3
Capabilities for Emergency Responders

The purpose of this chapter is to identify the command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) requirements for emergency responders. It addresses currently lacking capabilities as well as emerging future requirements. This chapter describes the scope of the emergency responder community considered, the tasks that this community could be required to perform, the conditions under which these activities might occur, the characteristics and functionality of the C4ISR technologies that responders would need in order to deal with the consequences of a disaster or a terrorist incident, and the training and exercise opportunities that currently exist. Lastly, it describes Project Responder, an independent effort focusing on the status of equipment for emergency responders. Appendix F provides specifics on C4ISR capabilities needed by civilian emergency responders.

ABILITY TO RESPOND TO MANY THREATS

The committee examined the requirements of emergency responders—that is, the personnel and services constituting the national response capabilities that could be called on to deal with a disaster or a terrorist attack. The committee acknowledges that this evaluation was accomplished at a fairly high level of abstraction. It is possible that different conclusions might be drawn should a highly detailed examination be conducted. A term in common usage, “first responders,” usually refers to law enforcement, firefighting, and emergency



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Army Science and Technology for Homeland Security: Report 2 - C4ISR 3 Capabilities for Emergency Responders The purpose of this chapter is to identify the command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) requirements for emergency responders. It addresses currently lacking capabilities as well as emerging future requirements. This chapter describes the scope of the emergency responder community considered, the tasks that this community could be required to perform, the conditions under which these activities might occur, the characteristics and functionality of the C4ISR technologies that responders would need in order to deal with the consequences of a disaster or a terrorist incident, and the training and exercise opportunities that currently exist. Lastly, it describes Project Responder, an independent effort focusing on the status of equipment for emergency responders. Appendix F provides specifics on C4ISR capabilities needed by civilian emergency responders. ABILITY TO RESPOND TO MANY THREATS The committee examined the requirements of emergency responders—that is, the personnel and services constituting the national response capabilities that could be called on to deal with a disaster or a terrorist attack. The committee acknowledges that this evaluation was accomplished at a fairly high level of abstraction. It is possible that different conclusions might be drawn should a highly detailed examination be conducted. A term in common usage, “first responders,” usually refers to law enforcement, firefighting, and emergency

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Army Science and Technology for Homeland Security: Report 2 - C4ISR medical personnel.1 These responders, however, are not the only assets that may be required in the aftermath of an attack on the homeland. In contrast, the term “emergency responder” encompasses all personnel within a community who could be needed in the event of a natural or man-made disaster or a terrorist incident (LaTourrette et al., 2003). As indicated in Chapter 1, the Homeland Security Act of 2002 defines emergency response providers as including “federal, state, and local public safety, law enforcement, emergency response, emergency medical (including hospital emergency facilities), and related personnel, agencies, and authorities” (P.L. 107-296, Sec. 2(6)). In addition, commercial assets such as communications industries and private, nonprofit, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) such as the Red Cross or the Salvation Army can also play an important role in emergency response. However, there is no national effort to leverage the supporting technological capabilities of these organizations for an effective response to a disaster or a terrorist attack. While it is believed that about 2.3 million firefighters, police, and emergency medical personnel could be considered emergency responders, these numbers do not suggest the full scope of the national response force (LaTourrette et al., 2003). Some have estimated that the broader public emergency response community could be as numerous as 9 million to 10 million.2 In addition to professional responders and volunteers, there is, for example, a pool of about 6.5 million skilled construction workers in the United States who could potentially be called up to respond in the wake of disasters. All of these assets could benefit from the enhanced use of C4ISR technologies. The sheer number of responders speaks to the immediate need for a compatible C4ISR architecture and standards set to coordinate and prioritize the activities of multiple response entities. Consideration should be given to identifying a simple but executable and expandable architecture as a start. The vast number of responders also suggests that significant economies of scale could possibly be achieved in terms of reducing unit costs for purchasing and maintaining emergency responder support systems and equipment. Conclusion 3-1. Once fully established, the national requirements for command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) technologies to support emergency responders will be substantial and sustainable and could create a significant market. 1   See, for example, U.S. Congress (2002). There is, however, no common definition of “first responder.” For example, the “National Strategy for Homeland Security” refers to first responders as police, firefighters, emergency medical providers, public works personnel, and emergency management officials. See OHS (2002). 2   See, for example, Collins (2000).

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Army Science and Technology for Homeland Security: Report 2 - C4ISR Communications equipment and capabilities vary widely. The larger cities of the nation appear to be reasonably well equipped for meeting disasters, but more rural and smaller jurisdictions receive little or no help in obtaining what they may need. Washington, D.C., for example, is perceived to be a high-value target and therefore receives much support. The nation’s capital has a sophisticated communications capability, including two-way pagers for senior leadership, appropriately scrubbed intelligence information provided to the responders who need it, satellite phones, an 800-megahertz (MHz) communications system, and full broadband multimedia capability. The city also has two Emergency Operations Centers and several mobile command posts, the newest with full multimedia broadband capability.3 This is not the case in rural and small jurisdictions. Federal grants are passed through states, and in the past some of those resources have been “skimmed off” to meet valid state requirements. Most recent federal grants have been given with restrictions concerning the amount that states can retain (e.g., 20 percent). Local municipalities generally have a list of shortages in needed equipment and capabilities by functional area but have often done little or nothing to prioritize the list on the basis of a multifunctional, all-hazards approach to mitigating damage. The net result is an uneven national approach to the funding and fielding of the technologies that would be needed if there were a prioritized approach to a common operational framework. Considering the scope of the emergency responder requirements, there may be significant advantages to be gained by employing C4ISR technologies that would link responders into a system of systems similar to the Army’s vision for linking the capabilities of its ground forces and integrating them with the capabilities of the other military services and coalition partners. As suggested in Chapter 2, the military’s network-centric approach to operations could serve emergency responders equally well. Such a system could produce significant efficiencies in terms of shared skills, knowledge, and scarce, high-value assets. Such an approach would build capacity and redundancy in the national emergency response system as well as gaining the synergy of providing a common operating picture to all responders and allowing them to share information readily. Network-centric systems could be particularly valuable for responding to large-scale attacks or those involving multiple weapons of mass destruction (WMD). In such situations, responders would have to surge capacity quickly, adapt to difficult and chaotic conditions, and respond to unforeseen requirements.4 In short, the committee believes that emergency responder needs suggest that the national emergency response system develop and adopt a network-centric 3   Michael Sellitto, Deputy Chief for Special Operations, Washington, D.C., “C4ISR for the Washington DC Fire Department,” briefing to the committee, Washington D.C., July 21, 2003. 4   For the scope of assets that could be required to respond to a WMD incident, see Larson and Peters (2001).

