Army Science and Technology for Homeland Security: Report 2: C4ISR (2004)

The first four chapters lay the groundwork for this chapter by describing the Army’s organizational structure, its Future Force, the needs of emergency responders, and planned and available technologies that can support homeland security. This chapter discusses ways to link science and technology (S&T) for the Future Force and emergency responder requirements. Additionally, it suggests how to facilitate collaboration between the Army and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) for this purpose and it identifies issues associated with such collaboration.

The substantial overlap in the capabilities required by civilian emergency responders and by the Army confirms the potential of collaborative efforts between the Department of Defense (DOD), specifically the Army, and the DHS for transferring and adapting technologies and programs that underpin command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) for the Army’s Future Force. However, the committee cautions that not all local governments may be amenable to the idea of collaborative efforts, whether because of costs, perceived complexity of equipment, or simply a preference for remaining independent. Consideration might be given to the following possibility: whether it might be more reasonable and prudent initially to supply regional response teams—such as the National Guard’s Civil Support Teams for Weapons of Mass Destruction—with appropriate C4ISR technology that can enable all of those responders to have compatible communications dur-

ing an emergency or crisis event, rather than trying to field the same system for the entire first responder community.

Collaboration could take many possible forms. The efforts described here—leveraged collaboration and true joint development—represent two fruitful modes of operation that can assist the Army and the nation’s emergency responders. It is analogous to the model established during the Cold War when Army and DOD science and technology provided many products that were very useful to the nation’s commercial sector. There is also an interesting parallel between the possibilities presented here and the approach represented by the Foreign Military Sales Program or the Foreign Internal Defense Program long used by the military to encourage interoperability with allies and friends.

Leveraged collaboration makes sense when one major user or developer is driving the process and another would like to leverage the ongoing efforts to reduce the cost or speed up its own product development. This is the most likely scenario in the near term for collaborative efforts between the Army and the emergency responder community, given the mature nature of most DOD research, development, testing and evaluation (RDT&E) infrastructure and the relative newness of the S&T organization within the DHS. It is also true, in general, that the DOD hardware requirements will often be different from and much more stringent than those for emergency responders (preparation for a warfighting environment can require qualities such as being air droppable, nuclear hardened, and so on) and therefore much more costly than emergency responders’ budgets allow. However, technology developed for the warfighter can be adapted to the needs of the emergency responder community.

An example of a potential leveraged program could be the concept of the Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS), Squad Level, discussed in Chapter 4. This software-programmable radio will support interoperability between the various DOD components in an integrated battlespace. While this type of radio would seemingly be very useful for the emergency responders in a local jurisdiction (such as the police, firefighters, National Guard, FBI, and so on), the DOD requirements with respect to the radio are well beyond what the local emergency responder needs and can afford. However, if the requirements can be adapted, with a corresponding reduction in costs, and if there is a sufficient market for such a concept for emergency responders, then there may be a potential for collaborative development.

There may be cases in which a truly joint collaborative program between the DOD and the DHS is practical, particularly as the relationship between the two

departments matures. In such a case, both departments would work together in developing technologies that would be of mutual benefit.

Throughout its study, the committee examined the capabilities that are the foundations for the Future Force and those that could enable emergency responders in crisis situations. Bridging the two could help both communities leverage S&T to obtain capabilities needed to perform their respective missions. Table 5-1 indicates how technologies planned to meet Future Force requirements might address emergency responders’ requirements in the following categories:

• Communications;

• Command, control, and computers;

• Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; and

• Other.

In the middle of the table—representing the area where the bridge must be established—technological opportunities for collaboration to meet the needs of both communities are identified as leveraged and joint activities. Table 5-1 is a tabular synopsis of the committee’s assessment presented in the preceding chapters.

In addition to technology transfer, the committee believes that there are other aspects to collaboration between the Army and the emergency responder community. These issues are addressed in the subsection below.

Transferring C4ISR technologies and systems to the DHS is not enough in itself to provide operationally suitable, supportable, and affordable C4ISR capabilities. Just as important as making technologies and systems available is that the Army also make its systems engineering expertise and experience available. This added benefit would enhance the DHS’s current capability to execute a methodical systems engineering approach to satisfying its unique C4ISR needs, and in the longer term it can enhance compatibility between the Army and civilian emergency responders.

