sciences to secure the services of eminent members of appropriate professions in the examination of policy matters pertaining to the health of the public. The Institute acts under the responsibility given to the National Academy of Sciences by its congressional charter to be an adviser to the federal government and, upon its own initiative, to identify issues of medical care, research, and education. Dr. Harvey V. Fineberg is president of the Institute of Medicine. The National Research Council was organized by the National Academy of Sciences in 1916 to associate the broad community of science and technology with the Academy’s purposes of furthering knowledge and advising the federal government. Functioning in accordance with general policies determined by the Academy, the Council has become the principal operating agency of both the National Academy of Sciences and the National Academy of Engineering in providing services to the government, the public, and the scientific and engineering communities. The Council is administered jointly by both Academies and the Institute of Medicine. Dr. Bruce M. Alberts and Dr. Wm. A. Wulf are chair and vice chair, respectively, of the National Research Council. www.national-academies.org

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Naval Forces’ Defense Capabilities Against Chemical and Biological Warfare Threats COMMITTEE FOR AN ASSESSMENT OF NAVAL FORCES’ DEFENSE CAPABILITIES AGAINST CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE THREATS MIRIAM E. JOHN, Sandia National Laboratories, Chair ROBERT S. CARNES, Biosciences International, Inc. JOHN D. CHRISTIE, Logistics Management Institute ROBERT P. CURRIER, Los Alamos National Laboratory RUTH A. DAVID, Analytic Services, Inc. JOSEPH P. FITCH, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory FRANK A. HORRIGAN, Bedford, Massachusetts HARRY W. JENKINS, JR., ITT Industries MICHAEL T. KLEINMAN, University of California at Irvine JOHN B. LaPLANTE, Alexandria, Virginia JOSHUA LEDERBERG, Rockefeller University DAVID W. McCALL,1 Far Hills, New Jersey JAMES W. MEYER, Fairport, New York WILLIAM C. MILLER, U.S. Naval Academy DAVID H. MOORE, Battelle Memorial Institute JOHN H. MOXLEY III, Korn/Ferry International BRADLEY H. ROBERTS, Institute for Defense Analyses CHARLES H. SINEX, Applied Physics Laboratory, Johns Hopkins University JOSEPH J. VERVIER, ENSCO, Inc. RICHARD L. WADE, Risk Management Sciences MICHAEL A. WARTELL, Indiana University-Purdue GEORGE M. WHITESIDES, Harvard University Staff RONALD D. TAYLOR, Director (on leave as of July 12, 2003) CHARLES F. DRAPER, Study Director, Acting Director (as of July 12, 2003) MARY G. GORDON, Information Officer SUSAN G. CAMPBELL, Administrative Assistant IAN M. CAMERON, Project Assistant (as of March 25, 2002) KERRY A.M. WILLIAMS, Research Assistant (through March 8, 2002) SIDNEY G. REED, JR., Consultant JAMES G. WILSON, Consultant 1   Deceased.

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Naval Forces’ Defense Capabilities Against Chemical and Biological Warfare Threats NAVAL STUDIES BOARD VINCENT VITTO, Charles S. Draper Laboratory, Inc., Chair JOSEPH B. REAGAN, Saratoga, California, Vice Chair ARTHUR B. BAGGEROER, Massachusetts Institute of Technology JOHN D. CHRISTIE, Logistics Management Institute RUTH A. DAVID, Analytic Services, Inc. JOHN F. EGAN, Nashua, New Hampshire ANTONIO L. ELIAS, Orbital Sciences Corporation BRIG “CHIP” ELLIOTT, BBN Technologies FRANK A. HORRIGAN, Bedford, Massachusetts JOHN W. HUTCHINSON, Harvard University RICHARD J. IVANETICH, Institute for Defense Analyses HARRY W. JENKINS, JR., ITT Industries MIRIAM E. JOHN, Sandia National Laboratories DAVID V. KALBAUGH, Applied Physics Laboratory, Johns Hopkins University ANNETTE J. KRYGIEL, Great Falls, Virginia L. DAVID MONTAGUE, Menlo Park, California WILLIAM B. MORGAN, Rockville, Maryland JOHN H. MOXLEY III, Korn/Ferry International ROBERT B. OAKLEY, National Defense University NILS R. SANDELL, JR., ALPHATECH, Inc. WILLIAM D. SMITH, Fayetteville, Pennsylvania RICHARD L. WADE, Risk Management Sciences DAVID A. WHELAN, Boeing Company CINDY WILLIAMS, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Navy Liaison Representatives RADM LEWIS W. CRENSHAW, JR., USN, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, N81 (through June 6, 2003) RADM JOSEPH A. SESTAK, JR., USN, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, N81 (as of July 15, 2003) RADM JAY M. COHEN, USN, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, N91 Marine Corps Liaison Representative LTGEN EDWARD HANLON, JR., USMC, Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command

