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Sensor Systems for Biological Agent Attacks: Protecting Buildings and Military Bases Sensor Systems for Biological Agent Attacks: Protecting Buildings and Military Bases Committee on Materials and Manufacturing Processes for Advanced Sensors Board on Manufacturing and Engineering Design Division on Engineering and Physical Sciences NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES PRESS Washington, D.C. www.nap.edu
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Sensor Systems for Biological Agent Attacks: Protecting Buildings and Military Bases THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES PRESS 500 FIFTH STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, DC 20001 NOTICE: The project that is the subject of this report was approved by the Governing Board of the National Research Council, whose members are drawn from the councils of the National Academy of Sciences, the National Academy of Engineering, and the Institute of Medicine. The members of the committee responsible for the report were chosen for their special competences and with regard for appropriate balance. This study was supported by Contract No. DTRA01-00-C-0083 between the National Academy of Sciences and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency. Any opinions, findings, conclusions, or recommendations expressed in this publication are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the agency that sponsored the report. International Standard Book Number 0-309-09576-X (Book) Available in limited supply from: Board on Manufacturing and Engineering Design 500 Fifth St., N.W. WS 930 Washington, DC 20001 202-334-3505 email@example.com http://www.national-academies.edu/bmed Copyright 2005 by the National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America
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Sensor Systems for Biological Agent Attacks: Protecting Buildings and Military Bases THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES Advisers to the Nation on Science, Engineering, and Medicine The National Academy of Sciences is a private, nonprofit, self-perpetuating society of distinguished scholars engaged in scientific and engineering research, dedicated to the furtherance of science and technology and to their use for the general welfare. Upon the authority of the charter granted to it by the Congress in 1863, the Academy has a mandate that requires it to advise the federal government on scientific and technical matters. Dr. Ralph J. Cicerone is president of the National Academy of Sciences. The National Academy of Engineering was established in 1964, under the charter of the National Academy of Sciences, as a parallel organization of outstanding engineers. It is autonomous in its administration and in the selection of its members, sharing with the National Academy of Sciences the responsibility for advising the federal government. The National Academy of Engineering also sponsors engineering programs aimed at meeting national needs, encourages education and research, and recognizes the superior achievements of engineers. Dr. Wm. A. Wulf is president of the National Academy of Engineering. The Institute of Medicine was established in 1970 by the National Academy of Sciences to secure the services of eminent members of appropriate professions in the examination of policy matters pertaining to the health of the public. The Institute acts under the responsibility given to the National Academy of Sciences by its congressional charter to be an adviser to the federal government and, upon its own initiative, to identify issues of medical care, research, and education. Dr. Harvey V. Fineberg is president of the Institute of Medicine. The National Research Council was organized by the National Academy of Sciences in 1916 to associate the broad community of science and technology with the Academy's purposes of furthering knowledge and advising the federal government. Functioning in accordance with general policies determined by the Academy, the Council has become the principal operating agency of both the National Academy of Sciences and the National Academy of Engineering in providing services to the government, the public, and the scientific and engineering communities. The Council is administered jointly by both Academies and the Institute of Medicine. Dr. Ralph J. Cicerone and Dr. Wm. A. Wulf are chair and vice chair, respectively, of the National Research Council. www.national-academies.org
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Sensor Systems for Biological Agent Attacks: Protecting Buildings and Military Bases COMMITTEE ON MATERIALS AND MANUFACTURING PROCESSES FOR ADVANCED SENSORS JOHN VITKO, JR., Sandia National Laboratories, Livermore, California, Chair DAVID R. FRANZ, Midwest Research Institute, Frederick, Maryland, Vice Chair MARK ALPER, University of California, Berkeley PETER D.E. BIGGINS, Dstl Chemical and Biological Sciences, Salisbury, United Kingdom LARRY D. BRANDT, Sandia National Laboratories, Livermore, California CINDY BRUCKNER-LEA, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, Richland, Washington HARRIET A. BURGE, Harvard School of Public Health, Boston, Massachusetts RICHARD EDIGER, PerkinElmer Analytical Instruments, Shelton, Connecticut MARK A. HOLLIS, Lincoln Laboratory, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Lexington LEO L. LAUGHLIN, Battelle, Arlington, Virginia RAYMOND P. MARIELLA, JR., Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore, California ANDREW R. McFARLAND, Texas A&M University, College Station R. PAUL SCHAUDIES, Science Applications International Corporation, McLean, Virginia Staff JULIUS CHANG, Staff Officer (until February 2002) SHARON YEUNG DRESSEN, Staff Officer (until May 2002) JUDITH ESTEP, Senior Project Assistant (until April 2002) JAMES KILLIAN, Study Director EMILY ANN MEYER, Research Associate (until April 2004)
