Executive Summary

The nation’s military Services have long embraced experimentation as a fundamental tool for force development. For the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Marine Corps in particular, experimentation has enabled historical transformations in the fleet1 such as naval aviation, for example, and more recently has contributed to a better understanding of and appreciation for emerging operational concepts such as urban warfare and network-centric operations.2 Furthermore, in its Naval Transformation Roadmap,3 the Department of the Navy has identified experimentation as a key enabler to achieve its vision of the future naval forces. Given the intended use of experimentation, the Department of the Navy must ask: Is naval experimentation as good as it needs to be? Is it as good as it can be? Answering these questions provides an underlying motivation for this study.4

1  

The term “fleet” is used in this report to include both the U.S. Navy’s fleet and the operating forces of the U.S. Marine Corps.

2  

Because network-centric operations is a new defining concept that uses the information network rather than major platforms as an underlying framework for force structure and operations, experimentation should play a central role in transitioning naval forces to network-centric-based operations. See Naval Studies Board, National Research Council, 2000, Network-Centric Naval Forces: A Transition Strategy for Enhancing Operational Capabilities, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C.

3  

Secretary of the Navy Gordon England, Chief of Naval Operations Vern Clark, and Commandant of the Marine Corps James L. Jones. 2002. Naval Transformation Roadmap: Power and Access … From the Sea, Department of the Navy, Washington, D.C.

4  

In an earlier report, the Naval Studies Board expressed concern about the adequacy of the Navy and Marine Corps approach to experimentation, citing a tendency to focus on a few critical events, an



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The Role of Experimentation in Building Future Naval Forces Executive Summary The nation’s military Services have long embraced experimentation as a fundamental tool for force development. For the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Marine Corps in particular, experimentation has enabled historical transformations in the fleet1 such as naval aviation, for example, and more recently has contributed to a better understanding of and appreciation for emerging operational concepts such as urban warfare and network-centric operations.2 Furthermore, in its Naval Transformation Roadmap,3 the Department of the Navy has identified experimentation as a key enabler to achieve its vision of the future naval forces. Given the intended use of experimentation, the Department of the Navy must ask: Is naval experimentation as good as it needs to be? Is it as good as it can be? Answering these questions provides an underlying motivation for this study.4 1   The term “fleet” is used in this report to include both the U.S. Navy’s fleet and the operating forces of the U.S. Marine Corps. 2   Because network-centric operations is a new defining concept that uses the information network rather than major platforms as an underlying framework for force structure and operations, experimentation should play a central role in transitioning naval forces to network-centric-based operations. See Naval Studies Board, National Research Council, 2000, Network-Centric Naval Forces: A Transition Strategy for Enhancing Operational Capabilities, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C. 3   Secretary of the Navy Gordon England, Chief of Naval Operations Vern Clark, and Commandant of the Marine Corps James L. Jones. 2002. Naval Transformation Roadmap: Power and Access … From the Sea, Department of the Navy, Washington, D.C. 4   In an earlier report, the Naval Studies Board expressed concern about the adequacy of the Navy and Marine Corps approach to experimentation, citing a tendency to focus on a few critical events, an

