Below are the first 10 and last 10 pages of uncorrected machine-read text (when available) of this chapter, followed by the top 30 algorithmically extracted key phrases from the chapter as a whole.
Intended to provide our own search engines and external engines with highly rich, chapter-representative searchable text on the opening pages of each chapter. Because it is UNCORRECTED material, please consider the following text as a useful but insufficient proxy for the authoritative book pages.
Do not use for reproduction, copying, pasting, or reading; exclusively for search engines.
OCR for page 62
Navy’s Needs in Space for Providing Future Capabilities 3 Roles and Responsibilities: Meeting Naval Space Needs Space-based support for many of the Navy’s current and future operations has much in common with the support needed by other military Services. For example, targeting information derived from space assets needs to be passed to naval strike units as accurately and promptly as it is delivered to other strike forces. Similarly, jam-resistant Global Positioning System (GPS) signals are needed equally by Navy, Air Force, Army, and Marine Corps precision weapons. As a result of the long and continuing history of the Navy, its operational and technical communities embody considerable expertise both on naval needs for support from space and on the underlying scientific and technical approaches that are needed for the support to be successful. But despite the many broad areas of commonality, naval forces continue to have unique requirements. As discussed in Chapter 2, these requirements are generally driven by the mobility of naval forces across broad ocean areas, by their need for accurate marine environmental data, by the nature of littoral military operations, and by the limited antenna configurations suitable for shipboard use.1 Initially the Navy attempted to meet many of its unique requirements for space support with Navy-funded space programs. For instance, Transit—the first satellite-based navigation system—was developed and fielded by the Navy (in conjunction with Johns Hopkins University’s Applied Physics Laboratory) to meet the Polaris missile system’s needs for highly accurate positional information.2 The Naval Research Laboratory (NRL) represents a particular focal point 1 For further elaboration, see the section entitled “Strategic Environment” in Chapter 2. 2 See Appendix A for further detail on the Navy’s history in space.
OCR for page 63
Navy’s Needs in Space for Providing Future Capabilities for many of the early basic and applied technologies that proved important to naval operations. In recent years, the management of most of the space programs that provide common support to military users has been transferred to the Air Force. Included are such programs as the Navigation Satellite Timing and Ranging (NAVSTAR)/ GPS precision navigation system; the Military Strategic, Tactical, and Relay Satellite (MILSTAR) system—the Department of Defense’s (DOD’s) current secure communications satellite program; and the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP). The Navy continues to fund and manage the succeeding generations of legacy ultrahigh-frequency (UHF) communications satellite programs that support not only fleet operations, but many of the needs of other military forces for tactical communications.3 Outside the DOD, the Navy has been a partner with the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) in most of the environmental satellite programs that are important to naval operations, and it has acted aggressively to field experimental meteorology and oceanography (METOC) platforms to test new sensing concepts. Naval officers have always held leadership positions in the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) wide-area passive electronic intelligence (ELINT) programs focused on tracking Soviet and other ships at sea. Recently, Navy participation in NRO programs has been expanded to include all NRO mission and support areas. The Navy continues to maintain some expertise in space through the ongoing work at NRL; formal naval involvement in NRO, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), NOAA, and National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) programs; less formal participation in some Air Force programs; and the development and acquisition of the only major space system that remains the Navy’s responsibility—UHF communications satellites. Thus, the Navy has established an ad hoc relationship with all relevant partners in all needed space mission areas. Not only is the Navy’s response tailored across the space mission areas, but it is also tailored across the five elements for effective participation in any program: (1) requirements, (2) acquisition, (3) science and technology (S&T), (4) experimentation, and (5) personnel. Table 3.1 lists the Navy’s partner agencies for each of the space mission areas mapped against the five interaction elements. To better coordinate the current ad hoc nature of Navy participation across the space mission areas, the Navy first needs to focus its awareness on these five participating elements. Only then can effective partnering plans that are specific to the space mission area be established. The following section addresses how the Navy can participate across the entire spectrum of space mission areas, and Chapter 4 provides specific guidance tailored to each of these areas. 3 These programs include the Fleet Satellite (FLTSAT) Communications System, UHF Follow-on (UFO), and the Mobile User Objective System (MUOS).
OCR for page 64
Navy’s Needs in Space for Providing Future Capabilities TABLE 3.1 Navy Partners for the Space Mission Areas and Interaction Elements Interaction Elements Space Mission Areas ISR METOC TBMD Communications PNT Space Control Requirements NRO, Air Force, JCIDS NOAA MDA, JCIDS ASD(NII), JCIDS Air Force GPS-JPO, JCIDS All Services, JCIDS Acquisition NRO, Air Force NOAA MDA, NRO Air Force Air Force GPS-JPO All Services Science and Technology NRO, DARPA NOAA, NASA MDA, Air Force Air Force Air Force GPS-JPO, Navy DARPA Experimentation NRO NOAA, NASA MDA Air Force Air Force GPS-JPO DARPA Personnel Executive Agent for Space, NRO NOAA Executive Agent for Space, MDA Executive Agent for Space, NRO Executive Agent for Space, Air Force Executive Agent for Space, all Services NOTE: A list of acronyms is provided in Appendix G. THE DOD EXECUTIVE AGENT FOR SPACE AND NEW MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE As discussed above, until recently, the role of each of the military Services in support of space programs has been decided case by case, rather than in consonance with all the Services. In response to this situation, in 2001 the Report of the Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization recommended that all DOD space activities be assigned to the Secretary of the Air Force as DOD Executive Agent for Space.4 The intention of this reorganization was to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the U.S. military space programs. The recommendation was initially approved by the Secretary of Defense in a memorandum of October 2001,5 and was formally 4 Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization. 2001. Report of the Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization, Washington, D.C., January 11. 5 Secretary of Defense Memorandum. 2001. “National Security Space Management and Organization,” Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense, Washington, D.C., October 18.