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Sensor Systems for Biological Agent Attacks: Protecting Buildings and Military Bases BOARD ON MANUFACTURING AND ENGINEERING DESIGN PAMELA A. DREW, Boeing Phantom Works, Seattle, Washington, Chair CAROL L.J. ADKINS, Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, New Mexico GREGORY AUNER, Wayne State University, Detroit, Michigan THOMAS W. EAGAR, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge ROBERT F. FONTANA, JR., Hitachi Global Storage Technologies, San Jose, California PAUL B. GERMERAAD, Aurigin Systems, Inc., Cupertino, California RICHARD L. KEGG, Milacron, Inc., Cincinnati, Ohio PRADEEP L. KHOSLA, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania JAY LEE, University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee DIANA LONG, Robert C. Byrd Center for Flexible Manufacturing, South Charleston, West Virginia JAMES MATTICE, Universal Technology Corporation, Dayton, Ohio MANISH MEHTA, National Center for Manufacturing Sciences, Ann Arbor, Michigan ANGELO M. NINIVAGGI, JR., Plexus Corporation, Nampa, Idaho JAMES B. O'DWYER, PPG Industries, Allison Park, Pennsylvania HERSCHEL REESE, Dow Corning Corporation, Midland, Michigan HERMAN M. REININGA, Rockwell Collins, Cedar Rapids, Iowa LAWRENCE RHOADES, Extrude Hone Corporation, Irwin, Pennsylvania JAMES B. RICE, JR., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge ALFONSO VELOSA III, Gartner Inc., Portland, Oregon JOHN F. WHITE, Altarum, Ann Arbor, Michigan JOEL SAMUEL YUDKEN, AFL-CIO, Washington, D.C. Staff TONI MARECHAUX, Director TERI THOROWGOOD, Research Associate LAURA TOTH, Senior Project Assistant
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Sensor Systems for Biological Agent Attacks: Protecting Buildings and Military Bases Preface The past decade has seen a growing concern about the potential for biological attacks on this nation's homeland and its military facilities. This concern was dramatically underscored by the events in the fall of 2001. The attack against the World Trade Center and the Pentagon made clear terrorists’ interest in mass casualties rather than smaller events to call attention to their cause. And the introduction of B. anthracis into the U.S. mail showed a willingness by some to use biological agents and also demonstrated their ability to develop or acquire relatively high-grade agent. When added to earlier studies that confirmed the potential of biological attacks for creating large-scale casualties, the events of the fall of 2001 added both a new sense of realism and urgency regarding such threats. Fortunately, during the past decade the nation had also invested significantly in developing technology to detect and respond to such a biological attack. As a result of this investment, it is now possible to detect and identify biological agents in time (tens of minutes to hours) to pretreat potential victims before the onset of symptoms, thereby greatly reducing the consequences of most attacks. However, these time scales are still too long to enable the occupants of a facility to take some action to minimize their exposure—for example, by altering airflow in a facility, sheltering in place, or evacuating the facility. Realizing the attractiveness of certain facilities as targets of biological attack and the desirability of minimizing the effects of any such attack not just by early treatment of exposed personnel but also by detection in time to minimize such exposures, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) chartered a study to examine the path to "detect to warn" sensors for facility protection. Specifically, DTRA asked that the study examine representative scenarios for facility protection, elucidate the driving sensor requirements, identify detection technologies and systems that have the potential for meeting those requirements, and chart a roadmap for attaining those capabilities. To address these tasks the National Research Council formed a committee comprising experts in systems studies, sampling, detection technologies, microbiology, aerosol backgrounds, materials technologies, and instrument development and commercialization. The Committee on Materials and Manufacturing Processes for Advanced Sensors, in turn, called on experts at the Department of Defense (DoD), the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), the Department of Energy (DOE), and in the university and industry sectors to understand the issues associated with detect-to-warn for facility protection and the status and prospects for a broad range of advanced detection and identification systems. The committee examined all the major families of detection systems from simple aerosol detectors, to those that identify an agent based on its genetic, structural, or chemical properties, to so-called "functional sensors," which detect the response of cells and organisms to the presence of an agent.
