Army Science and Technology for Homeland Security: Report 2: C4ISR (2004)

This chapter focuses on the technologies that are currently being developed in the Army or other components of the Department of Defense (DOD) in the area of command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) and which the committee believes may have potential application to the homeland security mission and emergency responders. Much of the information contained in the chapter is derived from Army and DOD documentation, from briefings presented to the panel, and from first-hand knowledge of the study committee members. No attempt is made to offer a comprehensive presentation with respect to these technologies, because of both space and study schedule limitations. Rather, it is the committee’s intent to present to the Army and the homeland security community those technologies that the committee believes may have relevance for emergency responders and which could prompt further interaction between the Army and the emergency responder community.

Very little discussion of commercial programs is presented here, as the committee believed that to do a credible and comprehensive job in such an endeavor would far exceed the scope of the present report; also, it was reluctant to highlight a particular commercial product without reviewing other similar available products. Nevertheless, there certainly are products being developed in the commercial world that would be of great benefit to the emergency responder. A major contribution has been made by commercial industry in the development of software

tools, particularly decision-making tools, that can easily be adapted to military and/or emergency responder use. Likewise, commercial standards such as those established by the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers and current and evolving Internet protocols can be very helpful in achieving interoperability across the plethora of agencies involved in homeland security, and the committee believes that these standards ought to be categorized and incorporated into any equipment development programs by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).

Following the methodology adopted in Chapters 2 and 3, the committee divided the C4ISR elements as follows: command, control, and computers (C3); communications (C); and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR). As explained previously, the choice of command, control, and computers as a grouping was made because of the integral nature of decision-making algorithms and software now so prevalent in command-and-control systems, and in fact enabled by the vast data capacity and fast processing made available by today’s computers. “Communications” stands by itself as the backbone of any such system. The ISR aspect of C4ISR is treated as a single entity because of the overlapping technologies underpinning the area.

This chapter begins with a general discussion of the technical issues associated with C4ISR, primarily from a broad system perspective. The committee identifies some broad-based programs and tools, at the integrated system level, that may be of interest to emergency responders and to the DHS. After a general technical discussion of C4ISR, attention is turned to the component-level areas (C3, C, and ISR). Finally, after a discussion of the technologies, the committee identifies some of the programs believed to be relevant, perhaps with modifications, to the emergency responder community and the DHS. Tables throughout this chapter (Tables 4-1 through 4-5) summarize the technologies relevant to each major aspect of C4ISR.

Finally, the committee offers some comments on other programs and activities within the DOD that, although outside the strict C4ISR arena, offer real value to the emergency responder. For example, attention is given to the major investment and significant advantages available in the DOD modeling and simulation arena.

Science and technology (S&T) in the area of C4ISR is designed to enable comprehensive situational awareness for network-centric operations (U.S. Army, 2003). As such, it has several technical components: the generation of sensor data; the processing required to turn these sensor data into information; the movement of the data or information through a communications system to another location; the integration of the information from various sources, both internal and external, to turn it into intelligence; the presentation of the intelligence to a user or a decision-support software program in a comprehensible fashion; and the dissemination of the decisions (commands) and selected information to subordinate elements. Each activity described here has its own unique—and sometimes complex—technology.

There are several issues associated with an effective C4ISR system that must be addressed in any technical solution. Many of these issues are being addressed in current Army and DOD programs. One such issue is whether or not the system will rely on commercial infrastructures, particularly power and fixed communications lines, or will be entirely self-reliant. Another key issue is mobility—that is, whether the system is fixed at one or more locations or is mobile. Of importance are the power and bandwidth issues, particularly those involving high-bandwidth video imagery, associated with the sensors and the movement of raw or processed data. A key parameter is information latency, tied closely to computer processing time and communication bandwidth. Another sometimes-related parameter involves the uncertainty associated with the generation of information and how the information will be used in the decision-making process. Another major systems issue is cost, particularly life-cycle cost. A brief discussion of some aspects of these key parameters follows.

Reliance on existing infrastructure versus a completely independent system as the backbone or even a component of a C4ISR system is probably the key design issue for the entire system, particularly with respect to the sensor system and the communications system. The design of a sensor system may be entirely different if it is a mobile, deployable system relying on battery power and a limited communications system—such as the Army’s legacy Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System—instead of being at a fixed site, utilizing infrastructure power and communication lines. In the latter case, power and bandwidth issues are not as constraining as in the former case, and even in the event of a power failure, there is usually a redundancy in power that will keep the system up and running for a period of time. However, in a catastrophic event, emergency

responders may not be able to rely on fixed infrastructure, and so the capability of an independent system, at least on a temporary basis, would be prudent.