With this enhanced systems engineering capability, the DHS would have a running start and could pursue an integrated design approach to optimize the synergistic performance of a C4ISR system, or system of systems. Each component of each system, and each system within a system of systems, must be designed to function as part of a node (e.g., like a personal digital assistant) as

well as being part of the network (network-centric environment). The overall performance of the C4ISR system will be further enhanced with consideration given to the human-system interface, system flexibility, reliability, maintainability, supportability, pre-planned product improvement, training, and safety.

The Army has the expertise, experience, and relevant industrial support to assist the DHS in designing a C4ISR architecture that could provide an effective and efficient path to developing C4ISR systems that are operationally robust at a more affordable life-cycle cost. A successful, cooperative Army-DHS C4ISR technology integration strategy must seek to meaningfully evolve appropriate C4ISR technologies, systems, and architectures (technical, systems, and operational) into a coherent DHS C4ISR capability. Without such a strategy, it will be difficult, if not impossible, for the DHS to properly integrate and transition C4ISR technologies.

A cooperative systems engineering approach will also help prevent the DHS from acquiring monolithic C4ISR systems that are not functionally compatible with military systems, that require access to huge databases, or that are combat-hardened with unnecessarily overdesigned, highly redundant hardware and software.

In some cases, the DHS may be better served by using the Army’s systems engineering expertise to integrate commercial off-the-shelf technologies into a more affordable, uniquely designed C4ISR system. With the Army’s assistance, more affordable, uniquely designed DHS systems can be created to interact,

when needed, with fielded systems of military units employed as part of an emergency responder team.

To a considerable extent, the degree of interoperability will be dependent on the effectiveness of the software engineering effort. This effectiveness will in turn be dependent on the architecture of the hardware/software infrastructure, as well as the software development methodology and tool sets. A well-defined software architecture and software engineering environment are necessary precursors to efficient software design. The architecture must be defined at the basic processor/operating system level, at the interapplication communications infrastructure level, and at the additional support infrastructure level (e.g., intelligent information fusion agents).

With an Army-DHS systems engineering team approach, a rigorous configuration management plan can also be designed and executed to ensure that interoperability is maintained.

Finally, as a consideration, the DHS must recognize that to realize the anticipated benefits of network-centric C4ISR systems, emergency responder organizations will now need to have within their organizations, or at least have access to, network system administrators and other information technology professionals. Increased logistics support will also require repair persons, repair parts, and batteries. Despite requirements for increased resources, systems engineering can help minimize their impact.

• A systems architecture that provides an effective and efficient path to near-term systems acquisition and future technology insertion, and

• A technical architecture that ensures operational robustness and economic manufacturability.

The committee assesses and describes the Army’s acquisition process in Chapter 1 and Appendix D. To facilitate technology transfer from the DOD to the DHS, the DHS needs to identify the capabilities required for emergency responders. The Army can assist in providing these needed capabilities by transferring already-existing technology and system solutions and/or those under development to the DHS.

Critical to the success of any type of collaboration is the ability to establish a meaningful dialogue between collaborating partners. There are several working groups that bring the Army together with the DHS, but it might be appropriate to establish a dedicated working group at the assistant secretary level to determine how these organizations can best work together. This approach would allow the Army to listen to the DHS’s requirements and offer suggestions in an established forum. Such a working group meeting need not be a permanent event but can be tailored as work progresses.

The DHS Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency (HSARPA) is responsible for extramural research and development (R&D) for the DHS. The agency will address a crosscutting portfolio of technologies and end users. Within this mission area, common technology areas should be identified that can be shared with the DOD. The DHS should identify the needs, roadmap, and requirements for mission success. One alternative to ensure optimal integration, sustainability, and accountability of federal technology investment is the establishment of mission-focused technology areas linked to capabilities- and performance-based requirements. By adopting such an approach, state and local communities will have enhanced opportunities for input to and refinement of the national technology investment.