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Sensor Systems for Biological Agent Attacks: Protecting Buildings and Military Bases After approximately 1 year of briefings, study, evaluation, synthesis, and integration the committee arrived at a roadmap that it believes establishes an important but limited detect-to-warn capability in the near term and charts the path to a robust detect-to-warn capability in the next 5 to 7 years. This roadmap and the supporting analyses are given in the following report. This report has been reviewed in draft form by individuals chosen for their diverse perspectives and technical expertise in accordance with procedures approved by the National Research Council's (NRC's) Report Review Committee. The purpose of this independent review is to provide candid and critical comments that will assist the institution in making its published report as sound as possible and to ensure that the report meets institutional standards for objectivity, evidence, and responsiveness to the study charge. The review comments and draft manuscript remain confidential to protect the integrity of the deliberative process. We wish to thank the following individuals for their review of this report: Leonidas Bachas, University of Kentucky, John Brockman, Sandia National Laboratories, C.W. Chu, Texas Center for Superconductivity, Catherine Fenselau, University of Maryland, Robert Hawley, U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases, Mohamed Sofi Ibrahim, U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases, John MacChesney, Bell Laboratories, Lucent Technologies, Timothy Moshier, SPARTA, Inc., Gary Resnick, Los Alamos National Laboratory, and Ashley Williamson, Southern Research Institute. Although the reviewers listed above have provided many constructive comments and suggestions, they were not asked to endorse the conclusions or recommendations nor did they see the final draft of the report before its release. The review of this report was overseen by Royce Murray of the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill. Appointed by the National Research Council, he was responsible for making certain that an independent examination of this report was carried out in accordance with institutional procedures and that all review comments were carefully considered. Responsibility for the final content of this report rests entirely with the authoring committee and the institution. The committee greatly appreciates the support and assistance of National Research Council staff members James Killian, Emily Ann Meyer, Julius Chang, and Sharon Dressen, and of Greg Eyring, who consulted in many stages of this study, including in its writing. John Vitko, Jr., Chair Committee on Materials and Manufacturing Processes for Advanced Sensors
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Sensor Systems for Biological Agent Attacks: Protecting Buildings and Military Bases Contents EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1 1 BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW 7 Statement of Task, 7 Scope and Committee Approach, 9 Concluding Thoughts, 12 2 SCENARIOS, DEFENSIVE CONCEPTS, AND DETECTION ARCHITECTURES 13 Scenario Selection and Defensive Concepts, 14 Outdoor Release Scenarios, 14 Facility Release Scenarios, 15 Military Versus Civilian Scenarios, 15 Defensive Concepts Against Attacks on Facilities, 16 Defensive Concepts Against Attacks on Distributed Target Complexes, 17 Key Detection System Attributes and Trade-offs, 18 Detector Performance Attributes in Detect-to-Warn Scenarios, 18 Detection System Trade-offs, 19 Key Architectural Design Principles for Detection, 19 Multistage Detection Architectures, 20 Detect-to-Warn Architecture Performance, 22 3 INDOOR AND OUTDOOR BIOAEROSOL BACKGROUNDS AND SAMPLING STRATEGIES 23 Organisms and Particles, 23 Analytical Methods, 25 Sources of Bioaerosols, 27 Outdoor Pollen, 27 Outdoor Fungi, 29 Outdoor Bacteria, 31 Other Outdoor Bioaerosols, 32 Indoor Aerosols, 33 Indoor Pollen and Pollen-Derived Particles, 35 Indoor Fungi, 35 Indoor Bacteria, 36 Predicting the Prevalence of Bioaerosols, 39
