Surveillance and security procedures are just as important as physical barriers in preventing and mitigating terrorist attacks. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission declined to provide the committee with detailed briefings on the surveillance and security procedures that are now in place to protect spent fuel facilities at commercial nuclear power plants against terrorist attacks. Although the committee did learn about some of the changes that have been instituted since the September 11, 2001, attacks, it was not provided with enough information to evaluate the effectiveness of procedures now in place.

RECOMMENDATION: Although the committee did not specifically investigate the effectiveness and adequacy of improved surveillance and security measures for protecting stored spent fuel, an assessment of current measures should be performed by an independent15organization.

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That is, independent of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the nuclear industry.

 



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