OCR for page 65
Navy’s Needs in Space for Providing Future Capabilities implemented on June 3, 2003, by issuance of DOD Directive 5101.2.6 In a separate but generally consistent decision, the Secretary of Defense also made a one-time adjustment between Service out-year funding totals to account for the transfer of the Navy’s space surveillance program from the Navy to the Air Force. The decision to assign the Under Secretary of the Air Force as the DOD Executive Agent for Space appears to have posed a major dilemma for the Navy—one that, in the opinion of the committee, has yet to be satisfactorily resolved. Some in the Navy have indicated a desire to rely on the Air Force to fund and provide all of the military support from space that the Navy believes it needs, with only minimal naval management attention and no naval funding beyond continuation of the UHF programs. For the Navy just to act as a “ruthless customer,” however, is not the intent of the DOD directive, which clearly tasks the Navy with continued responsibility for funding and managing a range of space-related activities that are uniquely important to naval warfighting. Nor is it realistic to expect the Air Force, in the absence of strong naval management attention or funding, to assign high priority to the specialized, space-related technical and operational expertise that may be uniquely important to supporting naval warfare. In contrast to the Navy’s apparent response within the DOD to the establishment of the DOD Executive Agent for Space, outside the DOD the Navy explicitly acknowledges its responsibilities to fund unique naval needs in such programs as NOAA’s National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS). However, recent actions such as cancellation of the Naval EarthMap Observer (NEMO) and Geosynchronous Imaging Fourier Transform Spectrometer (GIFTS) programs give the appearance that the Navy is withdrawing support from the development of future satellite systems. The responsibilities of the Secretary of the Navy as delineated in the new directive form a useful framework for assessing naval organizational and funding arrangements for meeting the Navy responsibilities, not only in its interface with the DOD Executive Agent for Space, but also with NRO and NOAA. Prior to issuance of DOD Directive 5101.2, the Secretary of the Navy had delegated all responsibilities related to space to the Under Secretary of the Navy. In the absence of a new, formal delegation of responsibility by the Secretary of the Navy, the committee presumes that this delegation remains in effect and finds it to be appropriate, given the need to closely coordinate Navy and Marine Corps activities regarding space programs. However, the committee does note that since the establishment of the DOD Executive Agent for Space, the position of Under Secretary of the Navy has remained vacant. This vacancy has led to a concern that 6 DOD Directive 5101.2 assigns responsibility as Executive Agent for Space to the Secretary of the Air Force, but goes on to further delegate the responsibility to the Under Secretary of the Air Force. The complete text of DOD Directive 5101.2 is presented in Appendix B of this report.
OCR for page 66
Navy’s Needs in Space for Providing Future Capabilities FIGURE 3.1 Command relationships within the National Command Authority to denote Navy and other Service support to National Security Space missions. NOTE: A list of acronyms is provided in Appendix G. there is currently no naval advocate for establishing and defining the responsibilities of the Navy governed under DOD Directive 5101.2.7 Section 6.3 of DOD Directive 5101.2 defines specific roles and responsibilities for the heads of each of the DOD components, both with respect to their own component’s internal activities and with respect to their interaction with the DOD Executive Agent for Space. The overall relationships of each of the Service Secretaries (including the Secretary of the Navy) envisioned under the new DOD Executive Agent for Space structure may be depicted as in Figure 3.1. Table 3.2 summarizes the 16 responsibilities assigned to the Secretary of the Navy. This list of responsibilities forms a useful framework for assessing the degree to which the Navy appears to be responding to the current DOD guidance in the area of space activities, which in turn provides some insight into the areas where more naval attention may be needed. While the committee did not evaluate in detail the quality of the Navy’s work in each of the 16 areas listed in Table 3.2, the table does include the committee’s 7 One positive step toward coordinating Navy space activities was reported in mid-April 2004; the article indicates that the Navy will create a Program Executive Office for Space: Amy Butler. 2004. “Navy to Establish Space Program Executive Officer,” Defense Daily, April 14, p. 5.