Mobility issues are related to but not identical to fixed-infrastructure issues. A mobile system can still rely heavily on the use of commercial power or communication lines as part of its technical solution. A completely independent mobile system using its own power and communications infrastructure is probably the ideal case—although, owing to power and bandwidth constraints, there may be limitations on system performance. The Army’s Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T) and C3¹-on-the-Move Demonstration are addressing both the independent infrastructure and the mobility issues.

Data latency (i.e., how much and how fast data or information can be transmitted across a network) is very important. In some cases, particularly if an emergency responder’s life may be at risk, late information or direction may be useless or even detrimental if the responder was relying on it. Latency is associated with processing power (how fast sensor data can be converted to information) and communication bandwidth availability (how fast the information can be provided to the appropriate decision maker or user). Closely related to this issue are the generation and transport of video imagery across the network. Video imagery requires considerable bandwidth, raising the question of what is good enough. Are two or three frames sufficient, or does the military or incident commander need full video? If the latter, what frame rates are sufficient—say, 10 frames per second or 30 frames per second? Is a sensor processor declaration that an object is a T-72 tank sufficient, or must the analyst see an image of it to be sure? The Army’s Network Sensors for the Future Force Program is addressing the generation and transport of video imagery across the network.

The uncertainty in information and the conversion of information to intelligence are also key issues, not independent of the latency and amount of information transferred. Uncertainty is generated in different ways. It could arise when a sensor, using automatic target recognition software, identifies a T-72 tank with a 90 percent confidence interval. It could also result from a human looking at an image and making a best guess at identifying it. Using aggregated information and trying to infer enemy composition and intent involve an inherent uncertainty that must be understood when courses of action are developed. The Army’s Knowledge Fusion Program is looking at some of these issues.

Finally, there is the difficulty of delivering information to the end user as it is needed and in a form that supports the task at hand, whether the user is a civilian incident commander, an infantry squad leader, or an individual soldier. Excess information, causing information overload, can be as detrimental as too little information. The concept of “push-pull” has been used in this area, with “push” meaning that certain information deemed to be important to a certain user is

automatically sent to him or her based on some pre-selected criteria, and “pull” meaning that information is sent only when it is asked for. How the information is presented, whether on a computer display, in an audio message, by a vibration, and so on, is also important.

Additionally, the problem of cost is associated with some of the Army’s high-performance sensors, particularly high-resolution, platform-based infrared imaging sensors. No matter how good they are, if the sensors cost too much, the system can become unaffordable for the Army. Cost may also be important to emergency responders because much equipment is procured through local budgets or grants. If emergency responder acquisitions cannot be bundled to achieve the economies of scale seen in military procurements, costs may be prohibitive at the local level.

Several programs attempt to look at the C4ISR system as a whole and to deal with the full complexity of systems integration. Three of these programs are noted here, with one, the C3-on-the-Move Demonstration, looking at providing integrated information to the rapidly moving platforms associated with Future Force and Future Combat Systems (FCS), and the other two, Land Warrior and Future Force Warrior, focusing more at the lower-echelon, infantry-level platform, the soldier. The committee believes that these programs are of particular importance for their applicability to emergency responders. The relevant integrated systems technology programs are shown in Table 4-1.

As discussed above, C3 technologies can support emergency responders’ need for informed event management. The following is a general discussion of technical issues and a follow-on discussion of applicable DOD programs. Table 4-2 presents information on the relevant C3 technologies, including a brief description or statement of purpose and an availability assessment.

The general technical issues associated with command and control are primarily focused on the aggregation of different information from various sources to support the incident commander’s decision-making process. The ability to fuse information from different sources into a coherent picture of the battlespace or disaster scene and the use of decision-support tools are the key technical aspects.

Fusion Technologies. Information fusion is the combination and distillation of information from various databases driven by a set of search algorithms designed to focus on answers to a set of queries. Knowledge management, expert systems, and artificial intelligence all contribute to information fusion. Knowledge management combines the capture of an organization’s information with (relatively) easy retrieval and use of that information by the corporate body. The intent is to make the knowledge that exists in a variety of locations available to the entire organization. Expert systems and artificial intelligence generally focus on narrow domains to assist human endeavors. Fusion technology systems attempt to take functions performed by humans and assist or replicate the actions of the human.

