1
Introduction

This report reflects the deliberations of the second of the three study committees to be convened in response to a request from the Department of the Army to assist it in better preparing for its emerging responsibilities in the realm of homeland security and homeland defense.1 The first report, Science and Technology for Army Homeland Security, was a broad survey of many different types of relevant technologies with possible application for both the Army’s Future Force2 and emergency responders (NRC, 2003).

1  

The terms “homeland security” and “homeland defense” are frequently used interchangeably, but for the Army the terms have precise meanings. At the time these reports were requested of the National Research Council, the term of choice was “homeland defense”; hence the name of the committee. However, the Army now uses the more inclusive term “homeland security.” This new terminology is reflected in the title of this report and throughout these chapters. The following definitions were provided by Gregory J. Bozek, Army War Plans Division, Army Deputy Chief of Staff, G3, in a briefing to the Committee on Army Science and Technology for Homeland Defense, Warrenton, Va., May 15, 2002:

  • Homeland security: The preparation for, prevention of, deterrence of, preemption of, defense against, and response to threats and aggressions directed towards U.S. territory, sovereignty, domestic population, and infrastructure; as well as crisis management, consequence management, and other domestic civil support.

  • Homeland defense: The protection of U.S. territory, sovereignty, domestic population, and critical infrastructure against external threats and aggression.

  • Civil support: Department of Defense support to U.S. civil authorities for domestic emergencies and for designated law enforcement and other activities.

2  

“Future Force” is the current term for the Army of the future; it was previously called the Objective Force. The Future Combat System (FCS) is envisioned as being one of several yet-to-be-determined systems that will be part of the Future Force.



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Army Science and Technology for Homeland Security: Report 2 - C4ISR 1 Introduction This report reflects the deliberations of the second of the three study committees to be convened in response to a request from the Department of the Army to assist it in better preparing for its emerging responsibilities in the realm of homeland security and homeland defense.1 The first report, Science and Technology for Army Homeland Security, was a broad survey of many different types of relevant technologies with possible application for both the Army’s Future Force2 and emergency responders (NRC, 2003). 1   The terms “homeland security” and “homeland defense” are frequently used interchangeably, but for the Army the terms have precise meanings. At the time these reports were requested of the National Research Council, the term of choice was “homeland defense”; hence the name of the committee. However, the Army now uses the more inclusive term “homeland security.” This new terminology is reflected in the title of this report and throughout these chapters. The following definitions were provided by Gregory J. Bozek, Army War Plans Division, Army Deputy Chief of Staff, G3, in a briefing to the Committee on Army Science and Technology for Homeland Defense, Warrenton, Va., May 15, 2002: Homeland security: The preparation for, prevention of, deterrence of, preemption of, defense against, and response to threats and aggressions directed towards U.S. territory, sovereignty, domestic population, and infrastructure; as well as crisis management, consequence management, and other domestic civil support. Homeland defense: The protection of U.S. territory, sovereignty, domestic population, and critical infrastructure against external threats and aggression. Civil support: Department of Defense support to U.S. civil authorities for domestic emergencies and for designated law enforcement and other activities. 2   “Future Force” is the current term for the Army of the future; it was previously called the Objective Force. The Future Combat System (FCS) is envisioned as being one of several yet-to-be-determined systems that will be part of the Future Force.

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Army Science and Technology for Homeland Security: Report 2 - C4ISR This second report builds on the previous effort and focuses specifically on capabilities in command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) being developed for the Future Force. The report compares and contrasts these capabilities with the C4ISR capabilities needed by civilian emergency responders for a catastrophic event. For this study the committee evaluated those capabilities common to both the Future Force and the emergency responder community and identified some of the most likely enabling technologies for the latter. The committee acknowledges that this evaluation was accomplished at a fairly high level of abstraction. It is possible that different conclusions might be drawn should a highly detailed examination be conducted. The report suggests areas in which the Army could develop collaborative efforts with the emergency responder community through the federal Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in order to accomplish the transfer of the most promising Army technologies to that community. This chapter provides a context for the rest of the report by describing the government’s organization for homeland security, beginning with the DHS, followed by the elements of the Department of Defense (DOD) that will play a role in homeland security, and lastly, the community of civilian emergency responders. A short section compares the ways in which the DOD and local emergency responders acquire their equipment. The chapter closes with a description of a series of potential scenarios illustrating how complexities will mount as additional events requiring emergency response take place. BACKGROUND The tragic events of September 11, 2001, have been called a defining moment in our history. Clearly, what happened that day dramatically changed this country and how we as citizens live our daily lives. The words of Abraham Lincoln describing another critical period in U.S. history come to mind: “The occasion is piled high with great difficulty and we must rise with the occasion. As our case is new, so must we think anew and act anew” (President Lincoln’s Second Annual Message to Congress, December 1, 1862). President George Bush declared war on global terrorism with a goal of eradicating it from the face of the Earth. In declaring that objective, the president launched the nation on a two-front campaign—overseas and at home. The overseas effort is spearheaded by the DOD, but it involves all elements of national power—military, economic, diplomatic, and moral. The structure to prosecute this campaign is in place. Much planning and training has gone into developing a world-class military force, and the paradigm for conducting the overseas “homeland defense” phase of this war is well understood. However, at home the situation is much different. The last serious external military threat to the continental United States was in 1812. As this report is being written, despite the establishment of the DHS, no coherent planning para-