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Naval Forces’ Defense Capabilities Against Chemical and Biological Warfare Threats Staff RONALD D. TAYLOR, Director (on leave as of July 12, 2003) CHARLES F. DRAPER, Acting Director (as of July 12, 2003) ARUL MOZHI, Senior Program Officer (as of May 15, 2004) MICHAEL L. WILSON, Program Officer (as of September 3, 2002) MARY G. GORDON, Information Officer SUSAN G. CAMPBELL, Administrative Assistant IAN M. CAMERON, Project Assistant (as of March 25, 2002)

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Naval Forces’ Defense Capabilities Against Chemical and Biological Warfare Threats Preface In support of the national security strategy, U.S. naval forces remain deployed throughout the world, engaged in or ready to support operations ranging from peacekeeping and peace enforcement, to crisis intervention, to combat. To conduct these operations successfully, the naval forces must be prepared to respond to a broad array of threats. In recent years, preparations to meet chemical and biological warfare threats have taken on increased importance. The number of countries capable of producing and delivering a wide range of chemical and biological weapons is increasing. The proliferation of associated technologies (such as delivery vehicles and weapons, navigation systems, and chemical and biological agents) and their availability to potential adversarial nation-states and transnational groups challenge U.S. peacekeeping, intelligence, and warfighting capabilities. In response to this changing situation and reflecting its dissatisfaction over the individual Services’ fielding of chemical or biological defensive materiel, the U.S. Congress included in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994 (Public Law No. 103-160) a mandated consolidation of the Department of Defense (DOD) chemical and biological defense programs and associated procurement funds. On the basis of DOD history in this area, the Secretary of the Army was designated executive agent for joint Service research, development, testing, evaluation, and acquisition for medical and non-medical chemical and biological defense. Recent studies1 of the DOD’s chemical and biological 1   See, for example, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. 2001. Report of the Defense Science Board/Threat Reduction Advisory Committee Task Force on Biological Defense, Washington, D.C., June.

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Naval Forces’ Defense Capabilities Against Chemical and Biological Warfare Threats defense research and development (R&D) efforts have recommended improvements in the process; for example, the connection between R&D goals and military requirements needs to be strengthened. The department is responding to these recommendations by reassigning responsibilities within the DOD Joint Chemical and Biological Defense (CBD) Program and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). In the context of the Joint CBD Program, one of the issues affecting the Department of the Navy is the extent to which the capabilities receiving priority and being developed meet naval-specific needs. For example, naval forces must quickly sense and analyze the presence of chemical and biological agents, withstand or avoid exposure to such agents (through effective protection or countermeasures), deal with contamination, and sustain operations in a broad—and largely unique—set of maritime environments. Forward-deployed, distributed naval forces will continue to provide adversaries with highly visible targets, particularly in port and in the littorals of forward operational areas, and must be equipped with effective chemical and biological defensive capabilities for both warfighting and support personnel. The focus of the Joint CBD Program and of this report, as requested by the Chief of Naval Operations, is on passive defense. The Committee for an Assessment of Naval Forces’ Defense Capabilities Against Chemical and Biological Warfare Threats recognizes, however, that a robust approach must include active measures as well, in order for the Department of the Navy to achieve a fully integrated capability for addressing the threat posed by chemical or biological weapons.2 Passive defense includes capabilities for contamination avoidance (detection, warning, and agent identification); force protection (individual protection, collective protection, and medical support); and decontamination. The Joint CBD Program considers its current R&D to be predominantly low risk and aimed at improvements to existing systems or technologies or at technologies developed in other communities—the intelligence community, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), the Department of Energy, or the private sector. DARPA has invested significant funds in biodefense, focused on higher-risk, potentially high-payoff technologies, most notably in multiagent medical therapeutics and countermeasures and in miniature mass spectrometry. 2   DOD’s Counterproliferation Program, which includes passive defense as one of its elements, is also developing capabilities for active defense and counterforce to detect, identify, destroy, and neutralize chemical and biological warheads or production and storage facilities while minimizing collateral damage. DOD’s Missile Defense Program includes capabilities to intercept missiles armed with chemical or biological warheads. The Navy’s ships on station for theater missile defense will not only have to intercept the missiles, but will also have to predict incoming threats and give adequate warning.