OCR for page 67
Navy’s Needs in Space for Providing Future Capabilities TABLE 3.2 Responsibilities for Navy Support of National Security Space Programs and Committee Perspective on the Navy’s Current Effectiveness in Meeting the Stated Responsibilities Responsibility Current Effectivenessa 6.3 The Secretary of the Navy shall: 6.3.1 Participate in the planning, programming, and acquisition activities of Department of Defense (DOD) Executive Agent for Space. In support of these activities provide to DOD Executive Agent for Space information regarding: 18.104.22.168 Space science and technology priorities, programs, and funding. Red 22.214.171.124 Operational requirements for space and space-related systems. Red 126.96.36.199 Strategies, plans for space systems, force structure, capabilities, measures of performance, and schedules. Red 188.8.131.52 Approved programmatic and budget data for space programs. Green 184.108.40.206 Space acquisition program data. Green 220.127.116.11 Key indicators reflecting the status of, or changes to naval space cadre. Yellow 18.104.22.168 Readiness of space forces when there are implications that may assist DOD Executive Agent for Space in addressing a space system deficiency. Yellow 22.214.171.124 Recommendations on priorities for space support to the naval warfighter. Red 126.96.36.199 Operations concepts for space and space-related systems. Red 6.3.2 Provide space strategies, plans, and program information to DOD Executive Agent for Space for review, coordination, and integration into the National Security Space program and to support DOD-wide planning, programming, and acquisition. Red 6.3.3 Submit space needs and requirements to DOD Executive Agent for Space for integration into space plans and major space program requirements documents as well as associated acquisition programs prior to submitting requirements to the Joint Requirements Oversight Council. Where possible, resolve issues with DOD Executive Agent for Space. Red 6.3.4 Develop Department of the Navy requirements and concepts for: space systems; space doctrine, education, and training requirements and standards; space research, development, testing, evaluation, and acquisition; related military construction; and space-related strategy and operations. Provide such information to DOD Executive Agent for Space. Red
OCR for page 68
Navy’s Needs in Space for Providing Future Capabilities Responsibility Current Effectivenessa 6.3.5 Develop and maintain a sufficient cadre of space-qualified personnel to support the Department of the Navy in space planning, programming, acquisition, and operations. Support DOD Executive Agent for Space with space cadre personnel to represent the Department of the Navy in DOD-wide planning, programming, and acquisition activities. Yellow 6.3.6 Recommend space and space-related planning and programming guidance for Department of the Navy programs to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the Director of Program Analysis and Evaluation for consideration in their formulation of planning and programming guidance documents. Inform the Under Secretary of the Air Force, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration of such submissions. Yellow 6.3.7 Continue to develop, acquire, and fund space research, development, and acquisition programs that meet Department of the Navy requirements and submit such program information to DOD Executive Agent for Space. Red 6.3.8 Advise DOD Executive Agent for Space on Program Objective Memorandums that significantly change any program subject to review during the program assessment for space, before submission to the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Yellow aEffectiveness evaluation: Green—adequately funded and staffed and largely effective; Yellow—marginal situation that warrants more attention; Red—little or no evidence of responsive naval management actions. SOURCE: See Appendix B in this report for the full text of DOD Directive 5101.2, from which this table is derived. subjective evaluation of the relative attentiveness of the Navy’s response to each listed responsibility. The right-hand column summarizes the committee view of how effective the Navy currently is in fulfilling each of these responsibilities: “Green” indicates that an activity is judged to be adequately funded and staffed and largely effective; “Yellow” indicates a marginal situation that warrants more attention; and “Red” signifies that the committee saw little or no evidence of naval management actions that could be construed as responsive, suggesting the need for more management attention or resources or both. In some of the areas of responsibility judged to be in the last (Red) category, ad hoc Navy support has been (or is) provided by the Navy for single programs, without broad and enduring support arrangements having been established. More detailed rationale for the evaluations is contained in the section below on “Navy Space Support.”
OCR for page 69
Navy’s Needs in Space for Providing Future Capabilities Often missing from the ongoing Department of the Navy discussions on space are Marine Corps participation and activities supporting space. Historically, the Marine Corps has relied on the Navy and other Services for the provision of all of its space capabilities, with little direct involvement in space capabilities development. In fact, currently the Marine Corps does not operate any space assets. Operationally, however, the Marine Corps has established itself as a prime user and developer of the concepts of operations, tactics, training, and procedures necessary to utilize space assets and capabilities. The Marine Corps recently expanded its space-related activities in an effort to become more involved with the development of space systems. These activities include the establishment of a Marine Corps space cadre, a Marine Corps space working group to foster dialogue across the Marine Corps on space issues, and a Marine Forces component command attached to the U.S. Strategic Command. Members of the Marine Corps space cadre are being assigned to these new organizations and are also being assigned throughout the NSS structure. This new level of space-related activity appears to be resulting in the Marine Corps’s becoming recognized as a stakeholder in space matters; it is also perceived that the Marine Corps is moving toward integrating space systems development into the development of its operational capabilities. NAVY SPACE SUPPORT The Navy’s needs in space can be satisfied by focusing on the support elements: requirements, acquisition, science and technology, experimentation, and personnel. Inspection of Table 3.2 shows that these elements also summarize the responsibilities cited by DOD Directive 5101.2. Hence the discussion below expands on these elements. Requirements Generation and Concepts of Development The committee finds that the Navy currently lacks a rigorous operational analysis process for identifying the detailed and cost-effective requirements and priorities for space support needed to accomplish the goals of Sea Power 21. Coordination was found to be either deficient or nonexistent among the various naval offices with responsibilities for developing operational concepts that include support from space. As a result, there is no strategic plan for the Navy’s role in space, and there are no clearly articulated needs for naval support from space programs that can guide the allocation of resources by naval leadership. Particularly troublesome is the lack of thorough operational analysis of the likely need for greatly increased communications throughput to and from naval forces at sea. A rigorous analytic process, including appropriate modeling and simulation, would permit the identification and evaluation of an appropriate range of space-based and non-space-based methods of providing support. The resulting
OCR for page 70