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Army Science and Technology for Homeland Security: Report 2 - C4ISR operations (NCO) approach. The committee defines “network-centric operations” as an information-enabled concept of operations that generates increased operational effectiveness by networking sensors, decision makers, and emergency responders to accurately see, understand, and act on the situations facing them. In essence, NCO translates information superiority into operational power, effectively linking knowledgeable entities in the response to emergencies from the local to the national level. Conclusion 3-2. Individual emergency responder C4ISR systems need to be linked and integrated into a national operational framework. Recommendation 3-2. The U.S. Army, through the Department of Defense, should offer to assist the Department of Homeland Security in developing a concept of operations for a national operational framework, to include the appropriate architectures and enabling technologies for C4ISR. ABILITY TO CARRY OUT A WIDE RANGE OF TASKS A wide range of emergency responder tasks could be facilitated by C4ISR technologies. The National Strategy for Homeland Security defines six critical mission areas: (1) intelligence and early warning, (2) border and transportation security, (3) domestic counterterrorism, (4) protecting critical infrastructure and key assets, (5) defending against catastrophic threats (i.e., research and development for the other five critical mission areas), and (6) emergency preparedness and response. This report is focused on C4ISR needs in support of the sixth function, emergency preparedness and response,5 which includes the preparation for, response to, and recovery from a disaster or terrorist attack. The assessment presented in this chapter includes C4ISR needs for planning, logistical support, maintenance and diagnostics, training, and management, as well as C4ISR needs for supporting the actual activities at a disaster site and for addressing post-recovery lessons learned. It should also be emphasized that this study considered C4ISR support for all emergency response functions that take place during an incident, not just that of setting up integrated command and control for incident commanders. In particular, the committee’s assessment found that there could well be significant intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) functions associated with a response, creating a common operating picture to help responders avoid threats or ensuring that they are equipped “just in time” to address threats. 5   The first report in this series (NRC, 2003) talked about “recovery and consequence management technologies”; emergency preparedness and response terminology is adopted in this second report to conform to the National Strategy for Homeland Security (OHS, 2002) and to highlight the important pre- and post-event requirements of emergency response.

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Army Science and Technology for Homeland Security: Report 2 - C4ISR Emergency Preparedness and Response Tasks The following list of emergency preparedness and response tasks is adapted and modified from the list in Report 1 (NRC, 2003, pp. 93-94). The tasks outlined below are generic. They are not intended to refer to a particular type of emergency responder or level of response. In addition, the tasks outlined here may not be accomplished in distinct phases or may be limited to only one phase of an emergency operation. Throughout Event Gather information; and Provide continuous public information. Pre-Response Evaluate lessons learned from previous incidents; Conduct vulnerability and risk assessments of response activities and response support infrastructure; Plan a response; Establish communications protocols; Train for disaster or terrorist attack response; Coordinate with other agencies, levels of government, and private sector assets; Establish procedures, including the use of sensors and other means to monitor critical support infrastructure, as required; Maintain information on critical infrastructure and geospatial data on areas of interest; Provide acquisition and logistical support; Perform maintenance, testing, and diagnostics; and Provide continuous public information. Initial Response Deploy responders; Protect responders; Establish an information clearinghouse; Monitor location and status of responders; Identify the incident commander; Establish an interoperable C4ISR system with existing assets; Assess in real time the extent of the physical damage, casualties, and the enduring level of contamination and risk of disease transmission; Establish quarantine zones, safe areas, and perimeter control of movements;

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Army Science and Technology for Homeland Security: Report 2 - C4ISR Triage and treat the injured; Conduct crime scene management; and Provide continuous public information. Containment Expand area of control and model and/or predict hazardous areas; Isolate secondary threats (ruptured gas mains, interrupted electrical service, instability of damaged infrastructures and buildings); Restore or replace infrastructure critical to containment; Restore and maintain C4ISR systems with restored or replaced infrastructure; Perform environmental monitoring; Conduct a site survey, determine additional needs, and provide reinforcements; Provide continuous public information; and Maintain C4ISR interoperability. Near-Term Recovery Provide continuous public information; Eliminate and/or control the ongoing immediate threat (e.g., contain the effects of weapons of mass destruction); Expand the treatment of casualties (begin stress management, including that for responders) and evacuate the injured; Rescue, protect, evacuate, and track civilians; Manage the identification, tracking, and reunification of missing persons; Conduct mortuary operations; Assure food and water safety; Provide food, shelter, and support for personnel in the affected area; Determine, marshal, and deploy assets required for long-term operations; Conduct additional training for emergency responders for site-specific threats; Manage volunteer resources; Provide additional geospatial resources; Provide emergency veterinary services and support for animal and plant control and disposal; and Establish a sustainment base. Post-Event Recovery Disengage responder assets; Consolidate and redeploy assets;