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Army Science and Technology for Homeland Security: Report 2 - C4ISR BOX 1-1 Some U.S. Agencies and Organizations Involved in Emergency Response Government Agencies Federal Department of Homeland Security (new) Directorate of Emergency Preparedness and Response U.S. Coast Guard Department of Defense Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense (new) U.S. Northern Command (new) Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force State State Offices of Emergency Preparedness State Police National Guard Local (counties, cities, municipalities) Fire Departments Local Police Emergency Medical Services Public Health Departments Nongovernmental Organizations, Private Sector American Red Cross Utilities Churches Private Ambulance Services digm for homeland security yet exists, and although a national operational concept for emergency response is being developed,3 no approved comprehensive framework exists to pull together the efforts of federal, state, and local responders. While much has been done in homeland security, there is still more to accomplish. The foundation of a national operational framework for emergency response involves partnership—among federal, state, and local levels of government; between the private and public sectors and between civilian emergency responders and the military. This partnership involves some agencies established as a direct result of the events of September 11 and others with long experience in responding to natural and man-made disasters. Some of these emergency response agencies and organizations are listed in Box 1-1. 3   See the discussion on the National Response Plan in the following section.

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Army Science and Technology for Homeland Security: Report 2 - C4ISR ORGANIZING FOR HOMELAND SECURITY To enhance understanding of the technologies described in subsequent chapters, the committee describes in the next three subsections how the nation is organized for homeland security and looks briefly at the structure of the U.S. Army and the emergency responder community with which it will be working in the event of a disaster. Department of Homeland Security Responsibility for homeland security has now been assigned to the Department of Homeland Security, which was established by the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Public Law [P.L.] 107-296) and Executive Order 13284 of January 24, 2003. Figure 1-1 provides the department’s organizational chart (as of March 2003). The public law establishing the DHS describes the department’s mission as follows: (1) IN GENERAL.—The primary mission of the Department is to— (A) prevent terrorist attacks within the United States; (B) reduce the vulnerability of the United States to terrorism; (C) minimize the damage, and assist in the recovery, from terrorist attacks that do occur within the United States; (D) carry out all functions of entities transferred to the Department, including by acting as a focal point regarding natural and manmade crises and emergency planning; (E) ensure that the functions of the agencies and subdivisions within the Department that are not related directly to securing the homeland are not diminished or neglected except by a specific explicit Act of Congress; (F) ensure that the overall economic security of the United States is not diminished by efforts, activities, and programs aimed at securing the homeland; and (G) monitor connections between illegal drug trafficking and terrorism, coordinate efforts to sever such connections, and otherwise contribute to efforts to interdict illegal drug trafficking. (P.L. 107-296, Sec. 101) The DHS performs this mission by, among other things, Securing our borders, transportation sector, ports, and critical infrastructure; Synthesizing and analyzing homeland security intelligence from multiple sources; Coordinating communications with state and local governments, private industry, and the American people about threats and preparedness; Coordinating government efforts to protect the American people against bioterrorism and other attacks with weapons of mass destruction; Helping to train and equip emergency responders; and

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Army Science and Technology for Homeland Security: Report 2 - C4ISR FIGURE 1-1 Organizational chart of the Department of Homeland Security as of March 1, 2003. Managing federal emergency response activities. Within the DHS, the Directorate of Emergency Preparedness and Response (EPR) is of critical importance to the emergency responder community. The newly organized EPR incorporates significant federal emergency responder elements, such as the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and response teams from the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS)4 and emergency response teams from the Department of Energy. These latter elements were placed under EPR/FEMA specifically to respond more efficiently to the threat scenarios postulated by the DHS in the post-September 11 environment. Initial National Response Plan Under the Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 (HSPD-5, February 28, 2003), the DHS is to prepare the National Response Plan (NRP) to replace the existing Federal Response Plan (see NRC, 2003, p. 157). The NRP is intended to provide an all-discipline, all-hazards approach to domestic incident management and to help federal, state, and local governments work together. The initial NRP was circulated in September 2003. The Secretary of DHS indicated that this initial document implements, on an interim basis, the domestic incident manage- 4   Most notably, those of the National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) and the Pharmaceutical Stockpile.