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Naval Forces’ Defense Capabilities Against Chemical and Biological Warfare Threats TERMS OF REFERENCE At the request of the Chief of Naval Operations, the Naval Studies Board of the National Research Council has conducted an assessment of naval forces’ defense capabilities against chemical and biological warfare threats. At issue for the Department of the Navy are these questions—to what extent are capabilities being developed that will enable the naval forces to quickly sense and analyze the presence of chemical and biological agents, withstand or avoid exposure to such agents (through effective protection or countermeasures), and deal with contamination under a broad spectrum of operational conditions; and over what time frame will these capabilities be realized? The tasks of this assessment were as follows: Evaluate present and projected chemical and biological warfare threats to naval force operations in littoral regions and deep-ocean regions of the world. Explicit consideration should be given to potential adversaries’ capabilities to deliver chemical and biological weapons in littoral settings. Examine the current state of technologies, tactics, and procedures involved in chemical and biological defense, accounting for the efforts of the other Services, the OSD, and other government agencies. Project (out to the year 2015) the future state of the technologies involved. Evaluate current and projected R&D programs aimed at providing naval forces with new and improved capabilities. Recommend R&D priorities, accounting for the potential operational interactions among naval and other Service elements of the joint forces. Evaluate existing and planned testing and evaluation procedures (in conjunction with training procedures) for ensuring operationally effective capabilities. The issues listed above should be addressed over three specific time frames—near term (to 2005), mid-term (to 2010), and far term (to 2015). SPECIAL TASKING FROM THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS In a letter to the president of the National Academy of Sciences on June 28, 2001, after the terms of reference for the study had been agreed upon (and notably, before September 11), the Chief of Naval Operations added special directions for the committee: I am especially pleased that the Board is now about to initiate a study of naval force defense capabilities against chemical and biological warfare threats. Recent world events demonstrate that forward-deployed naval forces are constantly at risk even in today’s relatively peaceful world. I look forward to supporting this study and receiving the conclusions on issues with direct operational implications such as developing concepts of naval operations to deal with emerging terrorist threats. [Emphasis added.]

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Naval Forces’ Defense Capabilities Against Chemical and Biological Warfare Threats These special directions added to the original terms of reference broadened the scope of the study to include not just deep-ocean and littoral operations but also any credible part of naval operations at risk for terrorist attacks. Although this study was initiated after September 11, 2001, it should be noted that the committee did not expand its charter to consider the roles for the Navy in homeland defense, with the exception of the ties of its continental United States (CONUS) force protection mission requirements in relation to U.S. naval bases’ neighboring civilian communities. Finally, as the committee was completing its work, there was a rapidly changing picture of activity by the U.S. government relating to chemical and biological defense—notably, the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security; the major involvement of the National Institutes of Health in vaccine development, drug discovery and development, pathogenesis, and some diagnostics; and the deployment of military forces in preparation for what was then considered a possible war in the Middle East. Throughout this period of change, the committee attempted to keep abreast of information relevant to the topic of this study. While its recommendations were formulated on the basis of impressions gained before these developments, the committee believes that these recommendations continue to be applicable to the chemical and biological defense problem at the time this report is issued. Any activity by the Department of the Navy in response to the report’s recommendations, however, should follow closely and leverage these new developments as much as possible. COMMITTEE MEETINGS The Committee for an Assessment of Naval Forces’ Defense Capabilities Against Chemical and Biological Warfare Threats first convened in September 2001 and held further meetings and site visits over a period of 6 months: September 18-19, 2001, in Washington, D.C. (plenary session). Organizational meeting. Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Chemical and Biological Defense: briefing on Department of Defense Joint CBD Program; Office of the Chief of Naval Operations: briefing on current Navy chemical and biological counterproliferation efforts; Office of Naval Intelligence: briefing on chemical and biological defense threats; Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency: briefing on the Unconventional Pathogen Countermeasures Program and defense capabilities against chemical and biological warfare threats; and Office of Naval Research: briefing on chemical and biological defense science and technology. October 16-17, 2001, in Washington, D.C. (plenary session). Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Expeditionary Forces Programs: briefing on naval forces’ defense capabilities in a chemical and biological warfare environment; Marine Corps Systems Command (MARCORSYSCOM): briefing on the