Image fusion combines images from several or various types of sensors into a single image for the viewer. This image, for example, could take the form of a digital terrain map that has icons of friendly and enemy forces depicted as an overlay. The data on the force locations could be received in message format from an intelligence or headquarters organization. It could also take the form, for example, of a combination of a photographic image taken in the visible spectrum,

an infrared photo, and a synthetic aperture radar image. In both cases the images need to be “registered” to a common map grid so that, in the latter case, similar terrain features (such as a crossroad) appear in the same place on the resulting fused image.

Decision-Support Tools. As sensors proliferate and more and more information is provided to the incident commander, he or she can quickly become overwhelmed. Decision-support tools—many of which can be adapted from the commercial market—can help the incident commander to use this information wisely. These tools can be adapted to military or police tasks to indicate potential courses of action, such as showing how resources can be allocated and where deficiencies might arise.

The history of the advance of radio communications shows an oscillation between commercial and traditional military applications. Table 4-3 presents information on communications technologies relevant to emergency responders, including a brief description or statement of purpose and an assessment of availability. The most recent major advances have come in the commercial sector, with the goal of giving mobility to telephone and Internet users. However, the goals and constraints of commercial and military radio systems are different. While both applications seek mobility, only the military seeks independence from fixed terrestrial infrastructure.

The goals and constraints of communications systems intended for homeland security and emergency workers lie somewhere between those of commercial systems and traditional military applications. Mobility is of course essential. However, depending on the size and nature of anticipated events or attacks, there can be some degree of reliance on fixed infrastructure. In order to discuss these differences in goals and constraints in greater depth, it is convenient to consider command and tactical networks separately.

Cost is an important consideration for the communications networks of emergency workers. Local governments (funding personnel such as firefighters and police) and companies with emergency workers (such as utilities) may not be willing to spend additional amounts for functionality that is used only for rare but large-scale emergencies. Thus, it may be important to engineer communications systems that can be upgraded incrementally. For example, a state or federal agency could bring radio equipment that would connect individual groups of emergency workers responding to large events.

Bandwidth is an increasingly scarce commodity, but there are work-arounds. Today, for example, 1000 simultaneous two-way conversations can be easily

accommodated in a 25-megahertz (MHz) band. With new technologies, such as Wideband Code Division Multiple Access, commercial systems might handle closer to 2,500 simultaneous two-way conversations. Even greater capacity may be on the horizon (Ericsson, 2001). Accounting for dead time in each conversation will allow nearly doubling the number of conversations that can be accommodated. At an event covering a large area, frequencies can be reused in different parts of the site, allowing for even more conversations. Compressed video of standard quality can be sent at 30 frames per second with a data transmission speed of 6 megabits per second (Mbps), which can be accommodated in less than 6 MHz of bandwidth. A lower frame rate or reduced image quality may be acceptable, thereby reducing the bandwidth required for transmission. Cable modems give fast access to the Internet at about 1 Mbps, requiring 1 MHz bandwidth or less. Since the bandwidth for data access is needed only for short periods of time, many terminals can have access using the same frequency band.

Thus, bandwidths on the order of 25 MHz should be adequate to support the

communications needs at a major crisis event. While public safety bands of 25 MHz exist, they are currently divided among various agencies in small disjointed segments. Each agency may deploy its segment of the bandwidth in a way that makes it impossible to share bandwidth with others, so no one can get the full advantage of its use. Developing a consensus among emergency workers to reform the use of bandwidth will require considerable resources and leadership.

A command network for vertical and horizontal communications among the commanders of different groups of emergency workers, with reach-back to local, state, and national headquarters, must accommodate voice, video, and data. In order to recover from information loss and to permit a forensic study of a crisis event, such a network should allow for recording and archiving the tactical communications at a fixed headquarters. For routine events, radio communications could be transmitted via terrestrial infrastructure designed to give good coverage over the region being served. However, to be prepared for a major catastrophic event involving destruction of the terrestrial infrastructure, some mechanism is needed for connecting to the fixed network via satellite, airborne relay, or terrestrial relay.