Navy’s Needs in Space for Providing Future Capabilities cost-benefit assessments would serve the Navy well in making hard choices as to the allocation of resources. Such assessments start with potential alternate concepts of operations. These concepts of operations are postulated by the operating force commanders for the assessment of near-term needs, and by an appropriate group charged with the responsibility of formulating potential long-term, future joint operational concepts in full consideration of the technology that could become available. The committee recognizes that as the concepts of operations are refined, the resulting naval space-based needs must be coordinated with the overall requirements-generation processes, which for space-related issues must now be coordinated with the U.S. Strategic Command. Currently, operational inputs for the Department of the Navy’s space-related requirements are collected and prioritized by the Naval Network Warfare Command (NETWARCOM), with support from the Naval Network and Space Operations Command. NETWARCOM then passes these priorities to the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, via the Commander, Fleet Forces Command, for further prioritization and development. Space-related requirements of the Marine Corps are developed through the Information Operations and Space Integration Branch of the Strategy and Plans Division of Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, in coordination with NETWARCOM and the Marine Corps Strategic Command. The collected naval requirements are then supported through the joint requirements process (i.e., the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System, or JCIDS.8 The committee noted very little evidence of coordination or consultation among these offices on concepts of operations, requirements generation, or needs prioritization involving space support. In addition, most of the commands and processes referred to above have recently been reorganized, thus creating additional confusion. One particular concern is the lack of a concept of operations and supporting analysis that could help establish reasonable goals for the communications bandwidth requirements to and from Navy ships. Careful analysis of potential bandwidth needs is particularly important as the DOD Transformational Communications Architecture (TCA) and Global Information Grid (GIG) are planned and developed. It appears that without a major change in this area, future naval ships are likely to deploy with a communications capacity that could be as much as two orders of magnitude below what will likely be needed for full participation in network-centric operations.9 The result could precipitate repetitions of the situation in Operation Desert Storm when the Navy’s participation was constrained by 8 The JCIDS process is based on top-level strategic direction, provided by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), to guide development of new capabilities. Capability recommendations and requirements are developed by the Services and evaluated by the JROC in consideration of how to optimize joint force capabilities and maximize interoperability. All major new programs are expected to participate in the JCIDS process. 9 See the section entitled “Space-Based Communications” in Chapter 4 for further details.
OCR for page 71
Navy’s Needs in Space for Providing Future Capabilities the inability of the battle groups to receive complex air tasking orders electronically. Long lead times are involved in this area because of the need for appropriate antenna configurations to be included early in the design of new ships and combat aircraft; hence the importance of early and comprehensive needs analysis. Unfortunately, the committee saw little evidence of a broad systematic approach to concepts development and requirements generation based on thorough cost-benefit analysis that can support naval forces in general or establish the appropriate role for space support in particular.10 Recommendation 3.1. The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) should task the appropriate organizations—including the Commander, Fleet Forces Command; the Deputy CNO for Warfare Requirements and Programs; and the Deputy CNO for Resources, Requirements, and Assessments—to strengthen the Navy’s requirements process for identifying space capability needs. Specifically, the Navy should increase its support of operations research, systems analysis, and systems engineering (both internally and externally performed), since the Navy appears to lack sufficient resources in these areas. Operational analysis is central to the process of integrating needs across Sea Power 21 capability areas and National Security Space mission areas. The results of this analysis should be articulated for purposes of prioritization to the appropriate organizations—those with responsibility for requirements, acquisition, science and technology, and experimentation. In this process, these organizations should use common simulation, modeling, and analysis tools that are also compatible with the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System. Acquisition Although Navy participation in NRO acquisition programs has been appropriate and effective, the Navy has fallen short in meeting its responsibility to participate in important DOD space acquisition programs, including Space Based Radar (SBR) and TCA. It is of particular concern that many of the DOD space programs on which naval forces will depend in the future are critical to the effectiveness of such forces, and these programs are so technically complex—with myriad potential internal cost and performance trade-offs—that a hands-off approach which defers excessively to the judgment of the DOD Executive Agent for Space risks the fielding of systems that will be inadequately responsive to the Navy’s needs. Furthermore, there is concern that, without direct naval participation in the early development activities important to future space support, the 10 For additional information on operations research and analysis, see the Military Operations Research Society Web site at <http://www.mors.org>. Accessed May 12, 2004.
OCR for page 72
Navy’s Needs in Space for Providing Future Capabilities Navy will be poorly equipped to meet the specific responsibilities relating to acquisition management outlined under the new DOD Executive Agent for Space structure. A hands-off approach would rely on expectations that the performance of future major DOD space programs will meet the Navy’s needs even though the Navy only provides early capabilities requirements. Such expectations are fraught with problems. When faced with otherwise-unaffordable cost growth, managers of large, complex acquisition programs are typically empowered to trade away performance features that they deem to be less important in favor of those that they deem more important. Unless the Navy remains an active participant during the cost management stage of such programs, important naval needs may well go unmet. For example, in the SBR program—a major new effort being established under the DOD Executive Agent for Space charter—the committee’s perception is that important maritime needs have to date been neglected or not properly prioritized.11 This lack of attention to naval space needs derives, in part, from the lack of up-front cost-benefit analysis of the utility of the SBR concept to Navy needs, the lack of naval funding contributions, the lack of a robust naval presence in the SBR program office, and the related lack of management attention by senior naval leadership. As a result, the Navy appears to be struggling to keep up, resorting to last-minute nonconcurrence in decisions of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) when programs do not properly reflect naval requirements. Similar concerns exist with respect to the Navy’s participation in the TCA program. In part, such lack of interaction may be the result of an apparent failure of Navy operations analysis to show that incremental funds going to space-related needs are worthwhile in competition with other expenditures. In contrast, the Navy has a strong record of active, effective partnership in the concept development, requirements generation, experimentation, acquisition, and operation of space systems under the purview of the NRO. The Navy provides the leadership of some of these programs, as well as supplying appropriate numbers of highly qualified professional staff to other NRO program and support areas. The Navy also has a strong record of partnership with NOAA, including a Navy-staffed office at NOAA. While the Navy is not directly supporting many future and developing programs, it has consistently supported initiatives (through the Navy’s Technical Exploitation of National Capabilities Program (Navy-TENCAP)) aimed at fulfilling Navy needs through the exploitation of existing (on-orbit) space assets. TENCAP programs exist for all four Services and, by congressional mandate, 11 One such issue that ground moving target indication (GMTI) must contend with is a Doppler-induced background clutter that has significantly different character for land use and marine use; hence, the optimization of SBR for land use may negatively impact its marine use.