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Army Science and Technology for Homeland Security: Report 2 - C4ISR ment authorities, roles, and responsibilities of his office, as defined by HSPD-5, until the full NRP becomes effective.5 National Incident Management System HSPD-5 also required the development of a National Incident Management System (NIMS) as part of the NRP. The NIMS will provide an operational framework for implementing the NRP. A draft NIMS was produced in September 2003. A second draft was published March 1, 2004. Compliance with certain aspects of the NIMS is now possible, while other aspects of the NIMS will require further development and refinement.6 Department of Defense The Department of Defense has a long history of providing military support to civil authorities. However, since the terrorist attacks against the United States, new emphasis is being placed on this mission. This focus has resulted in the establishment of new offices and commands. However, many homeland security issues remain unresolved for the DOD; currently the department is focusing on the following matters: The evolution of a national vision of military support to civilian authorities, The role of the National Guard in homeland security, The role of the Coast Guard in homeland security, The role of the national laboratories in homeland security, and DOD direct support to the DHS. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (P.L. 107-314, Sec. 902(a)) established the position of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense with the following mission: “Overall supervision of the homeland security activities of the Department of Defense.” This mission includes the following tasks: 5   Memorandum from Tom Ridge, Secretary of Homeland Security, to Cabinet Secretaries; Agency Directors; Members of Congress; Governors; Mayors; County, Township and Parish Officials; State Homeland Security Advisors; Homeland Security Advisory Council; and State, Territorial, Local and Tribal First Responders; Subject: Initial Response Plan, September 20, 2003. 6   Memorandum from Tom Ridge, Secretary of Homeland Security, to Cabinet Secretaries; Agency Directors; Members of Congress; Governors; Mayors; County, Township and Parish Officials; State Homeland Security Advisors; Homeland Security Advisory Council; and State, Territorial, Local and Tribal First Responders; Subject: National Incident Management System, March 1, 2004.

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Army Science and Technology for Homeland Security: Report 2 - C4ISR Overall supervision of the homeland defense activities of the Department of Defense Develop strategic planning guidance for DOD’s role in homeland security Develop homeland defense force employment policy and guidance Supervise DOD preparedness activities to support civil authorities in domestic emergencies Assist civil authorities in building and improving federal, state, and local homeland security response capabilities Plan, train, and perform DOD domestic incident management Advocate homeland defense requirements within the Department’s resource allocation process. (Cohen, 2003, p. 9) Figure 1-2 provides the organizational chart for the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense. An important new responsibility for the assistant secretary is found in the current draft of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (P.L. 107-314), in which his office is made responsible for overseeing the future technology transfer from the DOD to the DHS. This new responsibility will create a critical channel for the assistance recommended in this report. FIGURE 1-2 Organizational chart for the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense (ASD [HD]). SOURCE: From Homeland Defense, briefing to the committee by Peter F. Verga, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Homeland Defense) (PDASD [HD]), July 17, 2003.

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Army Science and Technology for Homeland Security: Report 2 - C4ISR U.S. Northern Command The DOD established the U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) effective October 1, 2002. NORTHCOM’s mission is homeland security and civil support, specifically: Conduct operations to deter, prevent, and defeat threats and aggression aimed at the United States, its territories, and interests within the assigned area of responsibility; and As directed by the President or Secretary of Defense, provide military assistance to civil authorities including consequence management operations. (NORTHCOM, 2003a) NORTHCOM’s area of responsibility is the United States, Canada, and Mexico and the land, sea, and aerospace approaches to these countries. Figure 1-3 portrays NORTHCOM’s command-and-control relationships. The only forces assigned directly to NORTHCOM are the Joint Force Headquarters for Homeland Security in Norfolk, Virginia; the Joint Task Force–Civil Support (JTF–CS) at Fort Monroe in Hampton, Virginia; and Joint Task Force-6 (JTF-6) at Biggs Army Airfield, Fort Bliss, Texas. Other forces are assigned as needed (NORTHCOM, 2003b). The committee notes that NORTHCOM’s organization and missions are in a formative and transitional stage and could be altered in the future. The U.S. Army The U.S. Army’s mission is to fight and win our nation’s wars by providing prompt, sustained land dominance across the full range of military operations and spectrum of conflict in support of combatant commanders. (See Appendix C for information about the organizational structure of the Army.) It accomplishes this mission by carrying out the following: Executing Title 10 and Title 327 United States Code directives, to include organizing, equipping, and training forces for the conduct of prompt and sustained combat operations on land. Accomplishing missions assigned by the President, Secretary of Defense and combatant commanders, and transforming for the future (U.S. Army, 2003). The U.S. Army consists of three components—the active Army, the U.S. Army Reserve, and the Army National Guard—each of which brings different 7   Title 10 of the United States Code provides for the organization, training, and equipping of all the U.S. Armed Forces, to include the Reserve Components. Title 32 of the United States Code provides for the function of the National Guard while under the control of the state governor. At this point it is not a federal force and is not governed by the Posse Comitatus Act (18 USC 1385). Missions in this status can include crisis management, consequence management, and combatant commander support.