The Army, as well as the rest of the DOD, has a very rigorous analysis process for evaluating new technologies and systems, as well as new or technology-driven operational or organizational concepts, doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures. This analysis process includes a combination of demonstrations, experiments, technical tests, and operational tests:

• Demonstrations normally provide limited views of technology or concept capabilities and do not include the rigorous collection of data. These demonstrations can be enhanced with some combination of models and simulations, breadboards in laboratories, representative technologies, and operationally ready systems in real-world environments. Demonstrations are normally designed to prove the utility of the best aspects of a technology or concept.

• Experiments, the next level up from demonstrations, include models and simulations, as well as well-defined scenarios, repetitive events, and rigorous data collection efforts.

• Technical tests focus on validating the technical performance of prototype (or limited production) systems or concepts. In addition, technical tests can be used to assess the manufacturer’s stated performance for a given off-the-shelf item.

• Finally, operational tests take limited production and/or off-the-shelf technologies and systems and assess them in an operational environment with real users.

Technical and operational tests also involve very rigorous data collection efforts. Users can be included in demonstrations and experiments to speed up the assessment process and to allow user insights to be incorporated early in the development of a technology or system. Models and simulations are useful for supporting demonstrations, experiments, technical tests, and operational tests.

Technical and operational tests can be a combination of capabilities: live (e.g., pilots in real aircraft), virtual (e.g., pilots in flight simulators), or constructive (e.g., computer-generated aircraft). Models and simulations are normally used to reduce analysis costs, provide a scale-up capability, or allow analysis in an unsafe or environmentally unfriendly environment.

In support of available modeling and simulation and owing to the complexity of DOD systems and to the consequences of failure of these systems, the DOD maintains an extensive laboratory and testing and evaluation infrastructure to assist in evaluating the performance of these systems and the components that constitute them. This infrastructure is coupled to the DOD S&T programs through the oversight of the Director, Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E). This program of modeling and simulation, experimentation, testing and evaluation, and review is in place to ensure that a system meets its specified functional and technical performance criteria and is operationally capable.

The systems that must be put in place to meet the objectives of the DHS may be similar in complexity to those developed by the DOD, and the consequences of any failure of these systems will be similarly grave. The DHS will likely find it necessary to institute a process to ensure that its systems meet specified functional and technical criteria and are operationally capable. Thus, an organization that can certify the validity of a manufacturer’s claims for equipment performance must be available to the DHS.

To expedite the transfer of technology between the Army and the DHS, it would be helpful if the DHS instituted a modeling and simulation, experimentation, testing and evaluation, and review process similar to that used by the DOD. The Army could assist the DHS in identifying civilian and military subject-matter experts to serve as a testing and evaluation board, assessing the robustness and applicability of results to the end-user community. This community will be interdisciplinary, with a wide variety of backgrounds and many different requirements. The DHS could utilize the DOD infrastructure where it is appropriate and available. A vehicle for the coordination of these DHS and DOD activities and capabilities and needs should be put in place.

• A testing, evaluation, and review process;

• The spiral development process used by the Army; and

• Modeling and simulation.

A low-cost but robust, multidisciplinary, multilevel training and exercise program among all emergency responders and military response units will facilitate the integration of the multitudinous C4ISR technologies into an effective system-of-systems approach to emergency management. Additionally, such exercises will help bridge the civil-military cultural gap that can hinder interactions between the two quite different communities. The Army has established a comprehensive individual and unit training program that includes extensive joint exercises. The Army’s National Simulation Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, plays a significant role in achieving and maintaining a high level of training.

It is recognized that there is a program for training individual emergency responders as described in Chapter 3, but few multidisciplinary, multiechelon, all-hazards training and exercise programs are conducted on a continuing basis.¹ Not to be overlooked is the technical training and maintenance component required for the transfer of equipment and programs to emergency responders. Additionally, the personnel turnover within these organizations suggests the need for frequent joint exercises between emergency responders and the military.