OCR for page 73
Navy’s Needs in Space for Providing Future Capabilities must limit their activities to the exploitation of existing National Security Space (NSS) systems. Even within this mandate, however, the Navy-TENCAP efforts have made real gains in system performance and have been able to achieve new naval capabilities. Given the strength and demonstrated utility of the Navy-TENCAP effort, the committee notes that the Navy has not sought to create TENCAP-like efforts aimed at experimentation and exploitation of space systems that are still under development (such as the Future Imagery Architecture (FIA)). Such an up-front analytic capability could serve the Navy well in understanding the utility and limitations of developing space systems. It appears that the Navy is reluctant at present to adequately fund either internal naval space activities, such as a Navy space science and technology base, or elements of DOD space programs that are not directly managed by the Navy but that could be important to naval operations. Current responsibilities consistent with the DOD Executive Agent for Space structure require the Navy to program and budget not only for those space programs for which the Navy has been assigned the lead (for example, the MUOS program), but also for the marginal costs of other DOD space programs that meet unique naval needs. Examples of such potential, unique naval needs include broad ocean surveillance capabilities for SBR and specialized seagoing requirements for TCA. In addition, to the extent that space programs include a need for adequate terrestrial and shipboard communications terminals and antennae, these needs also warrant adequate resourcing. In general, the earlier that a Navy need can be prioritized and its utility clearly identified, the easier that need becomes to support through the requirements generation and acquisition process. The Navy will be much more successful in assuring that its needs are met if it can contribute the needed up-front involvement and provide incremental funding. In this regard, the committee recognizes that such arrangements require careful management attention in order to avoid the impression that a contributing Service is being taken advantage of. Nevertheless, experience shows that such arrangements can work well when carefully overseen. Recommendation 3.2. The Secretary of the Navy should ensure that the naval forces are adequately staffed and supported to influence National Security Space programs that have the potential to meet important naval space needs. The Navy should engage early, with sufficient technical and management depth to influence the requirements generation, resourcing, and acquisition of new space systems being developed by the Air Force, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Reconnaissance Office, and other (commercial and government) partners. In addition, the Navy’s engagement should include tasking appropriate naval commands to provide inputs for and participate directly in NSS activities (see Chapter 4).
OCR for page 74
Navy’s Needs in Space for Providing Future Capabilities Science and Technology While the Navy has a long history of directly supporting scientific development, experimentation, and testing of important new space capabilities (as detailed in Appendix A), at present it no longer acts like a full-fledged member of the national space S&T community. Navy funding and management of space S&T appear to be inadequate to support the Navy’s needs both for broad expertise in space science and for the particular technical expertise in space-based ISR, communications, and METOC essential to fielding the capabilities required by Sea Power 21. In general, there are two categories of space S&T activity in need of Navy support. The first includes the basic and broad S&T development underlying most space programs. The Navy needs to maintain a vigorous basic research program so that it will continue to ensure its ability to participate in, and benefit from, the full range of space mission areas and activities. This program should support not only the technology per se, but also the analytic skills needed by the naval space cadre to enable it to act effectively in joint program management. Much of this in-house space technology expertise now resides at NRL’s Naval Center for Space Technology (NCST). The second category of space-related S&T in need of Navy support includes specific technologies important to fulfilling this Service’s unique space needs. As noted earlier, such specialized needs include the space-related technologies associated with ocean surveillance, oceanic and littoral environmental conditions, mobile communications, and navigation. One significant endeavor in the Navy’s support for space S&T is the launch of the Coriolis spacecraft with the WindSat sensor onboard. The WindSat sensor, a joint Navy and NOAA project, is likely to contribute significantly to wind vector measurement over the world’s oceans and to enable better ocean wind vector measurements from future NPOESS satellites. Continued Navy support for innovative and well-integrated space experiments such as this is seen as a positive role for future Navy activities. On the negative side, the Office of Naval Research (ONR) did not support WindSat, and in fact ONR recently abolished the Remote Sensing and Space Office within its Ocean, Atmosphere and Space Department. The closing down of ONR’s remote sensing office concerns the committee, as it seems to indicate an intent not to support this research area. Research efforts in the area of remote sensing and space are clearly needed to reinvigorate the Navy’s space S&T activities. The Navy’s base of space technology expertise is substantially housed at NCST.12 NCST has historically received little support from ONR or other naval offices (beyond NCST’s core NRL support); rather, most of NCST’s program support has been provided by non-naval organizations such as the Missile De- 12 See Appendix A for a detailed history of the Navy’s involvement in space.