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The Role of Experimentation in Building Future Naval Forces CONTEXT FOR THE REPORT The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) and the Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps (CMC) have defined their Service capstone concepts in “Sea Power 21”5 and Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare,6 respectively. For the Navy, the CNO recently established an organizational policy for experimentation in “Sea Power 21” that is captured under the innovation element called Sea Trial, “… a continual process of rapid concept and technology development.”7 While Sea Trial is fleet-led under the guidance of the Commander, Fleet Forces Command (CFFC), this organizational policy places the Navy Warfare Development Command (NWDC) in a central role: The Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command, will serve as Executive Agent for Sea Trial, with Second and Third Fleet commanders sponsoring the development of Sea Strike, Sea Shield and Sea Basing capabilities…. The Systems Commands and Program Executive Offices will be integral partners in this effort…. The Navy Warfare Development Command, reporting directly to the Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command, will coordinate Sea Trial.8 For the Marine Corps, force development and requirements to be determined through experimentation remain the responsibility of the Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC). The MCCDC has now established the Expeditionary Force Development Center to continue to develop concepts, coordinate assessment and experimentation, and integrate the implementation of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) across the range of Marine Corps operations.9 The underlying purpose of establishing this center, however, is to develop a single process—the Expeditionary Force Development System—by which the Marine Corps will transform its force     extreme underutilization of analysis and of modeling and simulation, and a failure to decompose broad problems into components that can be studied in appropriate ways over time. See Naval Studies Board, National Research Council, 2000, Network-Centric Naval Forces: A Transition Strategy for Enhancing Operational Capabilities, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C. 5   ADM Vern Clark, USN. 2002. “Sea Power 21: Projecting Decisive Joint Capabilities,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 128, No. 10, October 1, pp. 32-41. 6   Gen James L. Jones, USMC, Commandant of the Marine Corps. 2001. Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare: Marine Corps Capstone Concept, Warfighting Development Integration Division, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Quantico, Va., November 10. 7   Navy Warfare Development Command. 2003. “Sea Power 21,” Newport, R.I. Available online at <http://www.nwdc.navy.mil/SeaPower21.asp>. Accessed November 9, 2003. 8   ADM Vern Clark, USN. 2002. “Sea Power 21: Projecting Decisive Joint Capabilities,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 128, No. 10, October 1, p. 39. 9   Col Frank DiFalco, USMC, Joint Concept Development and Experimentation Operations Center, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, “Marine Corps Role in JCDE,” presentation to the committee on August 15, 2002.

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The Role of Experimentation in Building Future Naval Forces in order to be able to carry out Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare, its capstone concept. Given the charters of the NWDC and the MCCDC, the committee viewed these organizations as central to its examination of naval experimentation. It focused on their processes, programs, and successes to date, as well as on organizations with which the two interact and that are important participants in experimentation, such as the Office of Naval Research, the Third Fleet, the Navy Network Warfare Command, and the U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM). The experimentation activities of these organizations collectively bring together technologies, systems, doctrines, and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) that cut across traditional boundaries and cultures, that require substantial integration efforts, and that have the potential to dramatically improve naval capabilities. The NWDC and the MCCDC also conduct experimentation that supports immediate and mid-term needs in the fleet, and in addition are responsible for coordinating their Services’ participation in joint experimentation. Given the number of organizations involved in naval experimentation and the range of resulting interpretations, approaches, responsibilities, and activities, the committee defined “experimentation” as follows: Military experimentation is an activity conducted to discover, test, demonstrate, or explore future military concepts, organizations, and equipment and the interplay among them, using a combination of actual, simulated, and surrogate forces and equipment. The definition communicates two important points. First, experimentation explores more than equipment. It includes the development of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, and facilities that collectively constitute the mission capability of a military force. Second, experimentation encompasses a spectrum of activities, such as studies and analyses, seminars and conferences, work by subject-matter experts, war games, modeling and simulations, and experiments that are small and focused, as well as large field events with live forces. The need for this range of activities in conjunction with well-structured experimentation campaigns10—to investigate multiple concepts and alternative paths, explore fuzzy spaces, understand negative results, and discard and/or endorse solutions in order to “write the book” on how to achieve a transformational capability—is a basic tenet of this study that was used by the committee to assess current Navy and Marine Corps experimentation efforts. 10   The committee defined an experimentation campaign as a planned and cohesive, multiyear program of experimentation built on a series of experiments and related activities to develop the knowledge needed to inform major decisions about future forces, explore the viability of potential or planned changes to forces or their capabilities, and/or confirm that planned capability development and directions will enable forces to perform as expected. See Chapter 2 in this report for additional details about the characteristics of campaigns, their value, and their application of spiral methodology.