There should be a mutual understanding of the respective training philosophies of civilian emergency responders and the military. Civilians need to be exposed to both Army doctrine and the equipment available in emergency situations, and vice versa. In some areas, this is being accomplished as a result of local Homeland Security Councils that include federal (FBI), county, city, and military installation personnel with emergency responder responsibilities.²

The concept of network-centric operations (NCO) is as applicable to DHS’s emergency response mission as network-centric warfare is to the Army’s Future Force.³ Both the Future Force and the nation’s emergency responders will rely on a system-of-systems approach to see, understand, and act on situations. While network-centric warfare is a fairly well developed concept that enhances military capabilities and requirements, the concept of NCO for emergency responders is not as mature. Various sources of funds, different levels of technical capabilities, varied requirements, and the lack of an approved national operational framework for emergency response make NCO more difficult to implement in the near term. However, such a concept has merit when developing a long-term vision for the DHS. The ability to provide “the right information to the right people at the right time” (Cooper, 2003) could be enhanced by a concept of NCO that optimizes a system-of-systems approach to homeland security.

Developing such a vision and establishing a long-term roadmap to achieve it will help ensure the nation’s best use of its limited resources. The seamless convergence of compatible equipment and the development of open standards for networking are essential components. By restricting federal grants to allow only the purchase of systems and capabilities that allow NCO, the leadership within the DHS can achieve the desired end state more rapidly.

The foundation of NCO is an integrated communications infrastructure that ties together key decision makers and emergency responders and allows sharing of critical information. This ubiquitous system could surge to meet time-sensitive demands for critical bandwidth in crises involving multiagency and multilocation events. Although such a national civilian integrated system does not now exist, the committee recognizes that efforts are under way to develop such a system.

The U.S. military’s process for defining required operational capabilities, known as Mission Essential Task Lists (METLs), define the tasks that a unit must perform, the conditions under which the tasks might take place, and the standards to which the tasks must be accomplished in order to complete a given mission. The tasks describe activities or objectives to be achieved; conditions define the environment under which the tasks have to be accomplished (e.g., weather conditions, personal protective equipment requirements); and standards provide measures of effectiveness for determining whether the tasks have been accomplished successfully.

METLs are useful for directing training, measuring levels of readiness, defining requirements, and judging whether existing procedures and support systems are adequate. Hence, they offer a useful tool for identifying needs, clarifying requirements, and recognizing gaps. Currently, there is no universally accepted, analogous system at this level of specificity in the civilian emergency responder community. Many sets of standards for various activities related to responding to a terrorist attack do exist (Canada, 2003). However, there is not a set of nationally recognized, integrated tasks lists, particularly with regard to describing the tasks, conditions, and standards for local, state, and federal responses to catastrophic biological, chemical, nuclear, radiological, or explosive attacks.

Some have recommended establishing national preparedness standards—authoritative rules, principles, or measures to guide efforts in preparing for disasters. They argue that standards would improve coordination, identify gaps in capabilities, and promote higher levels of readiness (Canada, 2003). Adopting a system similar to the military’s METL might achieve these ends.

In addition, emergency responder task lists would provide a standardized tool for comparing and identifying overlapping emergency responder and combat activities, helping to better identify common needs and opportunities for collaboration and technology investment. As the committee previously pointed out, product standards and conformity testing are extremely important. In the Army’s case, this evaluation includes both testing in the development laboratories and operational testing in the field by soldiers. The responder community, especially in the smaller jurisdictions, lacks access to the full process. Only when there are well-crafted standards for equipment used by responders, as well as testing laboratories that are regularly subject to a formal laboratory certification procedure, will responders be assured that they are purchasing items that meet their needs.

The requirement for C4ISR is ubiquitous, whether for the Army’s Future Force or for today’s emergency responder. The committee is convinced that quick action on the part of the Army can provide beneficial C4ISR solutions to the Department of Homeland Security that will ensure a high level of interoperability between the emergency responders and the Army should our nation be forced to respond again to a catastrophic event on U.S. soil.

Canada, B. 2003. Homeland Security: Standards for State and Local Preparedness, May 12. Available online at <http://public.ansi.org/ansionline/Documents/Standards%20Activities/Homeland%20Security%20Standards%20Panel/RL31680.pdf>. Accessed November 20, 2003.

Cooper, S. 2003. Presentation by Steve Cooper, Chief Information Officer, Department of Homeland Security, to the National Institute for Urban Search and Rescue Conference, January 13, 2003, San Diego, Calif.