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Army Science and Technology for Homeland Security: Report 2 - C4ISR FIGURE 1-3 NORTHCOM command-and-control relationships. NOTE: STRATCOM, U.S. Strategic Command; TRANSCOM, U.S. Transportation Command; FORSCOM, U.S. Forces Command; PACOM, U.S. Pacific Command; JFCOM, U.S. Joint Forces Command; SOUTHCOM, U.S. Southern Command; SOCOM, U.S. Special Operations Command; N-NC, NORAD-NORTHCOM; WO, Washington Office; OSD, Office of the Secretary of Defense; JCS, Joint Chiefs of Staff; OGA, Other Government Agency; and NGO, nongovernmental organization. SOURCE: Stover James, briefing to the NORAD (North American Air Defense Command)/USNORTHCOM Joint and Interagency Coordination Group, August 6, 2003. strengths to the overall force. The active Army and the Army Reserve provide support to civil authorities in a variety of ways but are generally constrained by law from performing policing duties within the homeland (DHS, 2003). The National Guard—the states’ militia—is not constrained by the Posse Comitatus Act (10 USC 1385)8 as long as it is operating under control of the state governors (Title 32, USC). The National Guard is local in nature and is widely dispersed throughout the homeland. It can be quickly activated by the state governors and can help local police and other emergency responders as required. One would expect that in the aftermath of a large terrorist attack the National Guard would be functioning alongside the local fire, police, and medical personnel. In making 8   The Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 (18 USC 1385), as a general matter, prevents the Army and the Air Force from directly engaging in law enforcement activities such as search, seizure, arrest, and similar actions.

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Army Science and Technology for Homeland Security: Report 2 - C4ISR BOX 1-2 Findings from Report 1 Relevant to the Current Report Finding 1-1. Homeland security is an important extension of the Army’s historical role of providing military support to civilian authorities. The Army will be called on to assist the lead federal agency, the Department of Homeland Security, in meeting a wide range of demands for consequence management and recovery of public order and critical services. Finding 1-2. The Army National Guard, given its historical mission and flexibility, geographic dispersion, dual-mission capabilities, and frequent association with local agencies, is the key Army asset to meet homeland security demands and can be augmented as necessary with special capabilities from the Army Reserve and the active Army. Finding 1-3. There are many similarities between military operations involving allied or coalition forces and operations involving civilian emergency responders. SOURCE: NRC (2003), pp. 24, 29, and 31. technology packages available to emergency responders, the Army must consider the National Guard as well. The National Guard has anticipated this role. Among several forward-looking steps, it has reorganized its state headquarters into multi-service entities and established Civil Support Teams to respond to the possible use of weapons of mass destruction. Military support must be capable of smoothly, quickly, and efficiently augmenting the emergency responders in a crisis situation. This kind of assistance implies not only compatible equipment but also commonly understood doctrine and standards as well as joint9 training to refine operating procedures. Three findings presented in the first report in this series are also relevant to the present discussion (see Box 1-2). A corollary of the first report’s Finding 1-3 concerning the many similarities between military operations involving allied or coalition forces and operations involving civilian emergency responders would indicate that these similarities make it advantageous to consider technologies appropriate to both groups. Indeed, the underpinnings of the network-centric warfare capability envisioned for the Army’s Future Force (discussed in Chapter 2 of this report)—“See first, Understand first, Act first, and Finish decisively”—correspond directly to the emer- 9   Joint in this application means between civilian and military.