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The Role of Experimentation in Building Future Naval Forces CURRENT STATUS OF NAVY AND MARINE CORPS EXPERIMENTATION The committee noted some successes resulting from recent naval experimentation, as managed both by the NWDC and the MCCDC. Under the NWDC, experimentation, including the large and complex Fleet Battle Experiments (FBEs) Alpha through India, has addressed important concepts and topics, such as network-centric operations for naval and joint fire power, theater and air missile defense, precision engagement, time-critical strike, and defense against asymmetric threats. The committee’s summary observation is that recent Navy experimentation has indeed demonstrated the feasibility of some new operational concepts using surrogate or prototype or existing systems, and has led to the adoption by the fleet of new TTPs and the development of new doctrine for fleet operations. The MCCDC, including the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory, can also point to successes. A review of results derived from experimentation beginning with the Hunter Warrior campaign in 1997 shows that concepts, doctrine, and TTPs resulting from experimentation have transitioned successfully to forces in the field and that experimentation has resulted in changes in minor equipment items that are in the field today. Here, too, experimentation was used to address important areas of investigation, such as nonlethal weapons, small unmanned aerial vehicles, and precision targeting, and to explore both desert and urban environments. A notable success coming from the Urban Warrior campaign of 1998 influenced major changes in doctrine for operations in urban terrain. There is also progress in joint experimentation. Both the NWDC and the MCCDC are focal points for their respective Services’ participation in joint experimentation. What the committee noted was more “thinking joint”—more collaboration on joint concept development, more experiment planning with a joint context in mind, and increasing participation in USJFCOM-sponsored joint experimentation and its attendant processes. Given these positive results, the committee believes that both Navy and Marine Corps experimentation is enabling learning and producing meaningful results directed at promising concepts and technologies in a number of key naval mission areas. Nonetheless, these are modest successes, and the questions remain—Is naval experimentation as good as it needs to be for achieving the challenges of Sea Power 21 and Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare? Or is it as good as it can be? Here the committee would answer “no” to both questions. The Naval Services will have to enhance their programs and specifically, to improve their strategies, mechanisms, and processes for conducting experimentation. Alternately stated, with the moderate and careful changes that are the subject of the committee’s recommendations, the effectiveness of experimentation for shaping future naval forces can be significantly improved.

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The Role of Experimentation in Building Future Naval Forces RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVING THE OVERALL EFFECTIVENESS OF NAVAL EXPERIMENTATION Establish Senior Navy Oversight and Annual Review of Experimentation Efforts The CNO is using experimentation as an enabler for realizing the vision outlined in Sea Power 21, with the expectation that experimentation will contribute to building future forces, provide the means for development of advanced concepts, and facilitate the movement of capabilities to the field. What the committee sees is a modest program of experimentation managed by an organization (the NWDC) with insufficient influence over the Navy experimentation program11 and its numerous participants; this insufficient influence extends to the funding and assets required and to the leverage needed for moving the results of experimentation either into acquisition or into programs of record through the requirements process. Even under the best of circumstances, when the results of experimentation provide ample evidence of the need for new capabilities, the bridges between the experimentation organization and the acquisition and requirements organizations of the Navy are fragile; they depend unduly on the exercise of coordinating skills and personal interactions. The Navy’s situation is not unique or unusual for a large bureaucratic institution. One lesson learned from past successes in experimentation—both by an earlier, historical Navy and by the other Services—suggests the need for strong oversight and participation by the most senior leadership. This level of involvement is necessary when experimentation is intended to result in significant new capabilities for the field. The situation is not so exacerbated in the Marine Corps. The Marine Requirements Oversight Council (MROC) periodically reviews experimentation and effectively oversees its strategic direction and results. The ties to requirements and acquisition are less fragile, but they need strengthening. The smaller size of the Marine Corps facilitates tighter direction and control. A mechanism is needed to ensure that experimentation is consistent with the CNO’s vision and direction while garnering the support required Navy-wide. The committee debated but elected not to recommend a realignment of the NWDC under the CNO, given the NWDC’s recent reorganization under the CFFC. Instead, the committee recommends an annual review of experimentation to engage the most senior leadership—a review that is not pro forma and that 11   There is no single formal Navy experimentation program. Instead, a number of organizations are engaged in experimentation activities that collectively constitute a Navy program. In Chapter 3, see the subsection entitled “Organizational Roles and Major Participants in Navy Experimentation” for a discussion of various Navy organizations involved in experimentation.

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The Role of Experimentation in Building Future Naval Forces provides an integrated view of experimentation activities across the Navy, including linkages to joint experimentation. Recommendation 1: To ensure that experimentation is a key enabler of his long-term vision, the Chief of Naval Operations should establish and, together with the Vice Chief of Naval Operations, participate in an annual review of the experimentation program with the senior leadership of the Navy. This process should make visible the program content; the balance of near-term, mid-term, and long-term objectives; the progress that has occurred to date; the results that have been achieved; the use that has been made of the results relative to DOTMLPF, including the transition to requirements, acquisitions, programs of record, and/or capabilities in the fleet; and guidance for the future. Strengthen Transition Processes The mechanisms and processes for transitioning the results of experimentation, including transition planning, need strengthening. For the Navy, despite the transitioning of some concepts, doctrine, and TTPs to the field, there is little evidence that equipment and capabilities resulting from experimentation have transitioned or directly linked to major acquisitions and programs of record. Although the results of experimentation have had some influence on acquisition designs (e.g., for the Littoral Combat Ship), these instances appear to have evolved through personal connections rather than through institutional mechanisms. In general, institutional mechanisms are preferred because they typically endure beyond personal connections.12 In the Marine Corps, more structured transition planning is evident, as are some successes in moving concepts, doctrine, TTPs, and minor items of equipment into the field. Nonetheless, there was no evidence that major items of equipment from experiments had resulted in major acquisitions or displaced programs of record. Although not all experimental capabilities warrant transition in the context of cost, risk, and military value, the debate should be allowed. The committee also noted that spiral development—a potential enabler for transitioning capabilities more rapidly to the fleet—has not been explored systematically or incorporated as a fundamental method of experimentation. Recommendation 2: To strengthen the transition of experimentation results to the requirements and acquisition processes, the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps should institute 12   However, there are times when a personal connection is the initial enabler and the CNO can often assign or rotate key personnel to maximize benefits.

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The Role of Experimentation in Building Future Naval Forces specific procedures to facilitate and accelerate the transition of capabilities identified through experimentation to the fleet. Specifically, for the Navy: The Commander, Fleet Forces Command; Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Warfare Requirements and Programs (N6/N7); Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Resources, Requirements, and Assessments (N8); and Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition should collectively formalize a planning process for the transition of the operational and system capabilities emerging from experiments to the fleet. The process should include framing transition issues and identifying potential funding gaps. The N6/N7 and the N8 should develop a process which ensures that the successful results of experiments are adequately evaluated and competed with the programs of record in the context of cost, risk, and military value. The Navy operational and acquisition communities should explore means to accelerate transition of the results of experimentation to the fleet more aggressively. These means should include the expanded use of other transaction authority and spiral development.13 The Navy test community should explore new roles for the Operational Test and Evaluation Force, including its early participation in the experimentation program, with its advisory assessments provided directly to experiment managers. Specifically, for the Marine Corps: The Marine Corps Combat Development Command, in conjunction with the Marine Corps Systems Command, should expand early transition planning in order to include the framing of transition issues and the identification of potential funding gaps. The Marine Requirements Oversight Council should establish a process which ensures that the successful results of experiments are adequately evaluated and competed with the programs of record in the context of cost, risk, and military value. The Marine Corps operational and acquisition communities should explore means to accelerate transition of the results of experimentation to the fleet more aggressively. These means should include expanded use of other transaction authority and spiral development. 13   The use of spiral development to accelerate capabilities to the fleet has not been systematic to date, although spiral development is a component of “Sea Power 21.” See Chapter 5 for additional

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The Role of Experimentation in Building Future Naval Forces The Marine Corps test community should explore new roles for the Marine Corps Operational Test and Evaluation Activity emphasizing its early participation in the experimentation program, with its advisory assessments provided directly to experiment managers. Enhance the Naval Experimentation Programs Certain important areas are not yet adequately explored in the naval experimentation programs, although some of these areas are gaining definition.14 For the Navy, these omissions are due in part to its approach to experimentation, which in the past has not been founded on sufficiently robust experimentation campaigns but on an over-reliance on many individual events such as FBEs. Such singular events cannot provide the depth of knowledge required to explore potential concepts and capabilities sufficiently. Not only has the breadth of these programs been limited, but the number of concepts explored has been small, the concepts have not covered a sufficiently broad range, and they have not been systematically chosen and developed. As a result, the experimentation programs have lacked the cohesion and comprehensiveness needed to address the challenges of Sea Power 21 or to deal conclusively with questions about capabilities that will be delivered by the programs of record. Areas that need further investigation include over-the-horizon, time-critical strike; use of extended-range guided munitions for long-distance, high-volume, rapid fire support; expanded applications of network-centric capability to deployable undersea sensor arrays; mine/countermine warfare; and the use of unmanned aerial vehicles to locate and identify targets. The Navy’s experimental work to date has brought out overarching issues such as the need to achieve a satisfactory common operating picture; de-confliction; and bandwidth size and management. Some important areas not yet explored include Vertical Launch System reloading at sea, assault breaching of mine or obstacle fields near and on     details. Both the Air Force and Army have enjoyed some notable successes by incorporating it into their respective experimentation programs. See Chapter 3 for additional details. Given the Navy’s emphasis on network-centric operations and NETWARCOM’s emerging role, the committee believes that spiral development should be explored through experimentation to accelerate network-centric capabilities into operations. There are also naval infrastructures that may support such an exploration—namely, the Navy’s Distributed Engineering Plant and the Marine Corps’ Tactical Systems Support Activity. 14   In January 2003, the CNO requested that the CFFC—as part of its lead role for Sea Trial in support of Sea Power 21—“[d]raft and implement a comprehensive roadmap (by May 2003) that integrates studies, wargames, experimentation, and exercises with evaluation metrics and an execution timeline.” See Chief of Naval Operations, 2003, CNO Guidance for 2003, Department of the Navy, Washington, D.C., January 3. Available online at <http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/cno/clark-guidance2003.html>. Accessed November 9, 2003.

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The Role of Experimentation in Building Future Naval Forces the beach, and continued decisive operations under impaired network conditions and unfavorable environmental conditions. In response to the CNO’s guidance, the CFFC, through the NWDC, recently drafted the Sea Trial experimentation campaign plan.15 The committee believes that this is a step in the right direction, although the impact of the plan on the Navy is as yet unclear. For the Marine Corps, there has been a shift in recent years from a balanced program of experimentation campaigns to a program of experimentation based on near- and mid-term objectives. While these immediate challenges are important, there remains a need for continuing investment in long-term experimentation. Examples include sea basing, for which a program of experimentation needs to be designed, funded, and executed with the objective of realizing new capabilities, doctrine, and TTPs; operation in brown-water littorals to negate potential threats; and unconventional warfare, which will require the adaptation of current procedures for use from a sea base in brown-water operations. Recommendation 3: To address strategic, long-term objectives of Sea Power 21 and Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare, the Department of the Navy should expand its programs for experimentation. Specifically, for the Navy: The Commander, Fleet Forces Command, with the support of the Navy Warfare Development Command, should (1) create and maintain updated experimentation campaigns that address transformation objectives while identifying actionable steps and the organizations responsible for them; (2) ensure a balance in experimentation efforts directed at near-, mid-, and long-term objectives; (3) conduct experimentation sufficient to ensure that the highest-priority operational concepts are explored adequately for incorporation into the fleet and its operations; (4) establish adequate mechanisms for continued improvements and modifications to the experimentation program; and (5) maximize the effectiveness of joint experimentation in accordance with Recommendation 7 (below). The Navy Network Warfare Command and its supporting organizations should play a lead role in coordinating the information network aspects of experimentation and in enabling the realization of network-centric capabilities for the fleet through related concept development or exploration and spiral development processes. 15   Commander, Fleet Forces Command. 2003. Sea Trial—Concept Development and Experimentation Campaign Plan (U), Working Paper (draft), Norfolk, Va., May (Classified).

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The Role of Experimentation in Building Future Naval Forces Specifically, for the Marine Corps: In collaboration with the Navy Warfare Development Command, the Marine Corps Combat Development Command should augment its experimentation program by developing experimentation campaigns to address its strategic, long-term objectives, such as sea basing, conventional and unconventional expeditionary warfare, and, jointly with the Navy, assured access. Furthermore, its overall experimentation campaign should encompass all levels of force structure and activity necessary to meet the range of potential threats and future operational demands. As requested in the terms of reference for this study, a set of specific enhancements recommended for the naval experimentation programs is provided.16 These enhancements address future challenges stemming from Sea Power 21 and Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare and elaborate on areas for experimentation toward future capabilities in the naval programs of record. Enhance Navy Experimentation Processes Unlike the Marine Corps experimentation program, the Navy experimentation program needs more robust methods to build experimentation campaigns. To date, preparing for the event of an FBE has largely (but not exclusively) been a focus of activities. The NWDC needs both to shift focus and to augment processes. The NWDC requires enhanced processes for the following purposes: to select concepts for exploration; to integrate more overarching studies and analyses throughout the events of its campaigns; to build, mature, and evaluate concepts; and to maximize and apply a full range of experimentation venues (such as games, modeling and simulation, and limited objective experiments) in a more systematic manner. The NWDC’s experimentation campaigns require expansion and structure in order to ensure thorough learning of the relevant phenomena and of capability options and extensions of these by studies, analyses, and “writing the book” on concepts and capabilities under investigation so as to build definitive knowledge. Large field experiments are important and provide value, but they should be used only when appropriate—for instance, in exploring scalability or integration issues, or when warfighters need to interact with potential new capabilities. When experiments are introduced into large-scale exercises, conflicts between operational readiness objectives and an experiment’s objectives can arise, and the priorities of the exercises can degrade the value of the experiment. The recommended enhancements, as institutional processes, should pro- 16   In Chapter 6, see the section entitled “Specific Enhancements for the Naval Programs of Experimentation.”

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The Role of Experimentation in Building Future Naval Forces duce a better balance across all venues and yield knowledge that cannot be obtained in large field experiments, such as that gained from a large-scale examination of options or excursions. These are necessary changes in strategy for the Sea Trial process. As noted above, the recent emergence of the Sea Trial Experimentation Campaign Plan is a step forward in this direction. Recommendation 4: To improve the effectiveness of its experimentation efforts, the Navy Warfare Development Command should augment its end-to-end experimentation processes by making the following key changes: Expand the emphasis on experimentation campaigns that use a full spectrum of experimentation activities, with analysis integrated throughout the campaigns as well as applied to determine which venues are most appropriate. Conduct significantly greater amounts of systematic and innovative analysis earlier and throughout the experimentation process in order to select, develop, and broaden understanding of the operational concepts to be explored, including a range of multiple and competing concepts. Broaden the incremental, sequential approach by using spiral methodology. Apply the sequential approach to war games, to modeling and simulation, and to small-scale, more narrowly focused experiments. Build larger-scale experiments on the basis of the results of such a sequential approach. Establish a standing, high-level, independent technical advisory board composed of experts in methods of innovation and experimentation and reporting to the Commander of the Navy Warfare Development Command, as a means to foster more robust experimental processes, maintain their quality, and make recommendations for improvements. Sustain and Use Navy Experimentation Resources More Effectively The committee questioned whether sufficient resources are available to the NWDC for experimentation but found this difficult to answer for two reasons. One involves the past emphasis on large fleet events, compounded more recently by joint experimentation. Large fleet events are costly, require many months of effort, involve competing needs for resources, and can be less effective at answering important questions than other venues to experimentation are. However, in the committee’s judgment, maximizing the use of smaller and more effective venues (recommended above) provides better use of the resources available and represents a sound change in methodology as well. The committee applauds the recent Sea Trial Experimentation Campaign Plan for its inclusion of a greater number of small experimentation venues. The second source of difficulty in answering the funding question is that the NWDC lacks line-item funding to cover the full costs of its own experimentation program. Rather, it coordinates and leverages both participation and funding

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The Role of Experimentation in Building Future Naval Forces from many organizations. In addition to its own funding, the NWDC relies on supplements from various organizations such as the Office of Naval Research (ONR). Although ONR has intended to provide some $20 million to $40 million annually for experimentation, in the past it has reallocated funds to other, higher-priority efforts. Such diversion of funds has occurred with other sponsors as well. These perturbations severely impact planning, preparation, conduct, and evaluation of experiments such as FBEs, which typically have cycle times of 12 to 18 months. When funds are reallocated, undue effort is expended by the NWDC on finding alternative funding, to the detriment of planning and conducting experimentation. What is clear is that the Navy is not making the most effective use of the experimentation resources already committed. The Navy should establish a line item for funding that reflects the value it places on experimentation, stands on its own merits, and is sustained and supported Navy-wide. Moreover FBEs will continue to be an important component of experimentation when used more appropriately; however, resource contention, such as from sharing assets with training exercises, needs to be addressed. The CFFC’s command of fleet assets should provide for resolution and leverage in this matter. Recommendation 5: The Navy should use the resources already programmed for experimentation more effectively, while also resolving resource contention surrounding experimentation. Specifically: The Chief of Naval Operations, with input from the Vice Chief of Naval Operations; the Commander, Fleet Forces Command (CFFC); the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Warfare Requirements and Programs (N6/N7); and the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Resources, Requirements, and Assessments (N8), should determine, and then plan, program, and preserve sufficient funding for the experimentation program within the Future Year Defense Program as a matter of priority. Funding for the Navy’s experimentation program should be a separate line item that is not commingled with the funds provided by other Navy sponsors, such as the Office of Naval Research. The CFFC should ensure that sufficient priority is given to experimentation needs when fleet training exercises and maintenance events override or threaten to compromise experiments. The CFFC should oversee and adjudicate conflicts that arise during all stages of fleet experiments. In collaboration with the CFFC and the Navy Warfare Development Command (NWDC), the Chief of Naval Education and Training, the Naval Postgraduate School at Monterey, California, and the Naval War College at Newport, Rhode Island, should develop a tailored course on experimentation in order to train and educate sailors, Marines, and civilians, and to instantiate best practices in experimentation.

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The Role of Experimentation in Building Future Naval Forces Enhance Infrastructure and Tools for Naval Experimentation The Naval Services are in need of improvements in the infrastructure and tools supporting experimentation. Some critical platforms for experimentation are unavailable, including ship platforms—a shortfall compounded by the potential decommissioning of the USS Coronado—and airborne command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) assets, some of which are currently under the ownership or control of the other Services. In addition, the Naval Services will require improvements in modeling and simulation (M&S) tools to explore the full range of experimentation venues, including tools for generating scenarios, populating databases, and collecting and analyzing data. Simulations are required to explore more tactical-level interactions, and, at the conclusion of the Millennium Challenge ’02 exercise, USJFCOM noted that the Defense Department’s existing M&S capabilities are insufficient to represent future operational concepts. In response, USJFCOM is proceeding with the expansion of its own Continuous Experimentation Environment. As a result, the Navy and Marine Corps will have an opportunity to leverage the USJFCOM investments while also ensuring compatibility across the respective Service and joint environments. Industry partnerships can be explored also, as appropriate. Recommendation 6: To investigate a full range of experimentation venues, the Department of the Navy should enhance its infrastructure and tools for naval experimentation. Specifically for the Department of the Navy: Given the importance of having a command ship platform with an expert and experienced cadre of experimentalists for work in network-centric operations, the Department of the Navy should ensure that the USS Coronado (or a comparable platform) remains available for experimentation as it makes changes in the fleet of ships in commission or in active reserve duty. The Department of the Navy should augment its modeling and simulation tools and infrastructure to support a full spectrum of naval and joint experimentation campaign activities (e.g., concept development, war games, and limited-objective experiments) to support tactical-level interactions and to reflect next-generation warfighting environments. It should also supplement its tools for building, validating, and verifying models; for generating scenarios and populating databases; and for collecting and analyzing data, while ensuring tools that can function and integrate within the various frameworks and environments as future experimentation campaigns are defined and executed. In addressing enhancement of its infrastructure and tools for naval experimentation, the Department of

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The Role of Experimentation in Building Future Naval Forces the Navy should leverage the capabilities of other organizations, such as the U.S. Joint Forces Command. Balance Naval and Joint Experimentation As joint operations continue to leverage naval capabilities, planning is needed to link naval and joint experimentation across a spectrum of activities ranging from the earliest concept development through analyses, war games, and simulations, leading ultimately to limited-objective experiments and larger fleet experiments. Given this requirement, the committee views the current state in naval experimentation as having both limitations and opportunities. Joint concept development requires more synergistic collaboration with the Naval Services than is now taking place. Concept development for the Navy and the Marine Corps is focused at the NWDC and the MCCDC, respectively, and on the joint side at the USJFCOM. Although these organizations are interacting, the committee believes that the interaction is not as close or extensive as it needs to be. While the development of joint concepts does involve the Naval Services, it does not appear to build on the Services’ concepts in a substantive way; nor is there a good, detailed crosswalk between the joint concepts and those developed by the Naval Services. In the past the Navy and Marine Corps have participated with USJFCOM in a number of joint experimentation events ranging from war games to field experiments. Attention has been given more recently to the large-scale field experiment Millennium Challenge ’02, and USJFCOM is currently planning a significant program of future experimentation activities. The Naval Services are expected to be active participants and should play a substantive role in defining these events. There are opportunities to expand joint experimentation with the Combatant Commands. Both the Navy and the Marine Corps have participated in conducting experiments with the Combatant Commands, usually in conjunction with exercises such as Kernel Blitz. Past experiences have been valuable, particularly with respect to advances in command and control, communications, developing and refining procedures and working with prototype systems, and the involvement of coalition nations. There is a need for a coordination mechanism that will operate between the Naval Services and the Combatant Commands to identify and build programs of mutual interest. One alternative is to use this coordination mechanism between the Combatant Command and the Service component commands assigned to it.17 The component commands could in turn interact with appropriate elements of their respective Services (e.g., with the NWDC and the MCCDC). 17   Such as either the appropriate Navy fleet command or the numbered fleet commands under that fleet command.

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The Role of Experimentation in Building Future Naval Forces More cross-Service experimentation is required, yet interactions among Service concept development centers appear to be limited. The Navy has involved both the Army and the Air Force in past FBEs, and the NWDC previously indicated a desire to increase other Services’ involvement in future FBEs. The current Marine Corps experiments do not appear to have a significant joint or cross-Service perspective, yet cross-Service experimentation involving two or more Services is ideally suited for exploring operations at the tactical level. Moreover, there is a pressing need to investigate joint interactions at the tactical level, given the growing intensity of such interactions in recent operations. Expanding cross-Service experimentation, however, requires a mechanism for coordinating force deployment schedules—although it is conceivable that such coordination could be carried out at the top levels of the Services, with USJFCOM serving as an intermediary. Recommendation 7: To ensure better preparation for future joint operations and to maximize the effectiveness of its participation in joint experimentation, the Department of the Navy should establish a set of principles and guidelines to balance experimentation requirements for Service-unique and joint experimentation, and it should then align and synchronize its participation accordingly. Specifically: The Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant of the Marine Corps should actively support joint experimentation on the basis of a clear understanding of the priorities of the various joint concept development and experimentation activities. In addition, they should advocate top-level interest in operational concepts driven by naval force capabilities as well as concepts suitable in other operational environments. The Commander, Fleet Forces Command (CFFC) and the Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC) should conduct enough naval experimentation campaigns to ensure that the highest-priority naval operational concepts are adequately explored. The CFFC and the MCCDC should design all naval experiments with full recognition that the Navy and the Marine Corps will most likely be operating in a joint context; to the maximum degree feasible, the Naval Services should partner with the other Services in experimenting with relevant assets. The NWDC and the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory should achieve adequate cross-fertilization of joint and naval-specific operational concepts through substantive interaction of the respective concept development communities. The CFFC and the MCCDC should support and participate in joint experiments to explore the interaction and mutual support of the future operational concepts of each of the Services. These efforts should include staff interactions at the operational level and the “removal of seams” between components at the tactical level.

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The Role of Experimentation in Building Future Naval Forces The CFFC and the MCCDC should work with USJFCOM to identify key challenges (e.g., cruise missile defense, joint intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) on which they could welcome joint and/or other Service contributions. The CFFC, N7, N8, and the MCCDC should examine the tradeoffs in the benefits of large, resource-intensive and less well controlled experiments against the opportunities lost by not conducting a greater number of smaller, more focused joint and/or naval experimentation activities. The CFFC and the MCCDC should systematically develop programs of joint experimentation with the Combatant Commands and should establish a coordination mechanism to facilitate the development of such programs. The CFFC and the MCCDC should increase cross-Service experimentation, particularly at the tactical level, and should establish a scheduling mechanism to facilitate this experimentation. These principles are supplemented with a mission-based strategy for determining where to focus naval and joint experimentation. The mission-based approach is elaborated in Chapter 6, in the subsection titled “A Mission-Based Approach for Balancing Naval and Joint Experimentation.”