The functionality of this radio command network would be comparable to that envisioned for Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) Cluster 1, although it will not have the capability to work with legacy military systems (U.S. Army, 2003). In particular, the system could make use of the wider bandwidth available in some public safety bands and avoid the costly features of JTRS Cluster 1, which is software programmable and multiband. The command network must have access to databases in the fixed network and therefore can make use of Internet protocols, as is intended for Army networks. While the databases must be secure from malicious intrusion, it may not be necessary to encrypt transmissions over the networks.

Tactical networks of man-pack radios are needed to provide communications among incident commanders and individual emergency responders and among responders within a group. This network will be similar in use to that envisioned for JTRS Cluster 2, Squad-Level Communications, which at this time is in the research stage. Because this radio system is only in the research stage and is least influenced by legacy systems, it is well positioned to accommodate the needs of emergency responders. Moreover, fielding such a family of radios to all emergency responders could provide for interoperability among different groups of emergency responders, at least at the tactical level.

Emergency responders need radios capable of two-way voice and data trans-

mission, possibly including low-rate video from helmet-mounted cameras. It is easy to envision many uses for the down-link transmission of data from the global information grid (GIG) (e.g., vehicular records, photographs) to the personal digital assistances (PDA)s of individual emergency responders, and digital up-link transmissions (requests for data, vital signs, and equipment status). This capability is consistent with the applications seen by the Army for squad-level communications.

Ad hoc network technologies are being considered for JTRS Cluster 2 in order to create robust, network-centric communications. Firefighters operate in small units and have communications procedures and needs similar to those of an Army squad. Communications links must provide coverage over large buildings, in tunnels, and in other difficult environments not conducive to signal propagation. Current approaches to providing such coverage are based on the use of repeaters carried by firefighters or fixed in the infrastructure. In the case of ad hoc networks, nodes brought in for an operation or permanently fixed in the infrastructure would replace the repeaters. With sufficient deployment of such nodes, good coverage could be obtained, even in difficult radio environments.

Under normal conditions, police and emergency medical services communicate with a dispatcher rather than with each other. In this case robust coverage may be achieved using an ad hoc network design with the additional fixed nodes distributed in the infrastructure, as discussed above.

Given the scope of this study, the committee did not conduct a technical review of any of the communications programs listed in Table 4-3. However, on the basis of briefings provided to it and the knowledge of its members, the committee expressed some concerns with regard to the basic structure of the JTRS. The committee sees the program as being confronted with the challenge of retaining compatibility with legacy systems, while at the same time making significant progress toward the network-centric operations envisioned for the future battlefield. If this dilemma is not managed carefully, the outcome could be that of perpetuating the legacy radios at the expense of developing the low-cost, adaptable radio needed for the future. Additionally, while this type of radio would seemingly be very useful for the emergency responders in a local jurisdiction, such as the police force, firefighters, and National Guard and FBI personnel, the DOD requirements are well beyond what the local emergency responder needs and can afford.

The committee believes that the fundamental objective of future radio programs should be to implement the radio component of the network-centric warfare envisioned in the current DOD doctrine. To be successful, advantage must be taken of advances in commercial communications. The adoption of commercial

standards should be an objective. In fact, a previous study by the National Research Council urged the military’s participation in setting commercial standards to increase the commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) components of military radio systems (NRC, 1997). The military network solution must address problems such as routing in a mobile environment and the determination of adaptive and efficient ways to use the available spectrum. Addressing these problems will require taking advantage of the significant technology advances made by the cellular industry—which would best be done through the substantial involvement of that industry. This approach will also be necessary to enhance the radio in a straightforward manner and to produce it at a cost that would make it accessible to the civilian emergency responder community.

The future radio will require new modulation techniques, compression mechanisms, and error-correction features. These elements are clearly in the radio domain. Other functionality such as communications security, routing, and gateway services could be allocated to the radio or the terminal. In the end only certain pieces will be designated as radio components. Therefore, the tactical radio of the future must be designed in the context of the overall architecture envisioned for conducting network-centric information warfare.

The future radio is a software-defined radio (SDR). SDR technology can be used in any device that uses radio frequencies for communication, including cellular base stations, military communications systems, and public safety radios. SDR appears to be the best approach for interoperability, since it provides an immediate, cost-effective solution that does not require organizations to purchase new radios. A portable SDR device brought to an emergency scene can enable interoperability among selected members of different agencies by creating communication links between different radios and establishing infrastructure where none exists, or supplementing inadequate existing infrastructure by serving as a base station (Steinheider, 2003).