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Army Science and Technology for Homeland Security: Report 2 - C4ISR Provide maintenance and logistical support; Conduct an after-action study and maintain a record of lessons learned; Reconstitute assets; Update plans; Retrain assets; and Identify new organizational or material requirements. Restoration of Normalcy Provide decontamination support; Provide financial management for responder resources and manage contractual support; Provide post-event counseling; Restore public order and essential services; Assess casualties, damage, and environmental impact; Treat mass casualties; Restore the physical infrastructure; and Provide continuous public information. ABILITY TO FUNCTION EFFECTIVELY IN A DANGEROUS AND/OR CHAOTIC ENVIRONMENT In determining the technological needs of emergency responders, the conditions under which operations occur must also be considered. For example, emergency response operations may be conducted under the same chaotic conditions characteristic of a battlefield, particularly in an urban environment. As with combat forces, emergency responders in crisis situations may find it difficult to communicate with and determine the location of their organizations. Many current communication and locator systems, for example, are dependent on line-of-sight technologies that are easily disrupted by tall buildings and underground infrastructure. In addition, in an urban environment both responder and combat forces face the challenges of a limited area of observation, restricted span of control, and canalized movement. These restrictions have significant implications for the speed, size, and efficiency of operations. Complex terrain (buildings, elevated highways, and so on) as well as the physical destruction resulting from combat or a disaster or terrorist attack will force dispersion of forces or responders, nonlinear operations, and decentralized control, limiting the ability of assets to coordinate, reinforce, or support one another. In fact, the emergency responder environment suggests that advanced C4ISR capabilities prized on the battlefield could also be essential to improving national emergency response capabilities. In addition to the direct benefits of C4ISR, these capabilities can have significant indirect benefits for other aspects of operations. For example, on the battlefield, the knowledge gained from advanced

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Army Science and Technology for Homeland Security: Report 2 - C4ISR C4ISR can be used to reduce materiel requirements. Soldiers use battlefield knowledge to avoid threats and decrease requirements for munitions and armor protection, and responders can use information systems to reduce needs and improve on the capabilities of personal protective equipment. One relevant concept is “just in time” logistics—that is, the ability to ensure that support arrives at the scene precisely when it is needed rather than having resources stockpiled or requiring responders to carry equipment with them all the time. Another feature common to battlefield and emergency responder environments is the utility of situational awareness. The military expects that maintaining a common operational picture will allow its troops to avoid threats, and emergency responders may likewise rely on early warning to minimize their exposure to risks and decrease requirements for personal protective equipment and other support assets. Additionally, emergency responders could benefit from C4ISR capabilities similar to those needed by high-tech warriors: for example, reduced weight and power-generation requirements, non-line-of-sight systems, hands-free controls, and heads-up displays. Finally, C4ISR capabilities that are backward-compatible to older systems and technologies are essential to ensure the viability of the high-low technology mix. C4ISR CAPABILITIES FOR EMERGENCY RESPONDERS Given the personnel, tasks, and conditions outlined above, the committee identified shortfalls in the capabilities required by emergency responders in the area of C4ISR.6 This section identifies characteristics and functionalities of C4ISR technologies needed by emergency responders. Command, Control, and Computer Capabilities As to specific shortfalls in the areas of command and control, the greatest emergency response needs are in the capacity to scale responses to events that can range from local disasters to terrorist attacks involving catastrophic WMD attacks. Key elements in managing the scope of the response are as follows: to be better prepared before an emergency with better intelligence and training; to be able to assess a situation rapidly; and to be able to share this information with other authorities, which would include being able to hand over control to other authorities, if necessary. Needed capabilities include the following: To be able to see first. There is need for rapid and accurate situation assessment and the ability to produce a continually updated common operational picture. The common operational picture not only must have 6   This effort was complicated by the lack of uniform national standards that define the regional, state, and local capacities needed to respond to a terrorist attack. See Canada (2003).

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Army Science and Technology for Homeland Security: Report 2 - C4ISR the appropriate information for decision making but also must be presented in a way that highlights the most-time-critical information. The common operational picture should be able to display the nature and number of one’s own forces, the risks they face, and the facilities and services, including communications, at their disposal. To be able to understand first. There is a need for access to information—not only intelligence, but also background information that may be critical to handling the crisis. This could include information about infrastructure, facilities, and resources: for example, knowing the locations of hazardous materials, having floor plans of structures, and being aware of key personnel with critical knowledge. It is necessary to be able to provide information on the location and status of responders within the disaster area and of reinforcing responders from other jurisdictions. Tools for collaboration among responders are needed. To be able to act first. There is need for decision-making aids that can access, query, evaluate, and make recommendations employing large amounts of information maintained in different databases and transmitted by various communications systems. Significantly, many elements of the command-and-control programs for managing military operations for the Future Force call for capabilities similar to those listed above. Much as the military envisions using its future command-and-control systems as a linchpin for conducting network-centric warfare, the committee believes that emergency responder command-and-control systems could provide the basis for emergency responders to benefit from the effectiveness of network-centric operations. Many of the command-and-control capabilities for emergency responders should be based on published standards in order to facilitate broad cooperation and coordination among state, local, and federal response assets as well as with capabilities from the private sector. In addition, the committee concluded that command-and-control systems also require a degree of assurance and redundancy and that they must be resilient against critical infrastructure failures, particularly the loss of access to the Internet and wireless networks. Additionally, there is an important need to address significant shortfalls in command-and-control functions related to responding to large-scale WMD attacks. A common concern of responders is the need for effective perimeter control at the scene of an event in order to provide for management of movement within the site to facilitate operations and avoid hazards, and the need for control of traffic to accomplish evacuation away from the site. Significant unresolved problems in site management for catastrophic events or terrorist attacks also include those of processing patients, accounting for missing persons, and managing the volunteer support and the housing needs of displaced persons. The need for pre-disaster training, including realistic, high-quality exercises that cover

