committee for review. Consequently, the committee was unable to provide a technical assessment.
3.3 EVALUATION OF THE POTENTIAL RISKS OF POOL STORAGE
Prior to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, spent fuel pool analyses by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission were focused almost exclusively on safety. On the basis of these analyses, the Commission concluded that spent fuel storage carried risks that were no greater (and likely much lower) than risks for operating nuclear reactors, as discussed in the previous section of this chapter.
The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks raised the possibility of a new kind of threat to commercial power plants and spent fuel storage: premeditated, carefully planned, high-impact attacks by terrorists to damage these facilities for the purpose of releasing radiation to the environment and spreading fear and panic among civilian populations. The Commission informed the committee that Its conclusions about risks of spent fuel storage are now being reevaluated in light of these new threats.
Prior to September 11, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission viewed the most credible sabotage event as a violent external land assault by small groups of well-trained, heavily armed individuals aided by a knowledgeable insider.10 The Commission has long-established requirements for physical protection systems at power plants to thwart such assaults. The committee was told that these requirements have been increased since the September 11, 2001, attacks. To the committee’s knowledge, there are currently no requirements in place to defend against the kinds of larger-scale, premeditated, skillful attacks that were carried out on September 11, 2001, whether or not a commercial aircraft is involved. Staff from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and representatives from the nuclear industry repeatedly told the committee that they view detecting, preventing, and thwarting such attacks as the federal government’s responsibility.
It is important to recognize that nuclear power plants in the United States and most of the rest of the world11 were designed primarily with safety, not security, in mind.12 The reinforced concrete containment buildings that house the reactors were designed to contain internal pressures of up to about 4 atmospheres in case steam is released in the event of various hypothetical reactor accidents. These and other plant structures were not specifically designed to resist external terrorist attacks, although their robust construction would certainly provide significant protection against external assaults with airplanes or other types of weapons. Moreover, commercial power plants are substantially more robust than other critical infrastructure such as chemical plants, refineries, and fossil-fuel-fired electrical generating stations.
10 |
This is known as the “design basis threat” for radiological sabotage of nuclear power plants. See Chapter 2. |
11 |
Spent fuel storage facilities in Germany are designed to survive the impact of a Phantom military jet without a significant release of radiation. Since September 11, 2001, the Germans have also examined the impact of a range of aircraft, including large civilian airliners, on these facilities, A discussion is provided in Appendix C. |
12 |
No nuclear power plant ordered after the mid-1970s has been built in the United States, so the designs were developed long before domestic terrorism of the kind seen on September 11, 2001, became a concern. |