The DOD recognizes the potential efficiency and performance of SDR and has established the Joint Tactical Radio System Joint Program Office (JTRS JPO) to pursue this technology. The JPO has begun to acquire software implementations of a first set of 33 communications standards. The key standard is the software communications architecture (SCA), intended to ensure interoperability across platforms from many vendors. Thus, the JTRS operational requirements document (ORD) identifies compatibility with many military and commercial waveforms (JROC, 2003). The SCA standardizes the software’s operating environment, as well as the control and communications mechanisms for both the hardware and the external interfaces of the radio. Many NATO allies have signed agreements to apply the SCA in future acquisitions, and the JPO hopes that the SCA will become the basis for commercial SDR software standards (Steinheider, 2003).

Generally speaking, the technologies associated with ISR are the processing technologies at sensors or the sensor nodes, sensor communication networks that carry either the raw data or the processed data or information, higher-level fusion (discussed above) and processing aids such as automatic target recognition or higher-level aggregation and interpretation software, and displays. Table 4-4 presents information on the relevant ISR technologies, including a brief description or statement of purpose and an availability assessment.

IR/Thermal Detector Technologies. The Army has had a leading role in developing IR and thermal detector technologies during the past five decades. The major technology investment has been in mercury cadmium telluride (HgCdTe). High-performance detector systems based on this technology are in use or under development. Other detector technologies include bolometers, quantum well infrared photodetectors, and Schottky barrier internal photoemission detectors. Germanium silicate (GeSi) heterostructure internal photoemission detectors, gallium antimony (GaSb) detectors, gallium nitride (GaN) detectors for ultaviolet

(UV) detection, and carbon nanotube arrays are other detectors that are in various stages of research and development for possible future applications and use. These were discussed in Science and Technology for Army Homeland Security: Report 1 (NRC, 2003).

While emergency responders do not generally need the stringent capabilities of Army technology in this area, IR and thermal capability is of importance for firefighters as well as for perimeter defense and networked sensors. Again, while they may not have a need for solar blind optical detectors, UV semiconductor lasers and detectors currently being developed by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) solar blind UV detector programs as well as the Army’s in-house and extramural research efforts will be useful for chemical and biological detection spectroscopy.

Nuclear, Radiological, and Explosive Threat Detection. The technical area relating to nuclear and radiological threat detection was discussed in Report 1 (NRC, 2003). The major conclusion of the committee was that for nuclear and radiological materials, the detection range of existing technologies and those under development was not long, and hence there were difficulties with standoff detection from any large distance. It was also pointed out in Report 1 that the lead responsibility for this area did not reside with the Army. However, the additional point was made that networked sensors and data fusion and management were critical Army areas of S&T investment and hence could have a strong impact in this area for emergency responders as well. For conventional explosives detection the situation is a little different. Report 1 discusses the different detection technologies and the challenges for these technologies owing to the low vapor pressure of more modern explosives. Again, Report 1 discusses the gains that could perhaps be made in looking at crosscutting technologies in addressing this problem. Furthermore some of the technologies for chemical and biological detection cross over very effectively into explosives detection as noted in the first report (NRC, 2003).

Chemical and Biological Agent Technologies. Chemical and biological agent detection technologies were also discussed in Report 1 (NRC, 2003). In the S&T arena, many sensors are in the preliminary research and development cycle. While the Army is the lead agency in this arena, the Joint Program Office, with a funding stream from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, is tasked with this responsibility. The vapor pressure of chemical agents is higher than that of explosives, but the acceptable exposure levels are lower, as was discussed in Report 1. Tables 2-2 and 2-3 in Report 1 list the different technologies that are in use and in various stages of research and development for detecting chemical and biological agents, respectively (NRC, 2003, pp. 50-53). The technologies relevant for this area overlap with those for detecting some other threats, especially conventional explosives. Hence, as discussed in the first report, crosscutting technologies may

be very important here and may be candidates for collaborative research with the DHS (NRC, 2003).

Sensor Networking and Perimeter Sensors. The Army and other agencies have been pursuing the concept of networked sensors for several years, for use in both tactical situations and perimeter security. The general concept behind networked sensors is the ability to use disparate sensors, such as acoustic and seismic, non-imaging IR and laser, and visible and IR imaging, to develop a comprehensive situational awareness of an environment. Several schemes are available, with some currently focusing on the use of low-cost, low-power-consumption sensors such as seismic and acoustic and non-imaging IR and laser sensors to turn on the higher-cost, higher-power-consumption visible and IR sensors, generate an image or series of images, and then either send the images or processed information back to a central node or place them on a network for dissemination to users. Systems may include automatic alarms to indicate to the user if there is a disturbance in his or her area of operations. Several ongoing programs, described below, are taking this concept even farther, to include a moving infrastructure.