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Army Science and Technology for Homeland Security: Report 2 - C4ISR multiple jurisdictions and levels of government (including the employment of defense assets under the control of the U.S. Northern Command) are also cited by responders as an urgent requirement. Finally, command-and-control systems require means of support and sustainment to ensure a high degree of operational readiness. The ability to sustain a robust response to large-scale terrorist attacks will likely depend on logistical capabilities (Jackson et al., 2002). Computer and software support for emergency response is also inadequate at the present time to deal with large-scale disasters or terrorist strikes. Computer systems for emergency responders are envisioned as providing the incident commanders with an integrated view of information relevant to a disaster scene. Global Information System (GIS) databases are expected to play an important role in presenting a combination of static information (such as building layouts, floor plans, connections to utilities) and dynamic information (such as locations of emergency responders, fire conditions, and so on) (Beakley;7 Cashin et al., 2003). GIS systems are developed for the overlaying of static information and may be updated weekly or monthly. The DHS’s Directorate of Emergency Preparedness and Response (EPR)/Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has a close working relationship with the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency for remote sensing/GIS support. The available capabilities include many state-of-the-art and ongoing research and development (R&D) efforts in the remote sensing/GIS arena. However, they are not currently at the point of overlaying dynamic information that is continually updated as an event unfolds. Setting the standards for the necessary databases will be an important part of developing computer systems used by emergency responders. Another aspect will be the method by which emergency responders and utility workers can update the information in the databases as a result of routine inspections. For example, firefighters make handwritten notes on conditions inside buildings during inspections. These notes are not standardized and may not even be legible to others in times of emergency. Instead, one can imagine the use of a voice-activated personal digital assistant (PDA) to make entries in a standard format that can be downloaded into an appropriate database. While a wide range of computing hardware is readily available today at affordable prices, the challenge is to integrate the hardware and software into an interoperable system of systems. Particular challenges that emergency responders face include these: Interoperability—probably the greatest challenge. In this area, following commercial standards makes the most sense. Proprietary protocols and systems should be avoided. 7   Guy Beakley, Hicks and Associates, Inc., “C4ISR Requirements for the Nation’s First Responders from Project Responder,” briefing to the committee, Washington, D.C., July 22, 2003.

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Army Science and Technology for Homeland Security: Report 2 - C4ISR Processes for scaling up as the magnitude of a crisis builds. This requirement relates to the need to know who is in charge and how to transition authority. Exercises to determine whether the systems work as anticipated. Ability to protect sufficient command-and-control infrastructure and capabilities during emergencies. Communications Capabilities Many reports have cited emergency responders’ needs for secure voice, video, and data communications that are interoperable among agencies and governmental affiliations as well as scalable with the size of the event (Cummings;8 Cashin et al., 2003; NIJ, 2003; Schwabe et al., 2001). At a response scene, police, emergency medical services, and firefighters often use incompatible radio systems (LaTourrette et al., 2003; ISTS, 2001). Because millions of emergency responders are spread over thousands of state and local agencies and departments, they lack the organization necessary to produce a vision of future needs and possibilities (NIJ, 2003, p. 10). As a result of the heightened interest in homeland security resulting from the tragic events of September 11, emergency responder departments in the nation’s largest cities are now developing such a vision (Cashin et al., 2003). The principal strategy for addressing the need for interoperability has been to push for the implementation of a uniform, digital, 800-MHz backbone system. These systems, however, have not proven to be a “silver bullet.” While they have many advantages over traditional analog radio systems, concerns include their high costs, their inability to communicate effectively in complex urban terrain, and their inability to prioritize voice traffic (LaTourrette et al., 2003). Emergency responder communications systems are currently trapped by the history of their development into narrowband channels that are “inadequate and scattered widely in 10 discrete bands across the spectrum, making it difficult for different agencies and jurisdictions to communicate” (NIJ, 2003, p. 10). In any activity, emergency responders need the ability to communicate among themselves in the manner that best serves the functioning of the individual units. In major events it will be necessary for local emergency responders to coordinate with neighboring units, utility workers, state agencies, the National Guard, 8   John C. Cummings, Department of Homeland Security, Science and Technology, “An Overview of the Department of Homeland Security,” briefing to the committee, Washington, D.C., August 26, 2003; Guy Beakley, Hicks and Associates, Inc., “C4ISR Requirements for the Nation’s First Responders from Project Responder,” briefing to the committee, Washington, D.C., July 22, 2003; Donald C. Mertz, Director of Command and Control, Communications, and Computers Systems, Joint Task Force—Civil Support, “Communications Interoperability Between Military and Civilian Agencies,” provided to the committee for the August 25-26, 2003, meeting.