OCR for page 75
Navy’s Needs in Space for Providing Future Capabilities fense Agency (MDA), NOAA, NRO, and others. This funding has allowed NCST to maintain a critical mass of personnel, facilities, and technical credibility and has resulted in the development of a number of capabilities useful to the Navy (such as WindSat). In addition, NCST recently initiated or proposed several other programs focused on experimentation with direct user tasking, naval-platform-compatible wideband communications, improved radio-frequency (RF) emitter tracking, and hyperspectral imaging capabilities that may have the potential to significantly enhance naval operations. One such project is NCST’s current Tactical Microsatellite (TacSat) effort, aimed at testing concepts of operation for providing tactical field commanders direct satellite control. In particular, the first TacSat will test the ability for an airborne Navy EP-3E aircraft to control an on-orbit RF collector, to receive the RF data in real time, and to synthesize the satellite and EP-3E RF data to demonstrate an improved RF emitter geolocation capability. Future TacSat plans are to build on this test to investigate direct user tasking of electro-optic/infrared (EO/ IR) and other space-based capabilities using a variety of tactical platforms. Thus, NCST’s TacSat effort, which currently receives little Navy funding,13 could prove the utility of a wide range of S&T and operational capabilities that are of current interest to the Navy. The Navy may be well served by increased interaction with NCST and financial support to expand NCST’s development of maritime space mission concepts, on-orbit demonstrations of space-based capabilities that support maritime operations, and transition of technology to industrial or government partners for system production. An overall concern exists that the Navy’s support for space S&T has atrophied in recent years, thereby jeopardizing the Navy’s ability to meet its future responsibilities. Indications of this problem include the lack of ONR program support to NCST referred to above, the lack of Navy support for innovative space mission concepts such as TacSat, the recent cancellation of the NEMO and GIFTS satellites, and the successful launch of Coriolis-WindSat. While Coriolis is a successful program, its launch has reduced the Navy’s current support of satellite systems development. Each of these four satellite programs has been supported at a level of (or was projected to need) $10 million to $20 million annually through satellite construction and launch. While the three Navy-funded satellites (Coriolis, NEMO, and GIFTS) received strong support from the Navy as well as from partner agencies, each system experienced a different fate: Coriolis was launched successfully in 2003; NEMO was cancelled in 2002, apparently following financial troubles with its industrial partner; and GIFTS was cancelled in 2003, apparently following a 13 Current Navy funding for TacSat is limited to support from NRL for initial program development, Navy-TENCAP for the signals payload (an airborne experimental payload space-qualified by NRL), and the Naval Air Systems Command for the needed modifications to four EP-3E aircraft to be used during the TacSat evaluation and testing phase.
OCR for page 76
Navy’s Needs in Space for Providing Future Capabilities funding-related scheduling setback and the loss of its Space Test Program (STP) launch date. As a result of these recent events, the overall Navy METOC space budget has fallen from $22 million in FY03 to a request for $4.2 million in FY05,14 significantly impacting the Navy’s ability to support future Navy METOC needs.15 This lack of support for space-related S&T can be attributed in part to the lack of a clear focal point for space-related program and budget matters on the staff of the Chief of Naval Operations and to a lack of the cost-benefit analysis necessary to prioritize and protect sufficient funding for these programs. The problems with Navy support for science and technology have also been compounded by an artificial distinction within the Navy S&T budgeting process: the distinction made between S&T programs that directly support major planned future Navy acquisition programs (of which there are few for space) and those that do not—with the latter receiving minimal funding. This narrowly construed Future Naval Capabilities (FNC) process has inadvertently helped to divest direct support from naval space technology. This weakening of financial support has also resulted in the diffusion of effort at NCST into activities that are not in the mainstream of the Navy’s responsibilities (for example, currently NCST receives a majority of its financial support from non-Navy sources). The result has, in effect, perversely required Navy space S&T ideas to undergo a more difficult granting process than, for example, that for ship and aircraft S&T. In that area, in contrast to Navy space programs, well-funded ongoing acquisition programs enable transition-related S&T funds and also provide a direct source of technology development funding. This situation may have led, in FY03, to ONR’s supporting $10.7 million in basic research funds (6.1) for the study of space environmental effects and $3.3 million in applied research funds (6.2) for the study of spacecraft technology, but supporting no advanced technology development (6.3) projects in these areas.16 These figures are in contrast to the Navy’s overall 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3 budget of $1.6 billion in FY03.17 Recent METOC program cancellations (NEMO and GIFTS, which had been supported through 6.3 funds) appear to indicate a lack of continuing support for the development of novel spacecraft meeting maritime needs. The committee believes that relatively small additional Navy investments in space S&T (as compared with the Navy’s entire S&T funding) provided directly or through other organizations, such as DARPA, could provide the technology and expertise needed to ensure that future naval operations are effectively supported by new, non-Navy space systems and programs. 14 Funding data derived from recent DOD budget appropriations for FY98 through FY04. 15 See the section entitled “Meteorology and Oceanography” in Chapter 4 for further details. 16 RADM Jay Cohen, USN, Chief of Naval Research, presentation to the committee, July 29, 2003. 17 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller). 2002. “RDT&E Programs (R1),” Department of Defense Budget, Fiscal Year 2003, Department of Defense, Washington, D.C., February, p. N-1.