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Naval Forces’ Defense Capabilities Against Chemical and Biological Warfare Threats MARCORSYSCOM perspective on chemical and biological defense; Office of the Chief of Naval Operations: briefing on current Navy chemical and biological counterproliferation efforts; Marine Corps Combat Development Command: briefing on the Fourth Marine Expeditionary Brigade (Anti-Terrorism); Naval Sea Systems Command: briefing on the Navy and the Joint CBD Program; Joint Service Materiel Group: briefing on coordinating and integrating Department of the Navy research, development, acquisition, and logistics; Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps (HQMC) Security and Law Enforcement Branch: briefing on HQMC perspective on chemical and biological defense; U.S. Army Medical Research and Materiel Command: briefing on medical science and technology commodity areas; U.S. Army Soldier Biological Chemical Command: briefing on non-medical science and technology business areas; and U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Chemical Defense and U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases: briefing on medical defense against chemical warfare threats. November 14-16, 2001, in Norfolk, Virginia (plenary session). Site visit to Naval Amphibious Base, Little Creek, Virginia, U.S. Navy Atlantic Fleet Command, Headquarters, Marine Forces Atlantic, and U.S. Joint Forces Command to discuss operational readiness issues—fleet, bases, ports, Marine Corps warfighting—and joint doctrine training, tactics, and procedure development. December 18-19, 2001, in Washington, D.C. (plenary session). Chemical and Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF): briefing on CBIRF organization and capabilities; U.S. Air Force Directorate of Nuclear and Counterproliferation: briefing on the Air Force perspective on chemical and biological defense; Office of the Chief of Naval Operations: briefings on the status of the Joint CBD Program and maritime roles for homeland security; Center for Naval Analyses Corporation (CNAC): briefings on the following CNAC reports: Navy Implications of NBC Proliferation: Final Report (1999); Shipboard Biological Hoax (2001); Biological Attack on a Pier (2001); Shipboard Biological Contamination Scenarios (2000); The NBC Warfight: Concepts from the COMUSNAVCENT Experience (2001); MC00/FBE-H Biological Warfare Limited Objective Experiment (2001); Preparing a Forward Fixed Site for Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Defense: The COMUSNAVCENT Experience (2000); Operation Desert Thunder Quicklook: Chemical and Biological Defense (1998); Operation Desert Fox: CBR Defense (1999); and Navy Role in Homeland Defense Against Asymmetric Threats (2001). Office of the Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Chemical and Biological Defense: briefing on DOD counterproliferation efforts; Marine Corps Combat Development Command: briefing on U.S. Marine Corps land mine war-

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Naval Forces’ Defense Capabilities Against Chemical and Biological Warfare Threats fare requirements; Naval Sea Systems Command: briefing on Navy sea mines; and Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency: briefing on mine warfare technology efforts. January 14-15, 2002, in Washington, D.C. (Medical Science and Technology Panel and Operating Forces/Shore Establishment Panel). Joint Program Office for Biological Defense (JPO-BD): briefings on JPO Navy Medical Coordination and Medical Requirements Program; Joint Vaccine Acquisition Program Project Management Office: briefing on technologies for current, next-generation, and future vaccines for biodefense; Office of the Chief of Naval Operations: briefings on Navy medical chemical and biological defense coordination and programs and shore installation preparedness; Navy Medical Research Center (NMRC): briefing on NMRC overview and diagnostics; U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases: briefing on Aero-medical Isolation Team and Containment Care; Pennsylvania National Guard: briefing on Third Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Team; and Institute for Defense Analyses: briefing on restoration of operations. January 16, 2002, in Washington, D.C. (plenary session). Office of Naval Research and Naval Research Laboratory: briefing on the Department of the Navy’s science and technology regarding chemical and biological defense; Operational Test and Evaluation Force and Office of the Chief of Naval Operations: briefings on Navy chemical and biological defense technology assessment, testing, and evaluation; and Navy Warfare Development Command (NWDC): briefing on NWDC activities related to chemical and biological defense. January 17-18, 2002, in Aberdeen, Maryland (Non-Medical Science and Technology Panel). Small-group site visit to Edgewood Chemical and Biological Command for briefings on detection and identification devices, dispersion models, and decontamination. February 18-22, 2002, in Irvine, California (plenary session). Committee deliberations and report drafting. The months between the last committee meeting and publication of this report were spent preparing the draft manuscript, gathering additional information, reviewing and responding to external review comments, editing the report, and conducting the required security review to produce a public report. ORGANIZATION OF THE REPORT The committee’s first priority was to answer the request of the Chief of Naval Operations to address the operational implications for naval forces of dealing with chemical and biological threats. After an executive summary, the first three chapters of the report focus on these issues. Historical background, discussion of the nature and size of the threat, and arguments for and against how seriously it should