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Army Science and Technology for Homeland Security: Report 2 - C4ISR be used to detect unauthorized intrusion into an area. For firefighters, smoke and heat sensors distributed throughout a building may give information on fire conditions. In a major event, emergency medical services may use patient sensors to monitor the locations and conditions of injured people who are awaiting treatment. Technologies for locating emergency responders at the scene of a disaster may also make use of sensor networks. Sensor networks that are permanently installed, as in a building, may be linked together by cable. However, for economic reasons (e.g., when covering larger areas), it may be desirable to use radio links. For any system, its link to the incident commander may best be made via wireless communications. In the case of intrusion detection and locating of emergency responders, the detection process may involve radio technology at the sensor. Sensor networks that are established at the time of an incident will most likely be linked using radio technology.10 During emergency conditions, some emergency responders may be fitted with devices to monitor medical conditions, equipment status, and environmental conditions, to provide warning alarms, and to display location information and evacuation routes.11 These capabilities will require hands-free voice recognition, noise cancellation, and so on. Providing these functions and connecting the devices to a radio for transmission will require a specially adapted computer, worn by the individual. Most importantly, national emergency responder communications systems require an overarching enterprise architecture. This system must have the resiliency and redundancy to enable continued operations even if the network is directly targeted and attacked by terrorists. It must be capable of establishing priority communications links and addressing the “overload” demands that could occur during a crisis response. It must be open architecture, such as the one proposed by the DOD’s C4ISR Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Capabilities While enhanced command, control, computers, and communications are essential to developing the shared common operational picture needed to enhance the capability of federal, state, and local emergency responders across the nation, the capabilities that support this picture are equally essential and indispensable. They are founded on the integration and analysis of the products of multiple ISR sensors and the firsthand reports of emergency responders and observers. 10   A recent issue of Proceedings of the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (Volume 91, Issue 8, August 2003) is devoted entirely to sensor networks and applications. Nearly all of the work reported was supported by the DOD, some of it by the Army. 11   Guy Beakley, Hicks and Associates, Inc., “C4ISR Requirements for the Nation’s First Responders from Project Responder,” briefing to the committee, Washington, D.C., July 22, 2003.

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Army Science and Technology for Homeland Security: Report 2 - C4ISR The ISR system of systems for homeland security emergency responders can contribute to a shared common picture by helping to meet several basic requirements, including the following: Establish databases under normal conditions to serve as a template for comparison, Facilitate common situational understanding, Monitor critical assets required for response, Provide event assessment, and Conduct course-of-action development and situation management. Technologies that help meet these fundamental purposes are essential to developing a truly effective national emergency response capability. Fielding an ISR family of systems along with the requisite displays and analytical tools may be well beyond the initial capacity of state and local agencies. However, it is possible and desirable to build a national capability based on broadband communications drawing on information from selected assessment centers. Even before an event, ISR systems should ideally provide the intelligence needed by emergency responders to prepare for operations and the ability to identify the agency and/or the officials responsible for collecting and analyzing different types of intelligence. Intelligence collection will require implementing tools, training, and processes to support intelligence activities beforehand. In addition, well before a crisis C4ISR should provide the capacity for the early detection, identification, assessment, and tracking of, for example, exposure to biological agents through epidemiological and veterinary surveillance. Determining the extent of the physical damage from an attack or disaster involves comparing the resultant damage to the original status of facilities in the area. Databases that describe the design of facilities and their location are important in establishing the baseline condition. In the future, it is possible that structures will have embedded sensors that measure stresses occurring as the result of both natural and terrorist events. Overhead imagery can be used to systematically describe the effects of an event. Additionally, local terrestrial sensors can be placed in an affected area to provide focused readings of the effects. Unmanned robotic vehicles may enhance the common operational picture of natural or terrorist events. The ability to fuse the measurements from overhead imagery and focused sensor reports from embedded sensors can enable emergency responders to rapidly build an understanding of the magnitude of an event. One of the most critical tasks following a WMD event would be to assess the extent and spread of the chemical, biological, or nuclear contamination. The development of the courses of action for containment, remediation, and decontamination are highly dependent on the current and projected status of the contamination. The characterization of the contamination is developed from knowledge of

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Army Science and Technology for Homeland Security: Report 2 - C4ISR the location of the event, environmental factors, and the results of multiple sensor readings. It is plausible that plume models could be employed to provide real-time and projected contamination contours. These contours would then be displayed on digital maps to create a common operational picture of a WMD event. A shared picture of this kind can greatly enhance the process of developing courses of action for containment, remediation, and decontamination. Unfortunately, there are few sensors distributed around the nation for chemical or biological events (however, a fixed infrastructure of nuclear sensors is distributed across the nation). The U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) would probably be called upon to provide and disperse sensors to characterize a WMD event. Overhead imagery could be useful in the process. It is feasible that in the future a family of unmanned aerial vehicles could be employed to plant a family of sensors in a contaminated area to continually update and assess the situation. And in some cases, emergency personnel in protective suits might insert terrestrial sensors to characterize the situation. Another aspect of the assessment process is the determination of the status of casualties. In a chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or high-explosive event, emergency responders will need to know the status and location of the many potential casualties. Much of this picture will be generated from databases and estimates of similar events, but as happened when the World Trade Center’s Twin Towers, parts of the Pentagon, and the Murrah Federal Building were destroyed, there can be an urgent need to locate casualties buried in rubble. Although this situation also occurs with earthquakes, the task of locating and rescuing people is far more complex if an area is contaminated as a result of a WMD event. In the Army’s science and technology (S&T) program for the Future Force and for urban combat, new sensors are being developed to “see” inside structures, and robotics equipped with sensors are being developed to go inside structures and under rubble and debris. The benefits of blue force tracking and in-transit visibility, which allow participants to know where personnel are located, have been clearly demonstrated in recent conflicts. These systems can also contribute to the development of a common operational picture for emergency responders. In planning a course of action for emergency responders, it would be very useful to know where emergency responder vehicles, food stocks, medical supplies, and safe facilities are located and what their status is. Accounting for the location of responders at the incident scene is considered a significant challenge. Many firefighters, for example, are injured and do not receive prompt treatment because of confusion over the location and activities of individuals on the scene. Another concern is the possibility of physical assault. Responders focused on providing aid to victims and managing an on-scene response believe that they could be particularly vulnerable to surprise attacks and other violent acts (LaTourrette et al., 2003). Fire alarm systems in large buildings offer an example of a limited ISR system that is already used by emergency responders. Improving this system to