OCR for page 77
Navy’s Needs in Space for Providing Future Capabilities Recommendation 3.3. The Chief of Naval Research (CNR) should maintain a critical level of space mission area funding aimed at supporting current maritime needs as well as at providing broad support to base-level technologies with the potential to support National Security Space programs, such as the Transformational Communications Architecture and Space Based Radar programs. Specifically, the CNR should continue or increase current levels of basic research (6.1) and applied research (6.2) funds in support of space technologies and systems. In addition, the CNR should consistently allocate advanced research and development (6.3) funds to enable regular Navy space sensor development and on-orbit testing. Given recent Navy space sensor program allocations as a benchmark, the committee envisions that a level on the order of $40 million annually of 6.3 support would be sufficient to ensure regular development of new Navy space systems. Specific space mission areas recommended are as follows: Communications. Robust on-orbit capabilities supporting naval communications needs. These range from connecting Global Information Grid-enabled future sea-basing command centers to critical low-latency weapons control connections necessary for effective missile defense; Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; and meteorology and oceanography. Improved on-orbit capabilities, ranging from modified sensors to new capabilities including hyperspectral imaging, to support emerging needs arising from Sea Power 21; and Data fusion. Using space-derived information and systems in scaling and optimizing global information capabilities in support of Sea Power 21 operations. Experimentation The transformation of space systems by the DOD and the intelligence community will continue to offer new opportunities to improve naval capabilities. One ready means for taking advantage of available opportunities is for the Navy to engage in forward-looking experimentation efforts. Typically, experimentation is used not only to test new technologies that may prove useful to the operational forces, but also to provide a forum in which operators can practice with developing systems and thus study how systems could be modified so that they could be leveraged into programs of record. Additionally, experimentation supports the Navy’s overall operational analysis community and often identifies, or highlights, capability gaps in need of further developmental S&T work. A key to the experimentation process, however, is a clear identification, up front, of operational needs. Only then can experimentation efforts be constructed to appropriately address the Navy’s needs. Current Navy experimentation programs, however, do not appear to be derived from articulated operational needs and thus do not appear to effectively support the development of new capabilities. In part this lack appears to have
OCR for page 78
Navy’s Needs in Space for Providing Future Capabilities resulted from the Navy’s not supporting rigorous operations analysis of the missions and capabilities necessary to accomplish the goals for Sea Power 21. The Navy has acknowledged the need to tie operational needs more effectively into experimentation efforts, which has resulted in the establishment of Sea Trial. As discussed in the Sea Trial Campaign Plan, Sea Trial establishes the “process to go from strategy based concepts through experimentation to proposed [mission capability plans] and the [naval capability plan], to changes in doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership, development, personnel, and facilities (DOT-MLPF).”18 While led by the Commander, Fleet Forces Command, the Sea Trial effort is managed by the Navy Warfare Development Command (NWDC), and for issues related to space and network-centric operations it is also guided by the Naval Network Warfare Command.19 The Sea Trial plan, while involving space systems, does not include support to produce and launch new experimental space capabilities; rather, it focuses on the exploitation of existing or planned systems or on the use of airborne surrogates for potential space technologies. Another new driver in terms of the use of experimentation is the ever more rapid advancement of technology. This speed of progress makes it increasingly important to allow warfighters to experiment with new technology and to explore how to use that new technology to accomplish operational missions more effectively or efficiently. To support rapid development and experimentation, the DOD, in 1995, created the Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD) program. The ACTD program has been successful in allowing military operators to experience new technology, and it has also allowed researchers and operators critical feedback on how best to use the technology in real-world operational settings. One such recent ACTD program was Global Hawk, a high-altitude, unmanned surveillance aircraft that is now receiving strong interest from the Navy. The ACTD program, used as a technology supplier for experimentation, thus also allows technology to advance through a spiral development process, often involving the use and modification of commercial-off-the-shelf components, toward the adoption of new technology into the Services. Past Navy efforts in space experimentation are well documented, going back to the 1950s when Navy efforts achieved significant breakthroughs in satellite development (Vanguard), characterization of ocean features (the Geodetic Satellite—Geosat), navigation (Transit and Timation), and ocean surveillance.20 Much of this experimentation, supported through NRL as well as other organizations, 18 Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command. 2003. Sea Trial: Concept Development and Experimentation Campaign Plan (U), Norfolk, Va., June 30, p. 11 (an unclassified excerpt from a classified document). 19 The Naval Network and Space Operations Command provides operational input to NETWARCOM on space-related experimentation issues. 20 See the more detailed history of the Navy’s development of space provided in Appendix A.