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Sensor Systems for Biological Agent Attacks: Protecting Buildings and Military Bases Control of Bioaerosols, 41 Air Cleaning, 41 Air Treatment, 42 Findings and Recommendations, 43 Outdoor Aerosols, 43 Indoor Aerosols, 44 Predictive Models, 44 Sampling Strategies to Obtain Critical Missing Data, 45 4 BIOAEROSOL SAMPLINGS SYSTEMS FOR NEAR-REAL-TIME DETECTION 46 Particle Size Considerations, 47 Sampling from the Ambient Environment, 47 Sampling from Occupied Environments, 48 Bioaerosol Sampling from Indoor Air, 48 Sampling from Building Ductwork, 49 Collector Technology, 56 Sampling from Occupied Environments, 59 Sampling Bioaerosols from Ambient Air, 61 Aerosol Concentrators, 62 Performance of Virtual Impactor Aerosol Concentrators, 63 Performance of Cyclonic Concentrators, 64 Novel Concentrators, 64 Ideal Power to Draw Air Through a Concentrator, 65 Power Consumption to Prevent Freezing of Liquid, 66 Aerosol-to-Hydrosol Transfer Stages, 66 Findings and Recommendations, 68 Ductwork Sampling, 68 Occupied Area Sampling, 69 Ambient Sampling, 69 5 POINT AND STANDOFF DETECTION TECHNOLOGIES 71 Point Detection Technologies, 72 Current Instrumentation, 73 Point Detection Summary, 74 Standoff Detection Technologies, 75 Ultraviolet Systems, 77 Standoff Detection Summary, 78 Novel or Advanced Standoff Detection Techniques, 79 Ultraviolet Resonance Raman Spectroscopy, 79 Other Ultraviolet Systems, 81 Terahertz Spectroscopy, 81 Findings and Recommendations, 81 Spectroscopic Point Detectors, 81 Standoff Detectors, 82 6 NUCLEIC ACID SEQUENCE-BASED IDENTIFICATION FOR DETECT-TO-WARN APPLICATIONS 84 Sample Collection, 85 Sample Preparation, 85 Nucleic Acid Assays, 89 Group I: Assays That Use Amplification Techniques, 90 Group II: Sequence-Based Assays That Do Not Use Amplification Techniques, 99 Detection, Identification, Analysis, and Reporting, 101 Strawman Concept for a Fast RNA Detection/Identification System, 102 Findings and Recommendations, 103
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Sensor Systems for Biological Agent Attacks: Protecting Buildings and Military Bases 7 STRUCTURE-BASED IDENTIFICATION FOR DETECT-TO-WARN APPLICATIONS 105 The Structure-Based Biosensor: Basic Elements, 108 Sample Collection, 108 Sample Concentration, 108 Binding of Target to the Molecular Recognition Element, 109 Specific Detection and False Alarms, 110 Addition and Removal of Reporter Groups, 113 Detection of Target Molecular Recognition Element Complex, 113 Renewal of the Sensor Surface for Continuous Monitoring, 114 Consumables Considerations for Detect-to-Warn Applications, 114 Notional Structure-Based Detection Systems, 115 Detailed Considerations: Molecular Recognition Elements, 116 Antibodies, 116 Aptamers, 117 Peptides, 118 Small Molecules, 119 Protein Receptors and Other Cell Surface Features, 119 Imprinted Polymers, 120 Detailed Considerations: Notional Detection Systems, 120 Immunoassay Tickets, 120 Direct Binding Assays, 121 Surface Plasmon Resonance, 121 Flow Cytometry, 122 Target Binding That Changes Detectable Properties of Smart Sensor Surfaces, 124 Colorimetric Detection, 124 Fluorescence Detection, 125 One-Step Signal Amplification Concepts, 125 Modified Cell-Based Systems, 126 Waveguides and Fluorescent Detection, 127 Findings and Recommendations, 128 8 CHEMISTRY-BASED IDENTIFICATION FOR DETECT-TO-WARN APPLICATIONS 130 Mass Spectrometry, 131 Challenges for Rapid, Simple-to-Use Mass Spectrometry Identification Systems, 135 Gas- and Liquid-Phase Separations for Pathogen Detection, 137 Chemical Sensors, 138 Dipicolinic Acid Analysis, 142 Direct Labeling of Pathogens for Detection, 144 Flow Cytometry, 144 Planar Sensors, 144 Vapor Analysis of Cell Metabolites, 146 Microscale Monitoring of Cell Metabolites, 146 Findings and Recommendations, 147 9 FUNCTION-BASED DETECTION 149 Cell-Based Response Systems, 151 Research Issues, 153 Interfacing with Sampling Systems, 153 Operational Deployment, 153 Conclusion, 153 Findings and Recommendations, 153 10 DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS FOR DETECT-TO-WARN DEFENSIVE ARCHITECTURES 155 Systems Aspects of Defensive Architectural Design, 155 Key Principles for Detection System Design, 156 Facility Protection Architectures, 157
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Sensor Systems for Biological Agent Attacks: Protecting Buildings and Military Bases Time Line and Zone Isolation Considerations, 158 Example: Attack on a Multizone Office Building, 159 Impact of Facility Design on Defensive System Effectiveness, 163 Other Facility Detection System Considerations, 166 Facility Protection—Strategies and Priorities, 167 Distributed Target Defensive Architectures, 168 Detection Architecture Options, 169 Example: Attack on an Extended Military Installation, 169 Distributed Target Protection—Strategies and Priorities, 173 Findings and Recommendations, 174 Defense of Facilities, 175 Defense of Distributed Military Installations, 176 General Recommendations, 176 11 SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS AND A PATH FORWARD 178 Detection and Identification Systems, 178 Nonspecific Detectors, 178 Specific Detection and Identification Technologies, 179 Detect-to-Warn Systems for Buildings and Extended Military Installations, 182 Protection of Buildings, 183 Protection of Military Installations, 184 Top-Level Technical Findings and Recommendations, 185 Most Probable Path, 185 Technology Watch List, 186 APPENDIXES 187 A Biographical Sketches of Committee Members 189 B Acronyms and Abbreviations 194