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Army Science and Technology for Homeland Security: Report 2 - C4ISR provide firefighters with information on temperature, smoke, and other aspects of a situation can be financed by building owners as a building code requirement. Easy interpretation of this information would require the additional development of graphical displays and integration with GIS databases. The National Institute of Standards and Technology foresees the integration of fire prediction models with building and fire information to predict the advance of fires as a firefighting tool, much as plume models might be used to deal with WMD events. OPPORTUNITIES FOR TRAINING AND EXERCISES Training Emergency responders receive the majority of their training opportunities in their own communities. However, the DHS, through the Office of Domestic Preparedness (ODP) and the Federal Emergency Management Agency, provides direct training and technical assistance to state and local jurisdictions to enhance their capacity and readiness to respond to domestic incidents as part of the State and Local Domestic Preparedness Training and Technical Assistance Program. Based on National Fire Protection Association standards, the training provides emergency responders with comprehensive instruction in the areas of WMD awareness, technical support, operations, and terrorist incident command. All courses are reviewed rigorously by federal, state, and local subject matter experts who examine the course materials to ensure their accuracy and compliance with accepted policies and procedures. ODP staff have established regular and recurring meetings with representatives from the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the Public Health Service/Office of Emergency Preparedness, and the National Fire Academy to discuss and coordinate the development of training for responding to WMD attacks and the delivery of such training courses. Additionally, ODP has on-site representation from the National Guard Bureau to coordinate program efforts and provide technical assistance and guidance. Of note, the Institute of Medicine’s Preparing for Terrorism—Tools for Evaluating the Metropolitan Medical Response System Program (IOM, 2002) provides an excellent description of programs of training for medical-emergency first responders, as well as an evaluation of the effectiveness of that training and other elements of preparation in relation to response scenarios. These efforts go well beyond training of individual medical personnel within the framework of their individual responsibilities. Exercises Experience and data show that exercises are a practical and efficient way to prepare for crises. They test critical resistance, identify procedural difficulties,

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Army Science and Technology for Homeland Security: Report 2 - C4ISR and provide a plan for corrective actions to improve crisis and consequence management response capabilities without the penalties that might be incurred in a real crisis. Exercises also provide a unique learning opportunity to synchronize and integrate cross-functional and intergovernmental crisis and consequence management response. ODP’s national exercises and state and local domestic preparedness programs of exercises build on the office’s training, technical assistance, and equipment program activities, and incorporate the tremendous instructional value of exercises into its Domestic Preparedness Program. The National Exercise Program began in May 2000, when at the direction of the Congress, ODP conducted the TOPOFF (Top Officials) exercise, the largest federal, state, and local exercise of its kind, involving three separate locations and a multitude of federal, state, and local agencies. TOPOFF simulated simultaneous chemical, biological, and radiological attacks around the country and provided valuable lessons for the nation’s federal, state, and local emergency response communities. PROJECT RESPONDER In determining the capabilities that emergency responders require, the committee examined in some detail the results of a national effort aimed at improving local, state, and federal emergency responders’ capabilities to respond to the effects of terrorism-related weapons of mass destruction. Beginning in April 2001, well before the September 11 attacks, the National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism in Oklahoma City, working initially with the Department of Justice and later with the DHS, contracted for a study to identify emergency responders’ required capabilities and capability gaps. The study leveraged work conducted by the Interagency Board for Equipment Standardization and Interoperability (IAB) and worked with representatives of the first-responder community to identify requirements needed by the emergency responder community to mitigate the damage from a terrorist attack. The ultimate goals of this effort are to produce a national technology plan to help better focus research on the technological requirements of the responder community and to develop a Web-based, user friendly “responder knowledge base” of current and emerging systems for response to terrorism. This effort is called Project Responder. The committee received a briefing12 from the vice president of C4ISR for Hicks and Associates, Inc., one of the collaborators on Project Responder, and had access to the various reports developed by the project. This information enabled the committee to validate independently developed information against the Project Responder database. Tables 3-1 through 3-4 present information from 12   Guy Beakley, Hicks and Associates, Inc., “C4ISR Requirements for the Nation’s First Responders from Project Responder,” briefing to the committee, Washington, D.C., July 22, 2003.