OCR for page 79
Navy’s Needs in Space for Providing Future Capabilities was not necessarily focused on unique naval space needs and has had application to many military and civilian elements. For example, the Navy’s historical capabilities in space-based navigation and timing are still recognized today in the maintenance of the DOD timing standards. In addition, NRL performs the on-orbit clock analysis for all of the GPS satellites, houses the GPS Joint Test Agency working group leading time and frequency characterization for all GPS receivers, supports new GPS clock development, and (in concert with the Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command (SPAWAR)) had the lead role in developing the only military-approved satellite GPS receiver. The Navy has a strong history in space experimentation involving ocean surveillance from space, both in open-ocean and littoral regions (choke points) to monitor movements of all types of ships, and it has led the way in the application of national assets in the detection of high-performance aircraft that could threaten deployed naval forces. These efforts have also extended into the development of METOC satellites, including WindSat, which monitors sea-surface wind speed and direction, and Geosat, which provides precise measurements on sea-surface height. In recent years the Navy’s experimentation programs involving space have been largely opportunistic, taking advantage of available new technologies to make incremental improvements in fleet performance. These programs have focused heavily on antenna technologies for mobile platforms. Navy-TENCAP is a commendable example of experimentation with fielded NSS programs (ISR in particular), enabling those systems to provide critical intelligence to the tactical users. Today, a benchmark for tactical exploitation is the Navy’s use of the national ELINT systems. Unfortunately, current Navy space system experimentation is weak and does not appear to have come from a strategic and tactical planning process that identified and prioritized new capabilities necessary to meet the goals of Sea Power 21 successfully. As a result, there appears to have been limited success in transitioning successful space experimentation results into programs of record. Recommendation 3.4. As part of the Sea Trial experimentation process, the Commander, Fleet Forces Command, should formalize the roles between the Naval Network Warfare Command and the Navy Warfare Development Command pertaining to maritime and joint forces experimentation in space and space-related areas so as to fully exploit and complement the Joint Forces Command experimentation process and to explore the best uses of future space-based intelligence capabilities. In particular, NETWARCOM and NWDC should carry out the following: Coordinate with the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Warfare Requirements and Programs in order to generate experimentation initiatives aimed at addressing space capabilities requirements;
OCR for page 80
Navy’s Needs in Space for Providing Future Capabilities Perform analysis, modeling, and simulation in a simulation-based acquisition approach on potential new space capabilities before proceeding to testbeds and field experiments; and Conduct experimentation aimed at supporting new or improved sensors and subsystems that can piggyback on available NSS satellites. Personnel/Space Cadre An expanded naval space cadre is the key to ensuring that naval equities and needs can be articulated, addressed, and satisfied under the new National Security Space/DOD Executive Agent for Space structure. To this end, the Department of the Navy will need to develop and maintain a sufficient cadre of space-qualified personnel to support its component of national space planning, programming, acquisition, and operations. Navy efforts in the identification and management of the Navy space cadre started well before the formal establishment of the DOD Executive Agent for Space, and significant initial progress has been made. Although the Navy space cadre will represent only a small percentage of the total number of DOD space personnel (who are primarily Air Force personnel), experienced and motivated naval personnel, aggressive management, and targeted assignments across all space mission areas can provide considerable leverage in the effort to satisfy Navy needs in space. The recently adopted procedure of highlighting the need for space expertise to selection boards should be formalized and continued, to ensure that these uniquely experienced personnel are promoted and retained. The scope of involvement envisioned for the space cadre, combined with the potential impacts on naval systems and operational concepts, argues strongly for a significant expansion of space-coded billets and qualified personnel. The Navy’s current strategy for the naval space cadre envisions (1) a diverse blend of officers, civilian, and enlisted personnel rather than a separate community; and (2) appropriately coded billets in all space-related functional areas. In the Navy, there are approximately 250 space-coded officer billets, with approximately 700 officers identified as possessing the basic subspecialty designation. Little progress has been made in identifying either space-related billets or personnel for the enlisted and civilian components of the cadre. In addition, by the end of FY03, only approximately 20 percent of the space-coded billets had been filled by members of the Navy space cadre.21 It is anticipated that in time, as the space cadre is strengthened, this percentage will increase. A credible and sustainable space cadre starts with advanced education. The Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), through its space systems curriculum, is a recognized center of excellence for providing graduate-level education to officers 21 RADM Rand Fisher, USN, Commander, SPAWAR Space Field Activity, and Director, Naval Space Technology Programs, discussions with the committee, October 29, 2003.
OCR for page 81
Navy’s Needs in Space for Providing Future Capabilities of all of the military Services, as well as to selected DOD civilians. Relative to the trends of the previous decades, a disturbing decrease was noted in the recent Navy quotas and assignments to the space systems curricula. Given the opportunities, challenges and responsibilities represented by the new DOD Executive Agent for Space structure, this adverse trend concerns the committee. In contrast, it was noted that the entry of Marine Corps officers into the NPS program as well as Corps contributions in the design and content of the NPS curricula are increasing. These developments represent the Marine Corps establishment of a space cadre and its growing efforts to influence NSS programs that can meet Marine Corps needs. The process of implementing the new directive establishing the DOD Executive Agent for Space structure has identified both opportunities and issues relative to the future direction of the NPS space curricula. Closer interaction and coordination with the Air Force Institute of Technology is anticipated in such areas as curricula scope and duration. Naval leadership must remain fully engaged in the DOD Executive Agent for Space-led curricular oversight process to ensure that NPS curricula content and quality remain fully responsive to naval educational skill requirements. Recommendation 3.5. The Chief of Naval Operations should strengthen and expand the Navy space cadre as follows: Continue formalizing the leadership of the Navy space cadre under the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Warfare Requirements and Programs; Provide additional (new) billets to support National Security Space (NSS) research, development, and acquisition efforts; Ensure opportunities for positions of responsibility in all NSS activities and space mission areas; Review the function of fleet and operational staff billets and assign space codes to billets as appropriate; and Reexamine the Navy’s support of and quotas for the Naval Postgraduate School space systems programs in light of expanded naval involvement in NSS activities.
Representative terms from entire chapter: