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The Role of Experimentation in Building Future Naval Forces (2004)

Chapter: 3 Experimentation--Past, Present, and Future

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Suggested Citation:"3 Experimentation--Past, Present, and Future." National Research Council. 2004. The Role of Experimentation in Building Future Naval Forces. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11125.
×

3
Experimentation—Past, Present, and Future

This chapter provides an overview of past, current, and future experimentation programs in the four Services. The emphasis is on naval experimentation, but the experiences and lessons of the other Services are relevant and therefore are included.

U.S. NAVY

The U.S. Navy has a long history and tradition of using experimentation to evaluate doctrine, equipment, and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs)—in fact all of the elements included in DOTMLPF: doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, and facilities. In October 1884, the Naval War College was established at the behest of Captain Alfred T. Mahan and Rear Admiral Stephen B. Luce, who argued that future naval commanders needed a place where they could develop tactics and doctrine through experimentation. In Mahan and Luce’s day, the experimentation consisted of tabletop simulations of fleet maneuvers.

Through the years, the Navy has “experimented” with new platforms (submarines in about 1901, carriers in about 1920, PT boats from about 1939 to 1941) and new propulsion systems and fuels (diesels/fuel oil1 from about 1904 to 1935). Experimentation conducted from about 1923 to 1940 with exercises that the

1  

See John R. Edwards, 1904, Report of U.S. Naval “Liquid Fuel” Board of Tests Conducted on the Hohenstein Water Tube Boiler, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.

Suggested Citation:"3 Experimentation--Past, Present, and Future." National Research Council. 2004. The Role of Experimentation in Building Future Naval Forces. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11125.
×

Navy termed “Fleet Problems” was key to the development of U.S. carrier doctrine.2

A Case History in Past Experimentation: The Early Development of Naval Aviation

The history of the Navy’s use of experimentation to achieve new capabilities is illustrated by the role of experimentation in the introduction of aircraft and aircraft carriers. The motivation to undertake an experimentation campaign related to naval aviation was driven directly by a decision of Admiral of the Fleet George Dewey, who began to push the concept of naval aviation after viewing the use of dirigibles. The admiral is said to have commented, “If you can fly higher than the crow’s nest, we will use you.”3 To pursue the concept of naval aviation, Captain Washington Chambers was designated by Admiral Dewey as the Navy’s lead aviation project officer. Chambers’s jobs were to find funding for the project and to demonstrate that an aircraft could both take off from and land on a ship.

George von L. Meyer, then Secretary of the Navy, refused to include funds in the budget for the demonstration. Not to be deterred, Chambers found a rich, politically well connected publisher and aviation enthusiast named John B. Ryan to help him. Ryan contacted President Taft, who persuaded Secretary Meyer to change his mind and designate the cruiser USS Birmingham to be used for the experiment. The experiment required the construction of a wooden ramp extending from bridge to bow. While the Navy provided the ship, the cost of the ramp ($288) was paid for by Ryan. The first demonstration of an aircraft taking off from a ship took place near Norfolk, Virginia, in November 1910.

Captain Chambers was then authorized to spend not more than $500 to construct an aircraft recovery ramp on the stern of the cruiser USS Pennsylvania. On the basis of experiments ashore, Chambers and his pilot, Eugene Ely, determined that arresting cables would be needed to bring the aircraft to a stop. Accordingly, 15 cables were stretched across the deck, each fastened at either end to a 50-lb sandbag. When the cost of the arresting cables exceeded the funds allocated for the project, Captain C.F. Pond, the skipper of the Pennsylvania, paid for the overrun out of his own pocket.

On January 18, 1911, in San Francisco Bay, Ely landed his aircraft on an up-sloping ramp on the rear deck of the Pennsylvania. Ely’s tail hook caught the 10th arresting cable and his plane stopped 50 ft from a crash barrier. Captain Pond’s report after the experiment read:

2  

“Fleet Problems” were at-sea exercises with a considerable experimentation component. See Brian McCue, 2002, “Wotan’s Workshop: Military Experiments Before the Second World War,” Occasional Paper, Center for Naval Analyses Occasional Paper, Alexandria, Va., October.

3  

RADM George van Deurs, USN (retired). 1966. Wings for the Fleet; A Narrative of Naval Aviation’s Early Development, 1910-1916, U.S. Naval Institute, Annapolis, Md., p. 3.

Suggested Citation:"3 Experimentation--Past, Present, and Future." National Research Council. 2004. The Role of Experimentation in Building Future Naval Forces. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11125.
×

This was the most important landing since the dove flew back to the Ark.4 I desire to place myself on record as positively assured of the importance of the aeroplane in future naval warfare, certainly for scouting purposes. For offensive operations such as bomb throwing, there has as yet, to my knowledge, been no demonstration of value, nor do I think there is likely to be. The extreme accuracy of control as demonstrated by Ely, while perhaps not always to be expected to the same degree, was certainly not accidental and can be repeated and probably very generally approximated to. There only remains the development of the power and endurance of the machine itself, which as with all mechanical things, is bound to come.5

In 1913, Captain Chambers determined that all available aircraft and pilots should take part in the fleet’s winter exercises of 1913 off Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. These annual exercises were the equivalent of the current Navy fleet battle experiments (FBEs). For these experiments, Chambers’s officers rigged a wireless transmitter on one of the aircraft and a receiver on the flagship. An aircraft then flew over the horizon to scout out the position of the opposing forces. Although transmission took place on the plane, reception on the flagship did not occur. However, the concept of using an elevated platform to locate hostile forces had been established.

During the next 7 years, aircraft technology—driven by needs of the Allied and Central powers in World War I—accelerated rapidly, as did the number of qualified flyers and aircraft in the U.S. Navy. By the end of World War I, aircraft carried weapons (machine guns), could drop bombs, and could undertake primitive communications. Experiments had resulted in the development of moderately safe catapults that allowed pontoon aircraft to be launched from a ship’s fantail. In 1917, the British Navy undertook experiments with arresting cables that could absorb the energy of a landing aircraft more efficiently than could Ely’s arrangement of cables and sandbags. Thus, by the end of World War I, all of the technology required for an aircraft carrier was in place.

On March 20, 1922, the USS Langley, the Navy’s first aircraft carrier, was commissioned. The ship had been converted from the former Jupiter, a collier. By the end of the decade, two more carriers, the Lexington and the Saratoga, were commissioned. The performance of carrier aviation in the war games (FBEs) of 1929 was a portent of the future. Opposing fleets were charged with the attack and defense of the Panama Canal. The Saratoga (attacking force), under cover of darkness and bad weather, launched 69 aircraft, which arrived over and theoretically destroyed the canal without incident. Thus, the role of the fast carrier was predicted 12 years before Pearl Harbor.

4  

RADM George van Deurs, USN (retired). 1966. Wings for the Fleet; A Narrative of Naval Aviation’s Early Development, 1910-1916, U.S. Naval Institute, Annapolis, Md., p. 28.

5  

RADM George van Deurs, USN (retired). 1966. Wings for the Fleet; A Narrative of Naval Aviation’s Early Development, 1910-1916, U.S. Naval Institute, Annapolis, Md., p. 29.

Suggested Citation:"3 Experimentation--Past, Present, and Future." National Research Council. 2004. The Role of Experimentation in Building Future Naval Forces. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11125.
×

Evolution of the Linear Development Model

During World War I, Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels established a Scientific Advisory Board under Thomas Edison. Edison (over the objections of other board members) pushed for the establishment of a naval experimental station that was to conduct tests and experiments leading to better gun barrels, improved radio communication techniques, improved steel armor, and new torpedoes and mines. The recommended experimental station was established by 1923 and evolved into the Naval Research Laboratory (NRL), which rapidly began to operate as a scientific laboratory in the way that other board members had recommended.

At the end of World War II, the Navy adopted and institutionalized the concept of Vannevar Bush that the process of change in and growth of naval capabilities was a continuous and unending process. New capabilities would result from a linear process that started with an investment in basic research. The results achieved would then enter into a development process that would eventually transition into a state of sufficient maturity so that the results of the R&D process could be incorporated into systems and equipment that could be procured for fleet use. Once new systems and equipment were delivered to the fleet, naval personnel would devise optimum techniques for their employment.

This linear model resulted in some spectacular successes, yielding new warfighting capabilities that grew out of Navy basic research investments. Among these were the Global Positioning System (GPS), overhead surveillance and target localization capabilities, passive undersea surveillance, high-strength steels for submarine hulls, and phased-array antennas for radar and communications systems.

Nonetheless, the linear acquisition model had several deficiencies. These included long delays in delivering products to operators in the field, products that were technologically obsolete by the time of their introduction, and products that did not perform as advertised. In response, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology (USDA&T) created the advanced concept technology demonstration (ACTD), which was structured to put mature technology in the hands of operators to address a particular need. The goals of ACTD were to determine where, when, and why a system or technology did or did not work and to allow the operator an opportunity to develop TTPs using the technology. Another response to problems experienced with linear acquisition was the adoption of the spiral development method, discussed in Chapter 2.

The Navy has modified its historical approach to developing potential capabilities for the fleet by incorporating both linear acquisition and spiral development methods. Since the mid 1990s, the Navy has participated in various ACTDs such as Cruise Missile Defense, Phase 1; Extending the Littoral Battlespace; Link 16; and Coastal Area Protection System, to name a few. It has also applied spiral development, as is illustrated by the recent case study that follows.

Suggested Citation:"3 Experimentation--Past, Present, and Future." National Research Council. 2004. The Role of Experimentation in Building Future Naval Forces. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11125.
×

A Recent Experimentation Program: Advanced Rapid Commercial Off-the-Shelf Insertion

A more recent example of the role of experimentation in fostering new naval capabilities—and one using a spiral development approach—can be found in the Navy’s current Advanced Rapid Commercial Off-the-Shelf (COTS) Insertion (ARCI) Program. ARCI was motivated by an analysis of U.S. submarines’ operational experience in the early 1990s. Operations conducted against quiet Soviet submarines indicated a loss of acoustic advantage. The tactical and strategic implications of this problem were fully appreciated by the Submarine Type Commanders (Commander Submarine Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet, (COMSUBLANT) and Commander Submarine Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet (COMSUBPAC)), the Submarine Programs Resource Sponsor (Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV) N87)), and Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) 08 (Naval Reactors) Admiral Bruce DeMars, who was the senior submarine officer in the U.S. Navy. The recognition of the loss of acoustic advantage by the submarine force’s senior leadership galvanized a multifaceted response that included the acceleration of the existing sonar acquisition programs.

The first step in solving the acoustic superiority problem was the creation of a special advisory group known as the Submarine Superiority Technical Panel. This panel examined the problem and possible courses of action for regaining acoustic superiority. The panel’s recommended approach to quickly (and cheaply) improve submarine sonar processing capability was based on a philosophy of “build, test, build.” That is, the submarine community developed and tested capabilities and then integrated and installed them together as a unit of incremental capability commonly called a “block” to achieve an improvement in capability. This process was repeated and when an additional level of capability enhancement was achieved, another block was installed in succeeding submarine developments and overhauls. Thus, capabilities were enhanced through a series of block upgrades, phased in incrementally over time, in a process in which spiral development (develop, test, develop) could occur within individual block upgrades.

New algorithms hosted on COTS processors were first tested in the laboratory against data collected from at-sea controlled experiments and real-world operations. The tests were performed in the laboratory by an independent third party. Once an algorithm was determined to have performed successfully in the laboratory, it was taken to sea and tested in controlled experiments. The governing principles in at-sea testing were that (1) operational testing must be adequate and carried out under realistic conditions, and (2) degraded performance must be understood at a fundamental level. Feedback and analysis from the at-sea experiments were used to modify algorithms and correct deficiencies. The system after modification would then be integrated and would undergo an end-to-end test to ensure that it was working properly.

Suggested Citation:"3 Experimentation--Past, Present, and Future." National Research Council. 2004. The Role of Experimentation in Building Future Naval Forces. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11125.
×

To transition the successful ARCI software and hardware components, a program was established to deploy successful ARCI products into the submarine fleet as quickly as possible—by means of the block upgrades described above.

Almost all 688 class submarines have been or will be upgraded with ARCI technology.6 The Seawolf- and Virginia-class programs have also integrated the ARCI approach into their sonar systems. The ARCI approach is also being followed by the antisubmarine warfare community, specifically in the Surface Ship Towed Array and Bow Sonar Acquisition Programs.

In addition to testing new algorithms for detection and classification capability, a parallel effort was set up to develop TTPs as well as decision aids to take advantage of the new ARCI-enabled capabilities. In this regard, littoral conditions in terms of both acoustic conditions and contact density (number of objects acoustically detected per unit area) have been emphasized. The ARCI Program has been executed through a close partnership among NAVSEA, OPNAV, the Program Executive Offices, the Operational Test and Evaluation Force, and the fleet.

Experimentation That Changed Operational Capabilities

A review of successes in naval aviation and the example of the ARCI Program provide some lessons with respect to successful experimentation. If experimentation is to enable changes in fielded capabilities, the following five factors need to be present:

  1. Problem to be solved. First, a significant problem must exist. In the case of naval aviation, the problem was the development of a naval air capability by other countries and adversaries. In the case of the ARCI Program, the problem was U.S. submarines’ loss of acoustic advantage—a compelling need.

  2. Availability of technology. In the cases of naval aviation and ARCI, technologies appeared that made it possible to experiment with TTPs to improve warfighting capability.

  3. Leadership buy-in. In the cases discussed, top officers in the Navy—the Fleet Commander and the Submarine Type Commanders, respectively—were committed to change.

  4. Organizational structure conducive to change. In both of these cases, organizations were created under which the testing of new concepts with new technologies could flourish. Also, these organizations reported directly to senior

6  

The Defense Operational Test and Evaluation’s Annual Report for 2002 states that ARCI systems, while being deployed in increasing numbers, have not been adequately tested owing to lack of availability of resources: test platforms (submarines) and time (p. 133). The Secretary of the Navy, George England, has been quoted as having assured DOT&E that deployment “…risks were … considered acceptable … to support our emerging plans in the war on terrorism.” (Maline Brown. 2003. “Young Wants Navy to Trim Time, Money Spent on Operational Testing,” Inside the Navy, Vol. 16, No. 4, January 27, p. 1.)

Suggested Citation:"3 Experimentation--Past, Present, and Future." National Research Council. 2004. The Role of Experimentation in Building Future Naval Forces. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11125.
×

leadership. In the more recent example of ARCI, the Submarine Development Squadron (SUBDEVRON 12) had the responsibility for testing new concepts and new technologies. The DEVRON reported results directly to COMSUBLANT (relevant information was provided to COMSUBPAC) and to the N77 and N88 senior submarine officers. Owing to this process, important results were transitioned.

  1. Funding. In both cases, stable funding was provided to move the experimentation process along, and funding was provided to transition capabilities to the field. Funds were established at the specific direction of senior leadership. The President established funding for the first “carrier” experiment, and the Submarine Type Commanders with N76 and N86 support secured funding for sonar improvements.

The committee found that these five factors for success were and are applicable to successful experimentation programs in the other military departments. The experience is reinforced later in this chapter through details on past and present programs of experimentation by the Services. As seen below, the absence of one of these five factors significantly increases the likelihood of a failure to transition the results of experimentation to a future, fielded military capability. This is true regardless of the identity of the sponsoring entity—whether it is a Type Command in the Navy, the Navy or the Marine Corps, the Department of the Navy or any other military department, or the joint community through the U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM).

Organizational Roles and Major Participants in Navy Experimentation

The Navy Warfare Development Command (NWDC) was established at Newport, Rhode Island, in 1998 to address the coevolution of Navy concepts and doctrine through experimentation. Its mission as briefed to the committee in July 2002 is this:

  • To develop Navy warfighting concepts,

  • To conduct concept-based experiments,

  • To represent the Navy with joint and Service laboratories and tactical development commands, and

  • To be the primary point of contact for naval and joint/combined doctrine and experimentation.9

7  

N7 is responsible for setting requirements in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations; N76 is responsible for undersea warfare requirements in the N7 office.

8  

N8 is responsible for allocating resources in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations; N86 is responsible for allocating resources to undersea warfare in the N8 office.

9  

RADM Robert Sprigg, USN, Commander, Navy Warfare Development Command, “Navy Experimentation Overview and Progress Summary,” presentation to the committee on April 5, 2002.

Suggested Citation:"3 Experimentation--Past, Present, and Future." National Research Council. 2004. The Role of Experimentation in Building Future Naval Forces. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11125.
×

When NWDC was first established, it reported to the president of the Naval War College. As a result of a reorganization by the Navy in 2002, NWDC now reports to the Commander of the Fleet Forces Command (CFFC). The recent change in reporting relationships is intended to strengthen NWDC’s ties to the fleets, facilitating the introduction of new concepts, the harvesting of fleet ideas, and a continuous dialogue with fleet customers to explore the merits of various concepts and the evaluation of operational capabilities.

New concepts can come from any source. For example, the focal point for the Navy Global Hawk concept is at the Navy Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Office (designated as PMA 263) in the Naval Air System Command, Patuxent River, Maryland. In principle, concepts proposed for NWDC’s consideration may come from the fleet, from the Senior Steering Group, from ONR (or its contractors), from Navy laboratories and warfare centers, from the results of an ACTD, or even from a commercial contractor. In practice, concepts that have some degree of technical maturity and associated funding are given more attention than those that lack technical maturity and funding. Those concepts endorsed by major commands and/or senior officers are most likely to drive NWDC’s efforts. NWDC works with the fleet commands in developing experiments and with MCCDC on naval force efforts involving both the Navy and the Marine Corps.

One of NWDC’s principal responsibilities is to plan and coordinate fleet battle experiments. The CNO established the Maritime Battle Center (MBC) in 1998 at NWDC to serve as the single point of contact for FBEs. In this capacity, MBC plans, prepares, conducts, and evaluates FBEs in coordination with many participating organizations. NWDC has the decision authority to run limited-objective experiments (LOEs) that do not need large fleet participation. LOEs cost less than FBEs, but their funding sources are different and the visibility of FBE results is greater. These distinctions can create organizational incentives that may not be in the best interests of the Navy as a whole.

Although MBC has been assigned the role of FBE coordinator, many components of the Navy carry out experimentation on a more or less continuous basis. As noted in the sonar improvements case study, the submarine community has established a dedicated squadron whose entire mission is to undertake experimentation with new tactics, doctrine, and technology, so that new capabilities can achieve rapid introduction into the submarine force. The Navy and Marine Corps have a substantial R&D community to produce new capabilities (platforms, weapons, sensors, communications systems, and so on) that are designed to enhance the warfighting capabilities of naval forces. These new capabilities are “experimented with” by computer simulations, by trial on test and training ranges, through war games, and by employment during fleet deployments. Some naval organizations such as the Third Fleet regard the participation in FBEs to be among their most important missions. In addition to hosting FBEs, the Third Fleet provides support on a continuous basis to Systems Commands (SYSCOMs)

Suggested Citation:"3 Experimentation--Past, Present, and Future." National Research Council. 2004. The Role of Experimentation in Building Future Naval Forces. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11125.
×

to experiment with or observe the value of specific developments that the SYSCOMs are sponsoring.

While ONR’s primary mission is to manage and foster R&D efforts within the Department of the Navy, in recent years these efforts have included support of “experimentation.” ONR has both provided financial support for NWDC and acquired various platforms (SLICE, high-speed vessel (HSV),10 and so on) that have been used “experimentally” by fleet forces. Recently organized entities such as the Navy Network Warfare Command (NETWARCOM) have proposed extensive use of computer simulations and experimentation to drive transformation. Finally, the Navy has long supported the OPTEVFOR organization, which practices experimentation in the true academic sense of the word. OPTEVFOR examines the hypothesis that some new platform, item of equipment, or software product will improve naval capabilities and consequently should be procured. Although the results of its efforts are frequently negative, OPTEVFOR routinely supports such operability assessments.

Navy organizations involved in planning for and executing Navy experiments in conjunction with NWDC include the following:

  • Warfare centers of excellence—for concept development, provision of equipment for experimentation, and evaluation of results;

  • Numbered fleets and the Type Commands—working either directly with NWDC or through Fleet Forces Command on experimental needs and the provision of platforms and other fleet assets for experiments. For instance, the new Navy Network Warfare Command has a special responsibility to coordinate experimental aspects of information systems and information networks. The other Type Commands also coordinate with NWDC on large experiments and for LOEs not requiring large force elements. They may plan and execute their own, smaller experiments (e.g., the submarine sonar experiments described earlier in this chapter);

  • ONR—for funding some aspects of NWDC’s experimental activities and for providing equipment for FBEs. It was noted at NWDC that, if ONR did not provide equipment for experimentation, the FBEs could become science fairs, with industry sponsors providing the equipment for the Navy experiments;

  • The OPNAV staff, and N7 and N7011 in particular—for identifying needs and for using the results of experiments in developing and approving Navy requirements; and

10  

SLICE is a new, patented ship technology that enables SWATH (small waterplane area twin hull) ships to operate at higher speeds while retaining their characteristic low motions in a seaway. SLICE is not an acronym. High-speed vessels (HSV) are commercially available, leased by the Navy and the Army, for experimentation purposes.

11  

N70 is responsible for requirements analysis in the N7 office.

Suggested Citation:"3 Experimentation--Past, Present, and Future." National Research Council. 2004. The Role of Experimentation in Building Future Naval Forces. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11125.
×
  • The Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition (ASN(RDA)), including the program executive offices and program managers for acquisition programs—as possible identifiers of experimental needs and as recipients of the results of experiments.

In working with the other Navy organizations, NWDC must use its coordinating skills and abilities to direct and leverage all of the participation it can obtain from organizations and parties that it does not control. For example, NWDC has neither the line item funding to control equipment to be used for experimentation (it relies on ONR) nor the authority to require the N7 staff to listen and act on the results of experiments when dealing with Navy “requirements.”

FLEET BATTLE EXPERIMENTS

The Navy uses various types of field events in experimentation. Among the most prominent are FBEs, ACTDs, and LOEs. Fleet battle experiments are the most visible and resource-intensive activities in the spectrum of events comprised by experimentation in the Navy today. This section focuses on FBEs and the processes associated with them and reviews results to date. LOEs are also addressed, particularly in association with specific FBEs.

FBEs are field experiments used to address a variety of objectives. When NWDC formulates a concept and evaluates it through various studies and analyses, war games, and simulations, it employs FBEs to explore the concept and supporting technologies in the fleet to determine whether the concept has merit. As an example, several years ago during a global war game, the Navy explored the use of smaller, high-speed surface craft in the littoral to counter enemy antiaccess strategies. Subsequently, NWDC leased a high-speed vessel for FBE-I and FBE-J,12 to experiment with the HSV in conjunction with various payloads to determine its merit.

FBEs are used not only to investigate whether new concepts and technologies have utility, but also to find out whether a concept makes sense in its formulation. The focus of an experiment may be doctrine and TTPs coevolved in association with a new technology. The results of FBEs can be used to accelerate the delivery of new DOTMLPF to the fleet. Alternatively, results can be used to shape more experimentation, to drive additional research, or to terminate efforts that do not warrant future investigation or investment.

FBEs and LOEs have different schedules, complexity, and resource requirements. LOEs are used to examine a single (or at most a few) well-defined projects or concepts in situations in which a broad range of operational parameters can be

12  

Fleet battle experiments are named by the Navy’s phonetic alphabet. A = Alpha, B = Bravo, C = Charlie, D = Delta, E = Echo, F = Foxtrot, G = Golf, H = Hotel, I = India, and J = Juliet.

Suggested Citation:"3 Experimentation--Past, Present, and Future." National Research Council. 2004. The Role of Experimentation in Building Future Naval Forces. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11125.
×

examined without the constraints of time and resources that are inherent in large-scale FBEs. In recent years, FBEs have become progressively more complex and have incorporated progressively more tests and experiments within limited periods of platform and asset availability. As a consequence, it can be argued that the experiments undertaken during FBEs are inherently more incomplete than those carried out during LOEs. For example, a complete examination of the operational parameters and attributes of the HSV could not possibly have been carried out during the few-week period associated with an FBE. An LOE dedicated to an examination of the attributes of the HSV was used in addition to the vessel’s participation in FBEs. As a result, the Navy has a much broader understanding of HSVs than it would have had if the HSV had been examined only during the course of an FBE.

FBEs typically require 12 to 18 months. Platform and equipment availability must be planned in conjunction with personnel training cycles and operator availability. Surrogates, computer simulations, or models must be used when needed equipment is not available to support the experiment. These must be tested and verified as faithful representations of the system or capability being simulated or explored.

The FBE process involves many steps. They include the determination of objectives, concept definition, venue identification, selection of initiatives, technology selection, detailed planning, supporting events such as war games, simulations, and then the refinement of experiment planning, detailed preparation, execution, and evaluation.

For FBE-A through FBE-J, the process began with the solicitation of inputs from regional combatant commanders (then referred to as Commanders in Chief (CINCs)) for a numbered fleet sponsoring. The choice of sponsorship is synchronized with scheduled exercises owing to the need for live forces. Once selected, a sponsoring numbered fleet commander advises NWDC of warfare priorities and geopolitical and operational issues for the experiment. In response, NWDC recommends additional areas for consideration. Suggestions are also collected from the fleet, OPNAV, SYSCOMS, combatant commanders, ONR, the Navy laboratories, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), and industry.

Each FBE has a budget determined by its scope. Typically, FBE costs are between $3 million and $5 million13 (these are costs beyond those of fleet operations and prototype system development for the FBE). In contrast, the Navy component for large joint experiments is typically about $16 million. Funding for an FBE only pays for personnel support, supporting communications architectures, and technology.

13  

CAPT Patrick Denny, USN, Director, Maritime Battle Center, “Navy Experimentation,” presentation to the committee on July 9, 2002.

Suggested Citation:"3 Experimentation--Past, Present, and Future." National Research Council. 2004. The Role of Experimentation in Building Future Naval Forces. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11125.
×

Funding for an FBE is provided by NWDC; its funding is supplemented by various sponsors within the Navy, such as ONR, whose primary responsibility is the management of the Navy’s science and technology (S&T) program, and by organizations external to the Navy such as DARPA. ONR provides some support for NWDC’s planning of FBEs and frequently serves as a sponsor for individual projects and concepts that are evaluated in an FBE. From ONR’s perspective, NWDC is a claimant for available funds. Although ONR intends to provide from $20 million to $40 million per year for experimentation, in the past such funds have been used for other, higher-priority efforts. Such preemption has occurred with other sponsors as well.

As noted, many organizations participate in FBEs. NWDC designs the overall experiment, the concept, and the scenarios around which the concept is to be tested. Numbered fleet command personnel arrange for support services. Personnel from host ships are assigned to train on test equipment before an experiment is initiated and to assist with shipboard installation. SYSCOM representatives examine all temporary installations for safety. New equipment and systems are tested, integrated, and maintained once the experiments have commenced. Since there is no defined logistic support system available for experimental equipment undergoing testing, contractors normally provide support for their equipment with senior engineers and technicians. Individual project offices that are sponsoring systems or equipment normally provide their own teams of observers and analysts. The personnel from many organizations—military and civilian, government and contractor—monitor and observe events during the experiment, collect data, conduct analyses and evaluation, and prepare the lessons-learned and after-action briefings. For instance, when their programs or responsibilities are involved, ONR observers attend FBEs, review the final reports, and recommend changes and adjustments to ongoing R&D efforts based on the results. An indirect benefit from the level and nature of contractor involvement is the influence on industry independent research and development (IR&D).

Finally, since all systems and equipment being tested in an FBE must have an intended transition recipient (e.g., a SYSCOM or a program executive office), representatives of such organizations are also present. In short, many personnel contribute to the planning, preparation, execution, and evaluation of an FBE or an LOE.

While final versions of reports require long preparation times, lessons learned are prepared shortly after the FBE’s completion and are briefed to fleet operators, senior personnel of the ships and aircraft involved, and senior leadership in OPNAV. After each FBE, the sponsoring fleet sends a message to all major naval commands that summarizes “quick-look” results. ONR, all major SYSCOM organizations, and program executive offices are on the distribution list, as are the N7 and N8, since these organizations have the ultimate responsibility for sponsoring, budgeting for, and developing new capabilities.

Suggested Citation:"3 Experimentation--Past, Present, and Future." National Research Council. 2004. The Role of Experimentation in Building Future Naval Forces. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11125.
×

SYNOPSIS OF RESULTS TO DATE FROM FLEET BATTLE EXPERIMENTS ALPHA THROUGH INDIA

In FBE-A through FEB-J, the U.S. Navy experimented with concepts of operations and with new TTPs using networked systems for theater ballistic missile defense (TBMD), naval fire power, and defense against asymmetric threats. Each FBE had between three and eight major objectives, and each major objective had anywhere from one to nine subobjectives.

Table 3.1 summarizes the major objectives and findings of FBE-A through FBE-I. A complete analysis of the results of FBE-J was not available to the committee at the time of its study.

Table 3.1 is necessarily telegraphic, merely summarizing results. A review of the results reveals that, while all objectives might not have been achieved, a significant number of objectives were indeed realized. The reader should ask, of course, whether the lessons learned were trivial or profound, whether they could have been learned more easily and less expensively in other ways (such as through LOEs—a point discussed above with respect to the investigation of the HSV). By and large the committee concluded that the FBEs have in fact been valuable—and possibly invaluable because of their unique ability to focus the attention and excite the imagination of important senior officers with a warfighting perspective.

One of the important outcomes of the Navy’s FBE campaign has been the determination as to why certain objectives were not achieved, which allows for an iterative process of improvement. The principal successes of FBEs have been as follows:

  • Demonstrations of the feasibility of new operational concepts using surrogate or prototype systems or existing systems,

  • The adoption by fleet forces of new TTPs, and

  • The development of new doctrine for fleet operations.

A Recent Example of New Concept Development

FBEs have supported the evolution of decision-support concepts and tools intended to increase the speed of command14 and enable the collaboration of command echelon decision makers. The Knowledge-Web (K-Web) addressed in FBE-J is one such example. The K-Web involves the application of knowledge-management practices to warfighting, creating a concept of operations in which value-added information (i.e., “knowledge”) is created and published on the command intranet in real time rather than being coupled to daily briefing cycles.

14  

Speed of command can be defined as the rapidity with which decisions are made by all the ships involved in making command decisions, the decisions are formulated as executable orders, and the orders are communicated to those responsible for their execution.

Suggested Citation:"3 Experimentation--Past, Present, and Future." National Research Council. 2004. The Role of Experimentation in Building Future Naval Forces. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11125.
×

TABLE 3.1 Summary of Major Objectives and Findings of Fleet Battle Experiments Alpha Through India (FBE-A Through FBE-I)

FBE Name, Year Conducted

Objective

Findings

FBE-A 1997

1. Determine whether Commander, Marine Air/Ground Task Force could make tactical decisions based on Common Tactical Picture (CTP) seen on the USS Coronado.

1. Tactical decisions based on CTP seen on the USS Coronado were not possible because one-way data link limited distribution of CTP.

 

2. Demonstrate collaborative planning between Third Fleet and USAF, Special Purpose Marine Air/Ground Task Force (SPMAGTF), Area Air and Missile Defense Command, USMC Hawk, and the U.S. Space Command (SPACECOM); evaluate automated support and decision tools for deliberate and reactive planning.

2. Collaborative planning was performed among all entities except the ashore SPMAGTF. No collaborative planning was demonstrated for Naval Fire Support. Collaborative planning was demonstrated for theater ballistic missile defense (TBMD), as it was for Joint Task Force Exercise-97.

 

3. Examine Naval Surface Fire Support operational concepts utilizing a simulated arsenal ship, new command and control architectures, and advanced ordnance.

3. The command and control relationships between the Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) and the Naval Fire Cell were a source of contention and discussion. JFACC could easily integrate employment of arsenal ship in Rapid Strike scenario and successful results were achieved. Marine operators handled a peak of 2.5 targets per minute, error free.

FBE-B 1997

1. Examine and test concepts of operations for controlling all fire missions through defined threads using advanced sensors and technology.

1. The Naval Simulation System (NSS) simulation was used to provide a means of testing the Ring of Fire concept with a flow of target nominations similar to that in a wartime situation. The distributed C4ISR architecture using the Tactical Real-Time Targeting System was substantially more efficient at nominating targets for engagement than is the current, centralized architecture.

Suggested Citation:"3 Experimentation--Past, Present, and Future." National Research Council. 2004. The Role of Experimentation in Building Future Naval Forces. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11125.
×

FBE Name, Year Conducted

Objective

Findings

FBE-B 1997

2. Examine and test the use and value of the Common Operating Picture/Common Tactical Picture (COP/CTP).

2. The feasibility of using the Joint Maritime Command Information System to display the COP/CTP at all Navy command and control (C2) nodes was demonstrated.

 

3. Examine and test new procedures for deconfliction of multiple platform launches and existing flight plans.

3. NSS identified actionable targets and nominated them to Land Attack Warfare System (LAWS) for allocation to surface fire and close air support engagements; NSS also simulated target nominations to LAWS from four Forward Observer Air Controller Systems operating near the battlefront on the islands off the California coast.

FBE-C 1998

Explore alternative tactics, techniques, and procedures in executing the Ring of Fire concept for Joint Fires support in a littoral environment.

Fires Cell teams were exercised while testing alternative functional arrangements and procedures within the Fires Cell; increasing improvement in performance (as measured by time needed to service targets) validated the procedures and techniques tested.

FBE-D 1998

Examine (1) improved detection and targeting of Maritime Special Operations Forces through integrated use of air, surface, and subsurface Combined Forces under the Ring of Fire concept; (2) improved theater situational awareness and execution through coordination and application of a joint tactical picture; and (3) seamless sharing of a CTP between components for the Counter Special Operations Forces mission.

Bandwidth was limited and heavily used; new systems need to use it conservatively. The effect of added network load on legacy systems needs to be assessed. File transfers used in collaborative planning represented a trade-off between communication delays and bandwidth availability; all observed delays appeared to be acceptable during FBE-D.

Suggested Citation:"3 Experimentation--Past, Present, and Future." National Research Council. 2004. The Role of Experimentation in Building Future Naval Forces. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11125.
×

FBE Name, Year Conducted

Objective

Findings

FBE-E 1999

1. Explore Full Dimensional Protection.

1. Utilization of the unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) for detection, identification, and tracking had remarkable value; a combat swimmer could be detected by the UAV; high-quality imagery of mobile targets was almost continuously available to the Harbor Defense Commander, Full Dimension Protection Cell, and others.

 

2. Explore response to asymmetric threat.

2. Embarkation of the Mobile Inshore Undersea Warfare van extended organic and inorganic sensor range and allowed it to be used in the littoral zone of interest without having to establish a secure rear area for Mobile Inshore Undersea Warfare Unit protection.

 

3. Explore network-centric antisubmarine warfare (NCASW) with collaborative multisensor planning.

3. NCASW increased force situational awareness through distributed advance search plans. Reliable networked communications are essential for distributed collaborative planning in NCASW. Common tactical decision aids enhance the update of situational awareness required for NCASW.

 

4. Explore Theater Air and Missile Defense.

4. Changes in tactics are needed to compensate for arc and range of fire. Deconfliction requires further investigation. Improved identification methods are needed to prevent fratricide of high-value-asset defenders and to take into account possible collateral damage both over water and ashore.

5.

Explore precision engagement.

5. Weapons currently used for naval surface precision fires were not found to be useful against targets in urban canyons.

Suggested Citation:"3 Experimentation--Past, Present, and Future." National Research Council. 2004. The Role of Experimentation in Building Future Naval Forces. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11125.
×

FBE Name, Year Conducted

Objective

Findings

FBE-F 1999

1. Demonstrate ability to counter undersea threat and maintain sea line of communication into Persian Gulf.

1. Current C4I does not support requirements for in-stride mine clearance operations. The colocation of the Sea Combat Commander and the Mine Warfare Commander with the Joint Force Maritime Component Commander (JFMCC) was effective. Full exploitation of shared sensors and environmental data was not realized.

 

2. Demonstrate ability to protect Mine Countermeasures (MCM) forces by use of integrated joint forces assets.

2. Army attack aviation (e.g., Apaches) appeared uniquely fitted to this role of engaging surface threats. Issues involve airborne C2 and the ability of Apaches to discriminate between friendly and hostile targets require resolution.

 

3. Demonstrate ability to protect MCM forces by application of disruptive, neutralization, and suppressive fires to the shore-based threats.

3. Joint Fires Element (JFE) of the Commander Joint Task Force (CJTF) staff demonstrated the ability to control both deliberate and tactically responsive fires. JFE appeared particularly fitted to control of Navy fires during initial penetration when the preponderance of fires was maritime-based.

 

4. Examine implications of effects-based operations (EBO).

4. The integration of EBO was not effective owing to a lack of common understanding of EBO and a common language, and inadequate definition of requirements for detailed, continuous commander’s guidance.

 

5. Examine Joint Task Force nuclear, chemical, and biological defense capabilities.

5. The land-based CJTF was particularly vulnerable to nuclear, biological, or chemical (NBC) attack delivered by either theater weapons (i.e., theater ballistic missile) or by terrorists; the experiment illuminated the extent of the burden of conducting operations in an NBC environment.

Suggested Citation:"3 Experimentation--Past, Present, and Future." National Research Council. 2004. The Role of Experimentation in Building Future Naval Forces. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11125.
×

FBE Name, Year Conducted

Objective

Findings

FBE-G 2000

1. Examine capability of Composite Warfare Commander to provide seamless transition from tactical-level defense of battle group to theater defense of civilian population centers.

1. Navy assets assigned to theater ballistic missile defense missions produce C2 ambiguity when they report to theater commanders for TBMD and tactical commanders for other mission areas.

 

2. Examine use of Special Operations Forces (SOF) in time-critical target (TCT).

2. SOF demonstrated (1) the use of unattended ground sensors and an airborne Synthetic Aperture Radar/ Multispectral Thermal Imagery sensor, (2) capability to perform intelligence preparation of the battlefield through use of unattended ground sensors, and (3) a strike-coordinating role by an SOF cell deployed onboard a submarine.

 

3. Demonstrate use of combined strategic, operational,and tactical-level sensors in a single network to improve early warning missile defense time lines (sources for ballistic missile (BM) tracks included Tactical Data Dissemination System, Joint Tactical Ground Station, Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities (TENCAP), airborne laser, Aegis, Theatre High Altitude Area Defense, and Patriot).

3. Cueing data could be used to dedicate radar resources in affected sensors and to confirm or deny existence of BM tracks; use of multiple sensors in a single-sensor network significantly decreased time to validate BM tracks and improve early warning time lines; Navy’s TENCAP systems and processes decreased validation times for BM tracks by feeding Joint Tactical Air-to-ground System raw infrared data to an Aegis destroyer.

 

4. Examine the tactical employment of a network-centric warfare engagement network created using a combination of command and control options in the digital fires network.

4. The experimental C2 network demonstrated the commander’s requirement to impose varying degrees of control, depending on the tactical situation.

 

5. Examine application of antisubmarine warfare (ASW) search methods to TCT.

5. ASW search techniques could be used.

Suggested Citation:"3 Experimentation--Past, Present, and Future." National Research Council. 2004. The Role of Experimentation in Building Future Naval Forces. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11125.
×

FBE Name, Year Conducted

Objective

Findings

FBE-G 2000

6. Build and maintain an overland Common Operating Picture, identified by Commander Sixth Fleet as a key shortfall during Operation Allied Force.

6. This objective was not achieved.

 

7. Examine limitations of a distributed mensuration network to develop aim points for decentralized engagement.

7. Mensuration was achieved with average time of 9.5 min; despite high-bandwidth, low time-latency networks, the speed of execution (sensor to shooter) could not adequately engage targets with dwell times of less than 30 min.

FBE-H 2000

1. Examine a deliberate targeting and planning process based on collaboration between the warfare commanders to produce a Maritime Tasking Order (MTO) that provides guidance, apportionment/allocation instructions, and deliberate assignment of targets.

1. A collaborative planning process to prioritize, deconflict, and synchronize future maritime missions within an acceptable planning cycle was demonstrated. FBE-H indicated a need for planning and collaboration tools resident with each warfare commander and the JFMCC staff. The relationships between the Joint Force Air Component Commander and JFMCC and the relationships between the air tasking order and MTO were not examined.

 

2. Examine the application of the Digital Fires Network (DFN) to the time-sensitive-target problem. DFN was a synthesis of C2, intelligence, (ISR), and fire support planning and execution tools, with LAWS, Global Command and Control System (GCCS) ISR Capability, and Precision Targeting Workshop (PTW) being the core systems.

2. (a) A COP proved elusive—in varying degrees LAWS, GISRC, Global Command and Control System-Maritime (GCCS-M), and numerous surveillance, and reconnaissance warfare-area-specific tools contain information that is required for a thorough understanding of the battlespace, and during FBE-H the information required for situational awareness was present but could not be easily aggregated or shared between systems.

Suggested Citation:"3 Experimentation--Past, Present, and Future." National Research Council. 2004. The Role of Experimentation in Building Future Naval Forces. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11125.
×

FBE Name, Year Conducted

Objective

Findings

FBE-H 2000

 

2. (b) The value of conducting the experimentation with joint and allied forces was demonstrated (HMS Cardiff was integrated into the Digital Fires Network via a LAWS terminal); DFN could be used by Army and Marine Corps personnel to plan for and execute Tactical Tomahawk Land Attack Missile missions (weapons were allocated, assigned to targets, launched to loiter points, and retargeted to support the maneuver of Army and Marine forces).

 

3. Test the ability of the Mine Warfare Commander (MIWC) and Mine Countermeasures Commander (MCMC) to execute the mine warfare mission in support of the aircraft carrier battle group operations.

3. With some deficiencies, the concept for using organic MCM systems hosted on platforms with other warfare missions worked well in clearing the mined SLOC and approaches to the amphibious assembly area. As currently configured and tasked, a submarine development squadron (DESRON) staff is incapable of performing additional MIWC duties without a significant increase in manning and mine warfare expertise.

 

4. Demonstrate the operation of GCCS-M using a Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) network architecture equipped with the COP Synch Tool, and a database replicator, to provide low-latency replication of the GCCS picture across the battle force.

4. A low-latency GCCS-M data distribution throughout the COP was achieved but did not translate into a common understanding of the battlespace for commanders and planners; as configured, GCCS-M required dedicated management to ensure that information was complete, timely, and accurate.

 

5. Demonstrate the effective employment of nonlethal technology during simulated Maritime Interception Operations (MIO).

5. Nonlethal technology was effectively employed during simulated MIO; nonlethal means proved effective in gaining compliance of a live crew during a permissive but noncompliant experimental MIO scenario.

Suggested Citation:"3 Experimentation--Past, Present, and Future." National Research Council. 2004. The Role of Experimentation in Building Future Naval Forces. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11125.
×

FBE Name, Year Conducted

Objective

Findings

FBE-H 2000

6. To collect data in three major ASW areas: (1) sensor fusion, (2) use of remote and autonomous sensors, and (3) techniques to collect meteorological data in denied areas.

6. Remote/autonomous sensor fields in the form of simulated Long Endurance Low Frequency Active Sonar (LELFAS) buoys showed promise when used to shape the battlespace and as a force multiplier by freeing other ASW forces; LELFAS was successfully employed to monitor high-value unit operating areas and to drive adversary submarines into areas where their weapons and sensors were less capable.

FBE-I 2001

1. Assess the value of the Joint Medical Operations-Telemedicine (JMO-T), an ACTD whose purpose is to facilitate administrative and operational aspects of medical care.

1. System users believed that the JMO-T system shows tremendous promise for field use; in its present form it is not robust enough and self-compatible enough within its entirety to be close to field introduction.

 

2. Examine a counterforce concept that uses a tiered sensor system including live Special Operations Forces.

2. The concept of a tiered sensor system including live Special Operations Forces was found to be sound; execution of this initiative brought to light technical and logistical limitations that, when combined, were quite challenging; expectations for performance, though perhaps unreasonably high, were not met.

 

3. Explore two initiatives for assured access ASW, specifically, network-centric coordinated antisubmarine warfare (NCCASW) and submarine-launched UAVs (SLUAVs).

3. NCCASW provided a capability for both manned and unmanned sensors to increase the battle group’s situational awareness of ASW assets and of the threat. The SLUAV provided a distributed ISR capability in the battlespace, particularly for post-strike battle damage assessments and coastal/ port surveillance and for time-sensitive, quick-reaction launches.

Suggested Citation:"3 Experimentation--Past, Present, and Future." National Research Council. 2004. The Role of Experimentation in Building Future Naval Forces. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11125.
×

FBE Name, Year Conducted

Objective

Findings

FBE-I 2001

4. Test six measures of performance (MOPs) intended to assess whether the Information Knowledge Advantage (IKA) features helped improve network-centric warfare.

4. The MOPs were sufficiently complete to cover all of the pieces of the network-centric architecture, including new communication architectures, new application delivery options and underlying databases, and new methods of discovering and retrieving data and human interfaces. Assessment of the MOPs led to generally positive conclusions regarding the ability to transform information into knowledge and an eventual combat advantage.

 

5. Demonstrate the possibility of transforming network-centric warfare to standard naval practice.

5. The conditions for the transformation of network-centric warfare to standard naval practice were established by the combination of a tactically and technically proficient Joint Task Force and Component staff, the Digital Fires Network, an extended battlespace, and a robust experimental concept of operations.

 

6. Demonstrate the integration of the supporting concepts of Joint Fires to include the Tactical Exploitation System-Navy (TES-N), as a component of the Naval Fires Network.

6. (a) TES-N was shown to be able to operate in a relatively high tempo, warfighting environment networked in the FBE-I architecture that included C4ISR and weapons-target-pairing systems. TES-N contributed to a complete sensor-weapon capability for FBE-I that exploited strategic, operational, and tactical sensor products.

(b) The primary systems resident in the FBE-I architecture that enhanced the capabilities of TES-N were the GCCS-M, GISRC, Ku band network, and LAWS.

Suggested Citation:"3 Experimentation--Past, Present, and Future." National Research Council. 2004. The Role of Experimentation in Building Future Naval Forces. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11125.
×

Government off-the-shelf tools have been developed to take the work out of creating and maintaining networked content. They include a template-based authoring tool, Summary Maker, and a graphical drawing and annotation tool known as TACGRAPH that creates map-based information products—tools that allow information to be easily authored and disseminated in a manner consistent with a command’s current business practices.

The K-Web concept was initially developed for the Global 2000 and Global 2001 War Games. Based on the utility of the K-Web and supporting tools, the Commander, Carrier Group Three asked that revised versions of the tools be deployed and placed aboard the USS Carl Vinson during its fall 2001 deployment. The SPAWAR Systems Center (San Diego), with the support of the Office of Naval Research, developed and installed a prototype system aboard the USS Carl Vinson in less than 5 months.

On September 11, 2001, the Commander, Carrier Group Three, assumed command of Task Force 50 in the North Arabian Gulf. As a result, the K-Web was battle-tested by Carrier Group Three during Operation Enduring Freedom. Rear Admiral Thomas Zelibor, as Commander of Carrier Group Three, found the K-Web to be a “powerful” tool in the conducting of Operation Enduring Freedom, and the entire region came to rely heavily on the products stored in the Carrier Group Three K-Web. Following the return of the carrier group from its deployment, SPAWAR, the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet, the CFFC, as well as Carrier Group One and the Commander, Third Fleet Network-Centric Innovation Center have worked closely to migrate the K-Web tools to SPAWAR programs of record (specifically Global Command and Control Systems-Marine (GCCS-M)) and to transition the K-Web to additional battle groups. The K-Web is currently being integrated with the Collaboration at Sea program. The first release of the K-Web with instructions for its reproduction was used by the USS Constellation battle group during its fall 2002 deployment and is planned to support the upcoming deployments of the USS Nimitz and USS Theodore Roosevelt battle groups.

The Chief of Naval Operations has directed that the Navy become “web-enabled” and that it work toward maintaining “knowledge superiority.” The latest thrust of this effort is known as “FORCEnet.” The K-Web represents a significant first step in achieving these goals in that it defines and has demonstrated important progress toward a new concept of operations for warfighting. Because it is explicitly designed to support the distributed collaboration that is becoming core to modern military operations, the K-Web is directly relevant to the efforts of Task Force Web and FORCEnet, as well as to numerous command and control programs including GCCS-M and the Collaboration at Sea initiative.

Suggested Citation:"3 Experimentation--Past, Present, and Future." National Research Council. 2004. The Role of Experimentation in Building Future Naval Forces. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11125.
×

Transition into Acquisitions

The process of tracking the fate of products and technologies that performed successfully in FBEs has proven difficult. The committee was unable to identify the transition of any such products or technologies directly into the Navy’s acquisition process in the sense of their leading to new programs in the Navy’s program of record. This is a significant shortfall. The failure derives from several factors, including the following:

  • The requirements process that must be satisfied before an effort can become an acquisition program;

  • The relative shortness of time since the completion of some experiments (e.g., FBE-J was completed in the summer of 2002, and final reports were not disseminated until early 2003); and

  • The Navy’s program of record, which represents the result of many compromises, trade-offs among many programs competing for scarce funding, and prioritization by the Navy’s senior leadership.

However, FBE results have had some influence on acquisitions. For example, the results of the FBE-I and FBE-J explorations of the HSV-X1 have had an impact on the design concept of the littoral combat ship. In a sense, the route of entry of the results of FBEs seems to be either through evolutionary upgrades of existing systems or through modification of the design concept or implementation plans of ongoing programs of record.

The recent introduction to the fleet of the Naval Fires Network (NFN), first tested in FBE-A and later refined in FBE-I, has the potential for the most successful transition of the results of an FBE-tested concept. However, to date NFN has not become a formal program of record.

NFN is a network-centric warfare system that provides real-time intelligence correlation, sensor control, target generation, mission-planning, and battle damage assessment capabilities. It allows ships and aircraft in a carrier battle group (CVBG), amphibious ready group (ARG), or expeditionary strike group (ESG) to share near-real-time and real-time intelligence and targeting information not only with one other, but also with Army and Air Force units in a joint or coalition task force.

The successful test of NFN in FBE-I and its subsequent introduction into the fleet as an interim prototype on two CVBGs demonstrate that FBEs may become a vehicle for the rapid introduction of new capabilities into the fleet.

Future Plans for Fleet Battle Experiments (FBE-Kilo and Beyond)

FBE-A through FBE-J were developed under the hierarchy of planning called Concepts-Based Experimentation. Concepts were proposed at a high level by

Suggested Citation:"3 Experimentation--Past, Present, and Future." National Research Council. 2004. The Role of Experimentation in Building Future Naval Forces. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11125.
×

NWDC and built momentum that would extend throughout the experiment planning cycle. The maturation and development of a concept could extend up to the final planning conference for the experiment.

Initiatives, derived from concepts, were also kept at a high level. An initiative might be stated in terms such as, “Examine the use of Digital Fires Network on Time Sensitive Targets.” Experimental objectives then followed from an initiative description. In some cases, new initiatives and objectives were also introduced up to the final planning conference.

Experimental questions and hypotheses were usually derived from simulations, analytical studies, and war games that then provided the details necessary to conduct an experimental design, data collection, and analysis planning. The continuous changes in concepts and objectives place pressure on the design of the experiment.

An adjustment to this process was taking place at NWDC with the planning for Fleet Battle Experiment-Kilo (FBE-K); see Figure 3.1. Concepts were developed by Warfare Innovation Development Teams (WIDTs), each of which was assigned a high-level concept that NWDC was interested in exploring at the time—Navy Fires and the Information and Knowledge Advantage concept.15 When concepts flowed, doctrine was associated, and a set of related objectives was developed for an FBE. Concepts and associated objectives were produced at the front end of the experimentation process in order to be more stable throughout that process. Each WIDT was responsible for a set of activities, which consists of war games, meetings, LOEs, exercises, real-world experiences, and so on. FBEs may or may not be the culminating event.

The committee believes that these changes produce several positive consequences. They improve stability for good experiment design and place emphasis on selecting the right kind of activity to address the problem at hand. Nonetheless, there are concerns with this process:

  • The process by which a concept becomes worthy of further exploration by a WIDT is not clear. The pool of nominations is deep and comes from many sources, as discussed earlier. Considerations of sponsors and funding, technical maturity, and feasibility are among the many factors that are weighed in the selection process, which is dependent on human judgment.

  • Although more time may be available for better experiment design and planning as a result of the changes made, the process must be stable enough to produce better results.

15  

The committee understands that NWDC has recently changed this process somewhat. There are still five WIDTs, now called Sea Strike, Sea Basing, Sea Shield, Information and Warfare Advantage, and Combating Terrorism/Force Protection. The committee believes its comments are applicable to this process even if organized differently.

Suggested Citation:"3 Experimentation--Past, Present, and Future." National Research Council. 2004. The Role of Experimentation in Building Future Naval Forces. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11125.
×

FIGURE 3.1 Warfare innovation process of the Navy Warfare Development Command.

NOTE: WIDT = Warfare Innovation Development Team; MCP = Mission Capabilities Package; OPLANS = operational plans; TTPs = tactics, techniques, and procedures; NRE = Naval Research Establishment; SME = subject matter expert.

  • It is also not clear how feedback and knowledge gained from other events and venues will contribute to the definition of new concepts and experimentation objectives and result in coherent experimentation campaigns. While the importance of campaigns was clearly acknowledged, no example of how the process results in experimentation campaigns was forthcoming.

  • Participation in the WIDTs was still primarily an internal function of NWDC, without much participation from outside stakeholders.

  • Analysis and objectives were still emphasized at the end of the experimentation process, rather than at the beginning.

  • Cross-concept analysis was further fractured, as there was not a clear relationship between the learning from one WIDT and that from another, or between experiments developed in different WIDTs.

Suggested Citation:"3 Experimentation--Past, Present, and Future." National Research Council. 2004. The Role of Experimentation in Building Future Naval Forces. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11125.
×

FUTURE EXPERIMENTATION FOR NAVAL TRANSFORMATION

Today’s security environment is characterized by uncertainty, surprise, and conflict. Joint Vision 2020, the joint defense community’s principal template for future capabilities, calls on the U.S. Armed Services to prepare for an uncertain future by creating forces that are faster, more precise, and more lethal than today’s.16 The report sees innovation in technology, organizations, and concepts as vital to the process of creating new operational capabilities.

Similarly, the Quadrennial Defense Review of 2001 calls on the military to transform the way it operates. The review identifies six broad operational goals for transformation, including the protection of critical bases, assurance of information systems, projection of forces in the face of antiaccess threats, persistent surveillance and tracking, rapid precision engagement, enhanced space capabilities, and interoperable, joint command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR).17 The implication is more than modernization. It includes the creation of new fighting concepts and packages of military capability, potentially involving every element of DOTMLPF.

As indicated in Chapter 1, the CNO’s capstone concept, Sea Power 21, includes Sea Strike, Sea Shield, and Sea Basing as elements incorporating the key offensive, defensive, and support elements, respectively, of network-centric warfare. Experimentation is a key enabler under the heading of Sea Trial. The Naval Transformation Roadmap lays out a blueprint to guide Navy and Marine Corps efforts in support of those goals.18

  • Sea Strike is a concept for projecting offensive power from the sea in support of joint objectives. Its transformational capabilities include persistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); time-sensitive strikes; information operations; and ship-to-objective maneuver.

  • Sea Shield exploits naval control of the seas and forward-deployed defensive capabilities to defeat antiaccess threats, enabling joint forces to project and sustain power. Its transformational capabilities include theater air and missile defense (TAMD), littoral sea control, and homeland defense.

  • Sea Basing is intended to provide sustainable global power projection from the high seas at the operational level of war. Its transformational capabilities

16  

GEN Henry H. Shelton, USA, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 2000. Joint Vision 2020, The Pentagon, Washington, D.C., June, p. 13. Available online at <http://www.dtic.mil/jointvision/jv2020.doc>. Accessed October 7, 2003.

17  

Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense. 2001. Quadrennial Defense Review Report, Washington, D.C., September 30, Ch. V.

18  

Secretary of the Navy Gordon England, Chief of Naval Operations Vern Clark, and Commandant of the Marine Corps James L. Jones. 2002. Naval Transformation Roadmap: Power and Access … From the Sea, Washington, D.C.

Suggested Citation:"3 Experimentation--Past, Present, and Future." National Research Council. 2004. The Role of Experimentation in Building Future Naval Forces. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11125.
×

include accelerated deployment and employment times for power projection assets and enhanced seaborne positioning of joint assets.

  • Sea Trial is the Navy’s nomenclature for its processes for innovation.19 Through Sea Trial, the Navy plans to rely extensively on experimentation, with the goal of rapidly delivering emergent technology, doctrine, and capability to the fleet. The Sea Trial process is fleet-led under the CFFC, and NWDC is designated as the project coordinator for the entire Sea Trial process:

NWDC will work closely with the Program Executive Offices, Systems Commands and designated units to integrate these options into practice, developing and testing the capabilities in fleet battle experiments and joint exercises, culminating in operational deployments…. Thus the fleet commander, NWDC, and designated fleet units form an interactive team that carries innovation from the laboratory to deployment with focus, speed and efficiency.20

FORCEnet

As a fully implemented physical entity, FORCEnet does not currently exist. Conceptually it will be the network and its associated architecture, interface standards, and protocols, which will integrate warfighters, weapons, sensors, databases, and decision aids into a comprehensive warfighting maritime system.

The design of such a system will require many complex trade-offs. Computer simulations, analytic studies, and at-sea tests will be required to allow appropriate and optimal choices to be made. Ultimately, many of these choices will be made as a result of operational experience derived from many future LOEs and FBEs, indeed from a coherent set of experimentation campaigns.

The organizations within the Navy (Navy Network Warfare Command as the FORCEnet Type Commander and N61/N704 as the Resource and Warfare Sponsor/Joint Interoperability) that have responsibility for transforming FORCEnet into an operational capability are committed to such rigorous and extensive campaigns of experimentation (supported by computer simulation and analytic studies), which will result in a rapid convergence on FORCEnet needs and in the rapid acquisition of those components that must be procured. N61 has programmed a number of LOEs beginning in March 2003 that will continue with frequent interim evaluations through February 2004. If the proposed experimentation is successful, a prototype development will be provided to a battle group and an amphibious ready group by the fourth quarter of FY 2004 for operational evaluation.

19  

ADM Vern Clark, USN, Chief of Naval Operations. 2002. “Sea Power 21: Projecting Decisive Joint Capabilities,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 128, No. 10, October, pp. 32-41.

20  

Secretary of the Navy Gordon England, Chief of Naval Operations Vern Clark, and Commandant of the Marine Corps James L. Jones. 2002. Naval Transformation Roadmap: Power and Access … From the Sea, Washington, D.C., p. 34.

Suggested Citation:"3 Experimentation--Past, Present, and Future." National Research Council. 2004. The Role of Experimentation in Building Future Naval Forces. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11125.
×

U.S. MARINE CORPS

Past and Present Experimentation

Historically, the Marine Corps has used experimentation to develop new capabilities or to bring about changes in equipment, doctrine, tactics, training, and procedures. Early efforts led to the use of aircraft for close air support for ground troops during the 1920s, the development of amphibious warfare doctrine during the 1930s, the use of helicopters in combat during the 1950s, the development and use of vertical-capable jet aircraft during the 1970s, the development of very short takeoff and landing rotorcraft during the 1980s, and the building of Fleet Antiterrorism Security Teams and the Chemical/Biological Incident Response Force of today.

During the 1990s, the Marine Corps renewed its efforts in experimentation with General Charles Krulak’s establishment of the Commandant’s Warfighting Laboratory (CWL). The principal objective of the laboratory was to experiment with advanced warfighting capabilities that were generated from the Concept Based Combat Development System. The purpose of the experimentation program was to explore responses to requirements deficiencies; examples of such responses are a lightweight mobile fire support system or an intraplatoon/squad communications system to enhance advanced warfighting capabilities.

Marine Corps experimentation addressed personnel, organization, doctrine, tactics, training, procedures, and equipment—all components of DOTMLPF. However, resources for the experimentation program were limited, and the scope of the program fluctuated depending on financial, personnel, and operational tempo conditions.

The Marine Corps experimentation program of the 1990s was called Sea Dragon; a 5-year campaign plan was developed. This plan began with the standup of the CWL and the establishment of a Special Purpose Marine Air/Ground Task Force Command Element (SPMAGTF(X) CE). The CWL had direct responsibility for the development and execution of the Marine Corps Experimentation Warfighting Program. The SPMAGTF(X) CE Headquarters worked directly for the Commander, CWL (since 1995, Commanding General, Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory (MCWL)) and was the field execution agency headquarters for the MCWL. The 5-year plan laid out in broad terms a series of advanced warfighting experiments tied directly to the deficiencies noted in the capabilities required to realize the advanced warfighting concepts of the Marine Corps.

Methodology

The major intellectual factor influencing the early stages of the Marine Corps experimentation program was the Marine Corps Combat Development System (CDS), a concept-based requirement system. Through this process, Marines

Suggested Citation:"3 Experimentation--Past, Present, and Future." National Research Council. 2004. The Role of Experimentation in Building Future Naval Forces. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11125.
×

analyze the range of threats anticipated in the future security environment, identify potential challenges, and then determine the warfighting requirements needed to address those challenges effectively. At the core of this process are concepts—which are formal documents that articulate the Marine vision for future warfighting. They look forward in time—beyond the concerns of today’s programming and budgeting—and provide the spark that starts a focused process of proposal, debate, and experimentation. Marines use this participatory dialogue as the means of shaping the initial concepts, ultimately molding them into requirements that will provide the warfighting solutions needed. The hierarchy and relationship of Marine Corps concepts is shown in Figure 3.2.

Experimentation venues used by the Marine Corps included major advanced warfighting experiments (AWEs), preceded by warfighter discussions, focused discussions with subject-matter experts, seminars, symposiums, simulations, constructive simulations, limited technical assessments (LTAs), and LOEs—a spectrum of experimentation activities.

The Sea Dragon campaign was founded on the basic infantry warfighter and the basic warfighting unit—the Marine rifle squad. The campaign plan was

FIGURE 3.2 The hierarchy and relationship of Marine Corps capstone concepts.

Suggested Citation:"3 Experimentation--Past, Present, and Future." National Research Council. 2004. The Role of Experimentation in Building Future Naval Forces. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11125.
×

designed first to improve the individual Marine’s warfighting capabilities through experimentation with the introduction of new equipment, tactics, procedures, organizations, training, and doctrine. After this part of the campaign was well under way, the same basic process of experimentation was repeated with other Marine groups (fire teams, squads, combat patrols, and so on) to determine each unit’s enhanced warfighting capabilities.

Sea Dragon included three major advanced warfighting experiments: Hunter Warrior (HW), which focused on individuals and combat patrols operating in desert environments; Urban Warrior (UW), which focused primarily on individual and platoon-size operations in an urban environment; and Capable Warrior (CW), which focused on individual and company-size operations at Camp Pendleton, California. Each series required a cycle of somewhat more than 3 years. The major advanced warfighting experiments were conducted about every 2 years, and overlaps occurred in experiments during the same period in time. Also, some of the early preparatory work (such as focused discussions and simulations) was repeated for each of the three stages (planning, execution, and analysis). Graphically the campaign cycle might look something like Figure 3.3.

FIGURE 3.3 Marine Corps warfighting experiment campaign cycle.

Suggested Citation:"3 Experimentation--Past, Present, and Future." National Research Council. 2004. The Role of Experimentation in Building Future Naval Forces. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11125.
×

In these campaigns, and even today, the Marine Corps makes extensive use of LTAs and LOEs. LTAs are focused on the technical performance of a piece of equipment; LOEs, on the utility of experimental TTPs in the context of a tactical scenario or on the utility of experimental technology in a tactical scenario. LTAs and LOEs are used to select down to “best of breed” for experimental TTPs, equipment, or systems.

Several LOEs and LTAs were conducted as interim spiraling experiments that were critical to each AWE in the campaigns. The LOEs served as affordable checks on progress or reality for specific concepts and for TTPs before their inclusion in the concepts, tactics, and procedures used in the larger field event. The main success of these large events depended, in turn, on the success of several interacting variables. War games were also conducted to provide a reality check for the specific experiments as well as to assist in training the forces.

The application of this strategy of using LOEs can be exemplified by experimentation with various nonlethal weapons during the Urban Warrior campaign. The Marine Corps was interested in the use of nonlethal weapons during military operations in urban terrain (MOUT) operations because of the large number of noncombatants normally found in urban areas. An LOE called the dazzler provided a simulated microwave/laser and noise capability (about 100 decibels) that incapacitated the target area. Marines and actors played the role of the targeted enemy, and 20 actual members of the media functioned as observers. The LOE was very realistic in its execution, and although there were no constructed deaths or actual injuries, the media had very mixed opinions on the type of stories they would write after viewing the dramatic effects and constructed agony of the target force. This LOE was very instructive with respect to the types and uses of nonlethal weapons, especially with noncombatants as part of the included target population. The results were applied in later LOEs and in the Urban Warrior AWE.

A second example illustrates the importance of LOEs as preparation for larger field events. RISTA (reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, targeting, acquisition) is a potential asset that would cover the battlefield. Part of its surveillance capability was provided by UAVs and unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs). Surveillance and reconnaissance ground equipment (SARGE) was a UGV that was fully tested several times in the Northern Virginia area. It was learned that SARGE worked, but it had several limitations (e.g., line-of-sight transmission, terrain navigation) and was deemed a good initiative but not ready for use in an AWE.

A disciplined process was established for all experiments. To propagate and standardize the methods for individual experiments, the laboratory developed and published an experimentation procedures manual,21 which defines terms and sets

21  

Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory. 2001. Innovation and Experimentation Processes, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Quantico, Va., November 29. Available online at <www.mcwl.usmc.mil/divisions/expplans/i&eprocess.pdf>. Accessed October 7, 2003.

Suggested Citation:"3 Experimentation--Past, Present, and Future." National Research Council. 2004. The Role of Experimentation in Building Future Naval Forces. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11125.
×

forth experiment procedures, detailing requirements for analysis and conclusions. Each experiment has three basic stages—planning, execution, and analysis.22 The plans, analysis, and conclusions from individual experiments are comprehensive and are available for viewing through Web-based access.

Environment

The Commandant of the Marine Corps established the environment for experimentation in direct and definitive terms. In his “Commandant’s Planning Guidance” of July 1995, General Krulak stated:

An ongoing program will be established under the CG [Commanding General], MCCDC to serve as the cradle and test bed for the development of enhanced operational concepts, tactics, techniques, procedures and doctrine which will be progressively introduced into the FMF (Fleet Marine Force) in concert with new technologies…. This program will serve as the integrating ground for new technologies that we procure or develop with other services. It will provide a focal point for warfighting … while allowing me, as the Commandant, to accelerate and direct specific efforts within the process of change. It will be the centerpiece of operational reform in the Marine Corps and will help ensure that emerging technologies for the individual Marine are brought into service expeditiously and effectively…. By 1 August 1995, the CG, MCCDC will provide a plan of action for the establishment of this lab. I desire it to be operational by 1 October 1995.23

The title of the laboratory, the Commandant’s Warfighting Laboratory, left little doubt as to leadership and emphasis. The Commandant provided and articulated his vision for establishing the laboratory and the Marine Corps experimentation program. He emphasized a set of focused goals and objectives and an environment that allowed for failure. He provided for and directed the allocation of resources and set the time line to get the program under way. He also directed command relationships that kept him fully involved. By having the laboratory report through the CG, MCCDC, he ensured easy access to auxiliary resources (modeling and simulation (M&S), Marine Corps University, operation and maintenance support, and so on). This alignment also greatly facilitated the entry of the laboratory’s successes into the Marine Corps Combat Development System.

22  

As noted in Chapter 2, the Services do not have a standard set of of phases for experiments, although in the aggregate the tasks and functions performed across the cycle of an experiment are similar to those of Marine Corps experiments.

23  

Gen Charles C. Krulak, USMC, Commandant of the Marine Corps. 1995. The Commandant’s Planning Guidance, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Washington, D.C., July. Available online at <http://www.usmc.mil/cmc.nsf/CPG?OpenView&ExpandSection=1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13>. Accessed November 9, 2003.

Suggested Citation:"3 Experimentation--Past, Present, and Future." National Research Council. 2004. The Role of Experimentation in Building Future Naval Forces. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11125.
×

There was no doubt in the minds of the Marine Corps leadership that the laboratory and Sea Dragon were high on the Commandant’s priority list. Within 2 years after the establishment of the MCWL, the need for an experimentation program and the goals and objectives of Sea Dragon were understood and accepted by the majority of Marines.

Organizational Roles and Major Players

As in the past, all Marine Corps experiments are developed and conducted through the MCWL. Most of the experiments are Marine personnel-intensive and, as the MCWL has a very small staff, the majority of the forces used in the experiments came from operational forces, Marines in the training pipeline, and Marines stationed at Quantico, Virginia. To provide continuity of effort during experiments and an operational command element responsible for the actual execution of an experiment, a permanent SPMAGTF Headquarters was organized and staffed as a separate unit of the MCWL. The SPMAGTF Headquarters serves as the experimentation cadre for experimental operations in the Marine Corps. The MCWL coordinates efforts with numerous sources (Federally Funded Research and Development Centers, DARPA, NASA, industry, Service laboratories, academia, allies, and so on) to assist and participate in the Marine Corps experimentation program.

The Marine Requirements Oversight Council (MROC), chaired by the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps, and the Marine Advocates, for the support of ground combat, aviation combat, command element, and combat Services, are key participants in the experimentation process. Their participation is linked to the current mechanism for the concept-based requirements system, called the Force Capability Development Phase of the Expeditionary Force Development System (EFDS).24 All advanced warfighting concepts are briefed for consensus approval to the MROC prior to their final approval. EFDS supports the requirements validation role of the MROC, thereby increasing the ability of the Marine Corps leadership to define, review, and validate the concepts. These concepts constitute the foundation for the Marine Corps experimentation program. The MROC is also briefed annually on the Marine Corps Experimentation Plan (the current version extends to 2008) and on the results of the experiments. During each Executive Offsite (a meeting, called by the Commandant, of top-level Marine Corps officers, held away from the Washington area), the MROC provides Marine Corps leadership with an update on its activities.

24  

The EFDS is the single integrated system of dynamic processes and functions that produces and sustains integrated capabilities which meet the needs of the Marine Corps and the combatant commanders.

Suggested Citation:"3 Experimentation--Past, Present, and Future." National Research Council. 2004. The Role of Experimentation in Building Future Naval Forces. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11125.
×

Synopsis of Results of Sea Dragon to Date

Both successes and failures were experienced in Sea Dragon. The failures included the remotely controlled urban bulldozer used in Urban Warrior—it was dubbed by the troops “the bulldozer from hell”—the remotely controlled paraglider logistics delivery system, used in Hunter Warrior, that was not ready for use in the field; and the airborne aerostat communications relay system that broke from its tether during high desert winds and threatened Palm Springs, California. However, using the knowledge gained through experimentation, the Marine Corps learned from its mistakes and improved its experimental equipment. Although experimenting with industrial-quality knee and elbow pads for the urban combat troops was unsuccessful, it led to the use of the COTS skateboard equipment that satisfied the requirement.

Another notable success included the development and fielding of the Squad Leader Combat Decision Training Program. This program has been both effective and popular with small-unit leaders and Marines. It is a simulation combat training system that is open-ended, scenario-driven, facilitator-monitored, and computer-projected. The system was developed after visits to and interactions with the New York Stock Exchange, the Federal Aviation Administration, and the New York City Fire Department over 2 consecutive years. Each of these organizations has a unique and thorough training program for its personnel. The MCWL was directed to use the applicable aspects of these programs to develop for small-unit leaders a combat training program, and a prototype was developed in 6 months. Within a year, the basic system, with four scenarios and an associated equipment suite, was fielded to a deploying unit. The fielding of additional systems and scenarios continues today.

The Interim Fast Attack Vehicle (IFAV) Program is another example of success. It introduced a major capability into the operating forces in less than a year. The deficiency addressed was that of a needed augmentation in tactical mobility. Front-line Marine units were deploying jeep fast attack vehicles (FAVs) that were outdated (the last one was produced during the 1970s). Maintenance on these jeep vehicles when based at home was onerous, but when they were deployed it was nearly impossible. The Marine Corps had a major acquisition program to address the problem—the light strike vehicle (LSV) with an initial operating capability planned for 2007. During the UW program, the Marine Corps introduced a series of prototype FAVs to the experimental units. These vehicles represented a vast improvement in performance, reliability, and maintenance over the then-deployed FAVs. As a result of the experimentation, a Fleet Operational Needs Statement was written; it was discussed at the next meeting of the senior Marine Corps leadership, which directed that an immediate solution be provided for rapid fielding. MCCDC, working with the SYSCOM wrote an interim requirement. The SYSCOM responded within 60 days with a COTS solution that included a worldwide maintenance and logistics support program.

Suggested Citation:"3 Experimentation--Past, Present, and Future." National Research Council. 2004. The Role of Experimentation in Building Future Naval Forces. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11125.
×

Within 6 months, each Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) took delivery of 20 IFAVs. These are now routinely deployed with all front-line Marine units. The IFAVs performed well in combat during Operation Enduring Freedom in Kandahar, Afghanistan.25 In the meantime, the light strike vehicle, designed to meet the more comprehensive requirement, continues through the acquisition process.

A recent example of a capability with strong potential for transition to the field is that of the Dragon Eye actually used by the Marines in Operation Iraqi Freedom.26 This is a UAV that can be transported in an organic backpack; it is intended to support a Marine Corps small-unit leader by providing over-the-hill/ over-the-next building surveillance and reconnaissance with real-time day or night video imagery. As a prototype it underwent development and operational evaluation to enable TTP development in 2002. It then was used in the Marine Corps Millennium Dragon ’02 experiment to support urban warfare scenarios with a battalion headquarters element. Ten systems have been deployed to Kuwait to support MEF units, with an acquisition scheduled to follow, pending results of this extended user evaluation.

A review of the results of Marine Corps Hunter Warrior, Urban Warrior, and Capable Warrior experimentation campaigns leads to the following conclusions:

  • Concepts, doctrine, and TTPs resulting from experimentation have transitioned successfully to forces in the field.

  • Experimentation has resulted in changes in minor equipment items in the field.

  • Experimentation successes for major equipment items have been very difficult, if not impossible, to transition to fielded capabilities.

  • There has been a gradual shift from experimental objectives that address long-term conceptual requirements to those that satisfy short-term operational needs. This shift is due in part to an effort to garner support for the experimentation program within the operating forces that are pressed with immediate deficiencies and that supply the bulk of the experimental force. However, most of the experimentation objectives are tied either to near-term deficiencies affecting operating forces or to long-term conceptual requirements.

  • Service experimentation has prepared the Services for joint operations in several areas (command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I), targeting, and terminal weapon guidance).

25  

Committee conversation with then MajGen (Sel) James N. Mattis, USMC, Deputy Commanding General, First Marine Expeditionary Force/Command, General First Marine Expeditionary Brigade, on August 1, 2002.

26  

Jason Ma. 2003. “Experimental Dragon Eye UAV Available to I MEF in Persian Gulf,” Inside the Navy, Vol. 16, No. 10, March 10, p. 1.

Suggested Citation:"3 Experimentation--Past, Present, and Future." National Research Council. 2004. The Role of Experimentation in Building Future Naval Forces. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11125.
×
  • Marine Corps Tactical Systems Support Activities should be brought in earlier when experimenting with C4I issues and equipment to ensure integration and compatibility with current and future equipment and architectures.

  • Because of resource limitations, the scope of FBEs and AWEs should be carefully defined.

Future Plans and Program for Experimentation

The Commandant of the Marine Corps has defined his capstone concept for the Corps in Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare,27 and the Naval Transformation Roadmap, with its ties to the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review, provides a plan to evolve future warfighting capabilities to maximize advantages that are uniquely naval.

For the future, as is the case now, force development and requirements to be determined through experimentation remain the responsibility of the Marine Corps Combat Development Command. The MCCDC has established the Expeditionary Force Development Center to develop concepts, coordinate assessment and experimentation, and integrate the implementation of DOTMLPF across the range of Marine Corps operations.28 The underlying purpose of establishing the center, however, is to develop a single process—the Expeditionary Force Development System—by which the Marine Corps will be transformed in accord with its capstone concept, Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare.

Access, Sea Basing, and Future Maritime Prepositioning concepts will be core objectives in future experimentation plans. Naval forces offer the Joint Force Commander true expeditionary capabilities—those that not only can move to remote destinations and operate without host nation support or infrastructure, but that also can operate over a sustained period of time without requiring immediate reinforcement. Organic sustainability will be the hallmark of future naval forces.

Naval transformation will support the joint warfighter by delivering new military capabilities that will greatly expand the options available to and under the control of Joint Force Commanders. Inherent in all aspects of this transformation is that naval forces will be committed to and built upon the principles of jointness. Consequently the Marine Corps is aligning its Service experimentation toward a better integration with joint efforts.

27  

Gen James L. Jones, Commandant of the Marine Corps. 2001. Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare: Marine Corps Capstone Concept, Warfighting Development Integration Division, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Quantico, Va., November 10.

28  

Col Frank DiFalco, USMC, Joint Concept Development and Experimentation Operations Center, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, “Marine Corps Role in JCDE,” presentation to the committee on August 15, 2002.

Suggested Citation:"3 Experimentation--Past, Present, and Future." National Research Council. 2004. The Role of Experimentation in Building Future Naval Forces. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11125.
×

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3010.02A dated April 15, 2001,29 implemented the Joint Vision Implementation Master Plan (JVIMP), consisting of three closely related processes: (1) Joint Concept Development, (2) Joint Experimentation and Assessment, and (3) Joint Integration and Implementation. New joint operational concepts will be assessed through experimentation and assessment activities and will be developed with formal Service Headquarters, Combatant Commanders, Joint Staff, Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment (JWCA) teams, and selected Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) agencies for coordination.

Joint Experimentation and Assessment activities evaluate alternatives in order to achieve desired operational capabilities and articulate results in terms of recommended changes to joint DOTMLPF. The Joint Integration and Implementation component initiates the process for integration and the implementation of recommended changes. This process is consistent with USJFCOM’s role as the DOD lead for transformation, while the Joint Staff provides the guidance for future force design.

The Assistant Commandant addressed these process changes during MROC meetings. He directed that the Marine Corps improve its responsiveness to the JVIMP and that the Marine Corps more fully engage with USJFCOM and the Joint Staff through the JWCA process. He further stated that the MROC must oversee Marine Corps participation, and he identified MCCDC as the USMC lead in this effort. Additional instruction from the MROC meetings directed a better integration of Marine Corps combat development at all key JVIMP junctions. Also, the Marine Corps was directed to validate its capabilities in the joint context and to ensure that Title X responsibilities were part of the joint equation.

To accomplish these tasks, the CG, MCCDC, was directed to establish a Joint Concept Development and Experimentation Office (JCDE Office). He, in turn, set up his lead JCDE office at Quantico, Virginia, with branch offices at the Pentagon and at Suffolk, Virginia, colocated with USJFCOM. The published mission of the Marine Corps JCDE Office is “to integrate the Marine Corps force development process into the Joint force development process in order to provide Marine Corps capabilities for the future Joint Force Commander.”

Many of these recent actions are intended to aid and accelerate the transformation of U.S. forces. The Marine Corps’s next major experiment, Olympic Dragon 2004 (OD04), will be conducted within the context of the U.S. Joint Forces Command’s Rapid Decisive Operations integrating concept. OD04 is examining the art, not just the science, of command and control. The focus of OD04 experimentation is on the people and information associated with com-

29  

Joint Chiefs of Staff. 2001. Joint Vision Implementation Master Plan (JVIMP), Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3010.02A, The Pentagon, Washington, D.C., April 15.

Suggested Citation:"3 Experimentation--Past, Present, and Future." National Research Council. 2004. The Role of Experimentation in Building Future Naval Forces. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11125.
×

mand and control, not only on the hardware and associated systems. This is an essential step, because the Marine Corps cannot execute Ship-to-Objective Maneuver as envisioned with currently planned command and control information technology capabilities.

COMBINED EXPERIMENTATION OF THE NAVY AND MARINE CORPS

In the past, the Navy and Marine Corps have aligned their concepts selectively. Several advanced warfighting concepts—such as the Concept for Future Naval Mine Countermeasures in Littoral Power Projection and the 1998 concept Sea-Based Logistics—have been developed, signed, and published jointly by the Commander, Navy Warfare Doctrine Command, and the Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command. For the future, to ensure that both Services continue along the prescribed path of the Naval Transformation Roadmap together, permanent reciprocal billets have been established and filled at both the NWDC and the MCCDC. Two key positions have been given responsibility for two assignments: that of the CG, MCWL, as the Vice Chief of Naval Research; and that of the Chief of Naval Research as the Deputy Commandant for Programs and Resources on the Marine Corps staff. Such reciprocity is intended to solidify the collaboration of both Services in their work toward naval transformation.

There are numerous examples of combined efforts of the Navy and the Marine Corps in experimentation. The numbered fleet commanders normally conduct FBEs, usually in conjunction with training exercises (e.g., Kernel Blitz), AWEs, or carrier strike group (CSG) or ship or unit certification events. The Navy and Marine Corps each have training, certification, or experimental objectives in combined FBEs and exercises. During FBEs, the majority of the experimental objectives are Navy objectives. During AWEs the majority of the experimental objectives are Marine Corps objectives. Due to the large number of assets required and the operational and personnel tempo of units and people,30 both Services frequently align various experimentation objectives with advanced warfighting concepts and near-term operational requirements.

Many of the FBEs have involved the efforts of both Services. Several Marine Corps experimental objectives were included and worked on as part of Navy FBEs and, in turn, several Navy objectives were included in Marine Corps AWEs, but in neither case were these objectives highlighted in the list of objectives appearing in the descriptions of the larger-scale experiments. These were primarily LOEs and LTAs. One such example addressed the long-term problem associ-

30  

Operational tempo refers to naval units, and personnel tempo refers to people. “Tempo” means the duration and the frequency of overseas deployment.

Suggested Citation:"3 Experimentation--Past, Present, and Future." National Research Council. 2004. The Role of Experimentation in Building Future Naval Forces. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11125.
×

ated with the storage of “Mogas” (commercial gasoline) aboard amphibious ships for use in Marine tactical vehicles. This issue was temporarily resolved when the Marines experimented with various Interim Fast Attack Vehicles through an LTA discussed above. Another example involved addressing battle casualty treatment through telemedicine; the successful experimental objective included a separate LOE of FBE-E and an LOE of AWE Urban Warrior, as well as the award-winning Multipurpose Health Service Facility or “doc in a box” (winner of a 1998 Popular Science magazine annual competition).31 The experimental use of the SLICE ship to enhance rapid combat supply capability for troops ashore is another example of an LTA of FBE-E that combined Service objectives.

During the early stages of FBE-E and Urban Warrior, the Navy and the Marine Corps focused primarily on Service objectives. During the final stages of the same experiments, the Marines moved aboard the ships involved in the FBE, and the Services combined efforts to focus on naval objectives—to experiment with various shipboard command and control systems that would maintain contact and provide information to ground forces as they moved through urban terrain. The systems were to provide a common operating picture for all users, provide automatic intelligence updates, provide information on the supply and resupply status for all units, and guide precision fires.

Planning and execution for this last stage were both energetic and enthusiastic. To further explore the expanding use of naval forces, a humanitarian and disaster relief experiment was conducted. In order to provide realistic scenarios and the kinds of personal interactions associated with these types of missions, a wide range of new participants (actual city civilian officials and agencies) as well as surrogate facilities (Naval Postgraduate School) were incorporated in the experiments. The learning curve was steep for all participants, but the procedures and protocols for civil and military interaction in humanitarian missions were greatly advanced.

Doctrinal changes in command relationships were also explored. Following the Kernel Blitz exercise, the traditional command relationships of Commander, Amphibious Task Force, and Commander, Landing Force were replaced with the supporting and supported relationships normally associated with joint operations. This successful experiment greatly assisted the recent changes in naval doctrine regarding command relationships. Such naval experimentation partnerships have resulted in many innovations, including emerging telemedicine, improved ship-to-ship communications, a single fuel for deployed USMC vehicles, several command relationship options, and the first-time deployment of the Dragon Drone with the MEUs and ARGs in the late 1990s.

31  

Sgt Jason Bortz, USMC. 1999. “Doc-In-A-Box: New Tent Means Better Medicine for Combat Marines,” Marines Magazine, Vol. 28, No. 1, January, p. 13.

Suggested Citation:"3 Experimentation--Past, Present, and Future." National Research Council. 2004. The Role of Experimentation in Building Future Naval Forces. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11125.
×

Many of these capabilities and changes have been adopted by operational units and have resulted in changes to DOTMLPF, but to date, enhancements to equipment have been few and on a small scale. No major programs of record have been changed or initiated.

Both the Marine Corps and the Navy participated in the Extending Littoral Battlespace ACTD. This multiyear effort was designed to help develop and distribute a common operational picture to units afloat and ashore and to reduce the number of nodes required for communications and data transfer. Although surrogate equipment was used and the system was unclassified, the system did pass video, data, and voice transmissions. Both the Navy and the Marine Corps users asked to keep the equipment and to experiment during their upcoming deployment. However, no new equipment or capabilities have been developed or purchased for operational units owing to the lack of secure transmission, the immature nature of the technology, the amount of developmental funding required, and the lack of transition funding and authority.

EXPERIMENTATION BY OTHER SERVICES

The committee held discussions with representatives of the Army and the Air Force to acquire an understanding of how these Services approach and use experimentation for the development of their future military capabilities. The committee’s goal was not to assess these other Services’ experimentation activities but to extract ideas and lessons learned that could benefit the Navy and Marine Corps in their future experimentation efforts.

U.S. Army

Overview

U.S. Army experimentation was reenergized in 1956 with the formation of the Combat Development Experimentation Command (CDEC). The mission of CDEC was to conduct experiments to discover how to make the Army more effective. The experiments were primarily field exercises, with umpires oversee-ing the operations and trying out new ideas to see how they worked. Such ideas included evaluating operational concepts for unmanned aerial reconnaissance vehicles as early as the 1970s. CDEC evolved into a technology-focused command in 1970, with the development of an instrumentation system that controlled experiments and collected data automatically. It continued this mission of combat development until becoming an operational test command in about 1980. From 1980 until its dissolution, it remained centered on operational testing but continued to do some combat development-type experimentation.

Today combat development experimentation is done under the aegis of the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). In addition to its training mission,

Suggested Citation:"3 Experimentation--Past, Present, and Future." National Research Council. 2004. The Role of Experimentation in Building Future Naval Forces. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11125.
×

TRADOC oversees concept development along with new doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures. However, experimentation is executed mainly by individual battle laboratories that are associated with individual branches of the Army. For example, artillery experimentation is done at Fort Sill, Oklahoma; infantry experimentation, at Fort Benning, Georgia; and air defense experimentation, at Fort Bliss, Texas.

Various members of the Army research, development, and acquisition community sometimes participate in experimentation. While their primary mission is centered on moving individual acquisition programs through the required processes to achieve full-scale production, program managers are interested in experimentation to the extent that specific systems require or enable new operational concepts or TTPs. These individuals have also provided specific capabilities for experimentation activities, such as for LOEs and AWEs, as prominently illustrated by the Army’s experimentation campaign for digitization (discussed below). The Army’s Research, Development, and Engineering Centers sponsor prototypes or provide surrogate capabilities for experimentation activities.

A Past Example of Army Experimentation

The use of experimentation to achieve digitization was initiated in the early 1990s when then Chief of Staff of the Army General Gordon Sullivan realized the need to shift force capabilities to exploit information technology. His objectives were increased survivability, lethality, and operational tempo resulting from significant improvements in situational awareness. The long-term goal was for every person in the Army to know where he or she was and where the enemy was—and to achieve that goal with some form of fielded capability by 2010. This goal required a substantial change not only in DOTMLPF but also in the processes by which acquisition was accomplished in the Army. In short, achievement required a spiral process, which at the time was viewed as the antithesis of the Army’s standard linear approach of capturing detailed requirements “in stone,” sending them off to various contractors for development, and getting systems delivered approximately 14 years later.

General Sullivan assigned General William Hartzog to TRADOC in 1994 to achieve these objectives. He also made clear to the entire Army leadership the priority that he placed on the digitization goal. A plan to communicate its importance throughout all the Army was developed and carried out. The Army developed an Experimentation Campaign Plan with a view to developing a division-level prototype, and Army senior leadership maintained oversight of progress. To coordinate and integrate efforts of the various participating organizations, General Sullivan also established the Army Digitization Office. The office reported directly to him.

Experimentation served several objectives with respect to the digitization goals, but one of these was to determine what capabilities should be fielded and

Suggested Citation:"3 Experimentation--Past, Present, and Future." National Research Council. 2004. The Role of Experimentation in Building Future Naval Forces. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11125.
×

to accelerate that process. In response to the ambitious fielding dates, the Army applied spiral processes of all four types (see Box 2.1 in Chapter 2). It spiraled concepts to understand the implications of digitization. It spiraled through a series of experimentation campaigns built around what was learned about digitization at company, battalion, brigade, and division levels. For each of these unit experiences, the Army spiraled through a spectrum of activities, including games, modeling and simulation, LOEs, field exercises, and AWEs, to gain an understanding of required capabilities. It also applied spiral development to field an ambitious brigade-level architecture32 linked to the Central Technical Support Facility at Fort Hood, Texas; used a special oversight management structure; and designated the Fourth Infantry Division as an experimental cadre.

In March 1997, the Army conducted a brigade-level AWE, called Task Force XXI, at the National Training Center to evaluate the effects of digitization on lethality and operational tempo. It used a force-on-force encounter with 15,000 entities on the “battlefield” and maintained situational awareness on them. Included in the experimental capabilities were 71 initiatives requiring 66 new books of doctrine, used by the forces in the experiment. Following the event and its evaluation, eight new pieces of equipment were validated and designated to be acquired immediately; the Army subsequently received $100 million in funding for a rapid acquisition program for selected small items outside the normal annual authorization and appropriation process. Another important outcome was that the Army Chief of Staff decided to digitize the III Corps.

A review of these digitization efforts indicates that the five key factors for experimentation to achieve successful change were present (see subsection entitled “Experimentation That Changed Operational Capabilities,” earlier in this chapter). The Army had and/or provided the following:

  1. A problem to be solved—a compelling need;

  2. Relevant technology;

  3. Leadership buy-in (starting with the Chief of Staff of the Army);

  4. Organizational structure (the assignment of General Hartzog, the designation of an experimental cadre, and the use of special management structures for oversight and integration); and

  5. Funding.

Other lessons from these ambitious experimentation campaigns can be derived.33 They include the need for the following:

32  

See BG Steven Boutelle, USA, and Alfred Grasso, 1998, “A Case Study: The Central Technical Support Facility,” Army RD&A (now Army Acquisition, Logistics & Technology (AL&T) Magazine), March-April, pp. 30-33.

33  

Based on committee discussions with GEN William Hartzog, USA (retired), President and COO, Burdeshaw Associates, on May 3, 2002.

Suggested Citation:"3 Experimentation--Past, Present, and Future." National Research Council. 2004. The Role of Experimentation in Building Future Naval Forces. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11125.
×
  • Senior involvement (four-star rank is necessary; two-star rank is insufficient): The most senior leadership (Chief of Staff) must believe in experimentation and drive it;

  • A risk culture (mistakes will be made);

  • Sustained leadership to manage experimentation campaigns (a minimum of 4 years);

  • Industry incentives (to compete for products already in the program of record);

  • Testing embedded within the experimentation process (technologically successful architectures may not be operationally joint);34

  • Sufficient time for the assimilation of results (the time required can span as much as 5 years);

  • Mechanisms for the capture of knowledge (knowledge needs to be codified);

  • Sufficient funding (substantial funding should be planned for);

  • Communications plan (to relate experiments to the common vision and to broadcast results to stakeholders); and

  • Early training of operators on new capabilities to evolve the necessary business rules for their use.

The Army also gave great credit for its success to the Central Technical Support Facility, an integration and testing facility that had as its mission “to act as an enabler for rapid integration of dissimilar software and hardware systems through real time interaction with soldiers, contractors, testers, program managers, and the requirements community.”35

A postscript is warranted regarding the results of digitization experimentation. Acquisition programs were displaced and new programs were added. One critical factor, that of funding to acquire advanced capabilities, was constrained. Only three major new acquisitions were actually realized—the Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below System (FBCB2); the Army Battle Command System, which included a whole family of new command and control systems; and the Army’s tactical internet, which included the Warfighters Information Network–Tactical, line-of-sight tactical radios, and beyond-line-of-sight communications.

An entire division (the Fourth Infantry Division) was digitized, as was the current Stryker Brigade at Fort Lewis, Washington. Tactical communications—both data and voice—were completely changed to accommodate Internet Proto-

34  

The Army test community was made part of digitization experimentation. Today the U.S. Army Test and Evaluation Command exercises a role in experimentation different from that of its traditional operational test and evaluation responsibility for acquisition.

35  

See BG Steven Boutelle, USA, and Alfred Grasso, 1998, “A Case Study: The Central Technical Support Facility,” Army RD&A (now Army Acquisition, Logistics & Technology (AL&T) Magazine), March-April, p. 30.

Suggested Citation:"3 Experimentation--Past, Present, and Future." National Research Council. 2004. The Role of Experimentation in Building Future Naval Forces. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11125.
×

col networking. C2 and ISR programs of record were changed. The impact of the new programs was widespread, affecting many weapons platforms, most notably the M1A2 System Enhancement Program (modernized Abrams tank), M2A3 (Bradley fighting vehicle), aviation, and multiple-launch rocket system. These impacts were technical (such as requiring that systems use components of FBCB2, scheduling (delaying some key milestone events such as the M1A2 initial operator test and evaluation to ensure synchronization with FBCB2), and funding (requiring additional funds for these programs to make them compliant with digitization requirements and strategy). The linkage between the success of FBCB2 and its impact on the interfacing systems for the Future Combat System was a difficult challenge that has had a broad impact on Army acquisition.

Current Activities and Future Plans

Today the Army has shifted its strategy from its previous approach of digitization of heavy forces. In 1999 the Army acknowledged an inability to deploy the force rapidly to compel decisive outcomes. The current challenge for the Army is to provide a lethal force that can be decisive more quickly than its current light brigades and/or light divisions and that can be deployed more rapidly than its current heavy armored force.

The Army’s target for transformation is its future Objective Force (OF), which over the next several decades will provide new capabilities for each Combat Service and Combat Service support area, especially for armor and infantry. Already-fielded capabilities, including those from digitization, will be maintained through the Legacy Force. The OF roadmap, which began in 2000, involves three distinct paths: the Legacy Force, an Interim Force, and the Objective Force.

The operational concept for the OF is to employ an unprecedented level of C4ISR, enabling leaders at all levels to exercise initiative within the commander’s intent to dictate the time and place of engagements on future battlefields. The OF will also involve new approaches for echelons. OF units of action will include combat units that will be comparable to today’s brigades, whereas OF units of employment will interface with joint commanders and theater systems and be comparable to today’s divisions.

The Interim and Objective Forces specifically address newly acknowledged operational challenges—most importantly, the rapid deployment of a brigade in days. For the Interim Force, six brigades will be equipped with new “digitized” medium-weight vehicles that can be deployed through airlift. The Interim Force is structured around the Interim Brigade Combat Team and is equipped with the Stryker wheeled vehicle, which will have 10 variants, employ the latest off-the-shelf vehicle technologies, and owe all of its C4ISR capabilities to digitization efforts. However, these vehicles do not have the lethality or survivability of today’s Abrams and Bradley vehicles.

Suggested Citation:"3 Experimentation--Past, Present, and Future." National Research Council. 2004. The Role of Experimentation in Building Future Naval Forces. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11125.
×

The OF will receive substantially new capabilities resulting from aggressive science and technology efforts and fast spiral developments. The Future Combat System (FCS) includes 19 new vehicle variants and C4ISR systems for maneuver units of the OF. C4ISR integrates the FCS into a system-of-systems, affording greater lethality and survivability than the current Abrams and Bradley vehicles while supporting the rapid deployment capability of the Stryker. The Army has set a goal of achieving an initial operating capability for the FCS by 2010, when other OF systems, such as Force Warrior, Comanche, Warfighters Information Network–Tactical, and the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System, will be fielded. An architecture to subsume all of these systems is still under development.

Future Army Experimentation

Experimentation is important to the success of both the Stryker and the FCS efforts, but in different ways. For the Stryker, key issues revolve around developing the TTPs. In the case of FCS, there are significant changes in the unit-of-action concept of operations that warrant experimentation. Because there are limited surrogates for these new capabilities, much of the experimentation will of necessity rely on virtual or constructive modeling and simulation.

For the Stryker, the Army is using the traditional linear acquisition approach. However, the first versions of the Stryker that were produced (before full-scale production approval, which is yet to occur) did engage in the Millennium Challenge ’02 experiment managed by USJFCOM. This event provided the opportunity to evaluate the effectiveness and suitability of the Stryker, while developing doctrine and TTP before it enters its 18-month period of operational testing and evaluation to determine its suitability for full-scale production.

The production goal for equipping six Stryker Brigade Combat Teams (SBCTs) is about 2,100 vehicles. The goal for certification to “go to war” after the completion of operational testing and evaluation is 2003. It is not known exactly how and when the Army plans to use the experimental results to decide upon and then make adjustments and/or improvements to the Stryker for this accelerated acquisition program. At the request of OSD, the Army is currently evaluating potential improvements to equipment for the fifth and sixth SBCTs, which may be fielded through FY 2004 to FY 2009.

For the Army’s FCS, digitization experimentation has provided lessons learned, but the C4ISR is being designed with a “clean sheet of paper.” The strategy for FCS is to allow the design to spiral until 2005, but the schedule for its initial operating capability stands firm at 2010. The Army has adopted an innovative approach to acquisition called other transaction authority, to be used in conjunction with spiral development. Other transaction authority enables a cooperative relationship with industrial partners. The Army, teamed with DARPA, has selected a lead system integrator—a team of contractors—in order to seek out

Suggested Citation:"3 Experimentation--Past, Present, and Future." National Research Council. 2004. The Role of Experimentation in Building Future Naval Forces. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11125.
×

and integrate the most promising and cost-effective technologies. From the perspective of requirements, design, and experimentation, the important elements are that the user requirements will evolve in the initial development process as the contractor team, DARPA, and the Army learn from the spiral development process, including experimentation and risk management with continuous feedback. In this sense the FCS development is different from that for the Stryker family of vehicles.

The Army will use the Stryker capabilities to build the experiential base required for the initial OF units of action. A program of experimentation has been established at Fort Knox, Kentucky, to address unit-of-action experiments. This facility, which builds on the efforts of the Mounted Maneuver Battle Laboratory, is known as the Unit of Action Battle Laboratory. It is conducting a number of force-on-force events to explore how the unit fights and how it will be optimally organized. It has also conducted a C4ISR experiment.

The Army anticipates that FCS will become an acquisition program in May 2003. To provide evidence for FCS acquisition decisions, very small, focused events have been conducted to prove that operational and system concepts are sound. However, none of these events has been on the same scale as that of the AWEs conducted for digitization. They have actually been called demonstrations to highlight differences in the types of events. Demonstrations at military facilities have involved roughly 20 surrogate FCS manned ground vehicles (e.g., sport utility vehicles and Legacy Force vehicles) and one or more surrogate FCS unmanned aerial vehicles (e.g., Blackhawk helicopters), or virtual simulations. It appears that formal experimentation is not ongoing, at least while FCS is in a preacquisition state. Experiments for FCS or the OF on the magnitude of an AWE are not currently included in campaign plans or schedules leading to initial operating capability.

For FCS, the Army’s use of experimentation differs from what it did for digitization. The past cost of experimentation measured in dollars and human resources may be a factor, particularly that associated with large-scale events. However, the difference is not merely one of scale. There is yet no Army experimentation campaign plan for this, although there are efforts within TRADOC to develop what might be called an objective force experimentation campaign plan and to ensure that these Army activities are synchronized with the USJFCOM plans for experimentation. Also there is no special senior management structure in place (beyond TRADOC) to review OF experimentation.

Both Stryker and FCS are being managed as acquisition programs, using experimentation as a means to accelerate the acquisitions or determine relevant parameters; they are not part of an Army experimentation campaign to investigate the most desirable directions that the Army might pursue in developing or improving future forces. Said differently, the Army has determined what it needs and wants in its future force, and it will use experimentation to get there. How-

Suggested Citation:"3 Experimentation--Past, Present, and Future." National Research Council. 2004. The Role of Experimentation in Building Future Naval Forces. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11125.
×

ever, it has not set up an experimentation campaign to provide and evaluate multiple alternative means of improving its future force. The latter option would have taken more calendar time, and conceivably the decision has been made explicitly or implicitly not to accept such a delay. The result is the acceptance of an increased risk and the desire to use experimentation and testing in the spiral development and block procurement processes to manage such risks.

U.S. Air Force

Overview

The U.S. Air Force (USAF) has a long tradition and culture of experimentation, ranging from the 1920s, when General Billy Mitchell attacked an ex-German battleship in the Chesapeake Bay to investigate air search and air power, to today’s experiments that explore stealth-delivered, precision-guided weapons of the future.

The Air Force describes the purpose of its experimentation programs as follows: “… to explore new operational concepts and technologies that will provide the capabilities to achieve [the Air Force] vision….”36 There is published policy and guidance on how experimentation is conducted within the Air Force.37 That guidance expressly intends the results of experimentation to inform investment and divestment decisions, identify transition candidates for fielding, and validate changes to DOTMLPF. In short, the objective of experimentation is to quickly and efficiently improve the concepts, processes, and systems associated with air and space warfare capabilities at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.

Experimentation, as managed by the Air Force, includes a full spectrum of activities, from tabletop strategic war games to detailed, tactical, human-in-the-loop events that are highly instrumented. Among other activities, it includes ACTDs, large-scale Service experiments such as the Joint Expeditionary Force Experiments (JEFXs),38 small-scale experiments such as the Advanced Process and Technology Experiments,39 and experimentation events combined with field and command post exercises. It also includes participation in joint experiments.

The USAF candidates for experimentation come from numerous sources. These include organizations such as its Major Commands (MAJCOMs) and battle

36  

Lt Gen Robert H. Fogelsong, USAF, Deputy Chief of Staff, Air and Space Operations. 2000. Air Force Experimentation Campaign Plan FY00-05, Department of the Air Force, Langley Air Force Base, Va., p. 3.

37  

AFI 10-2304 was still in draft form as of this writing.

38  

Equivalent to an FBE or an AWE.

39  

Equivalent to an LOE or an LTA.

Suggested Citation:"3 Experimentation--Past, Present, and Future." National Research Council. 2004. The Role of Experimentation in Building Future Naval Forces. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11125.
×

laboratories, various events such as its Blue/Red/Green Flag battle management and flying training warfighting exercises and JEFXs, and from various individuals such as the senior USAF warfighters, such as Global Strike Task Force (GSTF), Multi-Mission Command and Control Constellation/Aircraft, and others. Concepts originate from any of the six Air Force staff task forces, from those involved in working the main elements of the Air force vision, and from various related sources.

Experimentation campaigns are documented in an Air Force experimentation campaign plan that is tied directly to the Joint Vision, to the Service Vision, and to the Air Force Transformation Flight Plan.40 There is also a management structure and a well-established process within the USAF to oversee, plan, and execute USAF experimentation and to make the resulting changes in doctrine and procedures.41 This process is well supported by the senior Air Force leadership. Results of experiments are reviewed first by a Council of Colonels, and then by a General Officer Steering Group for review and appropriate action. Recommendations may be briefed to the Air Force corporate structure, including the Chief of Staff. These briefings are usually provided after every major experiment.

Organizational Roles and Major Participants

The responsibility for executing USAF experimentation generally rests with the MAJCOMs and their associated battle laboratories, but there are many important participants, such as the Air Force Doctrine Center42 and the Air Force Research Laboratory, to mention just two. The organization and conduct of USAF experimentation is somewhat decentralized, in order to accommodate not only distributed responsibilities but also initiatives that arise from many sources. The appropriate MAJCOM oversees its assigned battle laboratories, while another part of the MAJCOM looks after Blue/Red/Green Flag battle management and flying training warfighting exercises. Yet another organization handles major command and control experiments, such as JEFX, under what is called the Air Force Experimentation Office43 (AFEO). And finally, ACTDs and other experiments directed by senior USAF officers are assigned to appropriate MAJCOMs

40  

Gen John P. Jumper, USAF, Chief of Staff, and James G. Roche, Secretary of the Air Force. 2003. Air Force Transformation Flight Plan FY03-07, Headquarters, U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C.

41  

Lt Gen Robert H. Fogelsong, USAF, Deputy Chief of Staff, Air and Space Operations. 2000. Air Force Experimentation Campaign Plan FY00-05, Department of the Air Force, Langley Air Force Base, Va.

42  

The Air Force Doctrine Command has the responsibility of maturing experimentation results into Air Force doctrine after an extensive approval process.

43  

This is something of a misnomer as it does not handle all USAF experimentation but rather major command and control experiments only.

Suggested Citation:"3 Experimentation--Past, Present, and Future." National Research Council. 2004. The Role of Experimentation in Building Future Naval Forces. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11125.
×

for execution. The development and execution of USAF experiments are organized under the operating side of the USAF. The USAF acquisition community, represented by the Air Force Materiel Command and its operating centers, is closely associated with all USAF experimentation activity so as to facilitate transitioning into acquisition those capabilities that may come from the experimentation process.

The function within the Air Force that brings all USAF experimentation output into focus and coordinates its transition into acquisition as appropriate is the USAF requirements/capability acquisition process. As various experiments from their sponsoring organizations are designed and executed, they are reviewed by the appropriate MAJCOM and Headquarters USAF Requirements Oversight Council. The Service equivalent of the JROC, it is called the Air Force Requirements Council (AFROC); it is analogous to the MROC, discussed earlier in the chapter. The outputs of the USAF experimentation process that are found worthy of becoming USAF capabilities are entered by the sponsoring MAJCOM or senior officer into the USAF requirements process to compete for the funding necessary for the acquisition process to proceed.

Many organizations foster and participate in individual experimentation activities. For instance, a JEFX has the Air Combat Command (ACC) as the executive agent, with the AFEO as the planning lead, Electronic Systems Command as a technical lead, and another ACC component as the operational lead. In addition, many other organizations may participate, depending on the nature and subject of the experiment. The Air Force experimentation campaign plan is a means of coordinating their activities. Examples of other participants are the exercise and training facilities, such as those at Hurlburt Field, Florida, and Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada; the Air Force Test Agency; and program offices, which sponsor initiatives such as UAVS and unmanned combat air vehicles (UCAVs) as subjects for experiments. Collectively, these participants may bring a full family of advanced engineering, engagement, mission, and campaign models and simulations as well as provide facilities, unique infrastructure, and specialized tools that make up the essential support for experimentation activities.

Specific organizational participants in USAF experimentation are as follows:

  • Air Force Experimentation Office. The AFEO manages experimentation within the USAF having to do with command and control and with intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. Its most notable experiments are those associated with the Joint Expeditionary Experiments in 1998, 1999, 2000, and 2002 (discussed below). The AFEO, which is part of the USAF C2 and ISR Center, was established in 1998 under the Air Combat Command. In recognition of its importance to the USAF as a whole, the C2 and ISR Center, along with the AFEO, was recently realigned under the Chief of Staff of the USAF.

  • USAF battle laboratories. Today the USAF has seven Air Force battle laboratories, each having fewer than 25 personnel, commanded by an O-6 (rank

Suggested Citation:"3 Experimentation--Past, Present, and Future." National Research Council. 2004. The Role of Experimentation in Building Future Naval Forces. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11125.
×

of colonel), and sharing equally in the funding available for experimentation.44 The command and control battle laboratory reports to the Air Force C2 ISR Center, the Space Battle Laboratory is under Air Force Space, and all the others report to the ACC.

The battle laboratories receive and/or generate ideas that are screened and selected to be initiatives for experimentation. With some exceptions, it takes from 3 to 6 months for an idea to be approved as an initiative; each initiative has an 18-month execution phase. Consequently, the lifetime of an initiative is on the order of 2 years and, if successful, the initiative should transition into an operational capability. Major initiatives are labeled “Mitchell” and more modest ones, “Kenney.” Mitchell initiatives have turned out to be beyond reach, so that all 90 initiatives45 were of Kenney status. As of the summer of 2000, of 90 initiatives, 40 were still being worked on, and 50 had been completed (all 50 are listed in Table 3.2).

The seven USAF battle laboratories are these:

  • The Air Expeditionary Battle Laboratory at Mt. Home Air Force Base, Idaho;

  • The Command and Control Battle Laboratory at Hurlburt Field, Florida;

  • The Unmanned Air Vehicle Battle Laboratory at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida;

  • The Space Battle Laboratory at Schriever Air Force Base, Colorado;

  • The Force Protection Battle Laboratory at Lackland Air Force Base, Texas;

  • The Information Warfare Battle Laboratory at Kelly Air Force Base, Texas; and

  • The Air Mobility Battle Laboratory at Scott Air Force Base, Missouri.

Certain facilities for exercises, training, and testing offer specialized capabilities to support experimentation. For example:

  • The Hurlburt Field, Florida Blue Flag Training Facility, Florida. The centerpiece of the laboratory is its modeling and simulation capability—it can provide a dynamic and realistic backdrop for both training and experimentation for USAF Senior Leader Operational Battle Command and Control.

  • The Nellis/Edwards Air Force Base/Fort Erwin Western Test and Training Complex, California. This range complex is used to train aircrews at the tactical level while they interface with operational command and control in red/ green flag exercises and large-scale joint exercises and experiments, the most recent being Millennium Challenge ’02.

44  

Typically about $5 million per battle laboratory.

45  

As of the summer of 2000.

Suggested Citation:"3 Experimentation--Past, Present, and Future." National Research Council. 2004. The Role of Experimentation in Building Future Naval Forces. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11125.
×

TABLE 3.2 Battle Laboratory Initiatives Completed as of Summer 2002

Battle Laboratory

Initiative

Status

C2B

Hill ATO Defragger

F (Kosovo, USAFE, 7 Wings at ACC)

AEFB

Integrated Planning and Execution Capability

F (Kosovo), R (Crisis Action System)

C2B

Collaborative Tools

F (Kosovo), R (AC2ISRC)

FPB

Ground Based Radar

F (3 sites, South America)

SB

Site Protection (Operation Geese)

F (55th SWS)

FPB

Space Environment

F (820th SFG)

IWB

Network Display Sensor Guard

F (AFCERT)

C2B

Network Attack Visualization

F (AFSOC, F117, 8th AF, 1st MEF)

FPB

Reduced Hardware Footprint

F (CENTAF, CENTCOM)

IWB

Food and Water Antiterrorism

F (Cheyenne Mountain, FBI)

IWB

Enhanced SA Tool

F (classified customer)

IWB

Diagnostic Emulator

F (classified customer)

C2B

Voice Optimal Interrogation

F (GCCS, TBMCS 1.0.2)

IWB

Enhanced Linked Virtual Information System

F (GPS JPO NAVWAR Tool)

C2B

Miniaturized GPS Jammer

F (Master Air Operations Planner)

SB

ATO Visualization and Assessment

F (Operation Northern Watch)

AEFB

Commercial Applications for Combat Effectiveness

F (Residual Cap: 2 KC-135Rs M)

IWB

EOC Enroute

F (SWC Red Team)

IWB

Software Agent System for OPSEC Information Warfare (SCI) Reachback

F (USAF, USA)

FPB

Vehicle Entry Explosives Search Strategy

T (guide published)

C2B

Tactical Sensor Integration

T (ASOC and BCC)

SB

Hyper-spectral Imagery Collection Upon Pike’s Peak

T (training changed)

IWB

Signal Analysis Mapping

P (ACC current purchase)

AEFB

Combined AGE

P (IOC Nov. ’01)

AEFB

Compact Air Transportable Hospital

P (AF/SG-buying~100 per year)

SB

Space Surveillance Network Optical Augmentation

A (’02 POM candidate)

UAVB

JSTARS Battlespace Imaging

A (’05 implementation)

FPB

Remote Visual Assessment

A (’02 POM vandidate)

FPB

Pathogen Indent Device

A (’02 POM)

AEFB

Next Generation Munitions Trailer

A (ACC/DRW writing ORD)

IWB

Pulse Doppler Identification

A (ECM Pods)

AEFB

Deployment Personnel Accountability Readiness Tool

A (Joint ORD)

C2B

Speech Recognition

A (AC2ISRC)

IWB

Network Early Warning

A

IWB

Cyber Warrior

A

IWB

Re-configurable EW Avionic Parts

A

SB

Space Object Indent in Living Color

A

Suggested Citation:"3 Experimentation--Past, Present, and Future." National Research Council. 2004. The Role of Experimentation in Building Future Naval Forces. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11125.
×

Battle Laboratory

Initiative

Status

UAVB

FAA Airspace UAV TCS

A

IWB

Panther Den

A/Masked

C2B

TBMCS and ABCS Data Sync

Further research

SB

Satellite Track Using Ambient RF

Further research

UAVB

SEAD Enhancement

Further research

UAVB

Communication Relay

Further research

UAVB

Spotter UAV

Further research

AEFB

Common Bore Sight

Not recommended

AEFB

Harvest Phoenix

Cancelled (redundant)

FPB

Virtual Tower

Cancelled

SB

Space Doctrine

Cancelled (not meeting objectives)

C2B

JFACC Project Phase 2

Technology not mature

FPB

Hazard Assessment and Mission Enhancement of Resources

Technology not mature

NOTE: F = fielded; T = changed; A = awaiting acquisition process; P = in Program Objectives Memorandum (POM). SOURCE: Lt Gen Robert H. Fogelsong, USAF, Deputy Chief of Staff, Air and Space Operations. 2000. Air Force Experimentation Campaign Plan FY00-05, Department of the Air Force, Langley Air Force Base, Va., p. 20.

  • The Eglin Air Force Base Land and Water Range Complex, Florida. This range complex is used to test, train, and experiment with the full spectrum of live air-to-air and air-to-ground precision-guided weapons.

  • The Combined Air Operations Center-Experimental (CAOC-X), Virginia. This center was established about 3 years ago to support experimentation with processes, procedures, and systems associated with the USAF Air and Space Operations Center.46 It was intended to facilitate the acquisition of fielded capabilities through a rapid spiral process, resulting in “leave behinds” for operations.47 However, owing to resource constraints and the operational urgency of establishing an updated CAOC at Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia, the objectives for CAOC-X appeared in flux at the time of this study. Nonetheless, CAOC experimentation has proceeded under the supervision of the AFEO using the facilities and infrastructure at Hurlburt Field and Nellis Air Force Base.

Many other facilities provide extensive modeling and simulation capabilities, and/or offer testbeds. For example:

46  

Analogous to the U.S. Army’s Central Technical Support Facility at Fort Hood, Texas.

47  

Naval Studies Board, National Research Council. 2000. Network-Centric Naval Forces: A Transition Strategy for Enhancing Operational Capabilities, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C., Section 2.5.4.2.

Suggested Citation:"3 Experimentation--Past, Present, and Future." National Research Council. 2004. The Role of Experimentation in Building Future Naval Forces. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11125.
×
  • The Paul Revere Boeing 707/767 flying experimental testbeds for the Multi-Mission Command and Control Aircraft (MC2A).

  • The THUNDER, BRAWLER, SUPPRESSOR, Joint Simulation System (JSIMS), Joint Warfare System (JWARS) family of campaign, engagement, and mission simulations, with their numerous supporting engineering models, are key capabilities for experimentation.

  • The Air Force Operational Test and Evaluation Center (AFOTEC) is responsible for the operational testing of new systems being developed for the Air Force and for multi-Service uses. It is a directorate, reporting directly to the Chief of Staff of the Air Force. It has become involved in development evaluation and is now involved at the beginning of experimentation. For instance, for an ACTD, AFOTEC will do an operational assessment, but it is not the usual test before the acquisition of a production capability. It is instead an assessment that goes to the developer for review. If the experimental capability is successful, AFOTEC evaluates the initiative later, after it has evolved through further experimentation. At the appropriate time, AFOTEC conducts the usual test and evaluations that support the formal acquisition process. AFOTEC’s earlier development assessment is “nonthreatening,” serving to point out issues that need resolution through experimentation and identifying key problems such as critical safety issues, and it familiarizes the test community with how operators use a promising new capability. As an example, AFOTEC was involved along with the Defense Evaluation Support Activity (DESA), at the request of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense/Anti-Terrorism (DUSD/AT), in analysis and assessment of the Predator UAV when it was the subject of an ACTD and used in Bosnia.

Examples of Air Force Experimentation

The predominant thrust of the Air Force Experimentation Program has centered on concepts and initiatives to achieve an effective expeditionary Air Force. Under the management of the AFEO, a series of experiments (the JEFX-1998/1999/ 2000/2002) examined command and control and information sharing (including coalition and alliance partners) over global networks and the relationships between sensors and weapons as they apply to the time critical target (TCT) problem. These activities were coordinated with the USJFCOM Rapid Decisive Operations concept development to ensure that joint aspects were fully appreciated and accommodated. This work has resulted in significant improvements in TCT operations in Afghanistan, as compared with those of Desert Storm. Significant reductions were achieved in the time required for executing the “kill chain.”48

48  

See Anthony H. Cordesman, 2002, The Lessons of Afghanistan: War Fighting, Intelligence and Force Transformation (Significant Issues Series, Vol. 24, No. 4), Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C., November, p. 110.

Suggested Citation:"3 Experimentation--Past, Present, and Future." National Research Council. 2004. The Role of Experimentation in Building Future Naval Forces. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11125.
×

Examples of results that are planned to transition into USAF CAOC Combat Capability as a result of JEFX-200249 include the Mapping Tool Kit, the Blue Force Tracker, the Combat Search and Rescue Module, the Space Tasking component in the Air Tasking Order, and three other, classified capabilities. The top initiatives were screened by the Air Force and successfully competed for set-aside funding for transitioning the results of experimentation to the field. However, some portions of all of the initiatives are being transitioned to the warfighter. These are small items, including a mix of new software and materiel, improvements to existing systems, TTPs, and training improvements. All of these items resulted from spiral processes, specifically from seven spirals. Several of these, including materiel and TTPs, have resulted in “leave behinds” for the field. For example, the Nellis CAOC benefited from the command and control systems left as residual assets. All of these initiatives were in the DOTMLPF approval process at the time this report was being prepared.

A second set of examples of results is provided by the USAF experiments with the Predator, Global Hawk, and UCAVs. While the Air Force was not much involved in the Predator ACTD (which was managed for DARPA by the U.S. Atlantic Command, which is now the U.S. Joint Forces Command, and the Navy program executive office), the Air Force was designated lead Service for this ACTD by the Vice Chief/Joint Chiefs of Staff in late 1995. As a result of its strong interest in the possibility of a replacement for the U2, the Air Force was heavily involved in the ACTD for Global Hawk and became the lead Service at the beginning. Both Predator and Global Hawk were participants in JEFX-1999 and also JEFX-2002, although Global Hawk was simulated for cost reasons. It is interesting to note that the firing of the Hellfire missile from Predator was demonstrated in 2001. Notional UCAVs have been simulated in experiments, such as JEFX-1999, but UCAVs are still in the development testing phase. All of these experimentation activities are managed by the AFEO and appear in campaign plans. Data obtained from these as well as other types of events are analyzed and archived by the AFEO.

The use of UAVs as combat vehicles is on the threshold of major transformation in joint warfighting. Both the Predator and the Global Hawk are in the Air Force procurement program and include programs of record. UCAVs are still in testing stages under a joint DARPA and Air Force development program but are not in the Air Force Program Objectives Memorandum.

Another example of Air force experimentation is that of a series of air command and control experiments under way with the USAF “Paul Revere” Boeing 707. These experiments are also managed by the AFEO under the Air Combat Command/C2 ISR Center (ACC/C2ISRC). The results of these experiments are

49  

JEFX-2002 included the Air Force segment of USJFCOM’s Millennium Challenge ’02 experiment.

Suggested Citation:"3 Experimentation--Past, Present, and Future." National Research Council. 2004. The Role of Experimentation in Building Future Naval Forces. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11125.
×

relevant for mission crew positions and equipment, associated processes and procedures, and the requirements for communications/bandwidth. Favorable results will be spiraled into a Boeing 767, which will be equipped with an improved electronically scanned synthetic aperture radar sensor. This Boeing 767 will become the prototype/experimentation platform for the future USAF MC2A. The concept of operations places the MC2A in control of on-board and off-board sensors with a fleet of UCAVs complementing an expeditionary CAOC. The Air Force has already proposed funding for the expedited development of an MC2A.

Finally, the USAF battle laboratories continue to produce combat capability improvements. Many of these constitute initiatives that provide hardware and software with TTPs. Battle laboratory initiatives have all been the subject of at least laboratory-level tests before becoming part of AFEO-managed experiments. Data resulting from experiments are regularly entered into DOTMLPF formats. A list of each activity and its status is provided in a 2000 USAF report.50Table 3.2 provides insight into the nature of the initiatives that are generated by battle laboratories. Some of these initiatives were selected as subjects for various experimentation events managed by AFEO. As such, these activities account for only one part of the Air Force Experimentation Program. Many of these initiatives are similar to the limited technical assessments (LTAs) of the Marine Corps, discussed earlier in this chapter.

From Experiments to the Field

A summary discussion of the processes used by the USAF to resource and transition experimentation results follows.

  • Large, expensive systems and programs. Large systems such as Predator and Global Hawk have their experimental genesis in DARPA and the Service R&D communities. As Service experiments and ACTDs with these two air vehicles proceeded, their military utility eventually became so compelling that they gained senior officer support (from the Chief of Staff of the Air Force and the Secretary of the Air Force), and secured funding in the USAF POM.51 Moreover, the UCAV and the MC2A (both supported by the Chief of Staff of the Air Force and the Secretary of the Air Force) yielded experimental results that formed

50  

Lt Gen Robert H. Fogelsong, USAF, Deputy Chief of Staff, Air and Space Operations. 2000. Air Force Experimentation Campaign Plan FY00-05, Department of the Air Force, Langley Air Force Base, Va.

51  

In 1995, the Predator secured Air Force POM funding as a consequence of VC/JCS designation of the Air Force as the lead agency. In 1996, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force stated that UAVs would play a significant role in the future battlespace environment; this was a turnaround from Air Force policy of the previous 20 years. Conceivably it was this four-star endorsement that removed opposition and enabled POM funding.

Suggested Citation:"3 Experimentation--Past, Present, and Future." National Research Council. 2004. The Role of Experimentation in Building Future Naval Forces. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11125.
×

the basis for their competing in the normal USAF POM process. Nonetheless, it is senior advocacy that provides the entrée into the competition.52 Those efforts associated with programs that require significant funding have, as a general rule, little chance of being funded and transitioned into the force. Exceptions may occur if the efforts are pushed very hard by a very senior leader proponent (influential four star).

  • Less-expensive programs and systems ($50 million to about $70 million). The Air Force battle laboratories and AFEO activity produce this class of candidates for transition almost without exception. To convert experimental systems to combat capability becomes a matter of obtaining the necessary resources through the POM process. The battle laboratories and the AFEO initiatives each have a slightly different transition process for obtaining their place in the POM for funding (discussed below).

  • Battle laboratory initiatives. For the past 3 years, the USAF has established a source of funds called the Warfighter Rapid Acquisition Program (WRAP). The purpose of the fund is to bridge the gap in the POM and to sustain initiatives until they can compete in the POM process; at that point, if they are successful, POM funding takes over. Originally $30 million to $40 million was allocated in this fund, but it is common for this fund to support other priorities, and it is often reduced to about the $10 million level. In addition, unless sponsored by a very senior officer (four star), which seldom occurs, the worthy battle laboratory system initiatives are seldom successful in obtaining POM funding; this makes the decrease in WRAP funding a moot issue.

  • AFEO initiatives. For the past 2 years, and instantiated with JEFX-’02, the AFEO has modified processes to transition its experimental results into improved C2 and ISR combat capability. Since it is meeting with success, the process is worth elaborating on here. Using JEFX-’02 as a case study and beginning 2 years in advance (FY 2000), the process starts by soliciting initiatives for experimentation. For the next 3 to 5 months, the initiatives are vetted first through the warfighting communities of the USAF and then to the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, who provides final approval for those initiatives selected for the JEFX experiment. This vetting process is very extensive, and by the time a system initiative is approved by the USAF, all of the underlying analysis and study have been accomplished and used to justify its selection.

Because of the rigor of the vetting process, by approval time there is little doubt that if the experimentation for testing the initiative is successful (using criteria established in the selection process), the initiative will be transitioned into

52  

There is significant support from the Chief of Staff of the Air Force for the MC2A. Gen John Jumper, as the Air Combat Commander, emphasized the experimentation that is providing critical data for the MC2A suite. He is now sponsoring MC2A as a major item in the R&D budget.

Suggested Citation:"3 Experimentation--Past, Present, and Future." National Research Council. 2004. The Role of Experimentation in Building Future Naval Forces. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11125.
×

the force. During this period, and as part of the process, a corresponding transition plan is developed and approved (by the Chief of Staff of the Air Force) simultaneously with the selection of the initiative itself. A part of this transition plan is to identify the program element in the POM that will subsume a particular initiative if it is found worthy. In this case, the program element was the Air Operations Center Improvement, which has a considerable amount of funding. The goal would be, to the extent possible, to allocate or earmark funds for an initiative under consideration. Alternatively, if necessary, funds can be reprioritized and reprogrammed within the program element in the future, if and when the initiative meets experiment exit criteria.

In addition, transition or bridge funding is allocated from the JEFX funding to sustain the initiative as needed until the POM funding stream becomes available. About $10 million of JEFX-2002 money was so earmarked and employed.53

As noted earlier, seven major initiatives successfully met the predetermined exit criteria in JEFX-2002. The $10 million bridge funding was used for each. The results of the experiments were briefed to the Chief of Staff of the Air Force in late September 2002 with a recommendation that they be accommodated in the Air Operations Improvement program element in the FY 2004 POM. The Chief of Staff of the Air Force approved the recommendation, and the seven initiatives were made part of the FY 2004 POM, with bridge money to sustain them until FY 2004. Initial results suggest that this is a successful process for moving small(er) programs to the field.

Future Air Force Plans and Programs for Experimentation

The Air Force Experimentation Campaign is a rolling 6-year plan that is updated each year with designated thrust areas. Most assuredly the overall thrust toward expeditionary capabilities will remain, and for the AFEO experiments, the C4ISR emphasis. In addition to the ongoing experimentation work in the USAF battle laboratories, the Air Force will concentrate heavily on the many-faceted aspects of the future USAF Command and Control Constellation. This includes sensors, UAVs, processes, procedures, and its centerpiece aircraft, the MC2A, and includes coordination with the Global Strike Task Force using specific Service experiments or as part of joint experimentation. More effort will be spent on time factors and tracking in time-critical targets. The battle laboratories and the Air Force Experimentation Office, using the GSTF facility, plus infrastructure at Hurlburt Field, Nellis and Eglin Air Force Bases, and other places, will continue to work on the associated tactical innovations and experiments and their interfaces to strategic and operational work. Direct influence for innovations

53  

Per committee discussion with AFEO staff on September 9, 2002.

Suggested Citation:"3 Experimentation--Past, Present, and Future." National Research Council. 2004. The Role of Experimentation in Building Future Naval Forces. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11125.
×

in strategies is anticipated from the experiences of expeditionary air forces now deployed.

Some methods and tools for experimentation will be enhanced in the future. The adequacy of simulation and data analyses will be assessed, since the AFEO believes that improvements are needed to raise confidence and increase depth. Also, a Joint Synthetic Battlespace will be explored. The Air Force has been applying spiral processes for some years, and a macrospiral process will be investigated—involving spirals that include changes in concepts of operation as well as in TTPs.

Suggested Citation:"3 Experimentation--Past, Present, and Future." National Research Council. 2004. The Role of Experimentation in Building Future Naval Forces. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11125.
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The Department of Defense is in the process of transforming the nation’s armed forces to meet the military challenges of the 21st century. Currently, the opportunity exists to carry out experiments at individual and joint service levels to facilitate this transformation. Experimentation, which involves a spectrum of activities including analyses, war games, modeling and simulation, small focused experiments, and large field events among other things, provides the means to enhance naval and joint force development. To assist the Navy in this effort, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) asked the National Research Council (NRC) to conduct a study to examine the role of experimentation in building future naval forces to operate in the joint environment. The NRC formed the Committee for the Role of Experimentation in Building Future Naval Forces to perform the study.

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