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Army Science and Technology for Homeland Security: Report 2 - C4ISR gency responder’s need to see, understand, and act in order to save lives and mitigate damage caused by man-made or natural disasters. Emergency Responders The Homeland Security Act of 2002 defines emergency response providers as including “federal, state, and local public safety, law enforcement, emergency response, emergency medical (including hospital emergency facilities), and related personnel, agencies, and authorities” (P.L. 107-296, Sec. 2(6)). These responders include hazardous materials response teams, urban search and rescue assets, community emergency response teams, antiterrorism units, special weapons and tactics teams, bomb squads, emergency management officials, and municipal agencies and private organizations responsible for transportation, communications, medical services, public health, disaster assistance, public works, and construction. Key responders also include emergency management personnel and political leaders at all levels who make crucial decisions and assessments during a crisis. While the emergency response needs of fire, police, and emergency medical personnel are receiving considerable attention and increased funding, the critical requirements of other support groups are not as well understood (Jackson et al., 2002). For example, both public health systems and national urban search and rescue assets are widely regarded as essential to emergency response, yet both lack sufficient capabilities to respond to large national emergencies, and little attention has been given to how additional C4ISR capabilities might be used to expand their capacity or improve their efficiency (CFR, 2003). The needs of responders in the private sector have received even less attention. For example, in the wake of the September 11 attacks, the World Trade Center site required about 10,000 skilled support personnel (heavy equipment operators, truck drivers, iron workers, carpenters, and laborers) per day during the initial search and cleanup period (CFR, 2003). Their operations were essential to the response and entailed significant health and safety risks that could have been mitigated by better C4ISR capabilities at the incident site (Lippy and Murray, 2002). Another category of resources frequently overlooked in needs assessments is that of the response assets required to deal with agricultural emergencies that either threaten the U.S. food supply or are potential sources of human infectious disease. Animal diseases, for example, can present a serious risk to humans. Many diseases can infect multiple hosts. Three-quarters of emerging human pathogens are zoonotic (i.e., they can be readily transmitted back and forth between humans, domesticated animals, and wildlife). Whether or not they infect humans, animal diseases can have fearful economic impact. For example, Great Britain’s response to the 2001 outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease, including lost productivity, amounted to $11.6 billion (Matthews and Buzby, 2001). While infectious disease is an ever-present danger in a globalized world, the

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Army Science and Technology for Homeland Security: Report 2 - C4ISR possibility of terrorists intentionally introducing vectors or bacteria or viruses into a population to foster the spread of disease introduces an added dimension to the danger. Thus, agricultural response assets could well be an important component of the consequence management system required to meet the threat of terrorist attacks, and these response assets could have significant C4ISR needs. The Federal Emergency Management Agency has identified this area as being in need of improvement (FEMA, 1997). Finally, in addition to the state and local assets already mentioned, such as the Army National Guard Civil Support Teams,10 and private sector assistance, emergency responses could involve a range of federal capabilities. These would include the active forces from the Army, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Navy, the Reserve forces from all services, as well as a range of federal response teams such as Domestic Emergency Support Teams, Disaster Medical Assistance Teams, Coast Guard National Strike Teams, and Nuclear Incident Response Teams.11 The needs of these various groups and their capacities to integrate into the overall national response system also require consideration. Finding 1-1. Although a number of informal mechanisms exist, no coherent planning paradigm for the interface between the military and the emergency responders currently exists, and although a national operational concept for emergency response is being developed, it is not yet a comprehensive framework that pulls together the efforts of federal, state, and local responders. Indeed, the committee conducting the first study in this series reached the conclusion shown in Box 1-3. COMPARISON OF ACQUISITION IN THE ARMY AND IN THE EMERGENCY RESPONDER COMMUNITY The ways in which the Army and emergency responder community acquire technologies in the form of new products, processes, and procedures differ widely. The DOD has a very well developed process for acquisition, with formal procedures and top-to-bottom management. Emergency responders acquire new technology through local city and town purchasing agents. The DOD process is controlled by standards of practice and rigorous testing and certification, while the emergency responder community has far fewer formal procedures and sometimes none at all. 10   National Guard Civil Support Teams are not exclusively state and local assets. These organizations could be brought into active federal service under Title 10 of the United States Code. In that status, they could be employed as part of NORTHCOM or any other military command structure as deemed appropriate to meeting the DOD requirement for homeland security. 11   Michael Lowder, Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Response Division, briefing to the committee, Washington, D.C., August 25, 2003.

