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An International Perspective on Advancing Technologies and Strategies for Managing Dual-Use Risks: Report of a Workshop (2005)
Board on Global Health (BGH)
Development, Security, and Cooperation (DSC)

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. "3 Drivers of International Biotechnology Development." An International Perspective on Advancing Technologies and Strategies for Managing Dual-Use Risks: Report of a Workshop. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, 2005.

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An International Perspective on Advancing Technologies and Strategies for Managing Dual-Use Risks: Report of a Workshop
  • There is no proof that race-targeting bacterial bioweapons were actually produced, but significant sums of money were spent on the effort and the intent existed.

  • Acquisition of a peptide synthesizer was ostensibly for the purposes of AIDS research, but court testimony indicated that the synthesizer was in fact being used for research on behavior-changing peptides absorbed through the nasal mucus membranes (e.g., they could make a person either more aggressive or more passive). Again, although it’s not clear whether this approach was ever tested or used on humans, the malicious intent existed.

Although South Africa has dismantled Project Coast and its other weapons programs, and post-apartheid legislative initiatives address the need to regulate dual-use technologies with WMD potential, it is interesting to note that the Non-Proliferation Council does not fall under the Ministry of Defense, presumably because of the realization that such technologies have commercial use.

It is also interesting to note and of concern that apartheid bioweapons expertise still exists and may be “at large,” that is for sale to the highest bidder. As recommended by the international community, the South African government has attempted to keep many of these experts employed under its watch rather than have them take their expertise elsewhere.

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