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Army Science and Technology for Homeland Security: Report 2 - C4ISR BOX 3-1 National Terrorism Response Objectives Personal Protection Detection, Identification, and Assessment Unified Incident Command Decision Support and Interoperable Communications Response and Recovery Emergency Management Preparation and Planning Crisis Evaluation and Management All-Source Situational Understanding Medical Response Public Health Readiness for Biological Agent Events Logistics Support Criminal Investigation and Attribution Agricultural Mitigation and Restoration NOTE: Objectives in bold type relate to some aspect of C4ISR. SOURCE: Pollard et al. (2003). Project Responder depicting some of the capability shortfalls as measured against several of the National Terrorism Response Objectives (see Box 3-1). Detection, Identification, and Assessment In the area of detection, identification, and assessment of WMD threats, the following specific C4ISR capabilities needed by emergency responders are identified: On-scene detection: Initial detection and characterization of danger to self and others; inclusion of detection before an event or onset of symptoms and characterization of suspicious objects; Remote and standoff detection: Identification and assessment of threat from outside the hot zone; remote sensors (e.g., lidar or directional/ imaging detectors), and/or point sensors mounted on robotic ground and air vehicles; Detector arrays and networks: Sensor arrays that can be networked to provide alerts, identification, and localization of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive threats; linkage to command data centers; provision of environmental monitoring in urban centers, building interiors; Epidemiological surveillance and information systems: Initial detection and characterization of a WMD event through public health and veterinary

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Army Science and Technology for Homeland Security: Report 2 - C4ISR surveillance; data-mining tools to detect abnormal levels of illness; linkage to suggested tactics, techniques, and procedures specific to the detected threat; and Remote detection of deception/intent: Noninvasive, noncontact detection of human deception and hostile intent at security checkpoints. Table 3-1 presents the Project Responder capability assessment for the detection, identification, and assessment of WMD threats. Unified Incident Command Decision Support and Interoperable Communications In the area of unified incident command decision support and interoperable communications, the following specific C4ISR capabilities needed by emergency responders are identified: Point location and identification: The ability to know and visualize at all times the location and identity of individual responders, regardless of their position or movement; Seamless connectivity and integration: Communications systems that are able to seamlessly and dynamically interconnect multiple interagency users (with multiple functions) and information and communications technology systems; Information assurance: Guarantees of the availability, confidentiality, security, and integrity of information and information systems, including redundant systems; Incident command information management and dissemination: The ability to provide decision support, situation and resource status management, communications system management, and mission and task tracking; and Multimedia-supported telepresence: Provision of a multimedia telepresence between incident commanders, response personnel, technical specialists, and off-site facilities. Table 3-2 presents the Project Responder capability assessment for unified incident command decision support and interoperable communications. Emergency Management Preparation and Planning In the area of emergency management preparation and planning for WMD scenarios, the following specific C4ISR capabilities needed by emergency responders are identified:

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Army Science and Technology for Homeland Security: Report 2 - C4ISR Risk awareness and assessment: Assessment and analysis of threat, vulnerability, and criticality of events, venues, and systems (including key assets and infrastructures); High-value target identification and monitoring: Retention of the identity of high-value targets, use of appropriate monitoring techniques, communication of status whenever needed, and addressing of transitional threats; and Disseminating threat and situation advisories: Timely dissemination of vetted, evaluated, and actionable intelligence; audience-specific information; inclusion of local through national-level threat advisories. Table 3-3 presents the Project Responder capability assessment for emergency management preparation and planning for WMD scenarios. Crisis Evaluation and Management In the area of crisis evaluation and management for WMD scenarios, the following specific C4ISR capabilities required for emergency responders are identified: Threat assessment data collection and analysis: The ability to collect specific and potential threat-related information, analyze the data, and validate and assess the threat for purposes of identifying the threat credibility; Threat-relevant data dissemination: The ability to identify what kinds of threat related information needs to be disseminated, identify who needs to receive what information, and deliver the right information to the right people; and Tactical threat assessment: The ability to assess threats inside buildings (i.e., “seeing” through walls), awareness of perpetrators’ actions and of position and status of devices and weapons; risk, hazard, and situational size-up (quick assessment); and identification of individuals and objects that are at risk. Table 3-4 depicts the Project Responder capability assessment for crisis evaluation and management for WMD scenarios. Summary of Project Responder Capability Assessment From the number of “red” entries (signifying “high risk; capability not currently available, fundamental science and technology work needed”) in Tables 3-1 through 3-4, it is clear that many capabilities for emergency responders have not yet been met.

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Army Science and Technology for Homeland Security: Report 2 - C4ISR TABLE 3-1 Capability Shortfalls for Emergency Responders in the Detection, Identification, and Assessment of Weapons of Mass Destruction Threats Capability Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear High-Explosive/ Incendiary On-scene detection Yellow Red Yellow Red Yellow Remote and standoff detection Red Red Red Red Yellow Detector arrays and networks Red Red Red Red Red Epidemiological surveillance and information systems Yellow Yellow Yellow N/A N/A Remote detection of deception/intent Red Red Red Red Red NOTES: Red = High risk; capability not currently available, fundamental science and technology work needed. Yellow = Medium risk; technology exists but needs significant development. Green = Low risk; technology exists and simply needs maturation (none in this category in Table 3-1). N/A = Not applicable. SOURCE: Adapted from Guy Beakley, Hicks and Associates, Inc., “C4ISR Requirements for the Nation’s First Responders from Project Responder,” briefing to the committee, Washington, D.C., July 22, 2003. TABLE 3-2 Capability Shortfalls for Emergency Responders in Unified Incident Command Decision Support and Interoperable Communications Capability Information Acquisition Information Assessment and Course-of-Action Development Decision Making Direction Point location and identification Yellow Red Red N/A Seamless connectivity and integration Red Red Red Red Information assurance Red Red Red Red Incident command information management and dissemination Yellow Red Red Red Multimedia-supported telepresence Yellow Yellow Yellow Yellow NOTES: Red = High risk; capability not currently available, fundamental science and technology work needed; Yellow = Medium risk; technology exists but needs significant development; Green = Low risk; technology exists and simply needs maturation (none in this category in Table 3-2); N/A = Not applicable. SOURCE: Adapted from Guy Beakley, Hicks and Associates, Inc., “C4ISR Requirements for the Nation’s First Responders from Project Responder,” briefing to the committee, Washington, D.C., July 22, 2003.