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Army Science and Technology for Homeland Security: Report 2 - C4ISR BOX 1-3 Conclusion and Recommendation from Report 1 Relevant to the Current Report Conclusion 4-1. A new national emergency response command, control, and communications system for homeland security must be developed and fielded to meet the demands of the emerging threats, particularly to integrate the response to chemical, biological, high explosive, radiological, and nuclear weapons. This system must be compatible with developments in the new Department of Homeland Security, the U.S. Northern Command, and state and local entities. Current Army science and technology thrusts and programs that are integral to the Objective Force can be adapted for the new national system. Recommendation 4-1. To facilitate the development and fielding of an integrated command-and-control system for homeland security, the Army should initiate or continue research that permits the earliest possible fielding of deployable communications packages equipped with universal multiplexer capability to facilitate command and control across the vast, and disparate, array of agencies that will respond to incidents and events. NOTE: Universal multiplexer capability refers to the broad capability for handling several different types of datastreams at an interface where they can be periodically sampled. SOURCE: NRC (2003), p. 97. The military acquisition process is designed to minimize failure and the attendant loss of life on the battlefield; however, because it is so methodical, it can be too slow for the purposes of many programs. Various ways have been devised to circumvent this problem. Spiral development, for example, is a process developed and refined by the Army to improve current capabilities through technology insertion. It involves fielding these new capabilities with a test unit, testing by that unit, and using the test results for fielding to the entire force. It is particularly suited for enhancing such capabilities as C4ISR. If it is interested in this process, the DHS might consider spiral development as part of a menu from which to choose options that would work for emergency responders. The Army acquisition process (see Appendix D for details) begins with the definition of needed capabilities, which are spelled out in a requirements document. The Army science and technology (S&T) arm, consisting of laboratories,12 engineering centers, and grants-in-aid and contracting offices, responds to the requirements document with technical programs that move through a series of prescribed stages until technologies transition to demonstration and validation efforts and eventually to prototype systems. In this process, the Army S&T

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Army Science and Technology for Homeland Security: Report 2 - C4ISR community is increasingly using formal cooperative alliances with private sector entities—universities and industry laboratories—to make use of the best expertise available, wherever it may be found. Once a technology is successfully demonstrated through developmental testing, mature products are transitioned to acquisition program managers for integration into systems or system-of-systems procurement efforts. Testing occurs during the development phase and operational testing is done in the early fielding stages, the latter with troops using the technology in simulated missions. The spiral development process greatly reduces the time associated with technology insertion and has great promise for resolving the challenges faced by emergency responders, particularly in the area of C4ISR. In contrast, there is little of this type of formal process available to emergency responders. They have not had a dedicated research, development, testing, and evaluation (RDT&E) system at their disposal, and many are concerned by the lack of standardization and certification of items that they must purchase. There are, however, several efforts under way on behalf of emergency responders: the Technical Support Working Group (TSWG) coordinates the federal research programs designed to help responders, and the Interagency Board for Equipment Standardization and Interoperability (IAB) is in the process of developing agreed-upon standards for emergency responders.13 As the DHS continues to mature, the development of a more formal RDT&E system for emergency responders will be required. Within the DHS, the Undersecretary for Science and Technology (US&T) has budget authority, but exact procedures for coordinating federal research efforts by the US&T are still being developed.14 One aspect of particular concern to emergency responders is the testing and certification of new technologies and equipment. The Army possesses many and varied testing facilities that, with proper 12   The Army laboratories perform a broad spectrum of research and development (R&D) activities, including basic and applied research as well as advanced development. Testing is conducted by the laboratories as needed, sometimes in their own facilities, and sometimes in other military facilities or in collaboration with other entities such as universities, industry, and other government laboratories. 13   Additional information about the TSWG is available online at <www.tswg.gov/tswg/about/about.htm and about the IAB at www.iab.gov/page_manager.asp.> 14   In the DOD, the term “S&T” refers to a program. It is used in that sense in this report. In the DOD, S&T is understood to be the longer-range part of R&D. It consists of three parts, each of which is identified by its own budget category, as follows: (1) basic research, budget category 6.1; (2) applied research, budget category 6.2; and (3) advanced development, budget category 6.3. Together these categories make up the DOD S&T program. Thus, “S&T” in DOD parlance does not include shorter-range R&D in higher budget categories, from 6.4 on up. By contrast, in the DHS the S&T directorate, a distinct part of the DHS established and so identified in the legislation that created the department, funds both short-term and long-term R&D. In the DHS S&T is thus more akin in character and content to what the DOD calls R&D than to what the DOD defines as S&T.