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Naval Forces’ Defense Capabilities Against Chemical and Biological Warfare Threats be taken are offered in Chapter 1. The committee’s assessment of the operational chemical warfare and biological warfare defense posture of naval forces is given in Chapter 2, along with general recommendations for improvement. Chapter 3 provides more specific recommendations for improving operations. The next two chapters present specific findings and recommendations related to the equipment, materiel, and skills required for effective chemical or biological defense. Chapter 4 deals with non-medical science and technology and Chapter 5 with medical chemical and biological countermeasures. Both near- and longer-term research and development efforts are addressed. Because the report contains multiple levels of findings and recommendations, Chapters 2 through 5 begin with an introduction to their major points, followed by separate sections that elaborate on each point, presenting findings and recommendations. In addition, the findings and recommendations of each of these chapters are collected in abbreviated form in a box at the end of the respective chapters. Chapter 6 closes the report emphasizing the essential role of leadership to sustain an improved posture—the threat is unlikely to stagnate, so neither can the approaches for dealing with it. Appendixes B and C offer greater detail on chemical and biological warfare agents and the technologies for dealing with them. Biographies of the committee and staff are also presented (Appendix A), and a list of acronyms is provided (Appendix D). A supplement to this report contains information that the U.S. government and the National Academies have determined is not releasable to the public. Requests for the supplement shall be made to the Office of Naval Research (ONR).

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Naval Forces’ Defense Capabilities Against Chemical and Biological Warfare Threats Acknowledgment of Reviewers This report has been reviewed in draft form by individuals chosen for their diverse perspectives and technical expertise, in accordance with procedures approved by the National Research Council’s Report Review Committee. The purpose of this independent review is to provide candid and critical comments that will assist the institution in making its published report as sound as possible and to ensure that the report meets institutional standards for objectivity, evidence, and responsiveness to the study charge. The review comments and draft manuscript remain confidential to protect the integrity of the deliberative process. We wish to thank the following individuals for their review of this report: Alexander H. Flax, Potomac, Maryland, David R. Franz, Southern Research Institute, Kenneth H. Keller, University of Minnesota, Bruce B. Knutson, Tucson, Arizona, Richard A. Nelson, Silverdale, Washington, William S. Rees, Jr., Georgia Institute of Technology, Harrison Shull,1 Monterey, California, and Robert H. Wertheim, Science Applications International Corporation. Although the reviewers listed above provided many constructive comments and suggestions, they were not asked to endorse the conclusions and recommen- 1   Deceased.

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Naval Forces’ Defense Capabilities Against Chemical and Biological Warfare Threats dations, nor did they see the final draft of the report before its release. The review of this report was overseen by Robert A. Frosch, Senior Research Fellow, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. Appointed by the National Research Council, he was responsible for making certain that an independent examination of this report was carried out in accordance with institutional procedures and that all review comments were carefully considered. Responsibility for the final content of this report rests entirely with the authoring committee and the institution.

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Naval Forces’ Defense Capabilities Against Chemical and Biological Warfare Threats Contents     PROLOGUE   1     EXECUTIVE SUMMARY   4 1   THE CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL THREAT TO NAVAL FORCES   15      Framing the Problem   15      Steps Toward Implementing a Solution   22 2   GENERAL FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS   30      Introduction   30      Naval Leadership for a Force Better Prepared   31      Getting Started   39      Summary   43 3   OPERATIONS: SPECIFIC FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS   45      Introduction   45      Operational Requirements   46      Doctrine   50      Readiness   57      Summary   64

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Naval Forces’ Defense Capabilities Against Chemical and Biological Warfare Threats 4   NON-MEDICAL SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY: SPECIFIC FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS   67      Introduction   67      The Non-Medical Science and Technology Program   71      Navy Involvement   75      Non-Medical Testing and Evaluation   77      Assessments of the Five Commodity Areas   79      Command, Control, and Communications: Findings, Assessments, and Analysis   99      Summary of Non-Medical S&T Findings and Recommendations in the Five Commodity Areas   100 5   MEDICAL CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL COUNTERMEASURES: SPECIFIC FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS   105      Introduction   105      Medical Training for Casualty Management   107      Technical and Operational Shortfalls: Drugs and Vaccines   112      Technical and Operational Shortfalls: Medical Diagnostics   120      Disease Reporting and Analysis   127      A Final Word on Training   131      Summary   132 6   THE LONGER TERM—LEADERSHIP TO SUSTAIN THE COMMITMENT   134     APPENDIXES         A  Committee and Staff Biographies   139     B  Chemical and Biological Agents and Their Effects   149     C  Additional Information on the Five Commodity Areas   161     D  Acronyms and Abbreviations   189

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Naval Forces’ Defense Capabilities Against Chemical and Biological Warfare Threats In Memoriam David W. McCall December 1, 1928–June 5, 2002 The committee members wish to honor the contributions of their colleague Dave McCall, who—in spite of his terminal illness—dedicated his exceptional talents to helping create this report.

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