In August 2003, the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers devoted a special issue to the topic Sensor Networks and Applications.² The issue contains nine papers, seven of which are invited. Eight of the nine papers describe work sponsored by DARPA. Many defense-related and homeland security applications are cited. The issue provides excellent coverage and is very up to date on the subject of sensor networks.

Synthetic Aperture Radar and Moving Target Indicator Technologies. The DOD has extensive programs in both synthetic aperture radar (SAR) and moving target indicator (MTI) technologies. The Army in particular has programs in small-scale, unmanned aerial vehicle-based systems for use at the tactical level that are also appropriate for homeland security purposes. The systems are expensive, however, and a trained force is required to maintain, operate, and interpret the data resulting from these radars. Thus, most nonmilitary crisis response organizations would not be sufficiently funded or staffed to have SAR/MTI radars as part of their organic equipment. SAR/MTI technologies are the type of capabilities that the DOD can bring to bear in support of emergency response during threats to homeland security. The interpreted output of the radars could then be integrated into the command-and-control network to give information to crisis managers. It is the product of the SAR/MTI, rather than the equipment itself, that is of value to homeland security crisis managers.

The primary benefit of a SAR is its all-weather capability. While a flying

video camera is the cheapest and easiest way to see a swath of ground, it is of no value at night, in cloudy weather, or when obscured by smoke from fires at a crisis location. Currently available SARs can provide images with less than 1-foot resolution, which is adequate to give a picture of damage to facilities and the locations of vehicles and personnel (at the time of the image). Since the image requires time to process, only snapshots are available. The current SAR limitations are the latency in image processing and the lack of ability to see through foliage or inside structures. (Foliage penetration, or FOPEN, capability is about a decade away.)

The primary benefit of the MTI radar is its ability to track objects on the move. Military applications of this radar are to see which roads are being used for enemy attack or withdrawal; homeland security applications are to see which roads are blocked for access by responders or for the evacuation of personnel in dangerous areas such as in the path of a hurricane or a chemical attack cloud. The MTI radar also functions through adverse weather and obscurants.

The committee also calls attention to other programs and activities that, although not strictly within the C4ISR envelope of programs, may be of value to the emergency responder community. Several of these programs and activities are addressed below. Table 4-5 presents information on the relevant technologies related to other DOD assets, including a brief description or statement of purpose and availability assessment.

The DOD has made a significant investment in modeling and simulation (M&S), which can be leveraged by the DHS. M&S tools can support the activities discussed below.

Planning. Before an event, M&S tools can be used to assess operational and support requirements, the long-term impact of a particular type of event (e.g., the release of a weapon of mass destruction), the displacement of personnel because of a crisis, and other related issues. Organizations such as the Army’s Center for Army Analysis consistently use M&S tools to support combatant commands in planning their operational and logistical needs. The Army’s Joint Virtual Battlespace Program can also be leveraged for these planning efforts. Planning tools for operations other than war (e.g., the Defense Modeling and Simulation Office/ Army Flexible Asymmetric Simulation Toolkit) can be used for planning the movement of displaced personnel, the distribution of food and water, and support for personnel needs. Many of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency’s tools can be used for assessing the effects of WMD.

Decision Support. Once an event has occurred, M&S tools similar to those mentioned above can be used for assisting the command element in making immediate decisions. M&S tools can enhance situation awareness—allowing a command element to better understand an environment that is sometimes defined by reams of data from many information and sensor systems. If linked to real-world sensor data and other relevant sources of information, these M&S tools can also support real-time predictions of chemical or biological cloud dispersion, traffic congestion, and so on.

Training. Training in the future will become ever more dependent on M&S because real-world and political considerations will make training more difficult. For example, large training exercises cannot be held in Washington, D.C., without taking many personnel away from their required jobs, without keeping large numbers of tourists out of the area, and without bringing media exposure to every success and failure of the event. Also, environmental considerations limit the types of training, as well as the availability of training areas. The costs of real-world training being higher, the ability to do some virtual training could lead to substantial cost savings. The inability of most emergency responders to attend training off-site will place even greater emphasis on M&S that can be used at responders’ places of duty. Most importantly, and of increasing note, many ongoing security and operational missions are drastically reducing the time available for personnel to train. M&S can help hone skills in an embedded (or desktop) training environment, or through the use of the DOD’s and the Army’s Advanced Distributed Learning programs.

