The consequence analyses should address the following questions:

  • To what extent would such attacks damage the spent fuel in the pool, and what would be the thermal consequences of such damage?

  • Is it feasible to reconfigure the spent fuel within pools to prevent zirconium cladding fires given the actual characteristics (i.e., heat generation) of spent fuel assemblies in the pool, even if the fuel were damaged in an attack? Is there enough space in the pools at all commercial reactor sites to implement such fuel reconfiguration?

  • In the event of a localized zirconium cladding fire, will such rearrangement prevent its spread to the rest of the pool?

  • How much spray cooling is needed to prevent zirconium cladding fires and prevent propagation of such fires? Which of the different options for providing spray cooling are effective under attack and accident conditions?

Sensitivity analyses should also be undertaken to account for the full range of variation in spent fuel pool designs (e.g., rack designs, capacities, spent fuel burn-ups, and ages) at U.S. commercial nuclear power plants.


RECOMMENDATION: While the work described in the previous recommendation under Finding 3E, above, is being carried out, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission should ensure that power plant operators take prompt and effective measures to reduce the consequences of loss-of-pool-coolant events in spent fuel pools that could result in propagating zirconium cladding fires. The committee judges that there are at least two such measures that should be implemented promptly:

  • Reconfiguring of fuel in the pools so that high decay-heat fuel assemblies are surrounded by low decay-heat assemblies. This will more evenly distribute decay-heat loads, thus enhancing radiative heat transfer in the event of a loss of pool coolant.

  • Provision for water-spray systems that would be able to cool the fuel even if the pool or overlying building were severely damaged.

Reconfiguring of fuel in the pool would be a prudent measure that could probably be implemented at all plants at little cost, time, or exposure of workers to radiation. The second measure would probably be more expensive to implement and may not be needed at all plants, particularly plants in which spent fuel pools are located below grade or are protected from external line-of-sight attacks by exterior walls and other structures.

The committee anticipates that the costs and benefits of options for implementing the second measure would be examined to help decide what requirements would be imposed. Further, the committee does not presume to anticipate the best design of such a system—whether it should be installed on the walls of a pool or deployed from a location where it is unlikely to be compromised by the same attack—but simply notes the demanding requirements such a system must meet.



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