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Army Science and Technology for Homeland Security: Report 2 - C4ISR coordination, might be made available to other agencies. For example, the Army has many long-term cooperative arrangements such as that with the permanent groups of engineers at NASA (National Aeronautics and Space Administration) Langley and NASA Glenn using NASA’s investment in wind tunnels and other airframe and propulsion testing facilities. If procedures for sharing these facilities with the DHS were put in place, it would greatly assist emergency responders and as a secondary benefit would allow the Army to preserve some underutilized facilities. The committee believes that there are considerable opportunities for collaboration between the Army and the DHS to provide emergency responders with enhanced capabilities and new technology, given the right policy guidance. SCENARIOS Scenarios are invaluable tools in helping to determine what capabilities might be required and what types of equipment might satisfy particular requirements. At the present time, national-level scenarios for use in such efforts are not available from the DHS. To better understand the technology needs of emergency responders, the committee developed four example scenarios that could provide a “mark on the wall” against which to measure C4ISR needs. It emphasizes that these scenarios are intentionally very general, lack significant detail, and should not be interpreted as approved Army, DOD, or DHS scenarios. They are intended merely to illustrate the range of situations against which potential C4ISR needs for emergency responders might be identified. The four scenarios are described below in order of increasing complexity. Scenario 1: Single Event, Single Location The first scenario could involve a single event occurring at a specific time at a single location. Examples are the 1995 bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City or the World Trade Center bombing in 1993. This scenario might also include natural disasters such as the San Francisco earthquake of 1989 or man-made disasters such as the overturning of a truck containing 40,000 pounds of explosive fireworks powder on the National Capitol Region Beltway at the Springfield interchange in Northern Virginia in 1999. The latter incident required closing the intersection of Interstates 95, 395, and 495 for a whole day, resulting in the delay of hundreds of thousands of commuters and the evacuation of nearby residents. With each event such as the truck accident, the potential exists for significant destruction, loss of life, and/or disruption of day-to-day activities, although the event is localized with no follow-on attack or natural disaster.

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Army Science and Technology for Homeland Security: Report 2 - C4ISR Scenario 2: Multiple Events, Single Location The second scenario assumes multiple events occurring over a period of time at a single location. This type of disaster could take the form of an initial terrorist attack followed by terrorist attacks on responders. It could also be an initial terrorist attack followed by some other disaster—for example, the 2001 terrorist attack on the World Trade Center followed by the collapse of the Twin Towers. An example of a natural disaster in this scenario would be the San Francisco earthquake of 1906 that first devastated much of the city with seismic shocks, and then triggered fires that could not be controlled because of building rubble blocking the streets and broken water mains. Scenario 3: Single Type of Event, Multiple Locations The third scenario could involve a single type of event occurring over a period of time over multiple locations. Such a disaster could take the form of a natural catastrophe such as Hurricane Isabel, which hit several states on the East Coast in 2003. Or it could include events such as the San Diego wildfires in 2003 that apparently began as a small fire and then, fueled by dry scrub and timber and spread by high Santa Ana winds, developed into multiple, devastating firestorms. These firestorms forced the evacuation of 40,000 residents and required 10,000 firefighters. An example involving a terrorist attack could be the use of a biological weapon at a convention that creates casualties in multiple cities days later. Scenario 4: Multiple Events, Multiple Locations The fourth scenario might involve coordinated multiple attacks at multiple locations. An example would be a disaster such as the attacks of September 11, 2001, but with five planes on both coasts. Such a disaster could also take the form of multiple tanker trucks with radioactive debris simultaneously exploding in several places around the nation, destroying government buildings, tunnels, bridges, other infrastructure, and so on. Additionally, the number of locations could increase, as changing winds might carry airborne radioactive debris to other sites. RELATIONSHIP TO C4ISR CAPABILITIES In Report 1, the committee found that C4ISR is an important capability cutting across all scenarios. Regardless of the nature or motivation of an attack, it is crucial that command and control, communications, and all aspects of data gathering and analysis be thoroughly coordinated and effective if disaster sites are to be managed properly. In short, emergency responders, just like the military, must see, understand, and act.

