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Suggested Citation:"REFERENCES." National Research Council. 2006. Safety and Security of Commercial Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage: Public Report. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11263.
×

FIGURE D.2 Three types of BWR containment system: Mark I, Mark II, and Mark III. SOURCE: Modified from Lahey and Moody (1993, Figure 1–9).

The fission process is controlled by the reactor operators through the use of neutron-absorbing materials. The primary control is an array of control rods or blades that can be withdrawn from the core to the degree needed. In the PWRs, the control rods are moved within selected empty tubes within the assembly. In the BWRs, cruciform (cross-shaped) control blades are moved across the faces of the fuel assembly, typically narrower than those in a PWR fuel assembly. Reactor fuel designers also use burnable poisons within the fuel assembly to control the fission process. These poisons are placed in appropriate amounts within the fuel assembly so that they burn away, making the fuel assembly more reactive, as the continued fission process is making it less reactive. PWRs also use neutron control by dissolving neutron-absorbing sodium borate in the reactor coolant, gradually lowering the concentration from the peak after refueling to the minimum before the next refueling.

REFERENCES

American Nuclear Society. 1988. Design Criteria for an (independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (Water Pool Type): An American National Standard. ANSI/ANS-57.7–1988. American Nuclear Society. LaGrange Park, Illinois.


Duderstadt, J.J. and L.J.Hamilton. 1976. Nuclear Reactor Analysis. John Wiley& Sons. New York.


Lahey, R.T. and F.J.Moody. 1997. The Thermal Hydraulics of a Boiling Water Nuclear Reactor. Second Edition. American Nuclear Society. La Grange Park, Illinois.

Suggested Citation:"REFERENCES." National Research Council. 2006. Safety and Security of Commercial Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage: Public Report. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11263.
×

USNRC (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission). 1976. Final Generic Environmental Statement on the Use of Recycled Plutonium in Mixed Oxide Fuel in Light-Water Cooled Reactors (GESMO). NUREG-0002. Washington, DC.

USNRC, 1987. Case Histories of West Valley Spent Fuel Shipments. NUREG/CR-4847. January. Washington, D.C,


Walker, J.S. 2004. Three Mile Island: A Nuclear Crisis in Historical Perspective. University of California Press. Berkeley, California.

TABLE D.1 Range of Dimensions and Weights for Light Water Reactor Fuel Assemblies Used in Operating Reactors in the United States.

Physical Characteristics of Typical LWR Fuel Assemblies

Reactor Type

BWR

BWR

PWR

PWR

PWR

PWR

PWR

PWR

PWR

PWR

PWR

PWR

Fuel Designer

GE

GE

B&W

B&W

GE

GE

W

W

W

W

W

W

Fuel Rod Array

7×7

8×8

15×15

17×17

14×14

16×16

14×14

14×14

15×15

15×15

17×l7

17×l7

Artive Fuel Leugth (in.)

144

144

144

143

137

150

120

144

121

144

144

168

Nominal Envelope (in.)

5.438

5.47

8.536

8.536

8.25

8.25

7.763

7.763

8.449

8.426

8.426

8.426

Fuel Assembly Length (in.)

176

176

166

166

157

177

137

161

137

160

160

Weight (lba.)

600

600

1.516

1.502

581 kg

501 kg

573 kg

594 kg

654 kg

665 kg

Fuel Rod

Number

49

63

208

264

164

224.236

180

179

204

204

264

264

Length (in.)

163

153

147

161

127

152

127

152

152

Pitch. Square (in.)

0.798

0.640

0.568

0.501

0.580

0.506

0.556

0.556

0.563

0.563

0.496

0.496

O.D. (in.)

0.570

0.493

0.430

0.379

0.440

0.382

0.422

0.422

0.422

0.422

0.374

0.360

Clad Thickness (mils.)

35.5

34

26.5

23.5

26

25

16.5

24.3

16.5

24.3

22.5

22.5

Clad Material

Zr 2

Zr 2

Zr 4

Zr 4

Zr 4

Zr 4

sst

Zr 4

sst

Zr 4

Zr 4

Zr 4

Pellet O.D. (in.)

0.488

0.416

0.370

0.3232

0.3795

0.325

0.3835

0.3659

0.3835

0.3659

0.3225

0.3088

Peilet Length (in.)

0.375

0.650

0.390

0.600

0.600

0.600

0.600

0.530

0.530

Gap, Radial (poits)

5.5

4.5

3.5

3.1

4.3

3.5

2.8

3.8

2.8

3.8

3.3

3.3

Density (STD)

92.5–95.0

93.5–95.0

93.0–95.0

94.75

93.0–94.0

92.0

93.0–94.0

92.0

95.0

95.0

Poison

Gd1O2

Gd1O2

None

None

B1C/A12O2

B1C/A12O2

Nonfueled Rods

Number

0

1

17

25

6

6

16

17

21

21

25

25

Material

Zr 2

Zr 4

Zr 4

Zr 4

Zr 4

304 sst

Zr 4

304 sst

Zr 4

Zr 4

Zr 4

Spacer Grids

Number

7

7

8

8

8

12

Material

Inconel x

Inconel X

Inconel 718

Inconel 718

Zr 4

Zr 4

 

SOURCE: American Nuclear Society (1988).

Suggested Citation:"REFERENCES." National Research Council. 2006. Safety and Security of Commercial Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage: Public Report. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11263.
×
Page 106
Suggested Citation:"REFERENCES." National Research Council. 2006. Safety and Security of Commercial Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage: Public Report. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11263.
×
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In response to a request from Congress, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Department of Homeland Security sponsored a National Academies study to assess the safety and security risks of spent nuclear fuel stored in cooling pools and dry casks at commercial nuclear power plants. The information provided in this book examines the risks of terrorist attacks using these materials for a radiological dispersal device. Safety and Security of Commercial Spent Nuclear Fuel is an unclassified public summary of a more detailed classified book. The book finds that successful terrorist attacks on spent fuel pools, though difficult, are possible. A propagating fire in a pool could release large amounts of radioactive material, but rearranging spent fuel in the pool during storage and providing emergency water spray systems would reduce the likelihood of a propagating fire even under severe damage conditions. The book suggests that additional studies are needed to better understand these risks. Although dry casks have advantages over cooling pools, pools are necessary at all operating nuclear power plants to store at least the recently discharged fuel. The book explains it would be difficult for terrorists to steal enough spent fuel to construct a significant radiological dispersal device.

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