The Army, as well as other components of the DOD, has significant test range capacity and a system for testing equipment to ensure that it meets users’ needs and manufacturers’ claims. The testing includes both operational or performance testing and maintenance and logistics support testing. The Army has also developed, over many years, a testing methodology that allows the user to determine whether the equipment meets the full performance requirements promised—including reliability and maintainability. This could be of particular importance to local emergency responders, as the true cost of much of the equipment that they need is in the maintainability and repairs over a number of years.

Critical to any successful system for use by either the military or emergency responders is a logistics and maintenance capability. Usually incorporated during system development, provision for logistics and maintenance supports the sustainability of an item of equipment for many years, ensuring that the equipment can be serviced, repaired as necessary, replaced, and disposed of at the end of its life cycle. It helps the user to determine the true life-cycle cost of equipment, what level of repairs are necessary (such as operator repair versus depot repair), and even disposal cost. It also helps assure the buyer that parts will be available for the foreseeable future and that equipment will not become obsolete owing to a future lack of such parts. The Army has many years of experience in this area, usually resident in its logistical and commodities centers.

Today’s Army is making a significant effort to develop lighter, higher-energy-density hybrid power sources, chargers, and power management technologies for soldier systems; reformed logistic fuel components for fuel cells for vehicle-silent watch power; and fuel-efficient power generation and electronic control component technologies to provide for smaller, lighter, more-fuel-efficient mobile electric power generators. These new power systems would be of significant value to emergency responders. A report in preparation from the Board on Army Science and Technology concerning portable energy sources for the soldier sheds light on the actual progress being made in these areas (NRC, 2004).

In this chapter the committee identifies some of the critical technical issues associated with a C4ISR system, highlighting several programs that may be of relevance to those developing such systems for use by emergency responders.

There is no attempt here to evaluate how well these programs are meeting their technical goals. However, where appropriate the committee expresses concerns about these technical objectives—particularly when they seem to be extremely difficult to achieve. The committee sincerely hopes that those who start down the path toward developing systems for emergency responders similar to those developed for the Army can at a minimum absorb some of the lessons learned from these prior endeavors and in some cases actually use the products of these programs.

AITS-JPO (Advanced Information Technology Services–Joint Program Office). 2003. CINC 21. Available online at <http://www.les.disa.mil/cinc21.html>. Accessed November 19, 2003.

DARPA (Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency). Undated. Network Embedded Systems Technology. Available online at <http://dtsn.darpa.mil/ixo/programdetail.asp?progid=42>. Accessed October 22, 2003.

DOD (Department of Defense). 2003. Joint Blue Force Situational Awareness. Available online at <http://www.acq.osd.mil/actd/desctript.htm>. Accessed October 22, 2003.

Ericsson. 2001. Ericsson Response MiniGSM. Available online at <http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~brewer/ict4b/Ericsson-miniGSM.PDF>. Accessed February 23, 2004.

JROC (Joint Requirements Oversight Council). 2003. Waveform Extract, Version A, Joint Tactical Radio System, Extract of JROC Approved Final with Waveform Table 4-2 and Annex E, Operational Requirements Document version 3.2, April 28. Washington, D.C: Joint Requirements Oversight Council.

NRC (National Research Council). 1997. The Evolution of Untethered Communications. Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press.

NRC. 2003. Science and Technology for Army Homeland Security: Report 1. Washington, D.C.: The National Academies Press.

NRC. 2004. Meeting the Energy Needs of Future Warriors. Washington, D.C.: The National Academies Press, in press.

Steinheider, J. 2003. Software-defined radio comes of age. February 11. Available online at <http://iwce-mrt.com/ar/radio_softwaredefined_radio_comes/>. Accessed December 16, 2003.

U.S. Army. Undated. Urban Recon ACTD, Airborne and Terrestrial 3-D Laser Imaging. Available online at <https://peoiewswebinfo.monmouth.army.mil/JPSD/UrbanRecon/Urban%20Recon%20Fact%20Sheet%20FINAL%2013MAY03.htm>. Accessed October 22, 2003.

U.S. Army. 2003. Weapon Systems 2003. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office.