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Army Science and Technology for Homeland Security: Report 2 - C4ISR TABLE 3-3 Capability Shortfalls for Emergency Responders in Emergency Management Preparation and Planning for Weapons of Mass Destruction Scenarios Capability Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear High-Explosive/ Incendiary Risk awareness and assessment Yellow Yellow Yellow Yellow Yellow High-value target identification and monitoring Red Red Red Red Red Disseminating threat and situation advisories Yellow Red Yellow Yellow Yellow NOTES: Red = High risk; capability not currently available, fundamental science and technology work needed; Yellow = Medium risk; technology exists but needs significant development; Green = Low risk; technology exists and simply needs maturation (none in this category in Table 3-3); N/A = Not applicable. SOURCE: Adapted from Guy Beakley, Hicks and Associates, Inc., “C4ISR Requirements for the Nation’s First Responders from Project Responder,” briefing to the committee, Washington, D.C., July 22, 2003. TABLE 3-4 Capability Shortfalls for Emergency Responders in Crisis Evaluation and Management for Weapons of Mass Destruction Scenarios Capability Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear High-Explosive/ Incendiary Threat assessment data collection and analysis Red Red Red Red Red Threat-relevant data dissemination Red Red Red Red Red Tactical threat assessment Yellow Red Yellow Yellow Yellow NOTES: Red = High risk; capability not currently available, fundamental science and technology work needed; Yellow = Medium risk; technology exists but needs significant development; Green = Low risk; technology exists and simply needs maturation (none in this category in Table 3-4); N/A = Not applicable. SOURCE: Adapted from Guy Beakley, Hicks and Associates, Inc., “C4ISR Requirements for the Nation’s First Responders from Project Responder,” briefing to the committee, Washington, D.C., July 22, 2003.

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Army Science and Technology for Homeland Security: Report 2 - C4ISR REFERENCES Canada, B. 2003. Homeland Security: Standards for State and Local Preparedness. May 12. Available online at <http://public.ansi.org/ansionline/Documents/Standards%20Activities/Homeland%20Security%20Standards%20Panel/RL31680.pdf>. Accessed November 20, 2003. Cashin, T., D. Evans, and B. Salis. 2003. First Responder’s Panel. Pp. 52–56 in Urban Security: Engineering the Protection of our Cities, Proceedings of the Conference on Urban Security: Engineering the Protection of Our Cities, October 7. George Bugliarello, ed. Brooklyn, N.Y.: Polytechnic University. Collins, J.J. 2000. Training America’s Emergency Responders: A Report on the Department of Justice’s Center for Domestic Preparedness and the U.S. Public Health Service’s Noble Training Center, Fort McClellan, Anniston, Alabama. July. Available online at <http://www.csis.org/homeland/reports/FirstResponders.html>. Accessed on September 25, 2003. IOM (Institute of Medicine). 2002. Preparing for Terrorism—Tools for Evaluating the Metropolitan Medical Response System Program. Washington, D.C.: The National Academies Press. ISTS (Institute for Security and Technology Studies). 2001. Cyber Attacks During the War on Terrorism: A Predictive Analysis. September 22. Available online at <http://www.ists.dartmouth.edu/ISTS/counterterrorism/cyber_a1.pdf>. Accessed September 25, 2003. Jackson, B., D.J. Peterson, J. Bartis, T. LaTourrette, I. Brahmakulam, A. Houser, and J. Sollinger. 2002. Protecting Emergency Responders: Lessons Learned from Terrorist Attacks. Available online at <http://www.rand.org/publications/CF/CF176/>. Accessed September 24, 2003. Larson, E.V., and J.E. Peters. 2001. Preparing the U.S. Army for Homeland Security: Concepts, Issues, and Options. Available online at <http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1251/>. Accessed September 29, 2003. LaTourrette, T., D.J. Peterson, J.T. Bartis, B.A. Jackson, and A. Houser. 2003. Protecting Emergency Responders, Volume 2: Community Views of Safety and Health Risks and Personal Protection Needs. Available online at <http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1646/>. Accessed August 21, 2003. NIJ (National Institute of Justice). 2003. When They Can’t Talk Lives Are Lost: What Public Officials Need to Know About Interoperability. February. Available online at <http://www.agileprogram.org/ntfi/ntfi_brochure.pdf>. Accessed April 1, 2004. NRC (National Research Council). 2003. Science and Technology for Army Homeland Security, Report 1. Washington, D.C.: The National Academies Press. OHS (Office of Homeland Security). 2002. National Strategy for Homeland Security, July. Available online at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/book/nat_strat_hls.pdf>. Accessed September 24, 2003. Pollard, N.A., R.V. Tuohy, and T. Garwin. 2003. Project Responder Interim Report: Emergency Responders’ Needs, Goals, and Priorities, March. Oklahoma City, Okla.: The Oklahoma City National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism. Schwabe, W., L.M. Davis, and B.A. Jackson. 2001. Challenges and Choices for Crime-Fighting Technology: Federal Support of State and Local Law Enforcement. Available online at <http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1349/>. Accessed September 26, 2003. U.S. Congress. 2002. First Responder Terrorism Preparedness Act of 2002, Senate Report 107-295, October 1. Available online at <http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/useftp.cgi?IPaddress=162.140.64.21&filename=sr295.pdf&directory=/diskb/wais/data/107_cong_reports>. Accessed September 24, 2003.