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Army Science and Technology for Homeland Security: Report 2 - C4ISR In general, the C4ISR requirements for dealing with all disasters are similar, with exceptions for the scope of different events and allowances for the likely incubation periods that may occur in a biological attack. The larger the scope of an event the more complex the C4ISR requirements will be. These needs are difficult enough with a local event handled by local authorities (that is, coordinated among the police, fire, and medical personnel of a single jurisdiction). However, an event drawing in responders from surrounding areas makes C4ISR even more problematic as different techniques, policies, and operational vocabularies are encountered. When higher levels of government such as the military are assisting, the potential for problems is even greater. In Report 1, the committee found such a situation to be very much like the situation in coalition warfighting when the military had to communicate with different forces. The role of computers in disaster scenarios is ubiquitous. Communications are increasingly computer-based. Command and control will rely on computer-stored data and computer-generated situational displays. Computers play a dominant role in data management. Responders should have detailed building plans and information about the activities conducted in buildings, maps of underground utilities, and locations of shut-off valves and switches available to them in real time. Computers will be necessary in disasters for the surveillance of hospital admissions and other medical records to detect any outbreak of unusual disease patterns that may signify a terrorist attack. The ISR portion of C4ISR is all of those activities that collect and analyze information about an incident and present ingredients for a common operating picture to decision makers. For emergency responders, the first indication of a serious problem may come from a sensor on a patrol car or from a network of sensors on the city streets or in subway tunnels. The use of multiple sensors and fusion of the sensor data can alert the various responders to the details of the incident. The challenge is to fuse this information into a common operational picture that policy makers can act on. Once the event scene has been established, the incident commander will need as complete a picture of the event as possible. As the crisis management progresses, knowledge of the position, physical condition, and actions of individual emergency responders will be necessary in order to aid in the command-and-control process and to keep the emergency responders away from particularly hazardous locations. Given technology’s increasing capability to provide the incident commander with ever-growing volumes of data, the problems resulting from information overload cannot be overstated. Equally there is the danger that critical information may not reach the proper decision levels where it can be acted on in a timely way. Worse, both phenomena, overload and failure to receive critical items of information, may occur simultaneously. This challenge applies to both Army decision makers and incident commanders and represents another area for collaboration between the Army and civilian emergency responders. The reasons for seeking new technologies transcend the obvious desire

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Army Science and Technology for Homeland Security: Report 2 - C4ISR simply to give emergency responders better equipment. The technologies discussed in Chapter 4 of this report allow entirely new capabilities to emerge, such as real-time decision-making ability by the on-scene command team at the crisis site. Such capabilities will enable and strengthen multidisciplinary efforts between and among the various emergency responder groups working on crisis management. These motivations are the very same ones that underlie the Army’s transformation program for the Future Force. Finding 1-2. The Army has developed a number of capabilities that could be used by emergency responders: Relevant technologies from the Army science and technology base; C4ISR systems that have been developed and deployed by the Army; An acquisition system, similar to the Army’s spiral development process, that encompasses identifying needs, funding the required technology, and developing fieldable products; A testing and certification process for new equipment; Training programs; A network-centric operations approach; Exercises (and supporting facilities); Modeling and simulation capabilities; and A process for the development and assessment of doctrine. REFERENCES CFR (Council on Foreign Relations). 2003. Emergency Responders: Drastically Underfunded, Dangerously Unprepared. New York, N.Y.: Council on Foreign Relations. Cohen, R. 2003. DOD Homeland Defense. Available online at <http://proceedings.ndia.org/3500/Cohen_Homeland.pdf>. Accessed April 1, 2004. DHS (Department of Homeland Security). 2003. National Incident Management System, Initial System. July 18. Washington, D.C.: Department of Homeland Security. FEMA (Federal Emergency Management Agency). 1997. State Capability Assessment for Readiness. December 10. Washington, D.C.: Federal Emergency Management Agency. Jackson, B., D.J. Peterson, J. Bartis, T. LaTourrette, I. Brahmakulam, A. Houser, and J. Sollinger. 2002. Protecting Emergency Responders: Lessons Learned from Terrorist Attacks. Available online at <http://www.rand.org/publications/CF/CF176/>. Accessed September 24, 2003. Lippy, B., and K. Murray. 2002. Improving the Training of Skilled Support Personnel for Responding to Terrorist Actions: A Review of the Problems and Feasible Solutions. December 14. Washington, D.C.: National Clearinghouse for Worker Safety and Health Training. Matthews, K., and J. Buzby. 2001. Dissecting the challenges of mad cow and foot-and-mouth disease. Agricultural Outlook, AGO-283: 4–6. NORTHCOM (Northern Command). 2003a. Who We Are—Mission. Available online at <http://www.northcom.mil/index.cfm?fuseaction=s.who_mission>. Accessed March 6, 2004. NORTHCOM. 2003b. Who We Are—Our Team. Available online at <http://www.northcom.mil/index.cfm?fuseaction=s.who_team>. Accessed November 17, 2003.

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Army Science and Technology for Homeland Security: Report 2 - C4ISR NRC (National Research Council). 2003. Science and Technology for Army Homeland Security: Report 1. Washington, D.C.: The National Academies Press. U.S. Army. 2003. Organization: Army Mission. Available online at <http://www.army.mil/organization/>. Accessed November 17, 2003.